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Fault diagnosis and fault tolerant control have become criti-
cally important in modern complex systems such as aircrafts
and petrochemical plants. Since no system in the real world
can work perfectly at all time under all conditions, it is crucial
to be able to detect and identify the possible faults in the sys-
tem as early as possible so that measures can be taken to pre-
vent significant performance degradation or damages to the
system. Fault diagnosis is not relevant only for safety critical
systems, but also for a significant number of systems, where
availability is a major issue.
In the past twenty some years, fault diagnosis of dynamic
systems has received much attention and significant progress
has been made in searching for model-based diagnosis tech-
niques. Many techniques have been developed for fault detec-
tion and fault tolerant control. However, the issue of robust-
ness of fault detection and fault tolerant control has not been
sufficiently addressed. Since disturbances, noise, and model
uncertainties are unavoidable for any practical system, it is
essential in the design of any fault diagnosis/fault tolerant
control system to take these effects into consideration, so that
fault diagnosis/tolerant control can be done reliably and ro-
bustly. The objective of this special issue is to report some
most recent developments and contributions in this direc-
tion.
The special issue is initiated by a paper by P. Zhang and
S. Ding, which gives a review of standard fault detection for-
mulations, focusing on robustness issues for model-based di-
agnosis systems.
N. Liu and K. Zhou then study a number of robust fault
detection problems, such as H /H , H2/H , and H /H prob-
lems, and it is shown that these problems share the same op-
timal filters. The optimal filters are designed by solving an
algebraic Riccati equation.
The robust fault detection and isolation problem is stud-
ied in the paper by E. Mazars et al., where an H criterion is
used, giving rise to a quadratic matrix inequality problem. A
jet engine example is provided.
D. Campos-Delgado et al. suggest an active fault-tolerant
control, and a design strategy is provided, which takes model
uncertainty into account. The methods are illustrated for a
DC motor example.
Systems that can be described by linear parameter vary-
ing models are considered by S. Grenaille et al. where robust-
ness constraints are included in the design of fault detection
and isolation filters. An illustration of the methods is given
in terms of an application to a nuclear power plant.
A method for design of a diagnosis and a fault tolerant
control system using an integrated approach is presented in
the paper by S. Yang and J. Chen. The design is illustrated for
a double inverted pendulum system.
M. Benini et al. present both a linear and a nonlinear fault
detection and isolation scheme. This paper focuses on robust
fault diagnosis for an aircraft model, and has extensive simu-
lations.
The fault tolerant scheme proposed by R. Dionisio and
J. Lemos is capable of stabilizing systems with intermittent
sensor faults. The approach is based on reconstructing the
feedback signal, using a switching strategy where a model is
used in the intermittent periods.
A design method for actuator fault diagnosis is proposed
in the paper by Q. Zhang, where the focus is to obtain robust-
ness with respect to nonlinear sensor distortion. A numerical
example is given.
The problem of designing fault tolerant control systems
for networked systems with actuator faults is treated in the
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paper by Li et al. The proposed design method is demon-
strated by a numerical example.
The notion of a reliability index is introduced by H. Li
et al., for monitoring fault tolerant control systems. The re-
liability is evaluated based on semi-Markov models, and the
approach is applied to an aircraft model.
The final paper of the special issue by N. Wu et al. ad-
dresses fault tolerant control of a distributed database system.
The fault tolerant design relies on data redundancy in the
partitioned system architecture. Robustness is represented by
the introduction of additional states modeling delays and de-
cision errors. The design is based on solving Markovian de-
cision problems.
Jakob Stoustrup
Kemin Zhou
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This paper gives a review of some standard fault-detection (FD) problem formulations in discrete linear time-invariant systems
and the available solutions. Based on it, recent development of FD in periodic systems and sampled-data systems is reviewed and
presented. The focus in this paper is on the robustness and sensitivity issues in designing model-based FD systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing requirements of modern complex con-
trol systems on safety and reliability, model-based fault de-
tection and isolation (FDI) technology has attracted remark-
able attention during the last three decades [1–6]. In major
industrial sectors, it has become an important supporting
technology and is replacing the traditional hardware redun-
dancy technique in part or totally. As a standard functional
module, FDI systems are increasingly integrated in mod-
ern technical systems and provide valuable information for
condition-based predictive maintenance, higher-level fault
tolerant control, and plant-wide production optimization.
Though closely related to the development of control
and filtering theory, there are several distinct features of the
model-based FDI problems that justify the efforts made in
this field. To evaluate the performance of an FDI system in
practice, miss alarm rate, false alarm rate, and detection de-
lay are the most important criteria that decide the accep-
tance of the methods. It is widely accepted that these func-
tional requirements can be reformulated as a multi-objective
problem. Enhancing the robustness of the FDI system to un-
known disturbances and modeling errors is an essential ob-
jective. However, alone the robustness does not guarantee a
good FDI performance. The sensitivity of the FDI system to
faults should be simultaneously improved. To find the best
compromise between the robustness and the sensitivity is
thus the central problem in model-based FDI. This is the first
difference of FDI problems from control and standard filter-
ing problems, where the focus is put on disturbance atten-
uation. Bearing this in mind, full-decoupling problem and
optimal design of FDI systems have been studied [3–6] and
different types of indices have been introduced to describe
the sensitivity to the faults. Secondly, for the purpose of FDI,
a fault indicating signal, called residual, needs not only to be
generated, but also to be evaluated and, based on it, a deci-
sion for the existence, location, and size of the faults needs
to be made. Therefore, an FDI procedure includes residual
generation and residual evaluation. An integrated design of
these two parts is needed to guarantee the optimal FDI per-
formance [7].
In this paper, we will first give a review of some stan-
dard fault detection (FD) problem formulations in discrete-
time systems and the available solutions. There are two types
of discrete-time model-based FD systems: the parity space
and the observer-based ones. The former is, in its original
form, specially dedicated to the discrete-time systems [8],
while the latter is analogous to the continuous-time sys-
tems and its development shares the same essentials with the
continuous-time systems. Perhaps for this reason, besides the
early research activity on the parity space approaches, only
few studies have been specifically devoted to the FD prob-
lems in discrete-time systems. Recently, the intensive research
on networked control systems (NCS) and embedded systems
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considerably stimulates the study on periodic, sampled-data
systems [9]. The integration of data communication net-
works into control systems introduces natural periodic be-
havior in the system dynamics and the sampling effect is un-
derstood not only in view of the behavior of A/D and D/A
converters but also in the context of data transmission among
the subsystems. It can be observed that the recent studies on
FD in periodic and sampled-data systems are mainly based
on the discrete-time model-based FD methods. It is this fact
that motivates us to give an overview of some standard FD
methods for discrete-time systems and, based on it, to re-
view and present some recent results on FD in periodic and
sampled-data systems. Bearing in mind that fault isolation
problems can be principally reformulated as a robust fault
detection problem [4, 5], our focus in this paper is on the
robustness issues in designing model-based FD systems.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
FD methods for discrete-time systems and address some im-
portant relations between different methods. Section 3 is de-
voted to FD in discrete-time periodic systems. In Section 4,
FD in sampled-data systems is addressed.
Throughout this paper, standard notations of robust con-
trol theory, for instance those used in [10], are adopted. We
will use σ(X), σ(X) to denote the minimum and maximum
singular values of matrix X , respectively and σi(X) to de-
note any singular value of X that satisfies σ(X) ≤ σi(X) ≤
σ(X). ‖x‖E denotes the Euclidean norm of vector x, ‖ξ‖2
the l2-norm of discrete-time signal ξ or the L2-norm of
continuous-time signal ξ, ‖ξ‖2,[a,b) the 2 norm of ξ over the
interval [a, b), and ‖G‖∞ the H∞-norm of transfer function
matrix G. The superscript T denotes the transpose of matri-
ces and the superscript ∗ denotes the adjoint of operators.
RH∞ stands for the subspace that consists of all proper and
real rational stable transfer function matrices. In this paper,
we call a state-space model (A,B,C,D) regular, if it is de-
tectable and has no invariant zeros on the unit circle and no
unobservable modes at the origin.
2. FD OF DISCRETE LTI SYSTEMS
Linear time-invariant (LTI) systems are the simplest class of
systems. Although the handling of FD problems in discrete
LTI systems can often be done along the well-established
framework of FD schemes for continuos LTI systems, study
on FD in discrete LTI systems is of primary importance from
the following three aspects:
(i) it gives insight and often motivates extensions to more
complex systems like periodic and sampled-data sys-
tems addressed in the subsequent sections;
(ii) there are some methods that have been developed spe-
cially for discrete LTI systems;
(iii) due to its practical form for the direct online imple-
mentation, the discrete-time system form is often fa-
vored in the applications.
In this section, basic ideas and solution procedures of ad-
vanced FD methods for discrete LTI systems, divided into
three groups, will be reviewed:
(i) parity space approaches, which are specific for discrete
LTI systems and will be dealt to some details;
(ii) the parametrization of observer-based FD systems and
postfilter design schemes;
(iii) fault detection filter schemes, which are mostly studied
and closely related to robust control theory.
Thanks to the well-known relationships between the tech-
nical features of the discrete- and continuous-time systems,
many well-established FD schemes for continuous LTI sys-
tems can be directly applied to the latter two FD schemes. For
this reason, we will restrict ourselves to some representative
methods and give a brief view of the analog application of
the methods for continuous-time systems to the discrete FD
systems. Another focus in this section is on the comparison
and interpretation of the FD methods.
2.1. System models and problem formulation
Suppose that the discrete LTI systems are described by
ΣLTI :
⎧
⎨
⎩
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + Edd(k) + Ef f (k),
y(k) = Cx(k) +Du(k) + Fdd(k) + F f f (k),
(1)
where x ∈ Rn is the state vector, u ∈ Rp the vector of con-
trol inputs, y ∈ Rm the vector of process outputs, d ∈ Rnd
the vector of unknown disturbances, and f ∈ Rn f the vec-
tor of faults to be detected, A,B,Ed,Ef ,C,D,Fd, and F f are
known constant matrices of appropriate dimensions. In the
frequency domain, system ΣLTI can be equivalently described
by
y(z) = Gu(z)u(z) +Gd(z)d(z) +Gf (z) f (z), (2)
where Gu(z),Gd(z), and Gf (z) denote, respectively, the
transfer function matrices from u,d, and f to y.
Although the design of a model-based FD systems mainly
consists of three tasks: (a) residual generation, (b) residual
evaluation, (c) threshold determination, major research at-
tention has been focused on the residual generation with the
following issues.
(i) Full decoupling problem, which deals with the design of
a residual generator, so that the residual signal r satis-
fies
∀u,d, lim
k→∞
r(k) = 0 if f = 0,
r(k)	=0 if fi(k)	=0, i = 1, . . . ,n f .
(3)
If a full decoupling is realized, then the residual evalu-
ation reduces to detect the nonzeroness of the residual
signal.
(ii) Optimal FD problem, which is to design the residual
generator so that the residual signal r is as small as pos-
sible if f = 0 and deviates from 0 as much as possible
if fi(k)	=0, i = 1, . . . ,n f .
Considering that in the fault-free case the residual signal r
would, due to the existence of d, differ from zero, evaluation
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of the size of r is necessary in order to distinguish the influ-
ence of the faults from that of the disturbances. In this paper,
the norm-based evaluation of the residual signal, denoted by
J = ‖r‖ and, based on it, threshold determination satisfying
Jth = sup
f=0,d
‖r‖ (4)
will be briefly reviewed.
2.2. Parity space approach
The parity space approach is based on the so-called parity
relation. Let s be an integer denoting the length of a moving
time window. The output of system (1) over the moving win-
dow [k − s, k] can be expressed by the initial state x(k − s),
the stacked control input vector uk,s, the stacked disturbance
vector dk,s, and the stacked fault vector fk,s as
yk,s = Ho,sx(k − s) +Hu,suk,s +Hd,sdk,s +Hf ,s fk,s, (5)
where
ξk,s =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
ξ(k − s)
ξ(k − s + 1)
...
ξ(k)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
with ξ standing for y,u,d, f ,
Ho,s =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
C
CA
...
CAs
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
, Hu,s =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
D O · · · O
CB D
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . O
CAs−1B · · · CB D
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
(6)
Hd,s and Hf ,s are constructed similarly as Hu,s and can be
achieved by replacing B, D, respectively, by Ed,Fd and Ef ,F f .
To satisfy the requirement on the residual signal, a residual
generator can be constructed as
r(k) = vs
(
yk,s −Hu,suk,s
)
, (7)
where a design parameter vs called parity vector is introduced
to modulate the residual dynamics and improve the sensitiv-
ity of the residual to the faults and the robustness to the dis-
turbances and the initial state. Usually, vsHo,s = 0 is required
to eliminate the influence of the initial state and the past in-
put signals (before the time instant k − s).
If the existence condition
rank
[
Ho,s Hd,s H f ,s
]
> rank
[
Ho,s Hd,s
]
(8)
is satisfied, then a full decoupling from both the initial state
and the disturbances can be achieved by solving
vs
[
Ho,s Hd,s
] = 0, vsH f ,s	=0, (9)
for vs, that is, vs lies in the intersection between the left null
space of [Ho,s Hd,s] and the image space of Hf ,s. If a full de-
coupling is not achievable or not desired, the FD problem is
often formulated as to solve the optimization problem
max
vs,vsHo,s=0
JPS(vs) = max
vs,vsHo,s=0
sup dk,s=0, fk,s	=0
(
rT(k)r(k)/ f Tk,s fk,s
)
sup fk,s=0,dk,s	=0
(
rT(k)r(k)/dTk,sdk,s
)
= max
vs,vsHo,s=0
vsH f ,sH
T
f ,sv
T
s
vsHd,sH
T
d,sv
T
s
(10)
whose solution can be obtained by solving a generalized
eigenvalue-eigenvector problem [11].
Solution to optimization problem (10)
Let Nbasis denote the basis of the left null space of Ho,s. As-
sume that λmax and ps,max are the maximal generalized eigen-
value and the corresponding eigenvector to the generalized
eigenvalue-eigenvector problem
ps,max
(
NbasisHf ,sH
T
f ,sN
T
basis − λmaxNbasisHd,sHTd,sNTbasis
)
= 0,
(11)
then optimization problem (10) is solved by
vs = ps,maxNbasis. (12)
It is pointed out in [12] that the solutions of a full decou-
pling or (10) are achieved at the cost of (considerably) re-
duced fault detectability. This can be immediately seen with
a look at the dynamics of the residual signal
r(k) = vs
(
yk,s −Hu,suk,s
) = vs
(
Hf ,s fk,s +Hd,sdk,s
)
(13)
which shows that the influence of the fault expressed
by vsH f ,s is structurally reduced to a minimum, that is,
rank (vsH f ,s) = 1. Reference [12] proposed the use of a par-
ity matrix Vs,
r(k) = Vs
(
yk,s −Hu,suk,s
) = Vs
(
Hf ,s fk,s +Hd,sdk,s
)
(14)
instead of a parity vector aiming at enhancing the influence
of the faults on the residual signal. To this end, the following
optimization problems are formulated as
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JPS,∞/∞
(
Vs
)
= max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
sup dk,s=0, fk,s	=0
(
rT(k)r(k)/ f Tk,s fk,s
)
sup fk,s=0,dk,s	=0
(
rT(k)r(k)/dTk,sdk,s
)
= max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σ2
(
VsHf ,s
)
σ2
(
VsHd,s
) ,
(15)
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JPS,−/∞
(
Vs
)
= max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
inf dk,s=0, fk,s	=0
(
rT(k)r(k)/ f Tk,s fk,s
)
sup fk,s=0,dk,s	=0
(
rT(k)r(k)/dTk,sdk,s
)
= max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σ2
(
VsHf ,s
)
σ2
(
VsHd,s
) ,
(16)
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JPS,i/∞
(
Vs
)
= max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σ2i
(
VsHf ,s
)
σ2
(
VsHd,s
) . (17)
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The difference in optimization problems (15)-(16) con-
sists in that the former considers the maximal influence of
the faults on the residual amplitude, while the latter considers
the minimal influence. Optimization problem (17) is a gen-
eralization of (15)-(16) and takes into account the fault sen-
sitivity in different directions. The achievable optimal perfor-
mance index of optimization problem (15) is the same with
that of (10). At the end of this subsection, we will show that
the solution of (17) would lead to maximizing the fault de-
tectability in the context of a tradeoff between false alarm rate
and fault detectability.
Solution to optimization problems (15), (16), and (17)
A solution to optimization problem (17) that also solves
(15)-(16) simultaneously is given in [12] as follows, which
is derived based on the observation that for any matrices X1
and X2 of compatible dimensions,
σ
(
X1X2
) ≤ σ(X1
)
σ
(
X2
)
,
σ
(
X1X2
) ≤ σ(X1
)
σ
(
X2
)
,
σi
(
X1X2
) ≤ σ(X1
)
σi
(
X2
)
.
(18)
Assume that there is the following singular value decompo-
sition (SVD):
NbasisHd,s = U
[
S O
]
VT , (19)
where U and V are unitary matrices, S = diag{σ1, . . . , σγ},
then optimization problems (15), (16), and (17) are solved
by
Vs = PsS−1UTNbasis, (20)
where Ps is any unitary matrix of compatible dimensions.
Note that the solutions to the above optimization prob-
lems are not unique. For instance, an alternative optimal so-
lution for problem (16) is
Vs = PsPNbasis, (21)
where P is the left inverse of NbasisHf ,s. On the other side,
only solution (20) solves (15), (16), and (17) simultaneously.
For this reason, (20) is called unified parity space solution.
To detect the faults successfully, the generated residual
signal should be further evaluated. For a residual signal gen-
erated by means of the parity space approach, the Euclidean
norm defined by
J = ∥∥r(k)∥∥E =
√
rT(k)r(k) (22)
is a reasonable evaluation function. It follows from (14) and
(4) that the corresponding threshold is determined by
Jth = sup
f=0,d
∥
∥r(k)
∥
∥
E = σ
(
VsHd,s
)
max
∥
∥dk,s
∥
∥
E. (23)
Based on the decision logic
∥
∥r(k)
∥
∥
E ≤ Jth =⇒ fault-free, otherwise faulty, (24)
a decision for the occurrence of a fault can be finally made.
In practice, false alarm rate and miss detection rate are
two important technical features for the performance eval-
uation of a fault detection system. Below, we will introduce
these two concepts in the context of the norm-based resid-
ual evaluation (22) and briefly compare the above-presented
parity space solutions.
Jth setting under a given false alarm rate. Consider (23)
and denote the upper bound of ‖dk,s‖E by δd. In the con-
text of norm-based evaluation, the objective of Jth setting is
to ensure that any disturbance whose size is not larger than
the tolerant limit should not cause an alarm. To express the
strongest disturbance that is allowed without causing a false
alarm in relation to δd, we define false alarm rate (FAR) as
FAR = 1− α
δd
, 0 ≤ α ≤ δd =⇒ 0 ≤ 1− α
δd
≤ 1, (25)
that is, those disturbances whose size is not larger than α =
(1 − FAR)δd should not cause an alarm. Suppose that the
allowable FAR is now given. It is straightforward that the
threshold should be set as
Jth = ασ(VsHd,s
) = (1− FAR)δdσ
(
VsHd,s
)
. (26)
Note that in the norm-based residual evaluation, Jth is often
set as δdσ(VsHd,s) which leads to a zero FAR but may result
in a very conservative Jth setting.
To express the miss detection rate (MDR), we introduce
the set of detectable faults. Note that a fault can be detected
if and only if
‖r‖E > Jth ⇐⇒
∥
∥Vs
(
Hd,sdk,s +Hf ,s fk,s
)∥
∥
E > Jth. (27)
Hence, the set of detectable faults (SDF) ΩDE(Vs, Jth,d) is de-
fined as follows: given Vs and Jth
ΩDE
(
Vs, Jth,d
) = { fk,s | (27) is satisfied
}
. (28)
Given Jth, a parity space matrix Vs,opt delivers a residual sig-
nal with the lowest MDR if
∀Vs,ΩDE
(
Vs, Jth,d
) ⊆ ΩDE
(
Vs,opt, Jth,d
)
, (29)
that is, ΩDE(Vs,opt, Jth,d) includes the largest number of de-
tectable faults, which is equivalent with the lowest MDR.
The subsequent comparison study is done in the con-
text of maximizing SDF (i.e., minimizing MDR) under a given
FAR.
Note that (27) can be, according to (19), rewritten into
∥
∥Vs
(
Hd,sdk,s +Hf ,s fk,s
)∥
∥
E
> (1− FAR)δdσ
(
VsHd,s
)
⇐⇒
∥
∥
∥Q
[
I O
]
VTdk,s +QS−1UTNbasisHf ,s fk,s
∥
∥
∥
E
> (1− FAR)δdσ
(
Q
[
I O
]
VT
)
by settingVs = QS−1UTNbasis, for someQ.
(30)
It turns out that∀Q	=0, (30) holds only if
∥
∥
∥
[
I O
]
VTdk,s + S−1UTNbasisHf ,s fk,s
∥
∥
∥
E
> (1− FAR)δd.
(31)
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It means that a parity matrix that ensures (31) would pro-
vide a maximal SDF. Note that the unified parity space solu-
tion (20) delivers exactly (31). Thus, the unified parity space
solution maximizes SDF (i.e., minimizes MDR) under a given
FAR.
For comparison, denote the SVD of NbasisHf ,s by
NbasisHf ,s = Uf
[
S f O
]
VTf . (32)
Then the vector-valued solution (12) to optimization prob-
lem (10) and the matrix-valued solution (21) to optimization
problem (16) can be, respectively, rewritten into
vs = psS−1UTNbasis,
ps
(
S−1UTUf S2f U
T
f US
−1 − λmax I
) = 0,
Vs =
(
PsS
−1
f U
T
f US
)
S−1UTNbasis.
(33)
Since, generally, ps,PsS−1f U
T
f US are not unitary matrices, we
have finally
ΩDE
(
Vs, Jth,d
) ⊂ ΩDE
(
Vs,opt, Jth,d
)
, Vs = ps,maxNbasis,
Vs,opt = PsS−1UTNbasis,
ΩDE
(
Vs, Jth,d
) ⊂ ΩDE
(
Vs,opt, Jth,d
)
, Vs = PsPNbasis,
Vs,opt = PsS−1UTNbasis.
(34)
With the following remarks we would like to conclude this
subsection.
(i) Parity-space-based FD system design is characterized
by the simple mathematical handling. It only deals
with matrix- and vector-valued operations. This fact
attracts attention from the industry for the application
of parity-space-based methods.
(ii) There is a one-to-one relationship between the parity-
space approach and the observer-based approach that
allows the design of an observer-based residual gen-
erator based on a given parity vector [13, 14]. Based
on this result, a strategy called parity-space design,
observer-based implementation has been developed,
which makes use of the computational advantage of
parity-space approaches for the FD system design (se-
lection of a parity vector or matrix) and then realizes
the solution in the observer form to ensure a numer-
ically stable and less consuming online computation.
This strategy has been successfully used in the sensor-
fault detection in vehicles [15].
(iii) In the parity-space approaches, a high order s will
improve the optimal performance index JPS but, on
the other side, increase the online computational ef-
fort [16]. By introducing a low-order IIR (infinite im-
pulse response) filter, the performance of the parity-
relation-based residual generator can be much im-
proved without significant increase of the order of
the parity relation [17]. Similar effect can be achieved
by the closed-loop-observer-based implementation, as
pointed out by [18].
(iv) The algebraic form of the parity-space-based FD sys-
tem allows a statistic test and norm-based resid-
ual evaluation and threshold determination [19]. It
may well bridge the statistical methods [1] and the
observer-based methods.
(v) In the framework of parity-space-based FD system de-
sign, system dynamic features like transmission zeros,
zeros in the right half plane (RHP), and so forth are
not taken into account. This may cause trouble at the
online implementation. Also for this reason, we are
of the opinion that the strategy of parity space de-
sign, observer-based implementation would be helpful
to solve this problem.
2.3. Parametrization of FD systems and
postfilter design
Observer-based FD system design for continuous LTI sys-
tems has been widely studied in the literature [3–6]. In this
and the next subsections, the analog form of those known
results will be briefly reviewed. Attention will be paid to the
comparison study when it is special for discrete LTI systems.
Let (M̂u(z), N̂u(z)) be a left coprime factorization pair of
Gu(z), that is, Gu(z) = M̂−1u (z)N̂u(z), M̂u(z), N̂u(z) ∈ RH∞
[10]. In [20], a parametrization of all LTI residual generators
for system (1) described by
r(z) = R(z)(M̂u(z)y(z)− N̂u(z)u(z)
)
(35)
is presented, where R(z) ∈ RH∞ is the so-called post-
filter that is arbitrarily selectable. Suppose that Gu(z) =
(A,B,C,D) is a detectable state space realization of Gu(z).
Then M̂u(z), N̂u(z) can be computed as follows [10]:
M̂u(z) = I − C(zI − A + LC)−1L,
N̂u(z) = D + C(zI − A + LC)−1(B − LD).
(36)
It is now a well-known result that
(i) M̂u(z)y(z)−N̂u(z)u(z) = y(z)− ŷ(z), where ŷ(z) is the
output estimation delivered by a full-order observer;
(ii) given L1 and L2, there exists an RH∞-invertible post-
filter Q(z) = I + C(zI − A + L1C)−1(L2 − L1) so that
M̂u,L1 (z)y(z)− N̂u,L1 (z)u(z)
= Q(z)(M̂u,L2 (z)y(z)− N̂u,L2 (z)u(z)
)
,
(37)
where (M̂u,L1 (z), N̂u,L1 (z)) and (M̂u,L2 (z), N̂u,L2 (z)) are
the left coprime factorization pair of Gu(z), which are
computed according to (36) with L = L1 and L = L2,
respectively.
(iii) all LTI residual generators can be expressed by a se-
ries connection of a full-order observer and a postfilter,
and are therefore called observer-based residual gener-
ators. Moreover, the selection of the postfilter can be
done independent of the observer design.
6 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
Due to the latter fact, we concentrate in this subsection on
the selection of R(z). The dynamics of a residual generator
(35) is governed by
r(z) = R(z)M̂u(z)
(
Gd(z)d(z) +Gf (z) f (z)
)
. (38)
The full decoupling problem is to find the postfilter R(z) so
that
R(z)M̂u(z)Gd(z) = 0, R(z)M̂u(z)Gf (z)	=0. (39)
If the l2-norm of the residual signal is used as evaluation
function, then the optimal FD problem is formulated as op-
timization problems
sup
R(z)∈RH∞
JFRE,∞/∞(R) = sup
R(z)∈RH∞
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gf (z)
∥
∥∞
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gd(z)
∥
∥∞
,
(40)
sup
R(z)∈RH∞
JFRE,−/∞(R) = sup
R(z)∈RH∞
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gf (z)
∥
∥−
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gd(z)
∥
∥∞
,
(41)
sup
R(z)∈RH∞
JFRE,i/∞(R)
= sup
R(z)∈RH∞
σi
(
R
(
e jω
)
M̂u
(
e jω
)
Gf
(
e jω
))
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gd(z)
∥
∥∞
(42)
sup
R(z)∈RH1×m∞
JFRE,2/2(R)
= sup
R(z)∈RH1×m∞
(∫ 2π
0
R
(
e jω
)
M̂u
(
e jω
)
Gf
(
e jω
)
G∗f
(
e jω
)
× M̂∗u
(
e jω
)
R∗
(
e jω
)
dω
/∫ 2π
0
R
(
e jω
)
× M̂u
(
e jω
)
Gd
(
e jω
)
G∗d
(
e jω
)
M̂∗u
(
e jω
)
× R∗(e jω)dω
)
,
(43)
where σi(R(e jω)M̂u(e jω)Gf (e jω)) represents the fault sensi-
tivity at different levels at the frequency ω,
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gf (z)
∥
∥− = infω
(
σ
(
R
(
e jω
)
M̂u
(
e jω
)
Gf
(
e jω
)))
= inf
ω,i
(
σi
(
R
(
e jω
)
M̂u
(
e jω
)
Gf
(
e jω
)))
(44)
though not a norm, it is interpreted as the worst-case fault
sensitivity. Optimization problems (40), (41), and (43) are
often called the H∞/H∞,H−/H∞, and H2/H2 optimization,
respectively.
The ratio-type performance index given in (40) and (43)
is the first one that was introduced for the FD purpose [11,
21]. Currently, the index of the form
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gd(z)
∥
∥ < γ,
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gf (z)
∥
∥ > β
(45)
becomes more popular, where γ,β are some constants. The
FD system design is often formulated as maximizing β under
a given γ. The third index type is often met in the robust
control theory and formulated as
J f−d = α f
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gf (z)
∥
∥− αd
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gd(z)
∥
∥,
(46)
where α f ,αd > 0 are some given constants. The FD sys-
tem design is then achieved by maximizing J f−d. In [22], it
has been demonstrated that the above three types indices are
equivalent in a certain sense. With this fact in mind, in this
paper we only consider optimizations under ratio-type in-
dices (40)–(43).
Solution to optimization problems (40)–(42)
Let M̂u(z)Gd(z) = Gdo(z)Gdi(z) be a co-inner-outer factor-
ization of M̂u(z)Gd(z) [10], where Gdo(z) is the RH∞-left-
invertible co-outer, Gdi(z) is the co-inner containing all the
right half complex plane zeros of M̂u(z)Gd(z) and satisfying
Gdi(z)G∗di(z) = I . Based on the relations
∥
∥G1(z)G2(z)
∥
∥∞ ≤
∥
∥G1(z)
∥
∥∞
∥
∥G2(z)
∥
∥∞,
∥
∥G1(z)G2(z)
∥
∥− ≤
∥
∥G1(z)
∥
∥∞
∥
∥G2(z)
∥
∥−
σi
(
G1
(
e jω
)
G2
(
e jω
)) ≤ ∥∥G1(z)
∥
∥∞σi
(
G2
(
e jω
))
, ∀i,
(47)
it has been proven in [23, 24], similar to the results for con-
tinuous LTI systems given in [22] and recently in [25], that
optimization problems (40)–(42) are solved simultaneously
by
R(z) = G−1do (z). (48)
For this reason, (48) is called unified solution.
Another solution to optimization problem (41), if Gf (z)
is RL∞-left-invertible, is
R(z) = G−1f o (z), (49)
where Gf o(z) is the co-outer of M̂u(z)Gf (z).
The main purpose of the co-inner-outer factorization is
to separate the nonminimum phase zeros so that the rest part
of M̂u(z)Gd(z) or M̂u(z)Gf (z) is RH∞-left invertible. Note
that the co-inner-outer factorization is not unique. There-
fore, the optimal postfilter R(z) is also not unique [26].
Solution to optimization problem (43)
The optimal solution to optimization problem (43) is a fre-
quency selector as follows [27]:
R(z) = fω0 (z)p(z), JFRE,2/2,opt = sup
ω
λmax (ω), (50)
where fω0 (z) is an ideal frequency-selective filter with the se-
lective frequency at ω0, which satisfies
fω0
(
e jω
)
q
(
e jω
) = 0, ω	=ω0
∫ 2π
0
fω0
(
e jω
)
q
(
e jω
)
q∗
(
e jω
)
f ∗ω0
(
e jω
)
dω
= q(e jω0)q∗(e jω0), ∀qT(z) ∈RH2,
(51)
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λmax (ω), p(e jω) are, respectively, the maximal generalized
eigenvalue and corresponding eigenvector of the following
generalized eigenvalue-eigenvector problem:
p
(
e jω
)(
λmax
(
ω
)
M̂u
(
e jω
)
Gd
(
e jω
)
G∗d
(
e jω
)
M̂∗u
(
e jω
)
− M̂u
(
e jω
)
Gf
(
e jω
)
G∗f
(
e jω
)
M̂∗u
(
e jω
)) = 0 (52)
and ω0 is the frequency at which λmax (ω) achieves its maxi-
mum, that is,
λmax (ω0) = sup
ω
λmax (ω). (53)
In practice, usually a narrow bandpass filter is implemented
as frequency selector. From the viewpoint of FAR and MDR,
the frequency selector may cause loss of fault sensitivity and
restrict the application of the H2/H2 optimal residual gener-
ator.
Recently, [27] reported a very interesting result on the re-
lationship between the parity-space vector and the solution
to optimization problem (43). It has been shown that
lim
s→∞minvs
vsH f ,sH
T
f ,sv
T
s
vsHd,sH
T
d,sv
T
s
= λmax
(
ωopt
)
(54)
and lim s→∞vs correspond to a bandpass filter. This result not
only reveals the physical interpretation of the standard op-
timal selection of parity vectors but also provides us with
an efficient tool to approximate the optimal solution to op-
timization problem (43). Moreover, based on it, advanced
parity-space approaches using wavelet transform have been
proposed [28, 29].
As to the residual evaluation and threshold determina-
tion, the l2-norm is the mostly used evaluation function,
which leads to
J = ‖r‖2,
Jth = sup
f=0,d
‖r‖2 =
∥
∥R(z)M̂u(z)Gd(z)
∥
∥∞ max ‖d‖2. (55)
In case of applying the unified solution (48), we have
Jth = sup
f=0,d
‖r‖2 = max ‖d‖2. (56)
Analog with the results in [30] and the discussion in the last
subsection, it can be proven that the unified solution (48)
minimizes MDR under a given FAR, where MDR and FAR
are defined in the context of the norm-based residual evalu-
ation.
2.4. fault detection filter design
fault detection filter (FDF) is a special kind of observer-based
FD systems (35) with a constant postfilter and constructed as
x̂(k + 1) = Ax̂(k) + Bu(k) + L(y(k)− ŷ(k)),
r(k) =W(y(k)− ŷ(k)),
ŷ(k) = Cx̂(k) +Du(k),
(57)
where the observer gain matrix L and the weighting matrix
W are design parameters. Due to its state space expression
and close relation to the observer design, FDF study receives
most research attention. The dynamics of residual generator
(57) is governed by
r(z) = Grd(z)d(z) +Gr f (z) f (z),
Grd(z) =W
(
Fd + C(zI − A + LC)−1
(
Ed − LFd
))
,
Gr f (z) =W
(
F f + C(zI − A + LC)−1
(
Ef − LF f
))
.
(58)
In the FDF design, the full-decoupling problem is to design
L and W such that
Grd(z) = 0, Gr f (z)	=0 (59)
while the optimal FD problems are formulated so as to
choose matrices L,W that solve the optimization problem
[5, 7, 31]
sup
L,W
JOBS,∞/∞(L,W) = sup
L,W
∥
∥Gr f (z)
∥
∥∞∥
∥Grd(z)
∥
∥∞
, (60)
sup
L,W
JOBS,−/∞(L,W) = sup
L,W
∥
∥Gr f (z)
∥
∥−∥
∥Grd(z)
∥
∥∞
, (61)
sup
L,W
JOBS,i/∞(L,W) = sup
L,W
σi
(
Gr f
(
e jω
))
∥
∥Grd(z)
∥
∥∞
. (62)
Solution to optimization problems (60)–(62)
Because the FDF (57) is a special case of (35), the optimal
solutions to optimization problems (60)–(62) can be derived
based on the state space realization of the optimal postfilter
R(z) given by (48), as shown in [24]. A unified optimal so-
lution to optimization problems (60)–(62) is associated to a
discrete-time algebraic Riccati system (DTARS) [24, 32]. As-
sume that (A,Ed,C,Fd) is regular, then
L = −LTd , W =Wd (63)
solve optimization problems (60)–(62) simultaneously,
where Wd is the left inverse of a full column rank matrix Hd
satisfying HdHTd = CXdCT + FdFTd and (Xd,Ld) is the stabi-
lizing solution to the DTARS
[
AXdAT − Xd + EdETd AXdCT + EdFTd
CXdAT + FdETd CXdC
T + FdFTd
][
I
Ld
]
= 0. (64)
An alternative solution to optimization problem (61), if
(A,Ef ,C,F f ) is regular, is given by
L = −LTf , W =Wf , (65)
where Wf is the left inverse of a full column rank matrix Hf
satisfying Hf HTf = CXf CT + F f FTf and (Xf ,L f ) is the stabi-
lizing solution to the DTARS
[
AXf AT − Xf + Ef ETf AXf CT + Ef FTf
CXf AT + F f ETf CXf C
T + F f FTf
][
I
L f
]
= 0.
(66)
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Recently, application of LMI-technique (linear matrix in-
equality) to solve (60) and (61) for continuous LTI systems
has been reported [33–36]. The core of those approaches
consists in formulating (60) or (61) as a multiobjective op-
timization problem and solving them based on an iterative
computation of two LMIs. It can be proven that these so-
lutions can, in the ideal case, converge to the optimal solu-
tion (63). The extension of these results to the discrete FDF
is straightforward and will not be discussed in this paper.
At the end of this subsection, we would like to introduce
a very interesting result achieved by the comparison study
between the well-known Kalman-filter-based residual gener-
ation [37] and the unified solution (63). Given system
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + Edζ(k),
y(k) = Cx(k) +Du(k) + Fdη(k), (67)
where ζ(k),η(k) are independent zero-mean Gaussian white
noise processes with cov(ζ(k)ζT(k)) = I , cov(η(k)ηT(k)) =
I , then a Kalman filter with
x̂
(
k+1 | k) =Ax̂(k | k−1)+Bu(k) +L(y(k)− ŷ(k | k−1)),
(68)
ŷ
(
k | k − 1) = Cx̂(k | k − 1) +Du(k), (69)
L = APCT(CPCT + R)−1, R = FdFTd (> 0), (70)
APAT−P−APCT(CPCT+R)−1CPAT+EdETd =0, P > 0,
(71)
delivers an innovation as residual signal, where x̂(k | k−1) is
a prediction of x(k) based on the data up to k−1. Comparing
the above Kalman filter algorithm with the unified solution
(63) makes it clear that both solutions are quite similar. In-
deed, (67) can be brought into the general form of (1) by
letting d = [ ζT ηT ]T and, as a result, (71) can be regarded as a
special case of (64). Remember that the Kalman filter deliv-
ers, in the context of statistic tests, a minimum MDR under a
given FAR. In comparison, in the context of norm-based def-
inition of MDR and FAR, the unified solution (63) provides
us with the same result.
3. FD OF DISCRETE-TIME LINEAR PERIODIC SYSTEMS
In this section, we review some recent results on FD in dis-
crete linear time periodic (LTP) systems. LTP is a special kind
of linear time-varying systems described by
ΣLTP :
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x(k + 1)
= A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)+Ed(k)d(k)+Ef (k) f (k),
y(k)
= C(k)x(k)+D(k)u(k)+Fd(k)d(k)+F f (k) f (k),
(72)
where A(k),B(k),C(k),D(k),Ed(k),Ef (k),Fd(k), and F f (k)
are known bounded and real periodic matrices of period θ,
that is, ∀k, A(k + θ) = A(k), and so forth. There is not
only continuous interest and development of periodic con-
trol and filtering theory [38–42], but also increasing appli-
cations of periodic control in practice like helicopter vibra-
tion control, satellite attitude control as well as wind turbine.
The FD problem of periodic systems has been considered in
[24, 32, 43–45]. Basically, there are two ways to handle the
FD problem of LTP systems, as shown below.
3.1. FD schemes based on lifted LTI reformulation
It is well known that there is a strong correspondence be-
tween discrete LTP systems and discrete LTI systems [42].
Therefore, FD system design for the LTP system (72) can be
carried out as follows:
(i) lift the LTP system (72) into a discrete LTI system,
(ii) design residual generator(s) based on the lifted LTI re-
formulation,
(iii) using either parallel residual generators or select the
parameters of the residual generator to satisfy the
causality condition.
Let ΨA(k)(k1, k0) ( k1 ≥ k0) denote the state transition
matrix of LTP system (72)
ΨA(k)
(
k1, k0
)=
{
I if k1=k0,
A
(
k1 − 1
)
A
(
k1 − 2
) · · ·A(k0
)
if k1>k0.
(73)
Periodic system (72) can be lifted into a discrete LTI system
described by [42]
x̃τ
(
(k + 1)θ + τ
) = Ãτ x̃τ(kθ + τ) + B̃τ ũτ(kθ + τ)
+ Ẽd,τ d̃τ(kθ + τ) + Ẽ f ,τ f̃τ(kθ + τ),
ỹτ(kθ + τ) = C̃τ x̃τ(kθ + τ) + D̃τ ũτ(kθ + τ)
+ F̃d,τ d̃τ(kθ + τ) + F̃ f ,τ f̃τ(kθ + τ),
(74)
where τ is an integer between 0 and θ−1 denoting the initial
time, the state vector of the lifted system is x̃τ(kθ+τ) = x(kθ+
τ), η̃τ with η standing for u, y,d, f is the augmented signal
defined by
η̃τ(kθ + τ) =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
η(kθ + τ)
η(kθ + τ + 1)
...
η(kθ + τ + θ − 1)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
Ãτ = ΨA(k)(τ + θ, τ),
B̃τ =
[
X ′ Y ′ · · · Z′
]
,
C̃τ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
C(τ)
C(τ + 1)ΨA(k)(τ + 1, τ)
...
C(τ + θ − 1)ΨA(k)(τ + θ − 1, τ)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
D̃τ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
D̃τ,1,1 O · · · O
D̃τ,2,1 D̃τ,2,2
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . O
D̃τ,θ,1 · · · D̃τ,θ,θ−1 D̃τ,θ,θ
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
D̃τ,i, j =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
D(τ + i− 1) for i= j,
C(τ + i− 1)ΨA(k)(τ + i− 1, τ + j)
B(τ + j − 1) for i > j,
(75)
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where B̃τ,1 = ΨA(k)(τ + θ, τ + 1)B(τ), B̃τ,2 = ΨA(k)(τ + θ, τ +
2)B(τ + 1), B̃τ,θ = B(τ + θ − 1) , and Ẽd,τ , F̃d,τ and Ẽ f ,τ , F̃ f ,τ
are defined in a way similar to C̃τ , D̃τ .
3.1.1. Observer-based FD system design and
implementation
Assume that (A(k),C(k)) is detectable. Then (Ãτ , C̃τ) is de-
tectable and an observer-based LTI residual generator can be
designed based on lifted reformulation (74) as
̂̃xτ
(
(k + 1)θ + τ
) = Ãτ ̂̃xτ(kθ + τ) + B̃τ ũτ(kθ + τ)
+ Lτ
(
ỹτ(kθ + τ)− ̂̃yτ(kθ + τ)
)
,
rτ(kθ + τ) =Wτ
(
ỹτ(kθ + τ)− ̂̃yτ(kθ + τ)
)
,
̂̃yτ(k) = C̃τ ̂̃xτ(kθ + τ) + D̃τ ũτ(kθ + τ),
(76)
where Lτ and Wτ are constant matrices and can be de-
signed with FD approaches for the discrete LTI systems intro-
duced in the last section to realize full decoupling or optimal
FD. Observer (76) reconstructs the outputs over one period
y(kθ + τ), . . . , y(kθ + τ + θ − 1) based on the estimation of
state vector x(kθ + τ). Both the state vector of observer (76)
and the residual signal are updated every θ time instants.
In fault detection, the detection delay should be as small
as possible. Therefore, it is advantageous if a residual signal
can be obtained at each time instant. To this aim,
(i) a bank of LTI residual generators (76) can be used, each
of which is designed for τ = 0, 1, . . . , θ−1, respectively
[43]. This scheme is characterized by a simple design
but needs much online computational efforts.
(ii) If the weighting matrix Wτ is designed to satisfy the
causality constraint, that is, Wτ is a lower block trian-
gular matrix in the form of
Wτ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Wτ,1,1 O · · · O
Wτ,2,1 Wτ,2,2
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . O
Wτ,θ,1 · · · Wτ,θ,θ−1 Wτ,θ,θ
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
, (77)
then, for a given integer τ, the residual generator (76)
can be implemented as
̂̃xτ
(
(k + 1)θ + τ
)
= Ãτ ̂̃xτ(kθ + τ) + B̃τ ũτ(kθ + τ)
+ Lτ
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
y(kθ + τ)
...
y(kθ + τ + θ − 1)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
−
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
ŷ(kθ + τ)
...
ŷ(kθ + τ + θ − 1)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
,
r(kθ + τ + j)
= [ Wτ, j+1,1 · · · Wτ, j+1, j+1 ]
×
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
y(kθ + τ)
...
y(kθ + τ + j)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦−
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
ŷ(kθ + τ)
...
ŷ(kθ + τ + j)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ ,
ŷ(kθ + τ + j)
= C(τ + j)ΨA(k)(τ + j, τ)̂̃xτ(kθ + τ)
+
[
D̃τ, j+1,1 · · · D̃τ, j+1, j+1
]
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
u(kθ + τ)
...
u(kθ + τ + j)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ ,
j = 0, 1, . . . , θ − 1.
(78)
In this case, the state estimation is still updated at every
θ time instants, but at each time instant kθ + τ + j,
j = 0, 1, . . . , θ − 1, a residual signal r(kθ + τ + j) is
calculated from control input and measured outputs
available up to the time instant kθ + τ + j.
3.1.2. Parity-relation-based FD system design and
implementation
Similarly, a parity-relation-based LTI residual generator can
be built as follows:
rτ(kθ + τ) = Vτ,s
(
ỹτ,k,s − H̃u,sũτ,k,s
)
,
ỹτ,k,s =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
ỹτ
(
(k − s)θ + τ)
ỹτ
(
(k − s + 1)θ + τ)
...
ỹτ(kθ + τ)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
ũτ,k,s =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
ũτ
(
(k − s)θ + τ)
ũτ
(
(k − s + 1)θ + τ)
...
ũτ(kθ + τ)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
H̃u,s =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
D̃τ O · · · O
C̃τB̃τ D̃τ
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . O
C̃τÃs−1τ B̃τ · · · C̃τ B̃τ D̃τ
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
(79)
where Vτ,s is a constant parity matrix,
Vτ,s
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
C̃τ
C̃τÃτ
...
C̃τÃsτ
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
= 0. (80)
To get a residual signal at each time instant, we can use a
bank of parity-relation-based residual generators, each one
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for τ = 0, 1, . . . , θ − 1, respectively. Alternatively, we can also
impose a structural constant on parity matrix Vτ,s as
Vτ,s =
[
Vτ,s,0 Vτ,s,1 · · · Vτ,s,s−1 Vτ,s,s],
Vτ,s,s =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
(Vτ,s,s)1,1 O · · · O
(Vτ,s,s)2,1 (Vτ,s,s)2,2
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . O
(Vτ,s,s)θ,1 · · · (Vτ,s,s)θ,θ−1 (Vτ,s,s)θ,θ
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
(81)
that is, the last block in Vτ,s is a lower triangular matrix, then
for a fixed τ, residual generator (79) can be implemented in
such a way that only control inputs and measured outputs
available up to the time instant kθ + τ + j are needed for the
calculation of r(kθ + τ + j), j = 0, 1, . . . , θ − 1.
3.2. FD schemes based on periodic model
In this subsection, we will show that the parity-space ap-
proach and the observer-based FD approach can be directly
extended to periodic systems, which do not need the tempo-
rary step of lifted LTI reformulation and lead to a simplified
design and implementation.
3.2.1. Periodic parity-space approach
The extension of the parity-space approach to periodic sys-
tems is straightforward, because the parity-space approach
can handle each time instant independently [45]. The input-
output relation of periodic system (72) during the moving
window [k − s, k] can be expressed by
yk,s = Ho,s,kx(k − s) +Hu,s,kuk,s +Hd,s,kdk,s +Hf ,s,k fk,s. (82)
While the vectors yk,s,uk,s,dk,s, and fk,s in (82) are built in
exactly the same way as in the LTI case according to (6), the
matrices Ho,s,k,Hu,s,k,Hd,s,k, and Hf ,s,k in (82) are not con-
stant matrices but the following periodic matrices:
Ho,s,k =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
C(k − s)
C(k − s + 1)A(k − s)
...
C(k)A(k − 1) · · ·A(k − s + 1)A(k − s)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
Hu,s,k =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
D(k − s) O · · · O
C(k − s + 1)B(k − s) D(k − s + 1) . . . ...
...
. . .
. . . O
C(k)A(k − 1) · · · · · · D(k)
A(k − s + 1)B(k − s)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
(83)
Hd,s,k, andHf ,s,k are similar asHu,s,k with B( j),D( j) replaced,
respectively, by Ed( j),Fd( j), and Ef ( j),F f ( j), j = k−s, . . . , k.
A periodic residual generator can be built as
r(k) = Vk
(
yk,s −Hu,s,kuk,s
)
, (84)
(a)= Vk
(
Hd,s,kdk,s +Hf ,s,k fk,s
)
, (85)
where Vk is a θ-periodic parity matrix (or vector) that sat-
isfies VkHo,s,k = 0, equation (85) represents the residual dy-
namics.
If the rank condition
rank
[
Ho,s,k Hd,s,k H f ,s,k
]
> rank
[
Ho,s,k Hd,s,k
]
(86)
holds for any k, then a full decoupling can be achieved by
solving
Vk
[
Ho,s,k Hd,s,k
] = 0, VkHf ,s,k	=0 (87)
for Vk over one period at k, k + 1, . . . , k + θ − 1. The residual
evaluation consists in detecting the deviation of residual r(k)
from 0. Especially, if
rank
[
Ho,s,0· · ·Ho,s,θ−1 Hd,s,0· · ·Hd,s,θ−1 Hf ,s,0· · ·Hf ,s,θ−1]
> rank
[
Ho,s,0 · · · Ho,s,θ−1 Hd,s,0 · · · Hd,s,θ−1],
(88)
then the full decoupling can be achieved by a constant par-
ity matrix (or vector) Vk. However, condition (88) is rather
restrictive in practice.
In case that a full decoupling is not achievable, optimiza-
tion problems similar to (15)–(17) are formulated as
max
Vk ,VkHo,s,k=0
JLTP,PS,∞/∞
(
Vk
) = max
Vk ,VkHo,s,k=0
σ2
(
VkHf ,s,k
)
σ2
(
VkHd,s,k
) ,
(89)
max
Vk ,VkHo,s,k=0
JLTP,PS,−/∞
(
Vk
) = max
Vk ,VkHo,s,k=0
σ2
(
VkHf ,s,k
)
σ2
(
VkHd,s,k
) ,
(90)
max
Vk ,VkHo,s,k=0
JLTP,PS,i/∞
(
Vk
) = max
Vk ,VkHo,s,k=0
σ2i
(
VkHf ,s,k
)
σ2
(
VkHd,s,k
) ,
(91)
which are solved over one period to get the optimal peri-
odic parity matrix Vk. Because the parity-space approach
handles each time instant independently and there is no sta-
bility problem, the solutions of problems (87)–(91) at each
time instant are independent of each other and can be ob-
tained following the procedures introduced in Section 2.2.
The threshold Jth can be calculated by (23) or (26) accord-
ing to the requirement on FAR, while the residual evaluation
function is selected as the amplitude (22) of the residual sig-
nal.
If the order s of the parity relation (82) is an integer mul-
tiple of the period θ, then the periodic parity-space approach
is equivalent with a bank of residual generators (79). In com-
parison, the periodic parity space approach provides more
flexibility. The order of the parity relation s needs not to be
related to the period θ. Moreover, s may take different val-
ues at different time instants. In this case, the threshold for
the residual evaluation may need to be chosen differently at
different time.
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3.2.2. Periodic observer-based approach
Assume that (A(k),C(k)) is detectable. A periodic observer-
based residual generator can be constructed as
x̂(k + 1) = A(k)x̂(k) + B(k)u(k) + L(k)(y(k)− ŷ(k)),
r(k) =W(k)(y(k)− ŷ(k)),
ŷ(k) = C(k)x̂(k) +D(k)u(k),
(92)
where L(k) and W(k) are θ-periodic observer gain matrix
and weighting matrix, respectively. The residual dynamics is
governed by
e(k + 1)=(A(k)−L(k)C(k))e(k) + (Ed(k)−L(k)Fd(k)
)
d(k)
+
(
Ef (k)− L(k)F f (k)
)
f (k),
r(k) =W(k)(C(k)e(k) + Fd(k)d(k) + F f (k) f (k)
)
,
(93)
where e(k) = x(k)− x̂(k).
To enhance the robustness of the FD system to the un-
known disturbances without loss of the sensitivity to the
faults, the optimal design problem is formulated as
sup
L(k),W(k)
JLTP,OBS,∞/∞
(
L(k),W(k)
)
= sup
L(k),W(k)
sup d=0, f∈l2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖ f ‖2
)
sup f=0,d∈l2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖d‖2
) ,
(94)
sup
L(k),W(k)
JLTP,OBS,−/∞
(
L(k),W(k)
)
= sup
L(k),W(k)
inf d=0, f∈l2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖ f ‖2
)
sup f=0,d∈l2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖d‖2
) .
(95)
The solutions of optimization problems (94)-(95) are de-
rived by solving an equivalent optimization problem for the
cyclically lifted LTI systems first and then recover the periodic
matrices L(k) and W(k) [24].
Solution to optimization problems (94)-(95)
Assume that (A(k),Ed(k),C(k),Fd(k)) is regular. Then
L(k) = −LTd (k), W(k) =Wd(k) (96)
solve optimization problems (94)-(95) simultaneously,
where Wd(k) is the left inverse of a full column rank ma-
trix Hd(k) satisfying Hd(k)HTd (k) = C(k)Xd(k)CT(k) +
Fd(k)FTd (k), and (Xd(k),Ld(k)) is the stabilizing solution to
the difference periodic Riccati system (DPRS)
[
Ωd,11 Ωd,12
ΩTd,12 Ωd,22
]
×
[
I
Ld(k)
]
= 0 , (97)
where Ωd,11 = A(k)Xd(k)AT(k) − Xd(k + 1) + Ed(k)ETd (k),
Ωd,12 = A(k)Xd(k)CT(k) + Ed(k)FTd (k), and Ωd,22 =
C(k)Xd(k)CT(k) + Fd(k)FTd (k). An alternative solution to
problem (95), if (A(k),Ef (k), C(k),F f (k)) is regular, is given
by
L(k) = −LTf (k), W(k) =Wf (k), (98)
where Wf (k) is the left inverse of a full column rank ma-
trix Hf (k) satisfying Hf (k)HTf (k) = C(k)Xf (k)CT(k) +
F f (k)FTf (k), and (Xf (k),L f (k)) is the stabilizing solution to
the DPRS
[
Ω f ,11 Ω f ,12
ΩTf ,12 Ω f ,22
]
×
[
I
L f (k)
]
= 0, (99)
where Ω f ,11 = A(k)Xf (k)AT(k) − Xf (k + 1) + Ef (k)ETf (k),
Ω f ,12 = A(k)Xf (k)CT(k) + Ef (k)FTf (k), and Ω f ,22 =
C(k)Xf (k)CT(k) + F f (k)FTf (k). It is interesting to note the
following connections between different approaches.
(i) Periodic observer-based residual generator (92) can be
rewritten into the form of lifted reformulation-based
LTI observer (76) with
Lτ =
[
Lτ,1 Lτ,2 · · · Lτ,θ],
Lτ,i = ΨA(k)−L(k)C(k)(τ + θ, τ + i)L(τ + i− 1),
Wτ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Wτ,1,1 O · · · O
Wτ,2,1 Wτ,2,2
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . O
Wτ,θ,1 · · · Wτ,θ,θ−1 Wτ,θ,θ
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
Wτ,i, j = W(τ + i− 1), if i = j,
Wτ,i, j = −W(τ + i− 1)C(τ + i− 1)
×ΨA(k)−L(k)C(k)(τ + i− 1, τ + j)L(τ + j − 1)
if i > j, i = 1, 2, . . . , θ, j = 1, 2, . . . , θ.
(100)
Recalling the discussion in Section 3.1.1, the physical
meaning is that the periodic observer-based residual
generator naturally satisfies the causality condition. It
is further proven that, if the parameters (L(k),W(k))
of the periodic observer-based residual generator (92)
solve optimization problems (94) or (95), then the pa-
rameters (Lτ ,Wτ) of the LTI observer (76) got by (100)
will solve optimization problems in the form of (60)-
(61).
(ii) Similar as in LTI systems, the periodic parity-space
approach and periodic observer-based approach are
closely related. Assume that the periodic vector
vk =
[
vk,0 vk,1 · · · vk,s] (101)
satisfies vkHo,s,k = 0. Then a periodic functional
observer-based residual generator in the form of
z(k + 1) = G(k)z(k) +H(k)u(k) + L(k)y(k),
r(k) = w(k)z(k) + q(k)u(k) + p(k)y(k)
(102)
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with z ∈Rs, r ∈R, can be readily obtained as [45]
G(k) =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
0 0 · · · 0 gk,1
1 0
. . .
... gk,2
...
. . .
. . . 0
...
0 · · · 1 0 gk,s−1
0 · · · 0 1 gk,s
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
L(k) = −
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
vk+s,0
vk+s−1,1
...
vk+1,s−1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
−
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
gk,1
gk,2
...
gk,s
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
vk,s,
w(k) = [0 0 · · · 0 −1],
p(k) = vk,s,
H(k) = T(k + 1)B(k)− L(k)D(k),
q(k) = −p(k)D(k),
(103)
where periodic scalars gk,1, . . . , gk,s appearing in ma-
trices G(k),L(k) are free parameters and should be
selected to guarantee the stability of G(k). More-
over, if vk realizes a full decoupling from the un-
known disturbances, that is, vk[Ho,s,k Hd,s,k] = 0, then
the functional observer-based residual generator (102)
also achieves a full decoupling, that is, r(k) = 0,
∀u(k),d(k). This provides an approach to design full
decoupling observer-based residual generator.
(iii) We would like to point out that, for the LTI system
(1), a residual generator with periodic gain matrix L(k)
and periodic weighting matrix W(k) will not improve
the FD performance under performance index (94).
4. FD OF SAMPLED-DATA SYSTEMS
The study on FD problems of sampled-data (SD) systems has
been motivated by the digital implementation of controllers
and monitoring systems. Figure 1 sketches a typical applica-
tion of an FD system in a process control system. The pro-
cess under consideration is a continuous-time process. Both
the controller and the FD system are discrete-time systems
which are implemented on a computer system or on an em-
bedded microprocessor. The sensor output signals are dis-
cretized by the A/D converters and then fed to the controller
as well as to the FD system. The D/A converters convert the
discrete-time control input signals into continuous-time sig-
nals. Since both continuous-time and discrete-time signals
exist in the system, the system design should be indeed con-
sidered from the viewpoint of an SD system [46, 47]. The
intersample behavior is the main factor that should be con-
sidered in developing FD algorithms for the SD systems. In
practice, it happens often that the A/D and D/A converters
are working at different sampling rates [48–53]. In this sec-
tion, we will review the FD methods for the SD systems with
various sampling mechanisms.
u(t) y(t)
d(t) f (t)
Continuous-time
process
D/A A/D
υ(k) ψ(k)
FDI unit
Control unit
Information
about fault
Computer
Figure 1: Schematic description of the application of an FDI system
in a process control system.
4.1. System description
Assume that, in the SD systems, the process is a continuous
LTI process represented by
ẋ(t) = Acx(t) + Bcu(t) + Edcd(t) + Ef c f (t),
y(t) = Cx(t), (104)
where Ac,Bc,Edc,Ef c, and C are known constant matrices of
appropriate dimensions. In single-rate sampled-data (SSD)
systems, the A/D converter and the D/A converter are, re-
spectively, described by
ψ(k) = y(kh), (105)
u(t) = υ(k), kh  t < (k + 1)h, (106)
where h is the sampling period, ψ ∈ Rm is the sampled pro-
cess output signal, υ ∈ Rp is the discrete-time control in-
put sequence delivered by the controller program. In mul-
tirate sampled-data (MSD) systems, the A/D converters and
the D/A converters may work with different sampling rates
and thus modeled, respectively, by
ψl(k
l) = yl(klTy,l), l = 1, 2, . . . ,m; kl = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
(107)
uj(t) = υj
(
k j
)
, k jTu, j ≤ t <
(
k j + 1
)
Tu, j ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , p; k j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (108)
where Ty,l and Tu, j denote, respectively, the sampling peri-
ods of the A/D converter in the lth output channel and the
D/A converter in the jth input channel. A more general class
of systems are nonuniformly sampled-data (NSD) systems,
where the sampling instants may be multirate, asynchronous,
and nonequidistantly distributed, that is,
ψl
(
kl
) = yl
(
ty,kl
)
, l = 1, 2, . . . ,m; kl = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
uj(t) = υj
(
k j
)
, tu,k j ≤ t < tu,k j+1,
j = 1, 2, . . . , p; k j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
(109)
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where ty,kl represent the sampling instants in the lth output
channel and tu,k j the time instants at which the jth control
input is updated. It is worth mentioning that a special kind
of NSD systems, where the sampling instants are nonequidis-
tant spaced but periodic, has been studied in the literature
rather intensively [54–57].
4.2. FD of SSD systems
Conventionally, an FD system can be designed for the SSD
system by indirect approaches, that is,
(i) analog design and SD implementation, or
(ii) discrete-time design based on the discretization of the
process model.
Motivated by the development of sampled-data control [46,
47], in the last years the FD problem of the SSD systems have
been studied from the viewpoint of direct design to take into
account the intersample behavior and eliminate the approxi-
mation made during the design [26, 58–60].
The dynamics of the SSD system at the sampling instants
can be described by
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bυ(k) + d(k) + f (k),
ψ(k) = Cx(k), (110)
where
A = eAch, B =
∫ h
0
eActBcdt,
d(k) =
∫ h
0
eAc(h−τ)Edcd(kh + τ)dτ,
f (k) =
∫ h
0
eAc(h−τ)Ef c f (kh + τ)dτ.
(111)
It is worth noticing that in SD systems there is a significant
difference between u(t) and d(t), f (t). Due to the D/A con-
verter (106), u(t) is a piecewise constant signal. The influ-
ence of u(t) on y(t) is exactly known from the information
of υ(k) and can thus be completely compensated in residual
generation. In comparison, d(t) and f (t) are unknown sig-
nals. Hence, the key is to study the influence of continuous-
time signals d(t) and f (t) on the discrete-time sampled out-
put signals ψ(k) and residual signals r(k).
4.2.1. Parity-relation-based FD scheme for SSD systems
A parity-relation-based residual generator
r(k) = Vs
(
ψk,s −Hu,sυk,s
)
(112)
can be used for residual generation, where VsHo,s = 0,
ψk,s, υk,s,Ho,s, and Hu,s are constructed according to (6). To
describe the intersample behavior, for a continuous-time sig-
nal δ(t) with δ standing for d and f , an operator is defined
as follows:
Ψδδk,s(t) =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
δ(k − s)
δ(k − s + 1)
...
δ(k)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
=
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
∫ h
0e
Ac(h−τ)Eδcδ
(
(k − s)h + τ)dτ
∫ h
0e
Ac(h−τ)Eδcδ
(
(k − s + 1)h + τ)dτ
...
∫ h
0e
Ac(h−τ)Eδcδ(kh + τ)dτ
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
.
(113)
The residual dynamics can be expressed with the help of op-
erators as
r(k) = VsH
(
Ψddk,s(t) +Ψ
f fk,s(t)
)
,
H =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
O O · · · O
C O
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . O
CAs−1 · · · C O
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
.
(114)
The influence of the continuous-time signal δ(t) over the
time interval [(k − s)h, (k + 1)h) on the discrete-time signal
Ψδδk,s(t) is measured by
σ
(
VsHΨ
δ(Ψδ
)∗
HTVTs
) = sup
δ∈L2,[(k−s)h,(k+1)h)
rT(k)r(k)
‖δ‖22,[(k−s)h,(k+1)h)
,
σ
(
VsHΨ
δ(Ψδ
)∗
HTVTs
) = inf
δ∈L2,[(k−s)h,(k+1)h)
rT(k)r(k)
‖δ‖22,[(k−s)h,(k+1)h)
,
(115)
where (Ψδ)
∗
denotes the adjoint of the operator Ψδ which
uniquely satisfies
〈
Ψδδk,s(t),βs(k)
〉 = 〈δk,s(t),
(
Ψδ
)∗
βs(k)
〉
(116)
for any vector βs(k) of compatible dimensions. The opti-
mization problems are thus formulated as
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JSSD,PS,∞/∞
(
Vs
)= max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σ
(
VsHΨ
f (Ψ f
)∗
HTVTs
)
σ
(
VsHΨ
d(Ψd
)∗
HTVTs
) ,
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JSSD,PS,−/∞
(
Vs
)= max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σ
(
VsHΨ
f (Ψ f
)∗
HTVTs
)
σ
(
VsHΨ
d(Ψd
)∗
HTVTs
) ,
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JSSD,PS,i/∞
(
Vs
) = max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σi
(
VsHΨ
f (Ψ f
)∗
HTVTs
)
σ
(
VsHΨ
d(Ψd
)∗
HTVTs
) .
(117)
An analytical expression can be obtained for Ψδ(Ψδ)
∗
as
Ψδ
(
Ψδ
)∗ = diag{EδETδ ,EδETδ , . . . ,EδETδ
}
,
EδE
T
δ =
∫ h
0
eAcτEδcE
T
δce
ATc τdτ.
(118)
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As a result, optimization problems (117) are transformed
into some equivalent optimization problems:
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JSSD,PS,∞/∞
(
Vs
) = max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σ2
(
VsH f ,s
)
σ2
(
VsHd,s
) ,
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JSSD,PS,−/∞
(
Vs
) = max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σ2
(
VsH f ,s
)
σ2
(
VsHd,s
) ,
max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
JSSD,PS,i/∞
(
Vs
) = max
Vs,VsHo,s=0
σ2i
(
VsH f ,s
)
σ2
(
VsHd,s
) ,
(119)
where H f ,s and Hd,s are built based on (A,E f ,C,O) and
(A,Ed,C,O) in a way similar to Hu,s in (6). The equivalent
optimization problems (119) are of the standard form and
can be solved as introduced in Section 2.2.
4.2.2. Observer-based FD scheme for SSD systems
An observer-based residual generator is constructed as
x̂(k + 1) = Ax̂(k) + Bυ(k) + L(ψ(k)− ψ̂(k)),
r(k) =W(ψ(k)− ψ̂(k)) ψ̂(k) = Cx̂(k). (120)
To describe the influence of continuous-time signals d(t) and
f (t) on the discrete-time residual signal r(k) in the frequency
domain, operator Γδ (δ standing for d or f ) is introduced as
Γδδ( jω) = 1
h
∞∑
k=−∞
Gδ
(
jω + jkωs
)
δ
(
jω + jkωs
)
,
Gδ(s) = C(sI − Ac)−1Eδc, ωs = 2π
h
.
(121)
Based on it, the residual dynamics can be expressed as
r
(
e jωh
) =WM̂u
(
e jωh
)(
Γdd( jω) + Γ f f ( jω)
)
,
M̂u
(
e jωh
) = I − C(e jwhI − A + LC)−1L.
(122)
Let Eδ be given by (118). Then
ΓδΓ
∗
δ = C
(
e jωhI − A)−1EδETδ
(
e− jωhI − AT)−1CT. (123)
Based on it, theH2/H2 optimal design problem is solved [59].
Further, it was shown that the H∞/H∞,H−/H∞ and Hi/H∞
design problems of the SSD system are equivalent to that of a
discrete LTI system and can be obtained by solving equivalent
optimization problems [26, 60]:
sup
L,W
JSSD,OBS,∞/∞(L,W) = sup
L,W
sup d=0, f∈L2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖ f ‖2
)
sup f=0,d∈L2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖d‖2
)
= sup
L,W
∥
∥Gr f (z)
∥
∥∞∥
∥Grd(z)
∥
∥∞
,
sup
L,W
JSSD,OBS,−/∞(L,W) = sup
L,W
inf d=0, f∈L2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖ f ‖2
)
sup f=0,d∈L2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖d‖2
)
= sup
L,W
∥
∥Gr f (z)
∥
∥−∥
∥Grd(z)
∥
∥∞
,
sup
L,W
JSSD,OBS,i/∞(L,W) = sup
L,W
σi
(
Gr f
(
e jωh
))
∥
∥Grd(z)
∥
∥∞
Grδ(z) =WC(zI − A + LC)−1Eδ , δ = d, f .
(124)
4.2.3. Influence of sampling on full decoupling
No matter which residual generation approach is adopted,
due to the sampling effect, the full decoupling becomes more
difficult in SD systems than in the original continuous-time
systems, because after sampling the dimension of the influ-
ence space of the unknown disturbances becomes
rank Ed = rank EdETd = rank
∫ h
0
eAcτEdcE
T
dce
ATc τdτ
≥ rank Edc,
(125)
that is, the equivalent number of the unknown disturbances
may increase [58].
4.3. FD of MSD systems
Under some assumptions, the FD problem of MSD systems
has been considered in [61–64]. The MSD system is in na-
ture a periodic system. The system period, denoted by T ,
is the least common multiple of the sampling periods [52].
The maximal common multiplier of the sampling periods is
often called base period. From the FD viewpoint, in MSD
systems only those time instants with sampled outputs are
of interest. In [65], the basic idea of the proposed FD ap-
proach is to get the input-output relations of the MSD at the
base periods at first and then downsample them according
to different sampling periods to get the parity relation of the
MSD system. In [66], a so-called fast rate residual generator
is proposed, which generates a residual signal as soon as a
new measurement is available. The basic idea is to reformu-
late the MSD system as a system with periodic output equa-
tions. The problem of fast rate residual generation is further
pursued by [67, 68], where the basic ideas are, respectively,
to compute the parity matrix Vs and the postfilter R(z) for
lifted system model. To satisfy the causality constraint, the
freedoms in matrix Ps and R(z) are used. Most recently, a
unified and simplified approach to the FD of the MSD sys-
tems is proposed by [69], which considers the special prob-
lem formulation of fault detection and shows clearly the dif-
ference between control problem and FD problem. The basic
idea of [69] is to remodel the MSD system as a nonuniformly
sampled-data system and then use periodic or time varying
system theory to design the FD system.
Denote with {tk} the sequence of time instants at which
one or more sampled outputs are available, t0 < t1 < · · · <
tk < tk+1 < · · · . Let ψ(k) represent the vector of sampled
output signals at time instant tk. The dimension of ψ(k) is
time-varying and upper bounded by m. Let x(k) = x(tk).
For the purpose of FD, the MSD system described by (104),
(107), and (108) can be equivalently remodeled as
x(k + 1) = A(k)x(k) + u(k) + d(k) + f (k),
ψ(k) = C(k)x(k),
(126)
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where
A(k) = eAc(tk+1−tk),
u(k) =
∫ tk+1
tk
eAc(tk+1−t)Bcu(t)dt,
d(k) =
∫ tk+1
tk
eAc(tk+1−t)Edcd(t)dt,
f (k) =
∫ tk+1
tk
eAc(tk+1−t)Ef c f (t)dt.
(127)
The new description is different from other descriptions
available in the literature [66–68] and considers the transi-
tion of system dynamics only at the time instants with sam-
pled outputs. The terms d(k) and f (k) characterize, respec-
tively, the influence of the disturbances and the faults on the
sampled outputs. As υ1, . . . , υp are available and the models
of the D/A converters (108) are known, u(k) and thus the
influence of the control input vector on the sampled out-
puts can be completely reconstructed and easily compen-
sated. The matrices A(k) and C(k) are time varying matrices,
as tk+1−tk is time-varying with respect to time k. In the MSD
system, due to the periodicity of the sampling time sequence,
A(k),C(k) are periodic matrices. FD systems can be designed
for the MSD system based on the time-varying model (126).
4.3.1. Parity-relation-based FD scheme for MSD systems
The input-output relationship of (126) over the moving
horizon [tk−s, tk], where s denotes the length of the moving
horizon, is
ψ̃(k) = Ho,s,kx(k − s) +Hs,k
(
ũ(k) + d̃(k) + f̃ (k)
)
, (128)
where ψ̃(k), ũ(k), d̃(k), and f̃ (k) are stacked vectors based on
ψ( j),u( j),d( j), and f ( j), j = k− s, . . . , k, respectively, Ho,s,k
is constructed according to (83),
Hs,k =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
O O · · ·
C(k − s + 1) . . . . . .
...
. . . O
C(k)A(k − 1) · · ·A(k − s + 1) · · · C(k)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
.
(129)
Build a parity-relation-based residual generator with
r(k) = Vk
(
ψ̃(k)−Hs,kũ(k)
)
, VkHo,s,k = 0, (130)
where Vk is a periodically time-varying parity matrix (or
vector). To describe the influence of continuous-time sig-
nals d(t), f (t) on the multirate-sampled outputs, linear time-
varying operators Ψδk (δ standing for d or f ),
δ̃(k) = Ψδkδk(t) =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
∫ tk−s+1
tk−s e
Ac(tk−s+1−t)Eδcδ(t)dt
∫ tk−s+2
tk−s+1e
Ac(tk−s+2−t)Eδcδ(t)dt
...
∫ tk
tk−1e
Ac(tk−t)Eδcδ(t)dt
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
, (131)
are introduced and the residual dynamics is described by
r(k) = VkHs,k
(
d̃(k) + f̃ (k)
) = VkHs,k
(
Ψdkdk(t) +Ψ
f
k fk(t)
)
.
(132)
The optimal selection of Vk can be formulated simi-
lar to (117) with Ψd(Ψd)
∗
and Ψ f (Ψ f )
∗
substituted by
Ψdk(Ψ
d
k)
∗
and Ψ
f
k (Ψ
f
k )
∗
, respectively. Using the same tech-
nique, Ψδk(Ψ
δ
k)
∗
are derived to be
Ψδk
(
Ψδk
)∗ = diag{Ψδk,s, . . . ,Ψδk,1
}
,
Ψδk, j =
∫ tk− j+1−tk− j
0
eActEδcE
T
δce
ATc tdt, j = s, . . . , 1.
(133)
Due to the periodicity ofΨδk(Ψ
δ
k)
∗
, the optimization problem
needs to be solved over one period.
4.3.2. Observer-based FD scheme for MSD systems
For the aim of fault detection, a fast rate time-varying
observer-based residual generator can be constructed as
x̂(k + 1) = A(k)x̂(k) + u(k) + L(k)(ψ(k)− ψ̂(k)),
r(k) =W(k)(ψ(k)− ψ̂(k)), ψ̂(k) = C(k)x̂(k),
(134)
where the gain matrix L(k) and the weighting matrix W(k)
are time-varying matrices to be determined. The dimensions
of L(k) and W(k) may change with the number of available
sampled output signals. Considering the periodicity of the
matrices A(k),C(k), (134) can be designed as a periodic ob-
server. Define the state estimation error as e(k) = x(k)−x̂(k).
The dynamics of residual generator (134) is governed by
e(k + 1) = (A(k)− L(k)C(k))e(k) + d(k) + f (k),
r(k) =W(k)C(k)e(k).
(135)
Introduce linear time-varying operators Γδk (δ standing for d
or f ),
Γδkδk(t) =
∫ tk+1
tk
eAc(tk+1−t)Eδcδ(t)dt, (136)
to rewrite the residual dynamics as
e(k + 1) = (A(k)− L(k)C(k))e(k) + Γdkdk(t) + Γ fk fk(t),
r(k) =W(k)C(k)e(k).
(137)
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To enhance the robustness of the FD system to the unknown
disturbances without loss of the sensitivity to the faults, the
design problem is formulated as
sup
L(k),W(k)
JMSD,OBS,∞/∞
(
L(k),W(k)
)
= sup
L(k),W(k)
sup d=0, f∈L2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖ f ‖2
)
sup f=0,d∈L2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖d‖2
) ,
sup
L(k),W(k)
JMSD,OBS,−/∞
(
L(k),W(k)
)
= sup
L(k),W(k)
inf d=0, f∈L2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖ f ‖2
)
sup f=0,d∈L2−{0}
(‖r‖2/‖d‖2
) .
(138)
By analyzing Γδk(Γ
δ
k)
∗
, optimization problems (138) are
transformed into equivalent optimization problems of dis-
crete LTP system
e(k + 1)=(A(k)−L(k)C(k))e(k)+Ed(k)deq(k)+E f (k) feq(k),
r(k) =W(k)C(k)e(k),
(139)
where the l2-norms of deq(k) and feq(k) in (139) have the
same upper bounds, respectively, with the L2-norms of d(t)
and f (t) in (104), the matrices Ed(k) and E f (k) are time-
varying matrices reflecting the sampling effect and satisfy
Eδ(k)E
T
δ (k) =
∫ tk+1−tk
0
eActEδcE
T
δce
ATc tdt. (140)
Then, optimization problems (138) can be solved with the
approaches introduced in Section 3.2.2.
4.4. FD of NSD systems
The same design procedures introduced in the last subsec-
tion can be applied to the FD of NSD systems by reordering
the sampling instants. The main difference lies in that in gen-
eral NSD systems, A(k),C(k),Ed(k),E f (k) are time-varying
matrices but not periodic matrices. In consequence, for the
NSD systems
(i) if the parity space approach is used, then the time-
varying parity matrix V(k) needs to be calculated at
each time instant,
(ii) if the observer-based approach is adopted, then the ob-
server gain matrix L(k) needs to guarantee the stability
of the resulting linear time-varying system.
4.5. Influence of sampling period on
optimal FD performance
Sampling period is an important parameter in SD systems.
Recently, the influence of the sampling period on the optimal
FD performance has been investigated in [70, 71]. Suppose
that for a given continuous-time process (104) three differ-
ent sampling schemes are considered: single-rate sampling
with sampling period h, single-rate sampling with sampling
period ρh, multirate sampling with base period h and system
period ρh, where ρ ≥ 1 is an integer. It is proven that the
optimal performance indeces are related by
JSSD,OBS,∞/∞,h ≥ JMSD,OBS,∞/∞ ≥ JSSD,OBS,∞/∞,ρh,
JSSD,PS,∞/∞,h ≥ JMSD,PS,∞/∞ ≥ JSSD,PS,∞/∞,ρh.
(141)
That means that, with the increase of the sampling period,
the FD performance will become worse. It can be intu-
itively interpreted as the consequence of information reduc-
tion caused by the increase of the sampling period. However,
we would like to emphasize that such a conclusion does not
hold for all performance indices, for instance, theH−/H∞ in-
dex.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, standard methods for FD in discrete LTI sys-
tems have been reviewed and recent development in FD for
discrete LTP and SD systems has been summarized. In case
of discrete LTI systems, the basic idea, full decoupling and
optimization problems, and the corresponding solutions are
introduced. It can be seen that different FD approaches are
closely related to each other. The FD problem of discrete LTP
systems can be handled either indirectly by lifting or directly
by considering the periodicity of the system matrices. In SD
systems the main problem is to take into account the inter-
sample behavior and to develop direct FD approaches. With
the aid of operators, the FD problem of SSD, MSD, and NSD
systems can be transformed, respectively, into the FD prob-
lem of discrete LTI, LTP, and linear time-varying systems. The
methods introduced in this paper have found several inter-
esting applications in the emerging research area of embed-
ded networked control systems (emNCS) [72, 73]. Because
of the limited data rate, the sampling mechanisms become
an important design parameter in emNCS and have decisive
influence on the real-time network and computing perfor-
mance and FD performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is well recognized that many practical dynamical sys-
tems are subject to various environmental changes, unknown
disturbances, and changing operating conditions, thus sen-
sors/actuators/components failure and faults in those sys-
tems are inevitable. Since any faults/failures in a dynamical
system may lead to significant performance degradation, se-
rious system damages, and even loss of human life, it is es-
sential to be able to detect and identify faults and failures in
a timely manner so that necessary protective measures can
be taken in advance. To that end, fault diagnosis of dynamic
systems has received much attention and significant progress
has been made in recent years in searching for both data-
driven and model-based diagnosis techniques: see [1–5] and
the references therein.
Much attention has been devoted to the development
of robust fault-detection methods under external distur-
bances for continuous time systems. Since most (continu-
ous) dynamical systems are nowadays controlled using dig-
ital devices, it is also important to understand those theoret-
ical development in the digital (sampled-data) setting. Fur-
thermore, it has been shown in [6] that sample-data fault-
detection problem can be converted to equivalent discrete
time-detection problem using certain discretization method
and thus discrete time fault-detection is of great importance
and most nature for modern digital implementation.
One of the particular interesting techniques among
all the model-based techniques is observer-based fault-
detection filter design [1]. It has been shown in many
theoretical studies and applications that suitably designed
observer-based fault-detection filters are easy to implement
in discrete systems and can be very effective in detecting
sensors, actuators, and system components faults. There are
significant amount of works addressing this problem using
Kalman filter related techniques [7–9]. Nevertheless, find-
ing systemic design methods for systems subject to unknown
disturbances and model uncertainties have been proven to
be difficult. Since known/unknown disturbances, noise, and
model uncertainties are unavoidable for any practical sys-
tems, it is essential in the design of any fault-detection filter
to take these effects into consideration so that fault detection
can be done reliably and robustly. To that effect, many robust
filter design techniques, such as H∞ optimization, LMI, par-
ity space, and eigen-structure assignment techniques, have
been applied to fault detection filter design with limited suc-
cess [10–15]. The reason is that a fault detection filter design
is really a multiple objective design task. It needs not only
rejecting disturbance, noise and being insensitive to model
uncertainties, it also needs to be as sensitive as possible to
possible faults so that early detection of faults is possible.
Unfortunately, these two design objectives are almost always
conflicting with each other. Hence a design tradeoff between
these two objectives is unavoidable and needs to be addressed
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explicitly in the design process. To do that, some suitable de-
sign criteria for both objectives have to be defined. It has been
widely accepted in the field that H2 norm and H∞ of the
transfer matrix from disturbances to fault detection residu-
als are good candidates for measuring up the disturbance re-
jection capability of a fault detection system. In some cases,
H2 norm of the transfer function matrix from faults to fault
detection residual signals is also suitable for evaluating the
fault detection system’s sensitivity to faults. It has also been
recognized that the H− index, first introduced by Hou and
Patton [16] and further extended by Liu et al. [17], seems to
be a very appropriate measure of the fault-detection sensitiv-
ity [1–3]. Although this concept was originally proposed for
continuous time system, it is quite straightforward to extend
this concept to discrete time systems. With such defined per-
formance objectives, several discrete time fault detection de-
sign problems can be formulated as multiple objective opti-
mization problems by minimizing the effects of disturbances
and maximizing the fault sensitivity, for example, H−/H∞
problem, H∞/H∞ problem, H2/H∞ problem, H−/H2 prob-
lem, and H2/H2 problem. These problems have attracted a
great deal of attention recently, [6, 18–25]. However, most of
the results obtained in the existing literature are either con-
servative or complicate to apply. Furthermore, they are usu-
ally not guaranteed to be optimal. A notable exception is the
work by Ding et al. in [26], where optimal solutions to some
formulations of continuous H−/H∞ and H∞/H∞ problems
are given. Zhang et al. in [27] also give an optimal solution to
H∞/H∞ problem for linear discrete time periodic systems.
We have developed a new technique to solve the above
problems for continuous time systems in [28]. In this pa-
per, we will carry out the parallel development for discrete
time problems. Although there are considerable similarities
between the continuous and the discrete time solutions, there
are also significant differences in some cases where we can
give more explicit solutions in discrete time cases that can-
not be done in continuous time cases. In addition, explicit
discrete time solutions have their own merits in applications.
It turns out that our solutions are surprising simple once the
problems are suitably formulated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces the notations and summarizes some key facts that
will be used in the later sections. Section 3 gives the math-
ematical formulations of various fault-detection problems
to be solved in this paper. The analytic and optimal solu-
tions for H−/H∞ problem and H∞/H∞ problem are given
in Section 4. The solution for H2/H∞ problem is given in
Section 5. The solutions for various H−/H2 problems are
discussed in Sections 6–8. Some numerical examples of our
fault detection designs are shown in Section 9. Some conclu-
sions are given in Section 10.
2. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
The notations used in this paper are quite standard. The
set of m by n real (complex) matrices is denoted as Rm×n
(Cm×n). For a matrix A ∈ Cm×n we use AT to denote
its transpose and A′ for its complex conjugate transpose.
For a Hermitian matrix A = A′ ∈ Cm×n, λ(A) represents
the largest eigenvalue of A and λ(A) represents the smallest
eigenvalue value of A. For A ∈ Cm×n, σ(A) =
√
λ(AA′) =√
λ(A′A) denotes the largest singular value of A and σ(A) =√
λ(AA′) (
√
λ(A′A)) denotes the smallest singular value of A
if m ≤ n (m ≥ n). The n× n identity matrix is denoted as In
and the m × n zero matrix is denoted as 0m,n, with the sub-
scripts dropped if they can be inferred from context.
Discrete transfer matrices and Z-transforms of signals
are represented using bold characters and sometimes in de-
pendence of the variable z. A state-space realization of a
transfer matrix G(z) is denoted as
G(z) =
[
A B
C D
]
(1)
such that G(z) = D + C(zI − A)−1B. We define G∼(z) :=
GT(z−1) and denote G−1(z) as the inverse of G(z) if G(z) is
square and invertible. Now suppose
G(z) =
[
A B
C C
]
(2)
is square and D is nonsingular, then we have from [29]
G−1 =
[
A− BD−1C −BD−1
D−1C D−1
]
. (3)
We use RLm×n2 to denote the set of m × n real rational
transfer matrices with no poles on the unit circle. The super-
scripts for dimensions will usually be dropped when they are
either not important or clear from context. RH2 (= RH∞)
is the set of all stable proper transfer matrices.
For G(z) ∈RH2 we define the H2 norm of G as
‖G‖2 =
√
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
Trace
[
G∼
(
e jθ
)
G
(
e jθ
)]
dθ. (4)
For G ∈RH∞ we define the H∞ norm of G as
‖G‖∞ = sup
θ∈[0,2π]
σ
[
G
(
e jθ
)]
. (5)
Similar to the H− definitions of continuous system in [16,
17], we define the H− index of a discrete transfer matrix G
on the whole unit circle as
‖G‖[0,2π]− = inf
θ∈[0,2π]
σ
(
G
(
e jθ
))
. (6)
The H− index of G over a finite frequency range [θ1, θ2] is
defined as
‖G‖[θ1,θ2]− = inf
θ∈[θ1,θ2]
σ
(
G
(
e jθ
))
. (7)
In particular the H− index defined at θ = 0 is
‖G‖[0]− = σ
(
G
(
1
))
. (8)
If no superscript is added to the H− symbol, such as ‖G‖−,
then it represents all possible H− definitions. In many litera-
tures H− index is also called H− norm, although it is actually
not a norm.
It is easy to show from the definition of singular value of
a matrix that we have the following result [30].
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Lemma 1. Let A ∈ Cm×n and B ∈ Cn×p be two matrices with
appropriate dimensions, then σ(AB) ≤ σ(A)σ(B).
The following transfer matrix factorizations will be fre-
quently used in this paper and can be found from [29].
Lemma 2 (left coprime factorization). Let G(z) be a proper
real rational transfer matrix. A left coprime factorization (LCF)
of G is a factorization
G = M−1N, (9)
where N and M are left-coprime over RH∞. Let
G =
[
A B
C D
]
(10)
be a detectable state-space realization of G and let L be a matrix
with appropriate dimensions such that A + LC is stable, then a
left coprime factorization of G is given by
[M N] =
[
A + LC L B + LD
C I D
]
. (11)
Lemma 3 (Spectral factorization). Let G(z) be a proper real
rational transfer matrix and let
G =
[
A B
C D
]
(12)
be a detectable realization of G. Suppose D has full row rank
and
[
A−e jθ I B
C D
]
has full row rank for all θ ∈ [0, 2π]. Let P ≥
0 be the stabilizing solution to the following algebraic Riccati
equation:
APA′ − P − (APC′ + BD′)(DD′ + CPC′)−1
× (DB′ + CPA′) + BB′ = 0 (13)
such that A − (APC′ + BD′)(DD′ + CPC′)−1C is stable and
let R := DD′ +CPC′. Then the following spectral factorization
holds
WW∼ = GG∼, (14)
where W−1 ∈RH∞ and
W =
[
A
(
APC′ + BD′
)
R−1/2
C R1/2
]
. (15)
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a discrete time invariant system with disturbance
and possible faults as:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + Bdd(k) + Bf f (k),
y(k) = Cx(k) +Du(k) +Ddd(k) +Df f (k), (16)
where x(k) ∈ Rn is the state vector, y(k) ∈ Rny is
the output measurement, d(k) ∈ Rnd represents the un-
known/uncertain disturbance and measurement noise, and
f (k) ∈Rn f denotes the process, sensor or actuator fault vec-
tor. f (k) and d(k) can be modeled as different types of sig-
nals, depending on specific situations under consideration.
See Chapters 4 and 8 of [29] and [1] for some detailed dis-
cussions. Two frequently used assumptions on d(k) and f (k)
are:
(i) unknown signal with bounded energy or bounded
power;
(ii) white noise.
Different assumptions on d(k) and f (k) will lead to different
fault detection problem formulations and the solutions for
all these problems will be discussed in this paper.
All coefficient matrices in (16) are assumed to be known
constant matrices. Furthermore, the following assumptions
are made.
Assumption 1. (A,C) is detectable.
This is a standard assumption for all fault-detection
problems.
Assumption 2. Dd has full row rank.
This means that ny ≤ nd and every measurement of the
output signals is either affected by some disturbance or cor-
rupted with some measurement noise. We argue that this as-
sumption can be made without loss of any generality since
it is impossible to take perfect measurement in any practi-
cal system and furthermore it is reasonable to assume that
the measurement noise is independent of each other. So it is
reasonable to assume that Dd has full row rank. In the case
of some simplified model where Dd does not have full row
rank, we can simply add some columns to make it full row
rank. For example, suppose that Dd does not have full row
rank, then let
d̃ =
[
d
dε
]
, B̃d =
[
Bd 0n×ny
]
, D̃d =
[
Dd εIny
]
(17)
for a small ε > 0. Then D̃d has full row rank.
Assumption 3.
[ A−e jθ I Bd
C Dd
]
has full row rank for all θ ∈ [0, 2π]
or, equivalently, the transfer function matrix
Gd :=
[
A Bd
C Dd
]
(18)
has no transmission zero on the unit circle.
This assumption can be relaxed in the same way as in the
continuous time case [28].
Remark 1. We want to point out that in several recent work
on continuous time fault detection problems [17, 19, 21, 22],
it is assumed that Df has full column rank. We believe that
this assumption is extremely restrictive. The assumption im-
plies that measurement y contains directly the independent
information on every faulty component of f . In particular,
4 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
Gd
d
Gu
u
G f
f
y
MNu
+−
Q
r
Figure 1: General fault-detection filter structure.
this implies that Df cannot be zero which is usually not the
case when there is only actuator/system component fault and
no sensor fault. Furthermore, we believe that the fault detec-
tion for sensor fault is relatively easier than that for actua-
tor/system fault.
By taking Z-transform of (16) we have the system in-
put/output equation
y = Guu + Gdd + G f f , (19)
where Gu, Gd, and G f are ny×nu, ny×nd and ny×n f transfer
matrices, respectively and their state-space realizations are
[
Gu Gd G f
] =
[
A B Bd B f
C D Dd Df
]
. (20)
Since the state-space realization of Gu, Gd, and G f share the
same A and C matrices, applying Lemma 2 we can find an
LCF for the system (20)
[
Gu Gd G f
] = M−1[Nu Nd N f ], (21)
where
[
M Nu Nd N f
]
=
[
A + LC L B + LD Bd + LDd B f + LDf
C I D Dd Df
]
(22)
and L is a matrix such that A + LC is stable.
It has been shown in [2] that, without loss of generality,
the fault detection filter can take the following general form:
r = Q(My −Nuu
) = Q[M−Nu]
[
y
u
]
, (23)
where r is the residual vector for detection, Q ∈RHny×ny∞ is a
free stable transfer matrix to be designed. The filter structure
is shown in Figure 1. Replacing y in (23) by the right-hand
side of (19) and (21) we have
r = Q[Nd N f ]
[
d
f
]
= QNdd + QN f f . (24)
Denote the transfer matrices from d and f to r by Grd and
Grf, respectively, then
Grd = QNd, Grf = QN f . (25)
In general a good fault-detection filter must make a
tradeoff between two conflicting performance objectives: ro-
bustness to disturbance rejection and sensitivity to faults. To
achieve good robustness to disturbance, the influence of dis-
turbance must be minimized at the output of the residual sig-
nals. On the other hand, the residual signal should be as sen-
sitive as possible to the faults. Therefore, we need to choose
certain performance criteria for measuring these two aspects
so that the fault-detection filter design has satisfactory fault
detection sensitivity and guaranteed disturbance rejection ef-
fect.
Since an H− index is a good measurement for a transfer
function’s smallest gain, ‖Grf‖− is a reasonable performance
criterion for measuring fault detection sensitivity if f (k) is
modeled as unknown energy or power bounded signals. If
d(k) is modeled as unknown energy or power bounded sig-
nals, then H∞ norm is a widely accepted worst case measure
and ‖Grd‖∞ is a good indicator of disturbance rejection per-
formance. On the other hand, if d(k) and/or f (k) are white
noise, the H2 norms of Grd and/or Grf seem to be more suit-
able criteria. See [29] for more detailed discussions and mo-
tivations on various performance measures.
We will now formulate several fault-detection filter de-
sign problems.
Problem 1 (H−/H∞ problem). Let an uncertain system be
described by (16)–(20) and let γ > 0 be a given disturbance
rejection level. Find a stable transfer matrix Q ∈ RHny×ny∞
in (23)–(25) such that ‖Grd‖∞ ≤ γ and ‖Grf‖− is maximized,
that is,
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
}
. (26)
Problem 2 (H2/H∞problem). Let an uncertain system be de-
scribed by (16)–(20) and let γ > 0 be a given disturbance re-
jection level. Find a stable transfer matrix Q ∈ RHny×ny∞ in
(23)–(25) such that ‖Grd‖∞ ≤ γ and ‖Grf‖2 is maximized,
that is,
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥
2 :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
}
. (27)
Problem 3 (H−/H2 problem). Let an uncertain system be de-
scribed by (16)–(20) and let γ > 0 be a given disturbance re-
jection level. Find a stable transfer matrix Q ∈ RHny×ny∞ in
(23)–(25) such that ‖Grd‖2 ≤ γ and ‖Grf‖− is maximized,
that is,
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥
2 ≤ γ
}
. (28)
Remark 2. A more conventional formulation of the above
problems is to optimize the following:
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
∥∥QN f
∥∥
X∥∥QNd
∥∥
Y
, (29)
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where X and Y can be 2,∞, or−. The problem that X = Y =
2 is classical and optimal solution is available [2]. The case
for X = −,∞ and Y = ∞ has been solved recently in [26] for
continuous-time systems. A discrete solution has also been
obtained recently in [27] for the cases of X = ∞ and Y = ∞.
Before we proceed to the solutions of the above problems,
we will first establish some preliminary results.
Lemma 4. Suppose Assumption 3 is satisfied and let Gd =
M−1Nd be any left coprime factorization over RH∞. Then Nd
has no transmission zero on the unit circle or, equivalently, for
any appropriately dimensioned matrix L,
[
A + LC − e jθI Bd + LDd
C Dd
]
(30)
has full row rank for all θ ∈ [0, 2π].
Proof. The result follows by noting that
[
A + LC − e jθI Bd + LDd
C Dd
]
=
[
I L
0 I
][
A− e jθI Bd
C Dd
]
(31)
and the fact that all coprime factors have the same unstable
transmission zeros [29].
An immediate consequence of the above result is the fol-
lowing spectral factorization formula.
Lemma 5. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied and let Gd =
M−1Nd be any left coprime factorization over RH∞. Then
there is a square transfer matrix V∈RHny×ny∞ such that V−1∈
RH
ny×ny
∞ and
VV∼ = NdN∼d . (32)
In particular, if a state-space representation of Nd is given as in
(22), then a state space representation of V is given by
V =
[
A + LC
[
(A + LC)PC′ +
(
Bd + LDd
)
D′d
]
R−1/2d
C0 R1/2d
]
(33)
with
V−1
=
[
A−(APC′ + BdD′d
)
R−1d C −
(
APC′+BdD′d
)
R−1d − L
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d
]
,
(34)
where P ≥ 0 is the stabilizing solution to the Riccati equation
APA′ − P − (APC′ + BdD′d
)(
DdD
′
d + CPC
′)−1
× (DdB′d + CPA′
)
+ BdB′d = 0
(35)
such that A− (APC′ +BdD′d)(DdD′d +CPC′)−1C is stable and
Rd := DdD′d + CPC′.
Proof. Since Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied, Lemmas 3 and
4 can be applied to Nd to get VV∼ = NdN∼d , where P ≥ 0
satisfies the following Riccati equation
ALCPA
′
LC − P −
(
ALCPC′ + BLDD′d
)
R−1d
× (DdB′LD + CPA′LC
)
+ BLDB′LD = 0,
ALC := A + LC, BLD := B + LD.
(36)
It is easy to show that the above algebraic Riccati equation
can be simplified to (35). The rest of the proof follows from
some simple algebraic manipulations.
The following lemma is the key to the solutions of all the
above problems.
Lemma 6. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied. Let
V, V−1 ∈RH∞ be defined as in (32). Let
Q = ΨV−1 (37)
for Ψ ∈ RH∞ and denote Ñ f = V−1N f ∈ RH∞. Then the
fault-detection Problems 1–3 are equivalent to Problems 4–6
below, respectively.
Problem 4.
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥
− : ‖Ψ‖∞ ≤ γ
}
. (38)
Problem 5.
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥
2 : ‖Ψ‖∞ ≤ γ
}
. (39)
Problem 6.
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥
− : ‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ
}
. (40)
Proof. We will first show that Problems 1 and 2 are equivalent
to Problems 4 and 5, respectively.
Note that by Lemma 6 there exists V ∈ RH∞ such that
VV∼ = NdN∼d and V−1 ∈RH∞. Therefore,
∥∥QNd
∥∥2∞ = sup
θ∈[0,2π]
σ
(
Q
(
e jθ
)
Nd
(
e jθ
)
N∼d
(
e jθ
)
Q∼
(
e jθ
))
= sup
θ∈[0,2π]
σ
(
Q
(
e jθ
)
V
(
e jθ
)
V∼
(
e jθ
)
Q∼
(
e jθ
))
= ∥∥QV∥∥2∞,
(41)
that is, ‖QNd‖∞ = ‖QV‖∞. We can, therefore without loss
of generality, take Q in the form of Q = ΨV−1 for some
Ψ ∈ RH∞. Hence ‖QNd‖∞ = ‖QV‖∞ = ‖Ψ‖∞, so that
‖QNd‖∞ ≤ γ is equivalent to ‖Ψ‖∞ ≤ γ. Moreover, QN f =
ΨV−1N f = ΨÑ f , hence Problem 1 is equivalent to Problem
4 and Problem 2 is equivalent to Problem 5.
Next we show that Problem 3 is equivalent to Problem 6.
Note that in Problem 3, we have QNd ∈RH2. Hence,
∥∥QNd
∥∥2
2=
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
Trace
{
Q
(
e jθ
)
Nd
(
e jθ
)
N∼d
(
e jθ
)
Q∼
(
e jθ
)}
dθ
= 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
Trace
{
Q
(
e jθ
)
V
(
e jθ
)
V∼
(
e jθ
)
Q∼
(
e jθ
)}
dθ
=‖QV‖22
(42)
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such that ‖QNd‖2 = ‖QV‖2. Since QV ∈RH2 and V, V−1 ∈
RH∞, we can let Q = ΨV−1 for some Ψ ∈RH2. Therefore,
‖QNd‖2 = ‖QV‖2 = ‖Ψ‖2 so that ‖QNd‖2 ≤ γ is equivalent
to ‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ. Moreover, QN f = ΨV−1N f = ΨÑ f , hence
Problem 3 is equivalent to Problem 6.
We will provide optimal solutions for each of the above
problems in the following sections.
4. H−/H∞ FAULT-DETECTION FILTER DESIGN
In this section, we give a complete solution for the H−/H∞
fault-detection filter design problem, that is, Problem 1 or
Problem 4.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied. Let
[
Gu Gd G f
] = M−1[Nu Nd N f ] (43)
be any left coprime factorization over RH∞ and let V ∈RH∞
be a square transfer matrix such that V−1 ∈RH∞ and VV∼ =
NdN∼d . Then
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
} = γ∥∥V−1N f
∥∥
− (44)
and an optimal fault-detection filter for Problem 1 is given by
r = Qopt
[
M−Nu]
[
y
u
]
, (45)
where
Qopt = γV−1. (46)
Proof. Note that by Lemma 6, we only need to solve Problem
4:
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥
− : ‖Ψ‖∞ ≤ γ
}
. (47)
From Lemma 1 we know that for every frequency θ ∈
[0, 2π],
σ
(
Ψ
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
)) ≤ σ(Ψ(e jθ))σ(Ñ f
(
e jθ
))
(48)
so that
∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥
− ≤ ‖Ψ‖∞
∥∥Ñ f
∥∥
− ≤ γ
∥∥Ñ f
∥∥
−. (49)
By letting Ψ = γI , we have ‖Ψ‖∞ = γ and ‖ΨÑ f ‖− =
γ‖Ñ f ‖−, which means that Ψ = γI is an optimal solution
achieving the maximum.
Remark 3. The optimal fault-detection filter given in
Theorem 1 does not depend on Bf and Df matrices.
Remark 4. Note that the solution given in the above theo-
rem does not depend on the specific definitions of H− in-
dex. Hence, the solution provided here is an optimal solution
for all H− indices. However, it should be pointed out that
this optimal filter is not the only optimal solution for some
H− index criterion. For example, let Q = γL(z)V−1 where
L ∈ RH∞ is a low-pass filter with a very small bandwidth
so that ‖L(z)‖∞ = 1 and L(1) = I . Then this Q is also an
optimal solution for
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥[0]
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
}
, (50)
even though this is obviously a bad fault-detection filter be-
cause the low-pass filter L(z) would make the filter much less
sensitive to faults.
Note also that the solution given in the above theorem
is completely general and it does not depend on specific
state space representation of those coprime factorization and
spectral factorization, which may be necessary in some fault
tolerant control applications [5, 31]. On the other hand, if
those specific state-space coprime and spectral factorizations
in the previous sections are used, the optimal filter can be
written in a very simple form.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied. Let P ≥ 0
be the stabilizing solution to the Riccati equation
APA′ − P − (APC′ + BdD′d
)(
DdD
′
d + CPC
′)−1
×(DdB′d + CPA′
)
+ BdB′d = 0
(51)
such that A− (APC′ +BdD′d)(DdD′d +CPC′)−1C is stable and
let Rd = DdD′d + CPC′. Define
L0 = −
(
APC′ + BdD′d
)
R−1d . (52)
Then
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
} = γ∥∥V−1N f
∥∥
− (53)
and an optimal H−/H∞ fault-detection filter has the following
state space representation
r = Qopt
[
M−Nu]
[
y
u
]
, (54)
where
Qopt
[
M−Nu] = γ
[
A + L0C −L0 B + L0D
−R−1/2d Ct R−1/2d −R−1/2d D
]
,
V−1N f =
[
A + L0C Bf + L0Df
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d D f
]
.
(55)
In other words, the optimal H−/H∞ fault-detection filter is
the following observer:
x̂(k + 1) = (A + L0C
)
x̂(k)− L0y(t) +
(
B + L0D
)
u(k)
r(k) = γR−1/2d
(
y(k)− Cx̂(k)−Du(k)).
(56)
Proof. Note that
[
M Nu
] =
[
A + LC L B + LD
C I D
]
, (57)
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where L is a matrix with appropriate dimensions such that
A + LC is stable. Note from Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 that
Qopt = γV−1 = γ
[
A + L0C L0 − L
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d
]
. (58)
Then
Qopt
[
M−Nu
]
= γ
[
A + L0C L0 − L
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d
][
A + LC L −(B + LD)
C I −D
]
= γ
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
A + L0C L0C − LC L0 − L −
(
L0 − L
)
D
0 A + LC L −(B + LD)
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d C R
−1/2
d −R−1/2d D
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
= γ
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
A + L0C 0 L0 −
(
B + L0D
)
0 A + LC L −(B + LD)
R−1/2C 0 R−1/2d −R−1/2d D
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
= γ
[
A + L0C L0 −
(
B + L0D
)
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d −R−1/2d D
]
= γ
[
A + L0C −L0 B + L0D
−R−1/2d C R−1/2d −R−1/2d D
]
.
(59)
Similarly, we have
V−1N f
=
[
A + L0C L0 − L
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d
][
A + LC Bf + LDf
C Df
]
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
A + L0C
(
L0 − L
)
C
(
L0 − L
)
Df
0 A + LC Bf + LDf
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d C R
−1/2
d D f
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
A + L0C 0 Bf + L0Df
0 A + LC Bf + LDf
R−1/2d C 0 R
−1/2
d D f
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
=
[
A + L0C Bf + L0Df
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d D f
]
.
(60)
Remark 5. Note that the optimal fault-detection filter
Qopt
[
M−Nu] is independent of the choice of L matrix.
Remark 6. It is easy to see that our optimal filter given in
Theorems 1 and 2 is also optimal for the so-called H∞/H∞
problem
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥
∞ :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
}
(61)
and it turns out this filter is the same as the one given by
Zhang et al. in [27] under the following equivalent optimiza-
tion criterion:
max
Q
∥∥QN f
∥∥
∞∥∥QNd
∥∥∞
. (62)
5. H2/H∞ FAULT-DETECTION FILTER DESIGN
In this section, we give an optimal solution for the H2/H∞
problem stated in Section 3 as Problem 2. Similar to the so-
lution for H−/H∞ problem given in Theorems 1 and 2, we
have the following parallel results for the H2/H∞ problem.
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied. Let
[
Gu Gd G f
] = M−1[Nu Nd N f ] (63)
be any left coprime factorization over RH∞ and let V ∈RH∞
be a square transfer matrix such that V−1 ∈RH∞ and VV∼ =
NdN∼d . Then
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥
2 :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
} = γ∥∥V−1N f
∥∥
2 (64)
and the optimal fault-detection filter for Problem 1 given in
Theorems 1 and 2 is also the optimal filter for this problem.
Proof. Note that by Lemma 6, we only need to solve Problem
5:
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥
2 : ‖Ψ‖∞ ≤ γ
}
. (65)
Note that
∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥
2 ≤ ‖Ψ‖∞
∥∥Ñ f
∥∥
2 ≤ γ
∥∥Ñ f
∥∥
2. (66)
By letting Ψ = γI , we have ‖Ψ‖∞ = γ and ‖ΨÑ f ‖2 =
γ‖Ñ f ‖2, which means that Ψ = γI is an optimal solution
achieving the maximum.
6. H−/H2 FAULT-DETECTION FILTER DESIGN: CASE 1
From Lemma 6 we know that the H−/H2 problem is equiv-
alent to Problem 6, that is,
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥
− : ‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ
}
. (67)
Unlike the H−/H∞ problem studied in Section 4, we have
different solutions for the H−/H2 problem if different H−
definitions are considered. In this section and the next two
sections we will illustrate this point and give solutions for all
cases.
Theorem 4. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied. Then
sup
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥[0]
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥
2 ≤ γ
}
= ∞. (68)
Furthermore, for any given α > 0, let 2 > ε > 0 and
Qsub = γ
√
ε(2− ε)
z − 1 + ε V
−1. (69)
Then
{∥∥QsubN f
∥∥[0]
− > α ,
∥∥QsubNd
∥∥
2 ≤ γ
}
(70)
is satisfied for a sufficiently small ε > 0.
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Proof. Again note that the equivalent Problem 6 in this case
is
sup
Ψ∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥[0]
− : ‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ
}
. (71)
Take Ψ(z) = (γ√ε(2− ε))/(z − 1 + ε)I such that 2 > ε >
0. Then Ψ(1) = γ√2− ε/εI and ‖Ψ‖2 = γ. Let ε→0, then
Ψ(1)→∞, so that
∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥[0]
− = σ
(
Ψ(1)Ñ f (1)
) = γ
√
2− ε
ε
σ
(
Ñ f (1)
) −→ ∞.
(72)
Remark 7. We should point out that an optimal filter de-
signed using Theorem 4 is not necessarily good for fault de-
tection since this optimal filter can be extremely narrow-
banded near 0 frequency so that any higher frequency com-
ponent of fault may not be detected.
7. H−/H2 FAULT-DETECTION FILTER DESIGN: CASE 2
In this section, we will consider another special case where
the H− index is defined for all frequencies but with Df full
column rank. As we have mentioned before, this is a very re-
strictive case. We are interested in this case because an ana-
lytic solution is possible.
Lemma 7. Suppose Df has full column rank. Then an optimal
solution Ψopt to Problem 6
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥[0,2π]
− : ‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ
}
(73)
has the form Ψopt = UΨo and
ΨoÑ f =
[
αInf
0(ny−n f )×n f
]
, (74)
where α is a positive scalar and U is an ny × ny all-pass stable
transfer matrix.
Proof. We will first show
σ
(
Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
)) = C for every θ ∈ [0, 2π], (75)
where C is a nonnegative scalar.
Suppose there exists a Ψopt such that σ(Ψopt(e jθ)
Ñ f (e jθ)) = C does not hold. Let Θ1 denote the set of all
θ values such that σ(Ψopt(e jθ)Ñ f (e jθ)) = ‖ΨoptÑ f ‖[0,2π]− is
achieved. Let Θ2 := [0, 2π]−Θ1 such that
σ
(
Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
))
θ∈Θ1 < σ
(
Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
))
θ∈Θ2 .
(76)
Then there exists a weighting function W ∈ RHny×ny∞ such
that ‖WΨopt‖2 = ‖Ψopt‖2 and
σ
(
Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
N f
(
e jθ
))
θ∈Θ1
< σ
(
W
(
e jθ
)
Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
))
θ∈Θ1
≤ σ(W(e jθ)Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
N f
(
e jθ
))
θ∈Θ2 .
(77)
Therefore, ‖WΨoptÑ f ‖[0,2π]− > ‖ΨoptÑ f ‖
[0,2π]
− and Ψopt
is not an optimal solution. Hence, it must be true that
σ(Ψopt(e jθ)Ñ f (e jθ)) = C for every θ ∈ [0, 2π].
Next we show that
σ
(
Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
))
= σ(Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
))
for every θ ∈ [0, 2π].
(78)
Suppose there exists a Ψopt such that σ(Ψopt(e jθ1 )
Ñ f (e jθ1 )) /=σ(Ψopt(e jθ1 )Ñ f (e jθ1 )) for some θ1 , that is,
σ
(
Ψopt
(
e jθ1
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ1
))
> σ
(
Ψopt
(
e jθ1
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ1
))
= ∥∥ΨoptÑ f
∥∥[0,2π]
− .
(79)
Then a Ψ1 can be selected such that
σ
(
Ψ1
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
))=σ(Ψopt
(
e jθ
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ
))
, ∀θ∈[0,2π],
σ
(
Ψ1
(
e jθ1
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ1
))
<σ
(
Ψopt
(
e jθ1
)
Ñ f
(
e jθ1
))
,
∥∥Ψ1
∥∥
2<
∥∥Ψopt
∥∥
2.
(80)
Since σ(Ψopt(e jθ)Ñ f (e jθ)) = C for every θ ∈ [0, 2π],
‖Ψ1Ñ f ‖[0,2π]− = ‖ΨoptÑ f ‖
[0,2π]
− . Let Ψ2 = ‖Ψopt‖2/‖Ψ1‖2Ψ1,
then ‖Ψ2‖2 = ‖Ψopt‖2 and
∥∥Ψ2Ñ f
∥∥[0,2π]− =
∥∥Ψopt
∥∥
2∥∥Ψ1
∥∥
2
∥∥Ψ1Ñ f
∥∥[0,2π]−
=
∥∥Ψopt
∥∥
2∥∥Ψ1
∥∥
2
∥∥Ψopt Ñ f
∥∥[0,2π]− >
∥∥ΨoptÑ f
∥∥[0,2π]− .
(81)
Therefore, Ψopt is not optimal and by contradiction the as-
sumption is false. So σ(Ψopt(e jθ)Ñ f (e jθ)) = σ(Ψopt(e jθ)
Ñ f (e jθ)) holds for every θ ∈ [0, 2π].
Since σ(Ψopt(e jθ)Ñ f (e jθ)) = σ(Ψopt(e jθ)Ñ f (e jθ)) = C
for every θ ∈ [0, 2π], and that Df has full column rank im-
plies ny ≥ n f , ΨoptÑ f has the form
ΨoptÑ f = U
[
αInf
0(ny−n f )×n f
]
, (82)
where U is an all-pass stable transfer matrix and α is a posi-
tive scalar. Let Ψopt = UΨo, then
ΨoÑ f =
[
αInf
0(ny−n f )×n f
]
. (83)
Lemma 8. Suppose Df has full column rank. Then Problem 6
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥[0,2π]
− : ‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ
}
(84)
is equivalent to the following problem.
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Problem 7.
min
Ñ+f ∈RH
n f ×ny
2
{∥∥Ñ+f
∥∥
2
: Ñ+f Ñ f = I
}
. (85)
Proof. From Lemma 7 we know that the optimal solution to
Problem 6 has the form Ψopt = UΨo and
ΨoÑ f =
[
αInf
0(ny−n f )×n f
]
. (86)
Let Ψo =
[Ψ1
Ψ2
]
, where Ψ1 is n f ×ny and Ψ2 is (ny −n f )×ny.
Then
[Ψ1Ñ f
Ψ2Ñ f
] = [ αI0
]
so Ψ2 = 0 and ‖Ψo‖2 = ‖Ψ1‖2. Since
Problem 6 needs to maximize ‖ΨÑ f ‖− with the constraint‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ, it is equivalent to find a Ψ1 with the smallest H2
norm such that Ψ1Ñ f = I. Denote Ψ1 = Ñ+f , then Problem 6
is equivalent to Problem 7.
In [32] the solution to a dual problem of Problem 7 is
given. Similarly, we have the solution to Problem 7 given by
the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Assume
H(z) =
[
A B
C D
]
(87)
is strictly minimum phase and D has full column rank. Let
D+ = D(D′D)−1,D⊥ is chosen such that D′⊥D⊥ = I −
D(D′D)−1D′ and A0 = A − B(D+)′C, then the optimal so-
lution to problem
min
H+(z)∈RHn f ×ny2
{∥∥H+(z)
∥∥
2 : H
+(z)H(z) = I} (88)
is given by
H+(z)opt =
[
A + KC K
RC R
]
, (89)
where Q ≥ 0 is the solution to the algebraic Ricatti equation
Q = A′0QA0 − A′0QC′D′⊥
(
I +D⊥CQC′D′⊥
)−1
D⊥CQA0
+ B(D′D)−1B′,
K = −B(D+)′ − A0QC′D′⊥
(
I +D⊥CQC′D′⊥
)−1
D⊥,
R = (D+)′(I + CQC′D′⊥D⊥
)−1
.
(90)
Proof. The equation H+(z)H(z) = I is equivalent to
HT(z)(H+(z))T = I , so Problem 7 is equivalent to find-
ing an H(rinv)(z) with the smallest H2 norm such that
HT(z)H(rinv)(z) = I. Hence the conclusion in [32] can be
applied to HT(z) to get the optimal H(rinv)(z)opt. H+(z)opt is
then obtained by taking transpose of H(rinv)(z)opt.
Theorem 5. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied. LetGf has
all zeros inside the unit circle and Df has full column rank. Let
[
Gu Gd G f
] = M−1[Nu Nd N f ] (91)
be any left coprime factorization over RH∞ and let V ∈RH∞
be a square transfer matrix such that V−1 ∈RH∞ and VV∼ =
NdN∼d . Let (Ñ
+
f )opt = (V−1N f )
+
opt be the optimal solution to
Problem 7. Then
max
Q∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥QN f
∥∥[0,2π]
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
}
= γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
(92)
and an optimal fault detection filter is given by
r = Qopt
[
M−Nu]
[
y
u
]
, (93)
where
Qopt = γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
[(
V−1N f
)+
optV
−1
0
]
. (94)
Proof. Note that by Lemma 6, we only need to solve Problem
6
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥[0,2π]
− : ‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ
}
. (95)
Since Gf has all zeros inside the unit circle and V−1 ∈RH∞,
Ñ f is strictly minimum phase. From Lemmas 7–9 we know
that the optimal solutionto Problem 6 is given by
Ψopt = U γ∥∥(Ñ+f
)
opt
∥∥
2
[(
Ñ+f
)
opt
0
]
, (96)
where (Ñ+f )opt = (V−1N f )
+
opt is the optimal solution to Prob-
lem 7 and U is a unitary matrix. Take U = I , then an optimal
solution is given by
Qopt = γ∥∥(Ñ+f
)
opt
∥∥
2
[(
Ñ+f
)
opt
V−1
0
]
= γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
[(
V−1N f
)+
optV
−1
0
]
.
(97)
Again the solution given in the above theorem is general
and it does not depend on specific state-space representation
of those coprime factorization and spectral factorization. If
specific state-space coprime and spectral factorization in the
previous section are used, the optimal filter can be written in
an explicit form.
Theorem 6. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied. LetGf has
all zeros inside the unit circle and Df has full column rank. Let
P ≥ 0 be the stabilizing solution to the Riccati equation
APA′ − P − (APC′ + BdD′d
)(
DdD
′
d + CPC
′)−1
× (DdB′d + CPA′
)
+ BdB′d = 0
(98)
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such that A− (APC′ +BdD′d)(DdD′d +CPC′)−1C is stable. Let
Rd = DdD′d + CPC′ and define
L0 = −
(
APC′ + BdD′d
)
R−1d . (99)
Let D+ = R−1/2d D f (D′f R−1d D f )
−1
,D⊥ is chosen such that
D′⊥D⊥ = I − R−1/2d D f (D′f R−1d D f )
−1
D′f R
−1/2
d and A0 = A +
L0C − (Bf + L0Df )(D+)′R−1/2d C. Let Q ≥ 0 is the solution to
the algebraic Ricatti equation
Q = A′0QA′0 − A′0QC′D′⊥
(
I +D⊥CQC′D′⊥
)−1
D⊥CQA0
+
(
Bf + L0Df
)(
D′f R
−1
d D f
)−1(
Bf + L0Df
)′
(100)
and define
K0 = −
(
Bf + L0Df
)(
D+
)′
− A0QC′R−1/2d D′⊥
(
I +D⊥R−1/2d CQC
′R−1/2d D
′
⊥
)−1
D⊥,
R0 =
(
D+
)′(
I + R−1/2d CQC
′R−1/2d D
′
⊥D⊥
)−1
.
(101)
Then
max
Q∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥QN f
∥∥[0,2π]
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ
}
= γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
,
(102)
where
(
V−1N f
)+
opt =
[
A + K0C K0 − L0
R0C R0
]
(103)
and an optimal H−/H2 fault-detection filter has the following
state-space representation:
r = Qopt
[
M−Nu]
[
y
u
]
, (104)
where
Qopt = γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
[(
V−1N f
)+
optV
−1
0
]
,
Qopt
[
M−Nu] = γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
×
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎢⎣
A + L0C 0 −L0 B + L0D
KL5 A + K0C KL7 KL8
−R0R−1/2d C R0C R0R−1/2d −R0R−1/2d D
⎤
⎥⎦
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
(105)
where KL5 = −(K0 − L0)R−1/2d C, KL7 = (K0 − L0)R−1/2d , and
KL8 = −(K0 − L0)R−1/2d D.
Proof. Note that
[
M Nu
]
=
[
A + LC L B + LD
C I D
]
, (106)
where L is a matrix with appropriate dimensions such that
A + LC is stable. From Theorem 1
V−1 =
[
A + L0C L0 − L
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d
]
. (107)
From Theorem 2
V−1N f =
[
A + L0C Bf + L0Df
R−1/2d C R
−1/2
d
]
,
V−1
[
M−Nu] =
[
A + L0C −L0 B + L0D
−R−1/2d C R−1/2d −R−1/2d D
]
.
(108)
From Lemma 9
(
V−1N f
)+
opt =
[
A + K0C K0 − L0
R0C R0
]
. (109)
Therefore,
Qopt
[
M−Nu]
= γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
[(
V−1N f
)+
opt
0
]
V−1
[
M−Nu]
= γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
⎡
⎢⎣
[
A + K0C K0 − L0
R0C R0
]
0
⎤
⎥⎦
×
[
A + L0C −L0 B + L0D
−R−1/2d C R−1/2d −R−1/2d D
]
= γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
×
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎢⎣
A + L0C 0 −L0 B + L0D
MN5 A + K0C MN7 MN8
−R0R−1/2d C R0C R0R−1/2d −R0R−1/2d D
⎤
⎥⎦
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
(110)
where MN5 = −(K0 − L0)R−1/2d C, MN7 = c(K0 − L0)R−1/2d ,
and MN8 = −(K0 − L0)R−1/2d D.
Remark 8. Note that the optimal fault-detection filter
Qopt
[
M−Nu] is independent of the choice of Lmatrix.
Remark 9. Note that the strictly minimum phase assumption
for Ñ f is not needed. In general, if Ñ f does not have any zeros
on the unit circle, one can always factorize Ñ f = Ñminf Ñaf
so that Ñminf is strictly minimum phase and Ñ
a
f is a stable
all-pass matrix. Then the solution can be computed by using
Ñminf in place of Ñ f . In the case when Ñ f has zeros on the
unit circle, approximation factorization can also be carried
out to obtain an approximation solution.
8. H−/H2 FAULT-DETECTION FILTER DESIGN: CASE 3
When Problem 3 is considered with the H− index defined
over a finite frequency range [θ1, θ2], the solution becomes
much more complicated. We will now state this as a separate
problem as below.
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Problem 8 (interval H−/H2 problem). Let an uncertain sys-
tem be described by (16)–(20) and let γ > 0 be a given dis-
turbance rejection level. Find a stable transfer matrix Q ∈
RH
ny×ny
∞ in (23)–(25) such that ‖Grd‖2 ≤ γ and ‖Grf‖[θ1,θ2]−
is maximized, that is,
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥[θ1,θ2]
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥
2 ≤ γ
}
(111)
or, equivalently, let Q = ΨV−1 and solve
max
Ψ∈RHny×ny2
{∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥[θ1,θ2]
− : ‖Ψ‖2 ≤ γ
}
. (112)
Remark 10. It is not hard to see that there is no rational func-
tion solution to the above problem. This is because an opti-
mal Ψ must satisfy Ψ(e jθ) = 0 almost every where for any
θ /∈ [θ1, θ2]. Hence, an analytic optimal solution seems to
be impossible. Nevertheless, it is intuitively feasible to find
some rational approximations so that a rational Ψ has the
form of a bandpass filter with the pass-band close to [θ1, θ2]
and ‖Ψ‖2 = γ.
Remark 11. When the condition that Df has full column
rank is not satisfied, the rational optimal solution to the
problem
max
Q∈RHny×ny∞
{∥∥QN f
∥∥[0,2π]
− :
∥∥QNd
∥∥
2 ≤ γ
}
(113)
may not exist. In this case, we also need to find some rational
approximate solutions. Moreover, this problem is a special
case of Problem 8 by letting θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 2π, we will only
consider the solution to Problem 8.
In the following, we will describe an optimization ap-
proach to find a good rational approximation for the
two cases above. To do that, we will need a state-space
parametrization of a stable rational function with a given H2
norm [33].
Lemma 10. Let
Ψ =
[
Aψ Bψ
Cψ Dψ
]
∈RHny×ny2 (114)
be an nψ th order proper stable transfer matrix. Then the state
space parameters of Ψ can be expressed as Aψ = (I + Aψk)(I −
Aψk)
−1(I − C′ψCψ)1/2 for some Aψk = −A′ψk and some Cψ sat-
isfies ‖Cψ‖ ≤ 1. Furthermore, ‖Ψ‖22 = Trace(D′ψDψ + B′ψBψ).
Proof. Assume that
Ψ =
⎡
⎣ Âψ B̂ψ
Ĉψ D̂ψ
⎤
⎦ ∈RH2 (115)
is an nψ th order observable realization, then the Observabil-
ity Gramian Lo satisfies
Â′ψLoÂψ − Lo + Ĉ′ψĈψ = 0. (116)
Since Lo > 0, there exists a Cholesky factorization of Lo =
T′T where T is invertible. Perform a similarity transforma-
tion on Ψ such that
Ψ =
⎡
⎣ TÂψT
−1 TB̂ψ
ĈψT−1 D̂ψ
⎤
⎦ =
[
Aψ Bψ
Cψ Dψ
]
. (117)
Thus, A′ψAψ − I + C′ψCψ = 0, so that Aψ = O(I − C′ψCψ)1/2
where O is an orthogonal matrix and I − C′ψCψ is a nonneg-
ative definite. Since an orthogonal matrix O with no eigen-
value equals −1 can be represented as A = (I + Aψk)(I −
Aψk)
−1, where Aψk = −A′ψk is a skew-symmetric matrix, we
have
Aψ =
(
I + Aψk
)(
I − Aψk
)−1(
I − C′ψCψ
)1/2
(118)
and ‖Cψ‖ ≤ 1. Consequently, ‖Ψ‖22 = Trace(D′ψDψ +B′ψBψ).
If we use directly the elements of Aψ , Bψ , Cψ , and Dψ as
optimization variables the total number of variables is n2ψ +
2nynψ + n2y. However, from Lemma 10 Aψ can be computed
from Cψ and Aψk so the elements Aψk, Bψ , Cψ , and Dψ are
all (necessary) optimization variables. Using this technique,
the total number of optimization variables is nψ(nψ − 1)/2 +
2nynψ + n2y and the reduction is nψ(nψ + 1)/2.
In order to carry out the subsequent optimization effec-
tively, we need an effective method of computing H− in-
dex fast and exactly. Enlightened by the bisection method
of computing H∞ norm of a transfer matrix [34], we now
present a bisection algorithm to compute the H− index de-
fined over [θ1, θ2] .
The following result shows the main idea used in our al-
gorithm.
Lemma 11. Suppose
G(z) =
[
A B
C D
]
∈RH∞ (119)
and θ ∈ [θ1, θ2], then
min
θ
σ
[
G
(
e jθ
)]
> β (120)
if and only if σ[D + C(I − A)−1] > β, and
S=
[
HK1 HK2
−(A′ + C′DR−1B′)−1C′β2R−1C (A′ + C′DR−1B′)−1
]
,
(121)
where HK1 = A + BR−1D′C − BR−1B′(A′ + C′DR−1
B′)−1C′β2R−1C and HK2 = BR−1B′(A′ + C′DR−1B′)−1 has
no eigenvalues on the segment of unit circle between θ = θ1 and
θ = θ2, where R = β2I −D′D.
The detailed procedure of our algorithm for computing
H− index is summarized below.
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(1) Give an initial guess on lower bound and upper bound
such that
0 ≤ β1 ≤ min
θ∈[θ1,θ2]
σ
(
G
(
e jθ
)) ≤ β2 (122)
and give a tolerance ε > 0.
(2) Let β = (1/2)(β1 + β2). Compute the eigenvalues of
S =
[
MP1 MP2
−(A′ + C′DR−1B′)−1C′β2R−1C (A′ + C′DR−1B′)−1
]
(123)
where MP1 = A + BR−1D′CBR−1B′(A′ +
C′DR−1B′)−1C′β2R−1C and MP2 = R−1B′(A′ +
C′DR−1B′)−1.
(3) If S has no eigenvalue on the segment of unit circle be-
tween θ = θ1 and θ = θ2, which means that
min
θ∈[θ1,θ2]
σ
(
G
(
e jθ
))
> β (124)
is true, then let β1 = β; else let β2 = β.
(4) Repeat steps (2) and (3) until β2 − β1 < ε is satisfied.
And the approximate value of
min
θ∈[θ1,θ2]
σ
(
G
(
e jθ
))
(125)
is given by (1/2)(β1 + β2) with tolerance ε.
With the state-space parametrization ofΨ on RH2 space
and our bisection algorithm for computing H− index, the
optimization process for solving Problem 8,
max
‖Ψ‖2≤γ
∥∥ΨÑ f
∥∥[θ1,θ2]
− , (126)
can be performed as
max
Aψk ,Bψ ,Cψ ,Dψ ,‖Cψ‖≤1,Trace(D′ψDψ+B′ψBψ )≤γ2
∥∥∥∥∥
⎡
⎣
(
I + Aψk
)(
I − Aψk
)−1(
I − C′ψCψ
)1/2
Bψ
Cψ Dψ
⎤
⎦ Ñ f
∥∥∥∥∥
[θ1,θ2]
−
.
(127)
Furthermore, we introduce a penalty func-
tion Θ(Bψ ,Cψ ,Dψ) to ensure the conditions
Trace(D′ψDψ + B′ψBψ) ≤ γ2 and ‖Cψ‖ ≤ 1. Θ is defined as
Θ
(
Bψ ,Cψ ,Dψ
) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
C, if Trace
(
B′ψBψ +D′ψDψ
)
> γ2
or
∥∥Cψ
∥∥ > 1;
0 else,
(128)
where C is a large positive number. Therefore, the new opti-
mization scheme is
max
Aψk ,Bψ ,Cψ ,Dψ
∥∥∥∥∥
[ (
I+Aψk
)(
I − Aψk
)−1(
I−C′ψCψ
)1/2
Bψ
Cψ Dψ
]
Ñ f
∥∥∥∥∥
[θ1,θ2]
−
−Θ(Bψ ,Cψ ,Dψ
)
.
(129)
For this optimization scheme we have developed a two-
stage optimization algorithm which is a combination of ge-
netic algorithm [35, 36] and Nelder-Mead simplex method
[10, 26]. Genetic algorithm is good at searching for the
right direction for global optimum but has slow convergence,
while Nelder-Mead simplex method is good at searching for
small neighborhood. So the result obtained by genetic algo-
rithm is used as the starting point for the second-step op-
timization by Nelder-Mead simplex method, the latter gives
the final results of the optimization process.
Theoretically, Ψ can be a transfer matrix of any order.
However, in practice we try to find aΨwith low degree. Thus,
we run the optimization process as follows: first set Ψ with a
given starting order, searching for the optimal value; then in-
crease the order of Ψ, run the searching algorithm again and
compare the results with the former one; if higher degree Ψ
gives a better performance and the Ψ’s degree does not ex-
ceed the predefined limit, then keep increasing the degree
of Ψ and redo the searching process; else the optimization
process ends. Example 4 will demonstrate the effectiveness of
this optimization method.
9. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we give some numerical examples to show
the effectiveness of our approaches for solving the fault-
detection problems.
Example 1. We consider Problem 1 for a third-order system:
A =
⎡
⎢⎣
−0.1964 −0.3962 −0.5884
1 2 3
−0.5428 −1.0879 −1.6291
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
Bd =
⎡
⎢⎣
0.01 0
0 0.01
0 0
⎤
⎥⎦ , Bf =
⎡
⎢⎣
1 −3
−0.5 1
0.5 0
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
C =
[
−0.1964 −0.3962 −0.5884
−0.3650 −2.1320 −3.0951
]
,
Dd =
[
0.02 0
0 0.02
]
, Df =
[
0 0.7
0 1
]
.
(130)
Let the pair (γ,β) represents the performance of an H−/H∞
fault-detection filter such that ‖Grd‖∞ ≤ γ and ‖Grf‖[0,2π]− ≥
β. Using our approach an optimal fault-detection filter has
the form in Theorem 2 with
L0 =
⎡
⎢⎣
−0.05 0
0 −0.05
0 0
⎤
⎥⎦ . (131)
Let γ = 1, we have the optimal β = γ‖Ñ f ‖[0,2π]− = 0.7632.
The singular value plots of Grd and Grf are shown in Figures
2 and 3, respectively.
Example 2. We consider Problem 2 for the same system in
Example 1. Let the pair (γ,β) represents the performance of
an H2/H∞ fault-detection filter such that ‖Grd‖∞ ≤ γ and
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Figure 2: The singular value plot of Grd, ‖Grd‖∞ = 1, for
Example 1.
‖Grf‖[0,2π]2 ≥ β. From Theorem 3 the optimal fault-detection
filter in Example 1 is also optimal for this example. Let γ = 1,
the optimal β = γ‖Ñ f ‖2 = 9.7591.
Note that if the so-called H∞/H∞ problem is consid-
ered for this system, the above fault-detection filter is also
the optimal H∞/H∞ filter. Let ‖Grd‖∞ ≤ 1, then the optimal
‖Grf‖∞ is 11.4598.
Example 3. We consider Problem 3 for the system
A =
⎡
⎢⎣
−0.1964 −0.3962 −0.5884
1 2 3
−0.5428 −1.0879 −1.6291
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
Bd =
⎡
⎢⎣
0.01 0
0 0.01
0 0
⎤
⎥⎦ , Bf =
⎡
⎢⎣
1 0
1 1
0.5 0
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
C =
[
−0.1964 −0.3962 −0.5884
−0.3650 −2.1320 −3.0951
]
,
Dd =
[
0.02 0
0 0.02
]
, Df =
[
1 0.7
0 1
]
.
(132)
We let the pair (γ,β) represents the performance of an
H−/H2 fault-detection filter such that ‖Grd‖2 ≤ γ and
‖Grf‖[0,2π]− ≥ β. Since this G f has all zeros inside the unit
circle and Df has full column rank, we get from Theorem 6
(
V−1N f
)+
opt
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−0.2555 −1.4924 −2.1666 0.1900 −0.1400
1.3059 3.0358 4.5169 0.2000 0.0500
−0.5723 −1.6360 −2.4182 0.1000 −0.0700
− 0.0591 −1.0962 −1.5782 0.2000 −0.1400
0.3650 2.1320 3.0951 0 0.2000
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(133)
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Figure 3: The singular value plot of Grf, ‖Grf‖[0,2π]− = 0.75, for
Example 1.
and the optimal filter
Qopt
= γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
(
V−1N f
)+
optV
−1
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−0.0740 0.3126 −0.8467 −1.2003 0.3892
−2.8761 1.3720 −5.9237 5.7439 −0.2946
−0.4110 0.2304 −0.9359 0.8321 −0.0352
0.7188 −0.7509 2.5122 0.7430 −0.5201
−1.7340 1.3456 −4.8682 0 0.7430
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
(134)
Let γ = 1 the optimal
β = γ∥∥(V−1N f
)+
opt
∥∥
2
= 0.7430. (135)
The singular value plots of Grd and Grf are shown in Figures
4 and 5, respectively.
Example 4. We consider Problem 8 for a system
A =
⎡
⎢⎣
−0.1964 −0.3962 −0.5884
1.0000 2.0000 3.0000
−0.5428 −1.0879 −1.6291
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
Bd =
⎡
⎢⎣
0.01
0.01
0
⎤
⎥⎦ , Bf =
⎡
⎢⎣
1.0
−0.5
0.5
⎤
⎥⎦
C =
[
−0.1964 −0.3962 −0.5884
]
,
Dd = 0.02, Df = 0,
(136)
where θ1 = 0 and θ2 = π/2.
As discussed in Section 8 we use optimization method to
search for a good solution. Let us denote the maximum of
14 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Normalized frequency
10−2
10−1
100
101
Si
n
gu
la
r
va
lu
e
of
G
rd
Figure 4: Singular value plot of Grd, ‖Grd‖2 = 1, for Example 3.
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Figure 5: Singular value plot of Grf, ‖Grf‖− = 0.7430, for
Example 3.
Table 1: Results for different Ψ’s order.
Ψ’s order First Second Third
β 14.2661 22.5345 22.8182
‖Grf‖[θ1,θ2]− as β when ‖Grd‖2 ≤ 1. In Table 1 the results ob-
tained using our optimization algorithm with different pre-
defined Ψ orders are given. It is clear that the results improve
with the increasing order of Ψ. In particular, a third-order Ψ
design achieving β = 22.8182 is given by
Ψ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.1187 −0.0019 0.4270 −0.1424
−0.8445 0.4220 0.3270 0.2363
−0.3536 −0.9012 0.2408 0.8865
0.3844 0.0988 0.8079 0.3714
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (137)
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Figure 6: Singular value plot of Grd with a third order Ψ, ‖Grd‖2 =
1, for Example 4.
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Figure 7: Singular value plot of Grf with a third order Ψ,
‖Grf‖[0,π/2]− = 22.8182, for Example 4.
The singular value plots of Grd and Grf are shown in Fig-
ures 6 and 7 for this third-order Ψ. Figure 8 demonstrates
how the smallest singular value of Grf changes in the fre-
quency range of [0,π/2] with the order of Ψ. It is seen that
the improvement on the performance with any Ψ of higher
order than 3 is insignificant.
It is interesting to note that the Ψ is trying to invert Ñ f in
the frequency interval [0,π/2].
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented optimal solutions to vari-
ous robust fault-detection problems for linear discrete time
systems in parallel with our continuous time results in [28].
We have shown that an optimal filter for both H−/H∞ and
H2/H∞ can be obtained by solving one Riccati equation. It
is also interesting to note that we are able to give analytic
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Figure 8: Singular value plot of Grf for different order of Ψ: first or-
der (solid line), second order (dotted line), and third order (dashed
line), for Example 4.
solution to an H−/H2 problem defined on the entire fre-
quency range [0, 2π] when Df has full column rank. In con-
trast, the corresponding continuous time problem does not
make any sense [28]. The critical reason for this difference is
because the entire frequency range in discrete time is finite
(≤ 2π) while the entire frequency range in continuous time
is infinite. We have also shown that many design criteria con-
sidered in the literature do not give desirable fault-detection
designs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, great attention has been devoted to the
design of model-based fault detection systems and their ro-
bustness [1, 2]. With the rapid development of robust con-
trol theory and H∞ optimization control techniques, more
and more methods have been presented to solve the robust
FDI problem. The H∞-filter is designed such that the H∞-
norm of the estimation error is minimized (see [3–5] and
the references therein). Some of the approaches used for this
problem include frequency domain approaches [6], left and
right eigenvector assignment [7], structure parity equation
[8], and an unknown input observer with disturbances de-
coupled in the state estimation error [9]. Recently devel-
oped LMI approaches offer numerically attractive techniques
[10–12].
A reference residual model is an ideal solution for robust
FDI under the assumption that there are no disturbances or
model uncertainty. The idea is to design a filter for the un-
certain system that approximates the solution given by the
reference model [13]. In [14], a new performance index is
proposed using such a reference residual model. Frisk and
Nielsen [15] give an algorithm to design a reference model
and a robust FDI filter that fits into the framework of stan-
dard robust H∞-filtering relying on established and efficient
methods. However, their framework consists in solving two
optimization problems successively, which results in a sub-
optimal solution.
In this paper, we propose a performance index that cap-
tures the requirements of fault isolation and disturbance re-
jection as well as the design of the optimal reference model.
The fault isolation performance is measured by the size of
the deviation of the fault to residual dynamics from the ref-
erence dynamics model, while the disturbance rejection per-
formance is measured by the size of the input to residual
and disturbance to residual dynamics. In all cases, the H∞
norm is used as a measure. The design of the optimal ref-
erence model is incorporated in the robust FDI framework.
We consider systems subject to norm-bounded or polytopic
uncertainties. For systems described by polytopic and un-
structured norm-bounded uncertainties, we derive an opti-
mal FDI filter obtained as the solution of a QMI optimiza-
tion. For systems described by structured uncertainties, we
derive a suboptimal QMI-based solution. Since the solution
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of a QMI optimization is, in general, intractable, we propose
a linearization technique to derive a suboptimal design pro-
cedure that requires the solution of a numerically tractable
LMI optimization. This note extends our work in [16] by
proposing algorithms for the design of suboptimal reference
dynamics.
The structure of the work is as follows. After defining
the notation, we review filter-based FDI techniques for resid-
ual signal generation and give the problem formulation in
Section 2. Section 3 presents a matrix inequality formulation
for the FDI problem, and gives the solution and the design
of the optimal reference model for both norm-bounded and
polytopic uncertainties in a form of QMI’s. Section 4 gives a
suboptimal solution in both cases through the use of an al-
gorithm that necessitates solving LMI’s. Finally, a numerical
example is presented in Section 5, and Section 6 summarizes
our results.
The notation we use is fairly standard. The set of real n×
m matrices is denoted by Rn×m. For A ∈ Rn×m, we use the
notation AT to denote transpose. ForA = AT ∈Rn×n,A  0
(A ≺ 0) denotes that A is positive (negative) definite, that is,
all the eigenvalues of A are greater (less) than zero. The n×n
identity matrix is denoted as In and the n×m null matrix is
denoted as 0n,m with the subscripts occasionally dropped if
they can be inferred from context.
Let L2 be the set of square integrable functions. The L2-
norm of u ∈ L2 is defined as ‖u‖2 =
√∫∞
0 u(t)Tu(t)dt. A
transfer matrix G(s) = D + C(sI − A)−1B will be denoted as
G(s)
s= (A,B,C,D) or
G(s)
s=
[
A B
C D
]
, (1)
and dependence on the variable s will be suppressed. For a
stable transfer matrix G, we define
‖G‖∞ = sup
{‖Gu‖2/‖u‖2 : 0 /=u ∈ L2
}
,
‖G‖− = inf
{‖Gu‖2/‖u‖2 : 0 /=u ∈ L2
}
.
(2)
In section 3, we use the following result.
Lemma 1 (see [17]). Let φ(s) = R + BT(−sI − AT)−1C +
CT(sI − A)−1B + BT(−sI − AT)−1Q(sI − A)−1B with (A,B)
sign controllable, RT = R, and QT = Q. Then φ(s) has a spec-
tral factor G(s) ∈ RLm×p∞ (i.e., φ(s) = GT(−s)G(s)) if and
only if there exists symmetric P that satisfies the following lin-
ear matrix inequality:
[
PA + ATP +Q PB + C
(PB + C)T R
]
 0. (3)
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a linear time-invariant dynamic system subject to
disturbances, modeling errors and process, sensor and actu-
ator faults modeled as
[
ẋ(t)
y(t)
]
=
M︷ ︸︸ ︷[
A B Bd B f
C D Dd Df
]
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x(t)
u(t)
d(t)
f (t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (4)
where x(t) ∈Rn, u(t) ∈Rnu , and y(t) ∈Rny are the process
state and input and output vectors, respectively, and where
d(t) ∈ Rnd and f (t) ∈ Rn f are the disturbance and fault
vectors, respectively. Here, Bf ∈ Rn×n f and Df ∈ Rny×n f
are the component and instrument fault distribution matri-
ces, respectively, while Bd ∈ Rn×nd and Dd ∈ Rny×nd are the
corresponding disturbance distribution matrices [18].
We consider two types of uncertainties: norm-bounded
and polytopic uncertainties. In the case of norm-bounded
uncertainties,
M ∈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Mo︷ ︸︸ ︷[
Ao Bo Bod B
o
f
Co Do Dod D
o
f
]
+
[
FA
FC
]
ΔH
[
EA EB Ed E f
]
: Δ ∈ Δ
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
=: MΔ,
(5)
where Mo represents the nominal model,ΔH = Δ(I−HΔ)−1,
where
Δ := {Δ = diag (δ1Iq1, . . . , δlIql,Δl+1, . . . ,Δl+ f
)
: ‖Δ‖≤1,
δi ∈R,Δi ∈Rqi×qi
} ⊂RnΔ×nΔ ,
(6)
and where FA, FC , EA, EB, Ed, Ef , and H are known and con-
stant matrices with appropriate dimensions. This linear frac-
tional representation of uncertainty, which is assumed to be
well-posed over Δ (i.e., det (I − HΔ) /= 0 for all Δ ∈ Δ), has
great generality and is widely used in control theories.
In the case of polytopic uncertainties,
M ∈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p∑
i=1
ξi
Mi︷ ︸︸ ︷⎡
⎣A
i Bi Bid B
i
f
Ci Di Did D
i
f
⎤
⎦:
p∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξi≥ 0
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
=: Mξ ,
(7)
where Mi, i = 1, . . . , p, are known constant matrices with
appropriate dimensions.
A residual signal in an FDI system should represent
the inconsistency between the system variables and the
mathematical model. The objective is to design an FDI filter
of the form
[ ˙̂x(t)
r(t)
]
=
[
Ak Bku Bky
Ck Dku Dky
]
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
x̂(t)
u(t)
y(t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , (8)
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Figure 1: Filter-based robust FDI scheme.
where x̂(t) ∈ Rnk is the filter state and r(t) ∈ Rn f is the re-
sidual signal. Figure 1 illustrates this filter in the robust resid-
ual generation scheme.
By defining an augmented state z(t) = [ x(t)T x̂(t)T ]T the
residual dynamics are given by
[
ż(t)
r(t)
]
=
⎡
⎣Ã B̃ f B̃d B̃u
C̃ D̃ f D̃d D̃u
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
z(t)
f (t)
d(t)
u(t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(9)
or
[
TMr f T
M
rd T
M
ru
]
s=
⎡
⎣ Ã B̃ f B̃d B̃u
C̃ D̃ f D̃d D̃u
⎤
⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
A 0 Bf Bd B
BkyC Ak BkyD f BkyDd Bku + BkyD
DkyC Ck DkyD f DkyDd Dku +DkyD
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
(10)
where TMr f , T
M
rd , and T
M
ru denote the dynamics from faults,
disturbances, and inputs to the residual, respectively. Note
that dependence on the uncertain data is indicated by a su-
perscript M.
Ideally, the residual signal is required to be sensitive only
to faults. This corresponds to TMrd = 0, TMru = 0, and TMr f /= 0.
For fault isolation, it is further required that the fault signa-
ture can be deduced from the residual. This corresponds to
TMr f ∈ S , where S is a set of transfer matrices with a spe-
cial structure that depends on the nature of the faults, for ex-
ample, if the faults can occur simultaneously, S is the set of
stable diagonal transfer matrices with nonzero diagonal en-
tries. Unfortunately, characterizing a general structured set S
is intractable, and we will assume that we can define a subset
S =
{
Tref
s= (Aref,Bref,Cref,Dref
)
: Aref ∈ SA ⊆Rnref×nref ,
Bref ∈ SB ⊆Rnref×n f , Cref ∈ SC ⊆Rn f ×nref ,
Dref ∈ SD ⊆Rn f ×n f
}
⊆ S
(11)
such that subsequent optimizations over the structured state-
space data sets SA, SB, SC , and SD are tractable. For example,
if S denotes the set of all stable n f ×n f diagonal transfer ma-
trices with nonzero diagonal entries, we may define SA as the
set of all n f ×n f diagonal matrices with negative entries, and
SB, SC , and SD as the sets of all n f ×n f diagonal matrices. An
example of this simplification procedure is given in Section 5
below. We also replace the requirement of nonzero diagonal
entries for S by a condition of the form ‖Tref‖− ≥ β > 0 for
all Tref ∈ S.
Due to the presence of disturbances and modelling un-
certainties, exact FDI is not possible. For robust FDI, we pro-
pose the following, more realistic, problem formulation.
Problem 1. Assume that the system dynamics in (4) are
quadratically stable. For any γ > 0, find a stable fault ref-
erence dynamics Tref
s= (Aref,Bref,Cref,Dref) ∈ S such that
‖Tref‖− ≥ 1 (to ensure the requirement of nonzero diagonal
entries for S), and find a stable filter of the form given in
(8), if it exists, such that the residual dynamics in (10) are
quadratically stable and
sup
M∈M
∥∥∥
[
TMr f − Tref TMrd TMru
]∥∥∥
∞ < γ, (12)
where M =MΔ for norm-bounded uncertainties and M =
Mξ for polytopic uncertainties.
Recall that quadratic stability for the dynamics in (4) is
equivalent to the existence of P = PT  0 such that ATP +
PA ≺ 0 for all A (see [19] for more details).
A modified version of Problem 1 uses a weighted cost
function, say, of the form
∥∥∥
[(
TMr f − Tref
)
Wf T
M
rd Wd T
M
ruWu
]∥∥∥
∞, (13)
whereWf ,Wd, andWu are constant or frequency-dependent
weighting functions that can vary the emphasis between fault
detection (small ‖TMrd ‖∞ and ‖TMru ‖∞) and fault isolation
(small ‖TMr f − Tref‖∞). In the sequel, we assume that any such
weighting functions are absorbed in the system data.
Remark 1. The objective is to find the smallest γ for which
(12) is satisfied. Indeed, by minimizing γ, we will ensure
‖TMrd ‖∞ (which measures the disturbance rejection level),
‖TMru ‖∞ (which measures the effect of uncertainty), and
‖TMr f − Tref‖∞ (which measures the deviation of the fault to
residual dynamics from the reference dynamics, and hence is
a measure of fault isolation capability) to be small.
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A poorly chosen reference model can result in a residual
generator with poor robustness. Here, we incorporate its de-
sign into our scheme so as to improve the robustness of the
FDI filter.
In some approaches, a common assumption is that Df =
0 and/or CBf has full rank [20, 21]; in others, the assump-
tion Df has full rank and is widely used [22, 23]. Here, we do
not impose any of these assumptions. Note, however, that if
Df does not have full column rank, for example, if Df = 0,
then this will have an adverse effect on the minimum val-
ues of γ since γ≥‖[ TMr f − Tref TMrd TMru ]‖∞ ≥‖T
M
r f (∞) −
Tref(∞)‖ = ‖DkyDf −Dref‖ = ‖Dref‖≥ 1. This would there-
fore limit the overall performance of the filter, which is mea-
sured by the value of γ.
3. MATRIX INEQUALITY FORMULATION
In this section, we derive a matrix inequality formulation of
Problem 1. The main idea is to express (12) in terms of QMIs
using the bounded real lemma and change of variables tech-
niques, and then to derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for solvability.
The dynamics in (12) can be written as
[
TMr f − Tref TMrd TMru
]
s=
[
AMc B
M
c
CMc D
M
c
]
:=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Aref 0 Bref 0 0
0 Ã B̃ f B̃d B̃u
−Cref C̃ D̃ f −Dref D̃d D̃u
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(14)
It follows from the bounded real lemma that there exists a
stable filter of the form given in (8) such that (12) is satisfied
if and only if there exists Pc = PTc such that Pc  0 and
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
AMc
)T
Pc + PcAMc PcB
M
c
(
CMc
)T
(
BMc
)T
Pc −γI
(
DMc
)T
CMc D
M
c −γI
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≺ 0 (15)
for all M (see [24, Theorem 3]). We deal separately with
norm-bounded and polytopic uncertainties.
3.1. Solution with norm-bounded uncertainties
For norm-bounded uncertainties, we separate the terms in-
volving modeling uncertainties from the other terms as
(
AMc ,B
M
c ,C
M
c ,D
M
c
)=(Aoc + AΔc ,Boc + BΔc ,Coc + CΔc ,Doc +DΔc
)
,
(16)
where
[
Aoc B
o
c
Coc D
o
c
]
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
A ref 0 0 B ref 0 0
0 Ao 0 Bof B
o
d B
o
0 BkyCo Ak BkyDof BkyD
o
d Bku+BkyD
o
−C ref DkyCo Ck DkyDof −D ref DkyDod Dku+DkyDo
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
(17)
[
AΔc B
Δ
c
CΔc D
Δ
c
]
=
[
Fr1
Fr2
]
ΔH
[
Er1 Er2
]
:=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
FA
BkyFC
DkyFC
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
ΔH
[
0 EA 0 Ef Ed EB
]
.
(18)
Using this separation, the inequality (15) can be rewritten as
Toc︷ ︸︸ ︷⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
Aoc
)T
Pc + PcAoc PcB
o
c
(
Coc
)T
(
Boc
)T
Pc −γI
(
Doc
)T
Coc D
o
c −γI
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
TΔc︷ ︸︸ ︷⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
AΔc
)T
Pc + PcAΔc PcB
Δ
c
(
CΔc
)T
(
BΔc
)T
Pc 0
(
DΔc
)T
CΔc D
Δ
c 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦≺ 0.
(19)
A calculation shows that TΔc = F̃ΔHẼ + ẼTΔHF̃T , where
F̃ =
[(
PcFr1
)T
0 FTr2
]T
, Ẽ =
[
Er1 Er2 0
]
. (20)
The next result uses the fact that Δ ∈ Δ to remove explicit
dependence on Δ.
Lemma 2 (see [25]). Let Δ be as described in (6) and define
the subspaces
Σ = {diag (S1, . . . , Sl, λ1Iql+1, . . . , λsIql+ f
)
:
Si = STi ∈Rqi×qi , λj ∈R
}
,
Γ = {diag (G1, . . . ,Gl, 0ql+1, . . . , 0ql+ f
)
:
Gi = −GTi ∈Rqi×qi
}
.
(21)
Let R = RT , F, E, and H be matrices with appropriate dimen-
sions. We have det (I − HΔ) /= 0 and R + FΔ(I −HΔ)−1E +
ET(I − ΔTHT)−1ΔTFT ≺ 0 for everyΔ ∈ Δ if there exist S ∈ Σ
and G ∈ Γ such that S  0 and
[
R + ETSE F + ETSH + ETG
FT +HTSE +GE HTSH +HTG +GH − S
]
≺ 0. (22)
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If Δ is unstructured (i.e., if Δ = {Δ ∈ RnΔ×nΔ : ‖Δ‖≤1}),
then (22) becomes
[
R + λETE F + λETH
FT + λHTE λ
(
HTH − I)
]
≺ 0 (23)
for some scalar λ≥ 0. In this case, condition (23) is both neces-
sary and sufficient.
When the uncertainty set is unstructured, then Lemma 2
implies that
(19) ⇐⇒ Toc + F̃ΔHẼ + ẼTΔHTF̃T ≺ 0
⇐⇒
⎡
⎣T
o
c + λẼ
TẼ F̃ + λẼTH
F̃T + λHTẼ λ
(
HTH − I)
⎤
⎦ ≺ 0
(24)
for some λ≥ 0. Using a Schur complement argument shows
that (19) is equivalent to
Tc :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
Aoc
)T
Pc + PcBoc
(
Coc
)T
PcFr1 λE
T
r1
 −γI (Doc
)T
0 λETr2
  −γI Fr2 0
   −λI λHT
    −λI
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≺ 0,
(25)
where  denotes terms readily inferred from symmetry.
Next, we introduce a change of variables to linearize the
above matrix inequality [26]. Assume that nk = nref + n, that
is, the filter order is equal to the order of the system plus the
order of the reference model. Let
Pc =
[
Y N
NT Ŷ
]
, P−1c =
[
X M
MT X̂
]
,
Π1 =
[
I I
MTZ 0
]
,
(26)
where X ,Y , X̂ , Ŷ ∈ Rnk×nk are symmetric matrices, and
Z = X−1. Define T = diag (Π1, I). Then Tc ≺ 0 if and only if
TTTcT ≺ 0. From PcP−1c = I , we have the following calcula-
tions, where boldface letters are used to indicate optimization
variables:
L11 := ΠT1 PcAocΠ1
=
⎡
⎣ ZA + ZE1ArefE
T
1 ZA + ZE1ArefE
T
1
YA+YE1ArefET1 +Â+B̂yC YA+YE1ArefE
T
1 +B̂yC
⎤
⎦,
(27)
L12 := ΠT1 PcBoc
=
⎡
⎣ ZB f + ZE1Bref ZBd ZB
YB f +YE1Bref +B̂yDof YBd+B̂yD
o
d YB+B̂yD
o+B̂u
⎤
⎦,
(28)
L13 :=
(
CocΠ1
)T =
⎡
⎢⎣
(
D̂yC − CrefE2 + Ĉ
)T
(
D̂yC − CrefE2
)T
⎤
⎥⎦ , (29)
L14 := ΠT1 PcFr1 =
⎡
⎣ ZFA
YFA + B̂yFC
⎤
⎦ , (30)
L15 := ΠT1 ETr1 =
⎡
⎣E
T
A
E
T
A
⎤
⎦ , (31)
LT23 =
[
D̂yDof −Dref D̂yDod D̂yDo + D̂u
]
, (32)
LT25 =
[
Ef Ed EB
]
, (33)
where we have defined
[
A E1 B f Bd B FA
]
:=
⎡
⎣ 0 0 Inref 0 0 0 0
0 Ao 0 Bof B
o
d B
o FA
⎤
⎦,
(34)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
C
E2
EA
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 Co
Inref 0
0 EA
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (35)
⎡
⎣Â B̂y B̂u
Ĉ D̂y D̂u
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣NAkM
TZ NBky NBku
CkMTZ Dky Dku
⎤
⎦ . (36)
If M and N are invertible, the variables Ak, Ck, Bky , Bku, Dky ,
Dku can be replaced by the new variables Â, B̂y , B̂u, Ĉ, D̂y , D̂u
without loss of generality. We can now rewrite (19) as
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
L11 + LT11 L12 L13 L14 λL15
 −γI L23 0 λL25
  −γI D̂yFC 0
   −λI λHT
    −λI
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≺ 0, (37)
which is nonlinear in the variables. Note that the nonlineari-
ties involve the terms Aref and Bref only. The constraint Pc  0
can be expressed as an LMI as follows:
Pc  0 ⇐⇒ ΠT1 PcΠ1  0 ⇐⇒
⎡
⎣Z Z
Z Y
⎤
⎦  0. (38)
The constraint ‖Tref‖− ≥ 1 can be expressed as a quadratic
matrix inequality using the next lemma.
Lemma 3. LetTref be as defined above. Then ‖Tref‖− ≥ 1 if and
only if there exists Pref = PrefT ∈Rnref×nref such that
Tro
:=
⎡
⎣PrefAref +Aref
TPref +Cref
TCref PrefBref +Cref
TDref
BrefTPref + DrefTCref DrefTDref − In f
⎤
⎦
 0.
(39)
6 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
Proof. Let φ(s) = T∼ref (s)T ref (s)− In f . Then φ(s)  0 if and
only if ‖Tref‖− ≥ 1. It is easy to show that φ(s) can be written
as follows:
φ(s) = DrefTDref−In f +BrefT
(−sIn f −ArefT
)−1
Cref
TDref
+
(
Cref
T
Dref
)T(
sIn f − Aref
)−1
Bref
+ BrefT
(− sIn f − ArefT
)−1
Cref
TCref
(
sIn f − Aref
)−1
Bref.
(40)
The result then follows from Lemma 1.
The next lemma summarizes our result so far by giv-
ing necessary and sufficient conditions for the solution of
Problem 1, in the case that the uncertainty set is unstruc-
tured, in the form of a QMI feasibility problem.
Lemma 4. Assume that Δ is unstructured. Then there exist a
stable filter of the form given in (8) and a stable fault refer-
ence dynamics model Tref
s= (Aref, Bref, Cref, Dref) ∈ S, where S
is defined in (11), such that ‖Tref‖− ≥ 1, residual dynamics in
(10) are quadratically stable, and (12) is satisfied for M =MΔ
if and only if there exist Aref ∈ SA, Bref ∈ SB, Cref ∈ SC ,
Dref ∈ SD, Â, B̂y , B̂u, Ĉ, D̂y , D̂u, λ, and symmetric matrices
Pref, Y, and Z such that (37), (38), and (39) are satisfied. If
such variables exist, the filter dynamics are obtained by solving
(36) where M and N are chosen such that NMT = I − YZ−1.
Approximate solutions to these QMIs can be obtained
by using algorithms with guaranteed global convergence
[27, 28], as well as local numerical search algorithms that
converge (without a guarantee) much faster [29, 30]. A re-
lated discussion of the solution algorithms for QMIs can also
be found in [31]. In Section 4 below, we develop an alterna-
tive procedure for the approximate solution of these QMIs.
Remark 2. In the case that Tref is preassigned to a known
value, (37) becomes linear and (39) becomes irrelevant,
therefore, the optimal solution is given in a form of an LMI
optimization. This case has been considered in [16].
When Δ is structured, we proceed as follows. By using
(22) from Lemma 2, we get
(19) ⇐⇒ Toc + F̃ΔHẼ + ẼTΔHTF̃T ≺ 0
⇐= ∃S ∈ Σ & G ∈ Γ s.t. S  0 & TSG ≺ 0,
(41)
where
TSG =
⎡
⎣ T
o
c F̃ + Ẽ
TG
F̃T + GTẼ HTG + GTH − S
⎤
⎦ +
[
ẼT
HT
]
S
[
Ẽ H
]
.
(42)
Using a Schur complement argument and the expression of
Ẽ and F̃ in (20), we get
TSG ≺ 0 ⇐⇒ TSG
:=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
Aoc
)T
Pc+ PcBoc
(
Coc
)T
PcFr1 +ETr1G E
T
r1S
 −γI (Doc
)T
ETr2G E
T
r2S
  −γI Fr2 0
   HTG+GTH − S HTS
    −S
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≺ 0.
(43)
As we did for unstructured uncertainties, we use the same
matrix T = diag (Π1, I) to allow to change variables, it fol-
lows that TSG ≺ 0 if and only if T̃SG := TTSGTT ≺ 0. We
multiply T̃SG by K = diag (I , S) and KT from left and right,
respectively, to get TSG ≺ 0 if and only if
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
L11 + LT11 L12 L13 L14 + L15G L15S
 −γI L23 0 L25S
  −γI D̂yFC 0
   HTG + GTH − S HTS
    −S
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≺ 0.
(44)
Therefore, when Δ is structured, we have the following suffi-
cient condition for solvability.
Lemma 5. Suppose that Δ has the structure defined in
(6). Then there exist a stable filter of the form given in
(8) and a stable fault reference dynamics model Tref
s=
(Aref, Bref, Cref, Dref) ∈ S, where S is defined in (11), such
that ‖Tref‖− ≥ 1, the residual dynamics in (10) are quadrat-
ically stable, and (12) is satisfied for M =MΔ if there exist
Aref ∈ SA, Bref ∈ SB, Cref ∈ SC , Dref ∈ SD, Â, B̂y , B̂u, Ĉ, D̂y ,
D̂u, S ∈ Σ, G ∈ Γ, and symmetric matrices Pref, Y, and Z such
that (38), (39), and (44) are satisfied.
3.2. Solution with polytopic uncertainties
In this section, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for solvability of the robust FDI problem for a system subject
to polytopic uncertainties, in the form of LMIs. Now,
⎡
⎣ A
M
c B
M
c
CMc D
M
c
⎤
⎦ ∈
⎧⎨
⎩
p∑
i=1
ξi
⎡
⎣ A
i
c B
i
c
Cic D
i
c
⎤
⎦ ,
p∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξi≥ 0
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
(45)
where (Aic,B
i
c,C
i
c,D
i
c) are as defined in (17), but with super-
script (o) replaced by (i). We assume that the polytopic sys-
tem is quadratically stable. Recall that (12) is satisfied if and
only if (15) is satisfied for all M. Now,
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(15) ⇐⇒
p∑
i=1
ξi
Tipol︷ ︸︸ ︷⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
Aic
)T
Pc + PcAic PcB
i
c
(
Cic
)T
(
Bic
)T
Pc −γI
(
Dic
)T
Cic D
i
c −γI
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦≺ 0,
∀ξi s.t.
p∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξi  0,
⇐⇒ Tipol ≺ 0, i = 1, . . . , p.
(46)
Noting that the change of variable defined in (36) is in-
dependent of Mi, we can therefore use it in this scheme as
well. Letting T = diag (Π1, I), it follows that
Tipol ≺ 0 ⇐⇒ T
i
pol := TTipolTT
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Li11 +
(
Li11
)T
Li12 L
i
13
 −γI Li23
  −γI
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≺ 0,
(47)
where the (Lijk)
Ts are as defined in (27)–(33) and (34)-(35),
but with the nominal model data Mo replaced by Mi. There-
fore, for polytopic uncertainties, we can derive necessary and
sufficient conditions for solvability of Problem 1 in the form
of a QMI feasibility problem as follows.
Lemma 6. Let M =Mξ . Then there exist a stable filter of
the form given in (8) and a stable fault reference dynamics
model Tref
s= (Aref, Bref, Cref, Dref) ∈ S, where S is defined in
(11), such that ‖Tref‖− ≥ 1, the residual dynamics in (10) are
quadratically stable, and (12) is satisfied for M =MΔ if and
only there exist Aref ∈ SA, Bref ∈ SB, Cref ∈ SC , Dref ∈ SD,
Â, B̂y , B̂u, Ĉ, D̂y , D̂u, S ∈ Σ, G ∈ Γ, and symmetric matrices
Pref, Y, and Z such that (38), (39), and T
i
pol ≺ 0 are satisfied
for i = 1, . . . , p.
4. ROBUST FDI FILTER DESIGN USING LMIS
In this section, we give a suboptimal solution to Problem 1.
An optimal solution would necessitate the solution of a
quadratic matrix inequality and is in general intractable.
Here, we propose a linearization procedure to derive an up-
per bound on the optimal solution that requires solving an
LMI optimization problem.
The following general result demonstrates that if we have
one feasible solution to a QMI optimization, then we can
construct an LMI optimization problem whose solution gives
an upper bound on the QMI problem.
Lemma 7. Let Qo,Ro ∈ Rm×n and S = ST ∈ Rm×m be given
and let Eo = Qo − Ro and Fo = Qo + Ro. For Q,R ∈ Rm×n,
define
M(Q,R) = S +QRT + RQT ,
N (Q,R)
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
S + EoETo − (Q − R)ETo − Eo(Q − R)T R Q
RT −I 0
QT 0 −I
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
O(Q,R)
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
S− FoFTo + (Q + R)FTo + Fo(Q + R)T R Q
RT I 0
QT 0 I
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(48)
Then
N (Q,R) ≺ 0 =⇒M(Q,R) ≺ 0, (49)
M
(
Qo,Ro
) ≺ 0 =⇒ N (Qo,Ro
) ≺ 0, (50)
O(Q,R)  0 =⇒M(Q,R)  0, (51)
M
(
Qo,Ro
)  0 =⇒ O(Qo,Ro
)  0. (52)
Proof. Let J(Q,R) = S +QQT + RRT + EoETo − (Q − R)ETo −
Eo(Q − R)T . Then by using a Schur complement argument,
we get
N (Q,R) ≺ 0 ⇐⇒ J(Q,R) ≺ 0. (53)
Let ξ(Q,R) = (Q − R− Eo)(Q − R− Eo)T . Now,
S + ξ(Q,R) = S + (Q − R)(Q − R)T − (Q − R)ETo
− Eo(Q − R)T + EoETo ,
(54)
and it follows that
S +QRT + RQT = S +QQT + RRT + EoETo − (Q − R)ETo
− Eo(Q − R)T − ξ(Q,R).
(55)
That is,
M(Q,R) = J(Q,R)− ξ(Q,R). (56)
Using (53) and noting that ξ(Q,R)  0 and ξ(Qo,Ro) = 0,
we have
N (Q,R) ≺ 0 =⇒ J(Q,R) ≺ 0 =⇒M(Q,R) ≺ 0,
M
(
Qo,Ro
) ≺ 0 =⇒ J(Qo,Ro
) ≺ 0 =⇒ N (Qo,Ro
) ≺ 0.
(57)
A similar proof can be used to derive (51) and (52).
In order to simplify the subsequent analysis, we adopt the
convention that variables appended with a subscript “x” de-
note feasible values of the variables for the QMIs (37) and
(39).
In (37), the only nonlinear terms are ZE1ArefET1 ,
YIE1Aref ET1 , ZE1Bref, and YE1Bref. We denote the matrix in
(37) by Tr f w, and set Sr f w to be the matrix Tr f w, with the
nonlinear terms removed.
Let Zx = ZTx ∈ Rnk×nk , Yx = YTx ∈ Rnk×nk , Arefx ∈
Rnref×nref , and Brefx ∈ Rnref×n f be given. We use Lemma 7 to
derive an LMI formulation. We can write Tr f w as
Tr f w = Sr f w +QcRTc + RcQTc , (58)
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where
Qc =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ZE1 0
0 YE1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, Rc =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
E1Aref
T 0
E1Aref
T E1Aref
T
Bref
T
Bref
T
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
· (59)
Let Qcx denote the value of Qc when Z and Y are replaced
by Zx and Yx, respectively, let Rcx denote the value of Rc when
Aref and Bref are replaced by Arefx and Brefx , respectively, and
define Ex = Qcx − Rcx . Using (49) from Lemma 7, we get
T linr f w ≺ 0 =⇒ Tr f w ≺ 0, (60)
where
T linr f w
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Sr f w + ExETx −
(
Qc − Rc
)
ETx − Ex
(
Qc − Rc
)T
Rc Qc
RTc −I 0
QTc 0 −I
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(61)
To linearize the matrix inequality in (39), we need
Lemma 7 and the following lemma, whose proof is similar
to that of Lemma 7 and is therefore dropped.
Lemma 8. Let Uo ∈ Rm×n and S = ST ∈ Rm×m. For U ∈
Rm×n, define
M(U) = S +UUT =M(U)T ,
N (U) = S +UUTo +UoUT −UoUTo = N (U)T .
(62)
Then
N (U)  0 =⇒M(U)  0,
M
(
Uo
)  0 =⇒ N (Uo
)  0. (63)
Let Prefx = PTrefx ∈ Rnref×nref , Crefx ∈ Rn f ×nref , and Drefx ∈
Rn f ×n f be given. Using (51) from Lemmas 7 and 8, it is easy
to get
T linro  0 =⇒ Tro  0, (64)
where
T linro =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
V   
V ′ V ′′  
Pref 0 I 
Aref Bref 0 I
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (65)
where V = {(Pref + ArefT)(Prefx + Arefx ) +  − CTrefxCrefx+
Cref
TCrefx + − (Prefx +ATrefx )(Prefx +Arefx )}, V ′ = {DTrefCrefx+
DTrefxCref − BTrefx (Prefx + Arefx )−DTrefxCrefx + BTref(Prefx + Arefx )+
BTrefx (Pref + Aref)}, V ′′ = {DrefTDrefx + DTrefxDref − BTrefxBrefx−
DTrefxDrefx − I + BTrefBrefx + }. The next lemma summarizes
the results of this section by giving a linearized formulation
of the optimization problem defined in Lemma 4 using (60)
and (64).
Lemma 9. Assume that Δ is unstructured. Let Zx = ZTx ∈
Rnk×nk , Yx = YTx ∈ Rnk×nk , Prefx = PTrefx ∈ Rnref×nref , Arefx ∈
SA, Brefx ∈ SB, Crefx ∈ SC , and Drefx ∈ SD be given. Then
there exist a stable filter of the form given in (8) and a stable
fault reference dynamics model Tref
s= (Aref, Bref, Cref, Dref) ∈
S, where S is defined in (11), such that ‖Tref‖− ≥ 1, residual
dynamics in (10) are quadratically stable, and (12) is satisfied
for M =MΔ if there exist Aref ∈ SA, Bref ∈ SB, Cref ∈ SC ,
Dref ∈ SD, Â, B̂y , B̂u, Ĉ, D̂y , D̂u, λ, and symmetric matrices
Pref, Y, and Z such that
T linr f w ≺ 0, (66)
T linro  0, (67)
[
Z Z
Z Y
]
 0. (68)
Remark 3. This scheme can also be applied to Lemmas 5 and
6 to obtain a suboptimal solution involving linear matrix in-
equalities.
Next, we need to choose the initial parameters (Zx, Yx,
Prefx , Arefx , Brefx , Crefx , and Drefx ) to reduce γ. The idea is to
derive an algorithm where at each iteration, we solve the op-
timization problem given in Lemma 9, using the solution of
this problem at the previous iteration, for initial parameters.
The algorithm will use initial values Z initx , Y
init
x , P
init
refx , A
init
refx ,
Binitrefx ,C
init
refx , andD
init
refx , which must guarantee that the LMI con-
straints (66) and (67) will be feasible.
From the above discussion, an algorithm for choosing the
initial parameters can be listed as follows.
Algorithm 1. (1) Set initial values Ainitrefx , B
init
refx , C
init
refx , and D
init
refx
such that T initref
s= (Ainitrefx ,Binitrefx ,Cinitrefx ,Dinitrefx ) satisfies ‖T initref ‖− ≥ 1
and T initref ∈ S.
(2) Find the solutions Z, Y, and Pref of the optimiza-
tion derived from Lemmas 3 and 4, which is linear since the
matrix inequalities (37), (38), and (39) become linear when
Tref := T initref is fixed. (The matrices Z, Y, and Pref always ex-
ist since the cost function in (12) is bounded because Δ is
bounded).
(3) Set Z initx := Z, Y initx := Y, and Pinitrefx := Pref.
(4) Start loop.
(5) Since the initial values are feasible for (37), (38), and
(39), the LMIs (66) to (68) have feasible solutions from (50)
and (63) in Lemmas 7 and 8. Compute solutions (Z, Y, etc.)
of (66) to (68) to minimize γ.
(6) Rename Z initx = Z, Y initx = Y, Pinitrefx = Pref, Ainitrefx = Aref,
Binitrefx = Bref, Cinitrefx = Cref, and Dinitrefx = Dref, and go to Step 5.
(7) End loop.
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Algorithm 1 is convergent, possibly to a local minimum,
in the sense that the quantity γ is nonincreasing after each
iteration. This can be easily shown using (50) and (52) from
Lemma 7, and (63) from Lemma 8.
Remark 4. Lemmas 7, 8, and Algorithm 1 can also be ap-
plied to other problems involving QMIs and bilinear matrix
inequalities (BMIs). The procedure potentially gives an im-
provement and seems to work well in practice.
Remark 5. In the case that we choose a diagonal structure for
Tref, we may use
Ainitref = −Inref , Binitref = 0nref×n f ,
Cinitref = 0n f ×nref , Dinitref = In f ,
(69)
as initial values. This will ensure that Tref is stable and
‖Tref‖− = 1. We can solve the LMI optimization problem
given in Lemma 4. This will give Z initx ,Y
init
x , P
init
refx , and so forth.
These initial values are not unique and can be chosen using
other criteria.
Remark 6. A more systematic technique for generating valid
initial values is as follows: first, generate any Binitref , C
init
ref , D
init
ref ,
and a stable Ainitref with the structure chosen, then, compute
α = ‖T initref ‖−. If α > 0, redefine the matrices as Ainitref = Ainitref /α,
Binitref = Binitref /α, Cinitref = Cinitref /α, and Dinitref = Dinitref /α, which ful-
fill that the conditions T initref are stable and ‖T initref ‖− = 1.
Remark 7. The requirement for Tref to be diagonal is to en-
sure fault isolability in the case that all faults may occur si-
multaneously. If we ignore disturbances and uncertainty, and
assuming perfect fault isolation, then r = Tref f so that fault
fi only affects residual ri. If none of the faults can occur si-
multaneously, then we need only to impose the constraint
that Tref is upper (or lower) triangular. While it is not diffi-
cult to modify our analysis under these conditions, we only
consider the case when Tref is diagonal so that all faults may
occur simultaneously since our contribution is focussed on
reducing the effect of disturbances and uncertainties under
the most stringent fault scenarios.
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the efficiency of Algorithm 1 and the im-
portance of the choice of Tref, we consider a jet engine state-
space model [32] supplied by NASA Glenn Research Center
given as
ẋ(t) = (Ao + FAΔHEA
)
x(t) +
(
Bo + FAΔHEB
)
u(t)
+ Bdd(t) + Bf f (t),
y(t) = (Co + FCΔHEA
)
x(t) +
(
Do + FCΔHEB
)
u(t)
+Ddd(t) +Df f (t),
(70)
where
Ao =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.9835 −0.0110 −0.0039
−0.0004 −0.9858 −0.0026
0 0.0002 −0.9891
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Bo =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.0080 0.2397 −0.0383
0.0068 0.1565 0.0248
0.0003 −0.0003 0.0003
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Co =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.2383 0.4871 0.1390
0 −.0008 0.0004
0.00002 −0.00004 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Do =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.4171 −4.4920 0.4875
0.0008 −0.0050 0.0003
0 0.0005 −0.0021
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(71)
The system is subject to three disturbances and three poten-
tial faults. Here, the setup is given by
Bd =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.1 0 0
0 0.1 0
0 0 0.01
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Bf =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.0080 0.2397 −0.0383
0.0068 0.1565 0.0248
0.0003 −0.0003 0.0003
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Dd = 0.1× I3,
Df =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.0205 0.6217 0.8115
0.2789 −1.7506 0.6363
1.0583 0.6973 1.3101
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(72)
Since no uncertainty parameters were given in this exam-
ple, we assume an unstructured norm-bounded uncertainty,
with matrices FA, FC , EA, EB, and H randomly generated as
H =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.319 −0.080 0.142
−0.288 0.138 0.258
0.114 0.163 0.133
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
EA =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.060 −0.008 −0.135
−0.015 0.154 0.047
−0.044 −0.061 −0.090
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
EB =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.134 0.630 0.451
0.207 0.371 0.044
0.607 0.575 0.027
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
FC =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.055 0.066 −0.012
−0.085 −0.085 −0.007
−0.025 −0.120 0.049
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
FA =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.148 −0.129 −0.084
0.114 −0.007 0.050
−0.068 −0.033 0.149
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(73)
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Figure 2: Time response of the residual before the optimization.
A square and diagonal structure for Tref is necessary to
get fault isolation in the case that the faults occur at the same
time.
Remark 8. If Aref, Bref, and Cref are chosen diagonal, then
Tref(s) = Cref
(
sI − Aref
)−1
Bref +Dref
= Cref Bref
(
sI − Aref
)−1
+Dref.
(74)
The terms in Bref can be incorporated in Cref. It follows that
we can set Bref = I . Therefore, the nonlinearity in (37) comes
only from bilinear terms ZE1Aref ET1 and YE1Aref E
T
1 .
To initialize Algorithm 1, T initref is generated following
Remark 6 as
Ainitref =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−1.60 0 0
0 −1.44 0
0 0 −0.57
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Binitref = I3,
Cinitref =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.71 0 0
0 1.29 0
0 0 0.67
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Dinitref =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1.40 0 0
0 1.69 0
0 0 1.81
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(75)
Then, by following the first two steps of Algorithm 1, we get
the optimal γ as
γ = 0.6273 (76)
and the values given below for Z, Y , and Prefx , which will be
used to initialize the main loop of the algorithm as follows.
Zref
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.5010 −0.4385 0.0309 0.6192 −0.4313 0.4861
−0.4385 0.8184 0.0844 −0.3629 −0.6083 −0.8105
0.0309 0.0844 0.0651 0.0986 −0.3323 −0.1397
0.6192 −0.3629 0.0986 1.4722 −1.2716 0.9082
−0.4313 −0.6083 −0.3323 −1.2716 5.7926 −1.5337
0.4861 −0.8105 −0.1397 0.9082 −1.5337 2.5593
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Yref
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
5.0059 19.1311 2.7518 0.1860 3.0607 0.7016
19.1311 165.3233 12.5435 −13.2886 32.4525 −15.3595
2.7518 12.5435 7.7249 −4.8209 0.6873 −3.4439
0.1860 −13.2886 −4.8209 7.4800 −5.3595 4.9329
3.0607 32.4525 0.6873 −5.3595 22.7920 −4.1575
0.7016 −15.3595 −3.4439 4.9329 −4.1575 8.6769
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Prefx =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.0492 1.4322 −0.1444
1.4322 −63.1246 8.1628
−0.1444 8.1628 −1.2084
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(77)
Taking into account Remark 8, we implemented Algo-
rithm 1 in Matlab to minimize γ. Table 1 shows the evolution
of the optimization following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 can clearly improve the result in a few iter-
ations; γ is reduced by 33% compared to the one obtained
with a fixed Tref. This shows that the choice of Tref is essential
in our FDI scheme. We get
Aref =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−18.1665 0 0
0 −9.2781 0
0 0 −6.0914
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Bref = I3,
Cref =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.0007 0 0
0 −0.3959 0
0 0 0.0572
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Dref =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1.2438 0 0
0 4.3768 0
0 0 1.8216
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(78)
Remark 9. In our numerical experimentation, other choices
for T initref have been used; however, all converged to the same
solution but with different numbers of iterations.
In order to show that our filter is robust against distur-
bances and model uncertainties, we introduce a randomly
generated Δ given by
Δ =
⎡
⎢⎣
0.4058 −0.0534 −0.3600
−0.4097 −0.5466 0.4822
−0.0067 0.0877 −0.2743
⎤
⎥⎦ , (79)
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Table 1
Iterations 0 1 2 5 10 20 50 100
γ 0.6273 0.6248 0.5791 0.5476 0.5253 0.4739 0.4641 0.4641
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Figure 3: Time response of the residual after the optimization.
as well as three disturbances. Simulated through MATLAB
and SIMULINK, these disturbances are three-band-limited
white noises with mean 0 and standard deviation 2. Faults f1
and f2 are both simulated by a unit positive jump connected
from the 14th second. Fault f3, simulated by a soft bias (slope
= 0.2), is connected from the 20th second. Figure 2 gives the
residual responses before the algorithm, where each residual
is dedicated to a particular fault, while Figure 3 gives the op-
timized residual response using our algorithm.
The lines opt1, opt2, and opt3 represent the optimal tra-
jectories that each residual must follow
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
opt1(s)
opt2(s)
opt3(s)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ = Tref
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
f1(s)
f2(s)
f3(s)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (80)
In both figures, each fault can be distinguished from the
others and the disturbances; however, in Figure 3, the faults
can be more easily distinguished and each residual follows
its optimal trajectory (green line) with more accuracy. Fur-
thermore, the disturbances are more attenuated compared
to Figure 2, and the jumps that indicate faults are clearer in
Figure 3 since their amplitudes are bigger and therefore allow
a better fault detection using thresholds [33, 34]. The isola-
tion performance is clearly effective as each fault produces a
deviation of its residual only, without modifying the trajec-
tory of the others. This example illustrates that the designed
filter satisfies the performance requirement of FDI which is
sufficiently robust against disturbances and modeling errors.
Figure 3 also justifies the efficiency of Algorithm 1 to im-
prove the design of the reference model and therefore the
overall performance of our filter.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has addressed the problem of fault detection
and isolation for linear time-invariant systems subject to
faults, disturbances, and model uncertainties. We proposed
a performance index that captures the FDI requirements.
Through QMI formulations, we gave the design of an op-
timal filter for polytopic or unstructured norm-bounded
uncertainties, and a suboptimal filter for structured norm-
bounded uncertainties. Suboptimality in the latter case is
inherited from the bounded real lemma, which gives only
sufficient LMI conditions for structured uncertainties (see
Lemma 2). By allowing the reference model Tref to be vari-
able in our formulation, we get its optimal design, which can
be used in other schemes dedicated to fault isolation. The
optimal design of this reference model is initially given in a
form of a QMI optimization, then a suboptimal solution is
obtained by using a linearization procedure which derives an
upper bound on the optimal solution of the QMI formula-
tion that requires the solution of an LMI optimization. Note,
however, that we have no indication concerning the deviation
of our design from the optimal filter. We have also illustrated
the effectiveness of our algorithm using a jet-engine example.
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In this contribution, an active fault-tolerant scheme that achieves fault detection, isolation, and accommodation is developed for
LTI systems. Faults and perturbations are considered as additive signals that modify the state or output equations. The accom-
modation scheme is based on the generalized internal model control architecture recently proposed for fault-tolerant control. In
order to improve the performance after a fault, the compensation is considered in two steps according with a fault detection and
isolation algorithm. After a fault scenario is detected, a general fault compensator is activated. Finally, once the fault is isolated, a
specific compensator is introduced. In this setup, multiple faults could be treated simultaneously since their effect is additive. De-
sign strategies for a nominal condition and under model uncertainty are presented in the paper. In addition, performance indices
are also introduced to evaluate the resulting fault-tolerant scheme for detection, isolation, and accommodation. Hard thresholds
are suggested for detection and isolation purposes, meanwhile, adaptive ones are considered under model uncertainty to reduce
the conservativeness. A complete simulation evaluation is carried out for a DC motor setup.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the early stages of control applications, closed-loop per-
formance was the main objective for the control engineer.
To achieve this goal, the implementations of these feedback
configurations involved sensors, actuators, electronic instru-
mentation, and signal processors. However, during a normal
operation, these parts could fail in some degree, and the re-
sulting performance of the closed-loop will be largely deteri-
orated, or even instability can be observed. In fact, for some
processes besides performance, safety is also a necessary and
important objective. Therefore, it is desirable to detect these
malfunctions to take proper action in order to avoid a dan-
gerous situation. Nowadays, the advance in electronics has
made possible to have digital signal processors as microcon-
trollers, DSP’s and FPGA boards that can perform, in real
time, very complex algorithms. Hence this extra processing
capacity could be applied to perform in parallel fault diag-
nosis strategies to the nominal control schemes. The prob-
lem of fault diagnosis is indeed a challenging one, and its
importance in applications has attracted the attention of the
research community in control theory and signal processing
[1–4].
In any process, the faults can be classified in two sets:
unrecoverable and recoverable. The unrecoverable ones rep-
resent all faults that cannot be compensated or accommo-
dated while the system is running. On the other hand, the
recoverable faults comprise any fault whose outcome can
still be safely compensated by the control algorithm with a
possible deterioration of performance, but still allowing the
necessary conditions to maintain closed-loop stability. Ob-
viously, this classification depends on the problem at hand,
and requires knowledge about the operation of the system.
From a control point of view, the focus is on the recoverable
faults, where a degree of robustness or reconfigurability in
the control scheme is desirable to accommodate these faults
and still preserve closed-loop performance. These ideas have
triggered a research line called fault-tolerant control (FTC)
[5–9].
FTC can be approached from two perspectives: passive
and active. In the passive approach, the faults are treated as
disturbances into the closed-loop system. As a result, a single
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controller is designed to achieve stability and performance
against all studied faults. The main drawback of this scheme
is the conservativeness that can be incorporated, however,
no extra complexity in the control implementation is car-
ried out. For LTI systems, the passive approach can be treated
as a simultaneous stabilization or robust H∞ design [9].
Meanwhile, for nonlinear systems, a variable structure con-
trol (sliding mode) methodology can be applied [10]. On
the other hand, the active approach relies on a fault diagno-
sis stage, followed by a controller reconfiguration or accom-
modation [6]. Compared to the passive approach, the active
one requires more computational power during implemen-
tations, but it can provide less conservative results and better
closed-loop performance after faults. Applications of the ac-
tive approach have been suggested for LTI [7, 8, 11, 12], LPV
[13, 14], and nonlinear systems [15, 16]. Three major trends
are devised in active FTC according to the required informa-
tion of the FDI stage as follows.
(A) Estimate the faults profiles and update the nominal
control law to cancel completely their effect (fault de-
coupling). Therefore, this idea requires a reliable fault
isolation and identification scheme.
(B) Design a compensation signal for the nominal con-
trol law that depends on the fault affecting the system.
Hence according to the transfer function from a spe-
cific fault to the output measurements or input con-
trol signal (fault signature transfer matrices), an accom-
modation control law is designed to reduce its effect
into the closed-loop system. Alternatively, the nomi-
nal control law can be reconfigurated according to the
isolated fault, for example, using reconfigurable con-
trol gains under a state-feedback control law. As a re-
sult, these approaches rely on the information from the
fault isolation stage to properly operate.
(C) Switch to a robust control law that maintains closed-
loop stability for a studied set of faults. In conse-
quence, this scheme depends just on the information
of a fault detection block. However, the post-fault per-
formance can be pretty conservative.
This work looks to extend the ideas initially presented in
[12, 17, 18]. Hence fault detection, isolation, and accommo-
dation are discussed in a more general framework under the
GIMC control structure for additive faults. The contribution
of this paper lies in the following lines.
(i) A two-step active FTC scheme is proposed for LTI sys-
tems under an additive fault scenario.
(ii) Design strategies are proposed for diagnosis and ac-
commodation based on general optimization criteria.
(iii) Performance indices are suggested in order to evaluate
the active FTC from a worst-case perspective.
(iv) A complete analysis is introduced for the synthesis al-
gorithms under model uncertainty. Hard and adap-
tive thresholds are provided for detection and isolation
purposes.
Consequently, the FTC philosophies (B) and (C) are
adopted in this work, looking to reduce the conservative-
ness in the post-fault performance, but avoiding the ne-
cessity of fault identification. The paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 describes the problem formulation. The
FTC scheme is presented in Section 3. First, the general
methodology is introduced, and the design criteria for di-
agnostic, isolation, and accommodation are detailed next.
Section 4 analyzes the effect of model uncertainty in the FTC
scheme. Finally, Section 5 presents an illustrative example,
and Section 6 gives some concluding remarks.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem addressed in this paper is fault detection, iso-
lation, and accommodation for LTI systems under additive
faults and perturbations. In this way, consider a system P(s)
affected by disturbances d ∈ Rr and possible faults f ∈ Rl,
as shown in Figure 1, described by
P(s)
{
ẋ = Ax + Bu + F1 f + E1d,
y = Cx +Du + F2 f + E2d,
(1)
where x ∈ Rn represents the vector of states, u ∈ Rm the
vector of inputs, and y ∈ Rp the vector of outputs. Thus
matrix F1 ∈ Rn×l stands for the distribution matrix of the
actuator or system faults, and F2 ∈ Rp×l for sensor faults.
Denote as Fi1 ∈ Rn and Fi2 ∈ Rp with i = 1, . . . , l the columns
of the fault signature matrices F1 and F2, respectively, that is,
F1 =
[
F11 · · · Fl1
]
, F2 =
[
F12 · · · Fl2
]
. (2)
Thus matrices (Fi1,F
i
2) will represent the signature of the ith
component fi in the fault vector f . The nominal system
(A,B,C,D) is considered controllable and observable. On
the other hand, the system response y can be analyzed in a
transfer matrix form (frequency domain) as follows:
y(s) = Puyu(s) + Pf y f (s) + Pdyd(s), (3)
where
Puy = C(sI − A)−1B +D,
Pdy = C(sI − A)−1E1 + E2,
Pf y = C(sI − A)−1F1 + F2.
(4)
A left coprime factorization for each transfer matrix can be
derived by obtaining matrix L ∈ Rn×p such that R{λi(A +
LC)} < 0 [19, 20], as it is shown next:[
Ñ M̃ Ñd Ñ f
]
=
[
A + LC B + LD L E1 + LE2 F1 + LF2
C D I E2 F2
]
.
(5)
Consequently, the LTI systems in (4) can be written as
Puy = M̃−1Ñ , Pdy = M̃−1Ñd, Pf y = M̃−1Ñ f ,
(6)
where M̃, Ñ , Ñd, Ñ f ∈ RH∞. An initial question about the
fault diagnosis and isolation process relies on the neces-
sary conditions to achieve this objective, hence the condition
originally presented in [1, 4] are assumed as follows:
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Figure 1: Problem formulation for control.
(1) for isolation of the fault vector f ,
rank
([
F1
F2
])
= l; (7)
(2) for the simultaneous isolation of faults under un-
known perturbations,
normrank
([
Ñd Ñ f
])
≥ normrank (Ñd) + l, (8)
where normrank stands for the normal rank of the corre-
sponding transfer matrix [20].
Now, it is assumed that a nominal controller K stabilizes
the nominal plant Puy , and it provides a desired closed-loop
performance in terms of robustness, transient, and steady-
state responses. The controller K is considered observable,
and consequently, it can also be expressed by a left coprime
factorization, that is, K = Ṽ−1Ũ where Ũ , Ṽ ∈RH∞,
K=
[
Ak Bk
Ck Dk
]
=⇒
[
Ũ Ṽ
]
=
[
Ak+LkCk Bk+LkDk Lk
Ck Dk I
]
.
(9)
The nominal controller can be synthesized following classi-
cal techniques or optimal control: lead/lag compensator, PI,
PID, LQG/H2, H∞ loop shaping design, and so on. Conse-
quently, the control objective is presented as follows. Design
an active fault-tolerant scheme such that it detects and isolates
the occurrence of a fault in the closed-loop system, and provides
an appropriate compensation signal q to the controller in order
to maintain closed-loop performance (see Figure 1).
Remark 1. The problem formulation in (1) assumes no pre-
vious knowledge of the time profiles of the fault components
fi i = 1, . . . , l. Thus the fault vector f is modeled as an un-
known exogenous input for the system P(s). However, if ex-
plicit knowledge about the faults time profiles is available,
then this information can be incorporated at the FDI stage to
improve the residual design and evaluation. Nonetheless, the
fault-accommodation scheme presented in the next section
is consistent with this assumption, and it does not require an
explicit identification of the faults affecting the system. Fur-
thermore, the additive faults representation in (1) might be
able to describe some common faults that cause changes on
system parameters or loss of effectiveness in actuators, but in
those cases, the faults time profiles will be related to states or
control inputs (as it will be shown in Section 5).
The definition of the following system performance in-
dexes will be very important for the synthesis and analysis
of the fault detection, isolation, and accommodation algo-
rithms [19–21]:
‖G‖1 = max
1≤i≤n
m∑
j=1
∫∞
0
∣∣gi j(t)∣∣dt,
‖G‖2 =
√
1
2π
∫∞
−∞
Trace
{
G∗( jω)G( jω)
}
dω,
G ∈RH2,
‖G‖∞ = sup
ω∈R
σ
(
G( jω)
)
, G ∈RH∞,
‖G‖− = inf
ω∈R
σ
(
G( jω)
)
,
‖G‖[ω1,ω2]− = inf
ω∈[ω1,ω2]
σ
(
G( jω)
)
, 0 ≤ ω1 < ω2 <∞,
(10)
where G is a n × m Hurwitz matrix transfer function, and
gi j(t) = L−1{Gij(s)} (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m) are the impulse
responses corresponding to every component in the trans-
fer matrix G. The next inequalities will be useful to derive
thresholds for residual evaluation:
‖y‖∞ ≤ ‖G‖1‖u‖∞,
‖y‖2 ≤ ‖G‖∞‖u‖2,
(11)
where y = Gu, the signal norms are defined as
‖y‖∞ = sup
t∈[0,∞)
∥∥y(t)∥∥,
‖y‖2 =
√∫∞
0
∥∥y(t)∥∥2dt,
(12)
and ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm.
3. FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROL SCHEME
The proposed FTC scheme relies on a fault diagnosis and
isolation (FDI) algorithm, followed by a fault accommoda-
tion into the nominal controller. For LTI systems and ad-
ditive faults, several FTC control structures have been sug-
gested [12, 22–24] departing from the Youla parametriza-
tion of all stabilizing controllers [20]. In this configuration,
a free parameter Q ∈ RH∞ is selected to achieve the fault
compensation, with the assurance that closed-loop stability
is achieved after the fault accommodation. In this fashion,
the accommodation scheme adopted in this work is moti-
vated by a new implementation of the Youla parametrization
called generalized internal model control (GIMC) [7, 12]. In
this configuration, the nominal controller K is represented
by its left coprime factorization, that is, K = Ṽ−1Ũ . In addi-
tion, the GIMC configuration allows to perform the FDI pro-
cess and accommodation in the same structure, where these
two processes are carried out by selecting two design param-
eters Q,H ∈ RH∞ (see Figure 2). Consequently, the resid-
ual r is generated by selecting the detection/isolation filter
4 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
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Figure 2: GIMC with additive perturbations and faults.
H , and the accommodation signal q by the compensator Q,
using the filtered signal fe with the following criteria.
(1) H(s): the fault detection/isolation filter must diminish
the effect of the disturbances or uncertainty into the
residual signal, and maximize the effect of the faults.
(2) Q(s): the robustification controller must provide ro-
bustness into the closed-loop system in order to main-
tain acceptable performance against faults.
3.1. Fault detection and isolation
From Figure 2, it can be observed that fe ∈ Rp contains in-
formation of perturbations d and faults f as follows:
fe(s) = −Ñdd(s)− Ñ f f (s). (13)
Hence a residual r is naturally constructed by using the in-
formation of the coprime factorization of the nominal plant
through fe [1];
r(s) = −H fe(s) = H
[
Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)
]
. (14)
In order to improve the accuracy of the FDI stage, it is pro-
posed to carry out this task in two consecutive steps: (a) first,
fault detection, and next, (b) fault isolation. This idea is also
appealing for fault accommodation, and its benefits will be
explained in the next section. As a result, the FDI algorithm
is designed in two parts as follows.
(1) A detection filter HD is first synthesized to determine a
general fault scenario.
(2) Next, an isolation filter HI is computed to identify the
faults affecting the system.
First, the detection filter HD is constructed to obtain a scalar
residual, that is, HD is a 1 × p transfer matrix such that it
attenuates the contribution from the perturbations d while
maximizing the faults f effect. Hence the following design
criteria are suggested:
sup
HD∈RH∞
∥∥HDÑ f ∥∥k∥∥HDÑd∥∥ j or
sup
HD∈RH∞
∥∥HDÑ f ∥∥k s.t. ∥∥HDÑd∥∥ j ≤ γ,
(15)
where γ > 0 denotes a desired attenuation factor for the
unknown perturbations contribution, and k, j represent the
performance indexes in (10). In [21, 25], the previous mul-
tiobjective optimizations have been studied where optimal
and approximation solutions are provided. Alternatively, the
∞/∞ and 2/2 optimizations can be solved using well-known
algorithms through a characterization by a linear fractional
transformation (LFT) [20];
min
HD∈RH∞
∥∥∥[0 h]−HD [Ñd Ñ f ]∥∥∥
j
= min
HD∈RH∞
∥∥Fl(GHD ,HD)∥∥ j , j = 2,∞, (16)
where h ∈ RH∞ is a 1× l transfer matrix that describes the
faults frequency bandwidth, Fl (·, ·) represents a lower LFT
[20], and GHD the generalized plant (see Figure 3) given by
GHD =
[
0 h −1
Ñd Ñ f 0
]
. (17)
One advantage of the LFT characterization is that it can be
augmented to include model uncertainty in the problem for-
mulation. Meanwhile, the isolation filter HI (l × p transfer
matrix) is designed to isolate the fault vector f and decouple
the perturbations d, that is,
(i) HIÑd(s) ≈ 0,
(ii) HIÑ f (s) ≈ T ,
D. U. Campos-Delgado et al. 5
fe
GHD
HD
e f
r
[
d
f
]
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where T ∈ RH∞ is a diagonal transfer matrix. Transfer ma-
trix T is a design parameter, and it should be chosen accord-
ing to the frequency response of Ñ f , in order to achieve the
isolation and decoupling objectives. Nevertheless, nonmin-
imum phase zeros of Ñ f could limit the resulting perfor-
mance [26]. Once more, the design criterion can be proposed
by combining both objectives measured by a system norm
j = 2,∞ as follows:
min
HI∈RH∞
∥∥∥[0 T]−HI [Ñd Ñ f ]∥∥∥
j
= min
HI∈RH∞
∥∥Fl(GHI ,HI)∥∥ j ,
(18)
where GHI stands for the generalized plant associated to the
LFT formulation given by
GHI =
[
0 T −I
Ñd Ñ f 0
]
. (19)
Hence once a fault is detected, in the isolation stage, the filter
HI has to provide a good estimate of the fault affecting the
system. Therefore, it is fundamental that HI could render di-
agonally the product HIÑ f , or at least diagonally dominant.
In fact, this issue has to be verified after HI is designed for a
correct fault identification.
Remark 2. Assumptions (7) and (8) about the rank prop-
erties of the perturbations and faults transfer matrices pro-
vide necessary conditions to achieve the decoupling objec-
tive. Therefore, it is expected that the optimal filters obtained
through (16) and (18) will guarantee good fault detection
and isolation properties of the residuals.
Now, perfect disturbance decoupling is hard to achieve in
a general scenario. As a result, the residuals will not be zero
in a fault-free condition. Two possible techniques can be fol-
lowed in order to detect a fault: hard or adaptive thresholds
[3, 27, 28]. Since the perturbations are considered unknown
and no uncertainty is assumed at this stage, hard thresholds
are adopted. Departing from the signal norms in (12), a win-
dowed residual evaluation criteria can be chosen as follows:
‖r‖ = ‖r‖2,t,To =
√∫ t
t−To
∥∥r(τ)∥∥dτ, (20)
‖r‖ = ‖r‖∞,t,To = sup
t−To≤τ≤t
‖r‖, (21)
where To is the window length or evaluation horizon. Hence
to avoid a false alarm in the evaluation due to perturbations
[27], a threshold value is selected such that
Jth = sup
f=0,∀d
‖r‖ (22)
in the case of the windowed 2 norm, and considering
bounded energy perturbations, that is, ‖d‖2,t,To < γd2 , then
an initial detection threshold can be calculated by applying
(11) as
JDth = γd2‖HDÑd‖∞. (23)
On the other hand, if the perturbations are now assumed
bounded for all time, that is, ‖d‖∞ < γd∞, then a new de-
tection threshold can be employed as follows:
JDth = γd∞‖HDÑd‖1. (24)
The hard thresholds in (23) and (24) are conservative starting
values since they are derived from the norms inequalities in
(11). Nevertheless, they have to be adjusted online for proper
fault detection. Now, with respect to the isolation stage, a
hard threshold has to be obtained for each output of the filter
HI that represents the estimated fault. However, if the prod-
uctHIÑ f is not diagonal, then each output is affected at some
degree by all faults and perturbations. Assuming that the ith
output is evaluated, then the following thresholds are pro-
posed:
J Iith =
l∑
j=1
j /=i
‖[HIÑ f ]i j‖∞γi2 +
r∑
k=1
‖[HIÑd]ik‖∞γd2 , (25)
or
J Iith =
l∑
j=1
j /=i
‖[HIÑ f ]i j‖1γi∞ +
r∑
k=1
‖[HIÑd]ik‖1γd∞, (26)
where i = 1, . . . , l, [·]i j denotes the i j term in the transfer
matrix, ‖ fi‖2,t,To < γi2, and ‖ fi‖∞ < γi∞. Consequently, some
information about the energy or time upper-bound on each
fault is necessary to compute (25) and (26). Once more, it
is important to point out that (25) and (26) are just starting
values for the threshold selection during the residual evalua-
tion, since they rely on inequalities that involve some inherit
conservativeness.
3.2. Fault accommodation
In order to derive the fault accommodation scheme, the ef-
fect of the compensation signal q in the GIMC structure of
Figure 2 is analyzed. Define the following nominal closed-
loop transfer matrices:
(i) input sensitivity: Si  (I + KPuy)−1,
(ii) output sensitivity: So  (I + PuyK)−1,
(iii) complementary output sensitivity: To  I − So = (I +
PuyK)
−1PuyK .
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The next lemma originally presented in [17] character-
izes the dynamic behavior of the compensated control input
u and output y of the closed-loop system.
Lemma 1. In the GIMC configuration of Figure 2 considering
additive faults, the resulting closed-loop characteristics for the
control signal u and output y are given by
u(s) = SiK ref (s)− SiṼ−1(ŨM̃−1 +Q)
(
Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)
)
,
y(s) = To ref (s) + SoM̃−1(I − ÑṼ−1Q)
(
Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)
)
.
(27)
The resulting closed-loop system is stable, provided that Q ∈
RH∞, since the nominal controller K internally stabilizes the
nominal plant Puy (proof in Appendix B).
By a simple inspection of (27), two results can be con-
cluded by considering the complete decoupling of perturba-
tions d and faults f from the control input u and output y of
the system.
Corollary 1 (see [17]). If the nominal plant Puy ∈ RH∞,
then M̃−1 ∈ RH∞, and the complete disturbance and fault
decoupling can be achieved at the control signal u by letting
Q = −ŨM̃−1 ∈RH∞. As a result, it is obtained that
u(s) = SiK ref (s), (28)
y(s) = To ref (s) + M̃−1
(
Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)
)
. (29)
Therefore, if the nominal plant Puy is stable by properly
choosing the compensator Q, the control signal is not af-
fected by faults and perturbations. The compensation sug-
gested in Corollary 1 is particularly useful under a sensor
fault scenario [24] since it is not desirable to adjust the con-
trol signal dynamics against erroneous information given
by a sensor. Note that from (29), perturbations and faults
are decoupled from the closed-loop feedback dynamics since
they appear in an open-loop fashion at the output. How-
ever, the perturbations are affecting the outputs with a feed-
forward structure, which is an undesirable effect of this
compensation. Consequently, as it was suggested in [18], if
some estimation of the perturbations d̂ could be deduced
by steady-state relations of the system or by an observer us-
ing state-augmentation, the compensation q could incorpo-
rate this new information to improve the closed-loop per-
formance. In general, if the FDI stage could provide a re-
liable identification of the fault vector f̂ , then this estima-
tion can be also applied under the compensation suggested in
Corollary 1 to decouple the faults from the closed-loop sys-
tem. The compensation including perturbations and faults
estimations will be given by
q(s) = −ŨM̃−1[Ñu(s) + Ñdd̂(s) + Ñ f f̂ (s)− M̃y(s)],
(30)
and the resulting output dynamics are given now by
y(s)=To ref (s)+M̃−1
[
Ñd
{
d(s)−d̂(s)}+Ñ f { f (s)− f̂ (s)}].
(31)
Therefore, the accuracy in the perturbations and faults esti-
mations (d(s)−d̂(s) and f (s)− f̂ (s)) will dictate the resulting
performance deterioration. However, in a practical scenario,
it is difficult to have these estimations available or to have a
stable plant. Hence it is important that the compensator Q
could simultaneously attenuate perturbations and faults into
the closed-loop system. On the other hand, if Puy has also
a stable inverse, a complete output decoupling for perturba-
tions and faults can be achieved.
Corollary 2 (see [17]). If the nominal plant satisfies Puy ,
P−1uy ∈ RH∞, then Ñ−1 ∈ RH∞ and with Q = Ṽ Ñ−1 ∈
RH∞, the resulting output is decoupled perfectly from the per-
turbations and faults, that is,
u(s) = SiK ref (s)− Ñ−1
(
Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)
)
,
y(s) = To ref (s).
(32)
Note that the compensation proposed in Corollary 2 is
particularly useful for an actuator or system fault, since the
output is perfectly decoupled from faults and perturbations.
However, it should be avoided in a sensor fault scenario. In
fact, the decoupling conditions of Corollaries 1 and 2 could
be very restrictive. For this reason, by analyzing (27), if it
is desired to minimize the faults effect at the control signal,
while reducing the perturbations contribution at the output,
the compensator Q should be designed by following the op-
timization strategy
min
Q∈RH∞
∥∥[Z1Z2]∥∥ j = minQ∈RH∞
∥∥[Z3Z4]∥∥ j , (33)
where
Z1 = αdSoM̃−1
(
I − ÑṼ−1Q)Ñd,
Z2 = −α f SiṼ−1
(
ŨM̃−1 +Q
)
Ñ f ,
Z3 = αdSo
(
Pdy − PuyṼ−1QÑd
)
,
Z4 = −α f Si
(
KPf y + Ṽ−1QÑ f
)
,
(34)
j represents the H2 or H∞ norms in (10), αd,α f ∈ [0, 1] are
two weighting factors to balance the tradeoff between per-
turbations and faults reduction, and the normalized coprime
factors relations in (6) are applied. However, the optimiza-
tion problem in (33) cannot be solved using standard robust
control algorithms [19, 20]. Therefore, it is proposed to ex-
tend the cost function to have a feasible problem as follows:
min
Q∈RH∞
∥∥∥∥∥
[
αdSoPdy 0
0 −α f SiKP f y
]
+
[
−αdSoPuyṼ−1
−α f SiṼ−1
]
Q
[
Ñd Ñ f
]∥∥∥∥∥
j
= min
Q∈RH∞
∥∥Fl(GQu ,Q)∥∥ j ,
(35)
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Figure 4: LFT formulations for compensator Q: (a) Control signal
and output attenuation, and (b) output signal attenuation.
where GQu represents the generalized plant (see Figure 4)
given by
GQu =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
αdSoPdy 0 −αdSoPuyṼ−1
0 −α f SiKP f y −α f SiṼ−1
Ñd Ñ f 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (36)
Meanwhile, if it is desired to attenuate both faults and pertur-
bations at the output y, then the next optimization scheme
is suggested:
min
Q∈RH∞
∥∥∥SoM̃−1(I − ÑṼ−1Q) [αdÑd α f Ñ f ]∥∥∥
j
= min
Q∈RH∞
∥∥Fl (GQy ,Q)∥∥ j ,
(37)
where GQy is given by
GQy =
⎡
⎣αdSoPdy α f SoP f y −SoPuyṼ−1
αdÑd α f Ñ f 0
⎤
⎦ . (38)
Remark 3. The optimization criteria for Q in (35) and (37)
can be interpreted as approximation or normalization prob-
lems with certain postweighting and preweighting given by
the frequency content of the perturbations Ñd or faults Ñ f .
In fact, (35) introduces a combined optimization: (i) a nor-
malization process of ÑṼ−1 by Q with a frequency post-
weighting given by the nominal output sensitivity So and
M̃−1, and (ii) an approximation problem to −ŨM̃−1 with a
frequency postweighting given by the nominal input sensi-
tivity Si and Ṽ−1.
Remark 4. Note that the compensatorsQ designed by the cri-
teria in (35) and (37) can be conservative since it is required
to attenuate the effect of all types of faults analyzed in (1),
and it is also assumed that all of them have the same struc-
ture.
To improve the post-fault performance, it is then pro-
posed to design specific compensators Qi ∈ RH∞ for i =
1, . . . , l for every studied fault, depending if their effect is
on the state (actuator or system faults) or the output (sen-
sor faults) equations in (1), using the previous optimization
algorithms as follows:
(i) actuator or system faults:
min
Qi∈RH∞
∥∥∥SoM̃−1(I − ÑṼ−1Qi) [αdÑd α f Ñ if ]
∥∥∥
j
;
(39)
(ii) sensor faults:
min
Qi∈RH∞
∥∥∥∥∥
[
αdSoPdy 0
0 −α f SiKPif y
]
+
[
−αdSoPuyṼ−1
−α f SiṼ−1
]
Qi
[
Ñd Ñ
i
f
]∥∥∥∥∥
j
,
(40)
where
Ñ if =
[
A + LC Fi1 + LF
i
2
C Fi2
]
(41)
and Pif y = M̃−1Ñ if . In this way, the fault accommodation
scheme of Figure 5 is proposed, and the overall active FTC
algorithm consists of three stages according to the informa-
tion of the FDI block as follows:
(1) in the fault-free case, just the nominal control loop is
active;
(2) after a fault scenario is detected into the system, a gen-
eral compensator Q designed by (35) is activated;
(3) finally, after the fault is classified and isolated, an spe-
cific compensator Qi designed by (39) or (40) is se-
lected.
In a general fault condition, it is then decided to decouple (if
possible) or attenuate the effect of faults at the control sig-
nal u, until the fault is well-characterized during the isola-
tion stage. As a result, after the fault is isolated, the specific
compensation is injected into the closed-loop configuration
to improve the postfault performance.
Remark 5. Since the fault accommodation is based on the
Youla parametrization, and since the faults are additive, the
closed-loop stability after each reconfiguration is guaranteed,
provided that Q,Qi ∈ RH∞, and any nonlinear behavior
is avoided into the closed-loop system, like saturations, rate
limiters, and so on. However, if the fault profile depends on
the states or outputs then closed-loop stability could not be
assured after all.
Remark 6. In the proposed configuration, multiple and in-
termittent faults could be handled. Once they are identified
by the FDI scheme, the corresponding compensator should
be activated to perform its accommodation. However, if FDI
algorithm detects that the fault is no longer present, the com-
pensation is removed.
3.3. Performance evaluation
One important question, after the design stage is completed,
is the resulting performance of the fault detection, isolation
and accommodation algorithms. To address this problem,
different quantification indices will be proposed using the
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Figure 5: GIMC accommodation setup.
system performance indexes in (10) of the resulting transfer
functions. The selection of the applied performance index in
(10) will depend on the a priori faults information, for ex-
ample, the faults frequency content, or the desired interpre-
tation of the quantification index, for example, the worst case
condition in the evaluation. The next indices are motivated
from the optimization algorithms used for synthesis in the
previous sections.
(1) Fault evaluation. The capability of the detection fil-
terHD of reducing the perturbations frequency content com-
pared to increasing the faults sensitivity is evaluated by
IFD 
∥∥HDÑ f ∥∥k∥∥HDÑd∥∥ j . (42)
Hence a large value of IFD will indicate good evaluation char-
acteristics.
(2) Fault isolation. This index is constructed by analyzing
the property of HI of diagonalizing Ñ f while attenuating the
disturbances frequency content:
IFI 
∥∥∥[HIÑ f ]diag
∥∥∥
k∥∥∥[HIÑ f ]nondiag
∥∥∥
k
+
∥∥∥HIÑd∥∥∥
j
, (43)
where [·]diag denotes the diagonal part of the transfer matrix,
and [·]nondiag the off diagonal structure. In fact, IFI is usually
denoted as signal-to-noise and interference ratio (SNIR) in
the signal processing community. Thus if IFI is large, then
fault isolation can be achieved.
(3) Fault accommodation. The fault accommodation is
quantified in terms of the property of reducing the effect of
faults and perturbations simultaneously into the closed-loop
system. The accommodation performance criteria is defined
for the ith fault fi as
IiFA  α f
∥∥WiAÑif ∥∥k + αd
∥∥SoM̃−1(I − ÑṼ−1Qi)Ñd∥∥ j ,
(44)
where the weighting WiA is selected according to the fault ef-
fect:
WiA 
⎧⎨
⎩
SoM̃−1
(
I − ÑṼ−1Qi
)
actuator/system fault,
SiṼ−1
(
ŨM̃−1 +Qi
)
sensor fault,
(45)
where (αd,α f ) are the positive weighting factors to judge the
importance of perturbations or faults attenuation. Now, a
small value of IiFA will indicate good fault accommodation.
Note that this value is related to a worst-case performance
degradation level expected in the FTC scheme [29].
The overall synthesis algorithms for fault detection, iso-
lation, and accommodation including performance evalua-
tion are described in Appendix A. The synthesis procedure
includes samples of MATLAB commands that could be used
for numerical calculations.
4. FAULT TOLERANT APPROACH UNDER
MODEL UNCERTAINTY
During the implementation of any control strategy, there is
always some model uncertainty in the mathematical descrip-
tion used for design. If the characterization of this uncer-
tainty could be obtained during the problem formulation,
this information could be used at the design stage to improve
the closed-loop performance, and understand also the prac-
tical limitations. In this work, additive model uncertainty is
considered [19, 20] as shown in Figure 6, that is, the actual
nominal plant P̂uy is given by
P̂uy = Puy + Δuy , Δuy  W2ΔW1, (46)
where W1,W2 ∈ RH∞ represent pre- and post-uncertainty
weighting functions, and Δ ∈ RH∞ a normalized uncertain
transfer matrix ‖Δ‖∞ < 1. As presented in [18], other uncer-
tainty representations (parametric, multiplicative, etc.) could
be also fitted under an additive uncertainty structure, but at
the price of introducing some conservativeness in the design.
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Figure 6: GIMC with additive perturbations, faults, and model uncertainty.
First of all, note that under model uncertainty, the signal
fe in the GIMC configuration is no longer decoupled from
the control signal u (see Figure 6). The results are summa-
rized as follows [17].
Lemma 2. Considering additive model uncertainty in the
GIMC configuration of Figure 2, the resulting closed-loop char-
acteristics are given by
fe(s) = −M̃Δuyu(s)− Ñdd(s)− Ñ f f (s), (47)
u(s) =W−1u
[
K ref (s)−Ṽ−1(ŨM̃−1 +Q)(Ñdd(s)+Ñ f f (s))],
(48)
y(s) = (Puy + Δuy)W−1u K ref (s)
− [(Puy + Δuy)W−1u Ṽ−1(ŨM̃−1 +Q)− M̃−1]
× (Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)),
(49)
where
Wu  I + K
(
Puy + Δuy
)
+ Ṽ−1QM̃Δuy
= I + KPuy + Ṽ−1(Ũ +QM̃
)
Δuy.
(50)
(Proof is in Appendix C)
4.1. Robust fault isolation
Note that by including additive uncertainty, an extra require-
ment is evident, the detection/isolation filter H should can-
cel or diminish the uncertainty contribution at the resid-
ual output r for a robust detection and isolation, that is,
HM̃Δuy ≈ 0. As described in Section 2, there are necessary
conditions related to the rank of the involved transfer ma-
trices to guarantee proper fault isolation. Consequently, this
condition can be extended for robust fault isolation, consid-
ering the worst-case uncertainty as
normrank
([
M̃W2W1 Ñd Ñ f
])
≥ normrank
([
M̃W2W1 Ñd
])
+ l.
(51)
Since the description of the uncertainty is posed in terms
of the ∞ norm, the optimization problems for the detection
HD and isolation HI filters are also proposed in terms of this
norm. As a result, the following robust performance criteria
are adopted for both synthesis procedures:
(i) fault detection:
min
HD∈RH∞
‖Δ‖∞<1
∥∥∥[0 0 h]−HD [M̃W2 ΔW1 Ñd Ñ f ]∥∥∥∞
= min
HD∈RH∞
‖Δ‖∞<1
∥∥Fl (Fu(GΔHD ,Δ),HD)∥∥∞, (52)
(ii) fault isolation:
min
HD∈RH∞
‖Δ‖∞<1
∥∥∥[0 0 T]−HI [M̃W2 ΔW1 Ñd Ñ f ]∥∥∥∞
= min
HD∈RH∞
‖Δ‖∞<1
∥∥∥Fl (Fu(GΔHI ,Δ),HI)
∥∥∥
∞,
(53)
where Fu(·, ·) stands for an upper LFT [20], and the respec-
tive generalized plants GΔHD and G
Δ
HI are given by
GΔHD =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 W1 0 0 0
0 0 0 h −1
M̃W2 0 Ñd Ñ f 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
GΔHI =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 W1 0 0 0
0 0 0 T −I
M̃W2 0 Ñd Ñ f 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(54)
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zw Δ
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Q
[
y
u
]
q
[
d
f
]
(a)
zw Δ
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GΔQy
Q
y
q
[
d
f
]
(b)
Figure 7: LFT formulations for compensator Q under model un-
certainty: (a) control signal and output attenuation, and (b) output
signal attenuation.
The optimization problems in (52) and (53) can be solved
by using μ-synthesis design or LMI’s [19, 20]. On the other
hand, at the residual evaluation, it is observed that the un-
certainty Δuy is affected by the control signal u at (47). Thus
the residual is directly dependent on the control signal u, and
its profile will appear in the resulting dynamic behavior, but
since this signal is known, an adaptive threshold [3, 28] can
be used in order to reduce the conservativeness in the fault
detection process introduced by the uncertain term as
JDth(t) =
∥∥HDM̃W1W2∥∥∞∥∥u∥∥2,t,To + γd2∥∥HDÑd∥∥∞, (55)
where γd2 is the bound on the windowed energy of the pertur-
bations, and the inequalities in (11) are applied. This charac-
terization is appropriate since the uncertainty Δ is quantified
in terms of the ‖·‖∞ norm. Similarly, an adaptive threshold
can be formulated for fault isolation as
J Iith(t) =
l∑
j=1
j /=i
∥∥[HIÑ f ]i j∥∥∞γi2
+
m∑
k=1
∥∥[HIM̃W1W2]ik∥∥∞∥∥uk∥∥2,t,To
+
r∑
k=1
∥∥[HIÑd]ir∥∥∞γd2 ,
(56)
where i = 1, . . . , l. As mentioned in the previous section, the
thresholds in (55) and (56) are derived from norms inequali-
ties, so their values could be conservative and they have to be
tuned online to optimize the fault detection capabilities.
Remark 7. It is clear that hard thresholds could lead to a con-
servative fault diagnosis stage, or fault misdetection due to
a change in the operating conditions or model uncertainty.
However, adaptive thresholds require a prior knowledge of
the possible uncertainty or maximum variability of the resid-
uals in nominal conditions for a correct implementation.
4.2. Robust fault accommodation
In general, no guarantee of closed-loop stability is granted al-
though Q ∈ RH∞ as in the uncertainty free case. From the
results in Lemma 2, it can be seen that for a special case (sta-
ble nominal plant), the uncertainty can be decoupled from
the control signal as in Corollary 1, and closed-loop stability
can be deduced if the nominal controller internally stabilizes
the nominal plant.
Corollary 3. If the nominal plant satisfies Puy ∈ RH∞, then
complete disturbance, fault, and uncertainty decoupling can be
achieved at the control signal u by letting Q = −ŨM̃−1, and
consequently
u(s) = SiK ref (s),
y(s) = (Puy + Δuy)SiK ref (s) + M̃−1(Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)).
(57)
Moreover, the closed-loop is stable if K internally stabilizes Puy .
Similarly to the result in Corollary 1, with the compensa-
tion suggested in Corollary 3, the perturbations d and faults
f affect the output in an open-loop fashion. Therefore, if an
estimation of the perturbations d̂ and faults f̂ are available,
then the feedforward structure in (30) could be followed to
attenuate their effect at the output. On the other hand, for a
general design case by looking at (48) and (49), a robust crite-
ria (performance and stability) should be targeted to reduce
the faults effects at the control signal u and the perturbations
contribution at the output y by
min
Q∈RH∞
‖Δ‖∞<1
∥∥∥∥∥
⎡
⎣−αd
(
P̂uyW−1u K − I
)
Pdy 0
0 −α fW−1u KP f y
⎤
⎦
+
[
−αdP̂uyW−1u Ṽ−1
−α fW−1u Ṽ−1
]
Q
[
Ñd Ñ f
]∥∥∥∥∥
∞
= min
Q∈RH∞
‖Δ‖∞<1
∥∥Fl(Fu(GΔQu ,Δ),Q)∥∥∞,
(58)
where Wu is defined in (50), and the generalized plant GΔQu
(see Figure 7) including uncertainty information is given by
GΔQu
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−W1SiKW2 −W1SiKPdy −W1SiKP f y W1SiṼ−1
αdSoW2 αdSoPdy 0 αdSoPuyṼ−1
−α f SiKW2 0 −α f SiKP f y α f SiṼ−1
−M̃W2 −Ñd −Ñ f 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
(59)
Meanwhile, if robust attenuation is now looked at the output
y, the following robust performance problem is formulated:
min
Q∈RH∞
‖Δ‖∞<1
∥∥∥− (P̂uyW−1u Ṽ−1(ŨM̃−1 +Q)− M̃−1)
×
[
αdÑd α f Ñ f
]∥∥∥
∞
= min
Q∈RH∞
‖Δ‖∞<1
∥∥Fl(Fu(GΔQy ,Δ),Q)∥∥∞,
(60)
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where the corresponding generalized plant GΔQy is given by
GΔQy
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
−W1SiKW2 −αdW1SiKPdy −α fW1SiKP f y W1SiṼ−1
SoW2 αdSoPdy α f SoP f y SoPuyṼ−1
−M̃W2 −αdÑd −α f Ñ f 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
(61)
As in the nominal case, in order to improve the closed-loop
performance after the fault has been isolated, a specific com-
pensator Qi ∈RH∞ can be designed using the optimization
criteria in (58) and (60), depending if the fault is affecting
the state or output equations on the state-space representa-
tion (1). For these cases, in the generalized plants (GΔQu , G
Δ
Qy )
presented in (59) and (61), Ñ f is replaced by the information
of the analyzed fault Ñ if for i = 1, . . . , l.
The robust stability condition is very important since it
is needed that the fault accommodation scheme will preserve
closed-loop stability after the compensation despite model
uncertainty. However, the size of the uncertainty and its fre-
quency content will dictate the degree of conservativeness in-
troduced. Assume that the ith fault fi is analyzed, then define
the transfer matrix Mi(s) by closing the lower feedback path
with its specific compensator Qi in the LFT configuration,
that is,
Mi(s) = Fl
(
Pi,Qi
) =
[
M11i M
12
i
M21i M
22
i
]
, (62)
where Pi represents the generalized plant in (59) (sensor
faults) or (61) (actuator or system fault) by replacing Ñ f with
Ñ if . Then robust stability with respect to the ith compensator
Qi is tested by the condition [20] as follows:
‖M11i ‖ ≤ 1. (63)
4.3. Robust performance evaluation
Finally, some indices are suggested to evaluate the robust per-
formance of the resulting FTC structure.
(1) Fault evaluation. The size of the worst-case uncer-
tainty is applied to obtain an estimate of the evaluation per-
formance as
IRFD 
∥∥HDÑ f ∥∥k∥∥HDÑd∥∥ j + ∥∥HDM̃W2W1∥∥∞ . (64)
Consequently, if IRFD is large, then good evaluation charac-
teristics are devised.
(2) Fault isolation. The structure of the index (43) is
maintained, but the worst-case uncertainty information is
appended as
IRFI 
∥∥∥[HIÑ f ]diag
∥∥∥
k∥∥∥[HIÑ f ]nondiag
∥∥∥
k
+
∥∥∥HIÑd∥∥∥
j
+
∥∥∥HIM̃W2W1∥∥∥∞
.
(65)
(3) Fault accommodation. The fault accommodation per-
formance is evaluated in terms of the faults and perturba-
tions attenuation subject to model uncertainty. For this pur-
pose, a robust performance analysis is carried out by using
the structured singular value μΔ [19, 20]. Then the fault ac-
commodation performance with respect to the ith fault is de-
fined by
IiRFA = sup
ω∈R
μΔp
[
Mi( jω)
]
, (66)
where Δp = diag(Δ,Δ f ) is an augmented uncertainty block
to address the performance specifications. Thus internal sta-
bility is guaranteed for ‖Δ‖∞ < 1/IiRFA, and the worst-case
performance is bounded Fu(Mi,Δ) ≤ IiRFA. As a result, if the
index IiRFA is lower than one, then robust stability is granted.
5. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the ideas presented in the paper, the de-
sign of an active FTC scheme for a separately excited DC mo-
tor is considered. The dynamics of a second-order actuator
are appended to the motor description. To have a more real-
istic simulation, the actuator gain is limited by a saturation
function. Hence the control signal u is limited to the interval
[0, 10]V . Thus a system with one input and three outputs
(armature voltage Va and current ia, and angular velocity ω)
is studied [30]. The load torque is modeled as an unknown
constant or slowly time-varying external disturbance d into
the system. The control objective is defined as the regulation
of the angular velocity to a prescribed reference. Note that
since there are three measurements and one unknown per-
turbation, then only the effect of two different faults could
be analyzed simultaneously [4]. The studied faults are actu-
ator f1 (gain of the dc drive) and sensor f2 (angular velocity
measurement). The parameters of the dc motor are shown
in Table 1. The mathematical model of the studied system is
presented next:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
ẋ1
ẋ2
ẋ3
ẋ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−Ra
La
−Kb
La
0
1
La
Kb
J
−B
J
0 0
0 0 0 −1
0 0 ω2a −2ζaωa
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
x1
x2
x3
x4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
0
Ka
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦u +
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
−1
J
0
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
d +
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0
0 0
Ka 0
0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎣ f1
f2
⎤
⎦ ,
⎡
⎢⎣ iaω
Va
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣1 0 0 00 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
x1
x2
x3
x4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ +
⎡
⎢⎣0 00 1
0 0
⎤
⎥⎦
[
f1
f2
]
.
(67)
In fact, the model described in (67), with the parameters in
Table 1, is stable and satisfies the isolation conditions pre-
sented in (7) and (8). The nominal controller is designed fol-
lowing a PI structure with respect to the velocity reference
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error ωref − ω, plus a constant feedback from ia and Va, that
is,
ẋk = ωref − ω,
u = Kixk + Kωp
(
ωref − ω
)
+ Kipia + K
V
p Va,
(68)
where Ki = 0.5, Kωp = 0.1, Kip = 0.2, and KVp = −0.01.
This control law satisfies the performance specifications by
achieving internal stability and asymptotic tracking. Now,
the detection and isolation filters (HD,HI) were designed fol-
lowing the optimization indices (16) and (18) with j = ∞,
and selecting
h(s) =
[
1 1
]
× 1
s/100 + 1
,
T(s) = 1
s/104 + 1
[
1 0
0 1
]
.
(69)
All the numerical calculations were carried out in MATLAB
by using two toolboxes: (i) control system, and (ii) LMI con-
trol (see Appendix A). The transfer matrix T(s) was cho-
sen as a diagonal low-pass filter since the frequency con-
tent of Ñ f allows perfect decoupling in the low frequency.
The residual evaluation was computed by the windowed 2
norm in (20). Consequently, assuming a time window To and
‖d‖∞ ≤ dmax , then a hard threshold for fault evaluation is
calculated by
JDth =
∥∥HDÑd∥∥∞
√
Todmax , (70)
since ‖d‖2,t,To ≤ dmax
√
To. Meanwhile, for isolation pur-
poses, two new thresholds are also computed as follows:
J I1th =
∥∥[HIÑd]1∥∥∞
√
Todmax +
∥∥[HIÑ f ]12∥∥∞
√
To f2 max,
J I2th =
∥∥[HIÑd]2∥∥∞
√
Todmax +
∥∥[HIÑ f ]21∥∥∞
√
To f1 max,
(71)
where ‖ f1‖∞ ≤ f1 max , and ‖ f2‖∞ ≤ f2 max . Next, the fault ac-
commodation compensators Q,Q1, and Q2 were synthesized
by (35), (39), and (40) with α f = 1.0 and αd = 0.0. The per-
formance indices in (42), (43), and (44) were computed tak-
ing the ∞ norm (k = j = ∞), and they are listed in Table 2.
The weight αd is chosen null since the perturbation is as-
sumed constant or slowly time varying, so the integral part of
the nominal controller can compensate effectively its effect.
Hence the results in Table 2 reflect that the active FTC will
provide good performance in the detection, isolation, and
accommodation stages. Furthermore, no degradation should
be expected in a steady state since IFA = I1FA = I2FA = 0. How-
ever, some transient changes have to be anticipated due to
control switching (see Figure 5). The velocity reference ωref
is defined as a square wave that oscillates between 75 and
125 rad/s at a frequency of 4 Hz. The load torque d is ini-
Table 1: DC motor parameters.
Parameter Description
Ra = 0.699Ω Armature resistance
La = 0.297 H Armature inductance
B = 4.544× 10−3 Nm/rad/s Friction coefficient
J = 2.79× 10−3 kg m Inertia
Kb = 0.746 V/rad/s Electromagnetic constant
Ka = 40 Actuator gain
ωa = 2π × 360 rad/s Actuator natural frequency
ζa = 0.7 Actuator damping factor
Table 2: FTC performance indices.
Index Value
IFD 6.17× 103
IFI 106.5
IFA 0
I1FA 0
I2FA 0
IRFD 1.63
IRFI 1.05
tialized to 1 Nm. The following scenario is tested under nu-
merical simulation:
(i) at 2.5 s, there is a perturbation step change from 1 Nm
to 2 Nm;
(ii) from 4 to 8 s, fault f2 is active as a complete sensor out-
age, that is, f2 = −ω;
(iii) from 10 to 14 s, fault f1 is triggered as a 50% reduction
in the actuator gain, that is, f1 = −0.5 u;
(iv) finally, from 16 to 20 s, fault f2 is once more active.
The results are presented in Figures 8 and 9. For compari-
son, the nominal controller (without compensation) and the
active FTC are plotted simultaneously in Figure 8. From the
simulation results, the nominal controller saturates the con-
trol signal u when f2 is triggered, and the actuator delivers its
maximum output voltage to the motor. As a result, the angu-
lar velocity is dangerously raised to ≈ 500 rad/s. This behav-
ior could induce severe mechanical stresses in the motor, and
practically, an instability scenario is faced, but limited by the
actuator saturation. Meanwhile, the active FTC scheme can
accommodate effectively this fault, with some transient oscil-
lation due to the control switching. However, for fault f1, the
nominal controller and the FTC scheme can compensate its
appearance by the integral action in the nominal controller,
but although the nominal control law can inherently accom-
modate this fault, there is no record of this faulty condition
in the closed-loop system. Now, the results of the fault detec-
tion and isolation stages are illustrated in Figure 9. Faults f1
and f2 are correctly isolated, and the disturbance step change
is not mistaken by a fault in the FDI stage. In fact, f1 and
f2 are almost instantaneously isolated. Note that the active
FTC scheme is able to maintain good performance after both
faults, and also when the faults are removed from the system,
the nominal performance is recovered.
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Figure 8: Simulation evaluation of FTC scheme: (a) angular velocity, and (b) control signal.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Time (seconds)
−25
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
Fa
u
lt
si
gn
al
s
f2/10 f1
(a)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Time (seconds)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
D
ia
gn
os
ti
cs A fault is detected A fault is detected A fault is detected
f2 is isolated f1 is isolated f2 is isolated
(b)
Figure 9: Simulation evaluation of FTC scheme: (a) fault signals, (b) detection and isolation results.
Now, in order to evaluate the fault diagnosis and isolation
under model uncertainty, the performance of the previously
designed filtersHD andHI under uncertainty in the measure-
ments ia and ω is analyzed. So, consider the following output
uncertainty weight W2 as follows:
W2(s) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.2
s/10 + 1
0.15
s/1000 + 1
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (72)
The interpretation of W2 is the following: (a) there is a maxi-
mum error of 20% at the low frequency of the armature cur-
rent measurement, and there is a 15% error in the measure-
ment of the angular velocity sensor over the whole frequency
bandwidth. The robust performance indices in (64) and (65)
were calculated (k = j = ∞), and the results are presented in
Table 2. The results show that there is a severe deterioration
in the diagnosis and isolation capabilities under that uncer-
tainty profile, but there are still some degree of separability
to achieve the diagnosis and isolation stage.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a control methodology for fault detection, iso-
lation, and accommodation to address LTI systems has been
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detailed. The FTC scheme is based on the GIMC configura-
tion [12] which extends the use of the Youla parametrization
to FTC. Design strategies were presented for the FDI pro-
cess and accommodation. Multiple and intermittent faults
can be treated in this FTC scheme. Closed-loop stability is
always guaranteed after each configuration but only if the ad-
ditive faults profiles do not depend on the states or outputs.
Moreover, the analysis of the design schemes under model
uncertainty was carried out. For detection and isolation pur-
poses, a hard threshold is suggested for the nominal case, and
an adaptive one is considered when model uncertainty af-
fects the output measurements. Performance indices are also
suggested to evaluate the detection, isolation, and accommo-
dation schemes. The FTC structure was tested in numerical
simulation over a DC motor setup, and the advantages over
a nominal control law were clearly presented.
APPENDICES
A. FAULT TOLERANT SYNTHESIS ALGORITHMS
The synthesis algorithm for fault diagnosis, isolation, and ac-
commodation in the nominal case is presented in this sec-
tion. The algorithm follows the ideas exposed in Section 3.
The synthesis procedure is based on MATLAB, and it could
be implemented using the next toolboxes: (i) control system,
(ii) LMI control, (iii) μ analysis and synthesis, and (iv) ro-
bust control. After each step in the algorithm, the MATLAB
commands used for numerical synthesis are introduced in-
side parentheses as follows.
(1) Define the state-space description of the plant and
nominal controller in (1) and (9) (ss, ltisys, pack and
mksys).
(2) Construct the left coprime factorizations of plant (5)
and controller (9) (lqr, place and acker), in order to
avoid numerical problems, use a balance realization
for all the coprime factors (balreal, sbalanc, sysbal and
obalreal).
(3) Check conditions (7) and (8) to verify the solvability
of the synthesis schemes.
(4) Define the filters h,T ∈ RH∞, and obtain HD,HI by
solving the optimization problems (16) and (18) (hin-
flmi, hinfric, hinfsyn, h2syn, hinfopt, and h2lqg).
(5) Evaluate the fault diagnosis performance through (42),
and isolation property by extracting the diagonal and
nondiagonal parts of the productHIÑ f using the state-
space realization and computing (43) (norm, norminf,
norm2, h2norm, hinfnorm, normh2, normhinf, ssdata,
ltiss, unpck, and branch).
(6) Obtain the general accommodation compensator Q
using (35), and the specific compensators Qi by (39)
or (40) (hinflmi, hinfric, hinfsyn, h2syn, hinfopt, and
h2lqg).
(7) Evaluate the fault accommodation performance by
(44) (norm, norminf, norm2, h2norm, hinfnorm,
normh2, and normhinf ).
Alternatively, the synthesis procedure can be computed
using open source numerical programs as Scilab [31] and
Octave [32]. In fact, freely in the web, there are toolboxes
for these two programs that implement the same synthesis
algorithms as in MATLAB.
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From the block diagram in Figure 2, it is observed that the
internal signal fe is given by (13), and as a result, the internal
control signal û is constructed as
û(s) = q(s) + Ũe(s) = Q fe(s) + Ũ
(
ref (s)− y(s))
= −Q[Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)] + Ũ[ref (s)− y(s)]. (B.1)
Thus the control signal u contains information from the
faults, perturbations, references, and outputs:
u(s) = Ṽ−1û(s) = K[ref (s)− y(s)]
− Ṽ−1Q[Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)]. (B.2)
Finally, by a direct substitution of (3) into (B.2), the results
in (27) are deduced.
C. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
From the block diagram of Figure 6 under additive uncer-
tainty, (47) is obtained directly to describe fe by recalling
(13). Next, the control signal u is derived as
u(s) = Ṽ−1[Q fe(s) + Ũ(ref (s)− y(s))], (C.1)
and by a substitution of (3) and (46) into the previous equa-
tion, the effects of the reference, perturbations, and faults can
be isolated from the control signal u :
[
I + Ṽ−1QMΔuy + K
(
Puy + Δuy
)]
u(s)
= K ref (s) + Ṽ−1(ŨM̃−1 +Q)(Ñdd(s) + Ñ f f (s)).
(C.2)
Hence by defining the term Wu in (50), the result in (48) is
obtained. Finally, substituting (48) and (46) into the output
equation (3), the contributions of the references, perturba-
tions, and faults into the output are described by (49).
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONS
The issue of Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) in dy-
namic systems has been an active research area in the last
two decades. Model-based FDI techniques use mathematical
models of the monitored process and extract features from
measured signals, to generate fault indicating signals, that
is, the residuals. LTI models have been widely used to solve
the problem of FDI. Tools are now available to enhance ro-
bustness against small parameter variations and other dis-
turbances (see, [1–3] for surveys). The resulting robust FDI
problem is generally formulated as a min-max optimization
setting to maximize fault sensitivity performance and at the
same time, to minimize the influence of unknowns inputs.
More recently, some research works have appeared that
consider Linear Parameter Varying (LPV) modeling of the
monitored system to take into account wider and more rapid
parameters variations. Such models can be used efficiently to
represent some nonlinear systems (see, e.g., [4, 5]). This mo-
tivates some researchers from the FDI community to develop
model-based methods using LPV models (see [6–8] among
others). The two commonly used approaches are fault esti-
mation methods where the fault indicating signal is an es-
timate of the fault signal, and residual generation methods
where the residuals are synthesized to be robust against mod-
eling errors and unknown inputs, while being sensitive to the
faults. In this context, a geometric approach is proposed in
[6] to design a LPV observer in a Luenberger form. A pro-
cedure is derived to obtain the observer parameters via the
construction of a suitable family of invariant subspaces (pa-
rameter varying (C,A)-invariant and un-observability sub-
spaces). In [7], a multi-model approach is used to solve the
FDI problem for nonlinear systems. The nonlinear system is
modeled using polytopic models and a robust polytopic un-
known input observer is then synthesized by means of pole
assignment. The method uses LMI optimization techniques
to synthesize the observer gain. The major limitation of this
approach is that sensitivity of the residual signal against faults
can only be checked a posteriori. More precisely, if the distri-
bution matrices of the fault model and the effects that faults
could have on the decoupled state is not of full column rank,
then faults could go undetectable. To overcome this problem,
a solution is provided in [8] where the main idea is to build a
fault estimate using a LPV filter such that the worst-case gain
(i.e., the H∞ performances measure for LPV systems) from
disturbances and faults to the estimation error, is minimized.
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In this paper a different approach based on residual gen-
eration is considered for LPV systems that can be modeled
within a LPV polytopic setting. Robustness against exoge-
nous disturbances and sensitivity against faults are consid-
ered in a framework similar to the well-known H∞/H− set-
ting for LTI systems. The robustness objectives are expressed
in terms of a minimization problem using the H∞ norm for
LPV systems, and the sensitivity requirement is formulated
in terms of a maximization constraint using also the H-index
for LPV systems. The main difference between this problem
and the standard H∞ problem for LPV systems is that it in-
volves the residual structuring matrices that are unknown.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the gen-
eral FDI filter design problem and the corresponding solu-
tion are presented. In Section 3, the proposed method is ap-
plied to real data set coming from the secondary circuit of a
nuclear power plant in France. Finally, some concluding re-
marks are made in a final section.
Preliminaries
The Euclidean norm is always used for vectors and is writ-
ten without a subscript; for example ‖x‖. Similarly in the
matrix case, the induced vector norm is used: ‖A‖ = σ(A)
where σ(A) denotes the maximum singular value of A. Sig-
nals, for example w(t) or w, are assumed to be of bounded
energy, and their norm is denoted by ‖w‖2, that is, ‖w‖2 =
(
∫ +∞
−∞‖w(t)‖2dt)1/2 < ∞. LTI models, for example, P(s) or
simply P, are assumed to be in RH∞, real rational func-
tions with ‖P‖∞ = supωσ(P( jω)) < ∞. ‖P‖∞, that is, the
largest gain of P, is accompanied by the smallest gain of
P, infωσ(P( jω)), which may be equal to zero for some P
(e.g., strictly proper systems), if the frequency range of in-
terest is infinite. This motivated [1, 9–12] to define the non-
zero smallest gain of P, that is, the H-index, as the restric-
tion of infωσ(P( jω)) to a finite frequency domain Ω, that is,
‖P‖− = infω∈Ωσ(P( jω)).
In [1, 9], an evaluation function ‖•‖e which is a restric-
tion of the H2 signal norm to Ω, is defined by the authors
as ‖w‖e = ‖w‖2,Ω = (
∫ ω2
ω1‖w( jω)‖22dω)1/2 . Then, given P so
that y = Pu, it follows that
‖y‖2e =
1
2π
∫ ω2
ω1
∥
∥P( jω)u( jω)
∥
∥2
2dω
= 1
2π
∫ ω2
ω1
∥
∥∥
∥P( jω)
u( jω)
‖u‖2
∥
∥∥
∥
2
2
‖u‖22dω ≥ ‖P‖2−‖u‖2e
(1)
and thus that ‖P‖− ≤ ‖y‖e/‖u‖e. This motivates the intro-
duction of an evaluation function, denoted ‖•‖sens, which is
defined according to:
‖P‖sens = inf‖u‖e /=0
‖y‖e
‖u‖e ≥ ‖P‖−. (2)
From (2), it follows that ‖P‖sens takes the sense of the smallest
value of a singular value of P( jω) evaluated on Ω. Then it
follows that ‖P‖− ≤ ‖P‖sens ≤ ‖P‖∞.
The underlying LPV system is modeled by the following
state space representation
ẋ = A(θ(t))x + B(θ(t))u
y = C(θ(t))x +D(θ(t))u (3)
which is denoted in a compact form as
M(θ) =
(
A(θ) B(θ)
C(θ) D(θ)
)
. (4)
x is the state vector, u is the input vector, y is the output vec-
tor and θ(t) is a varying parameter vector. It is assumed that
all parameters θi(t), i = 1, . . . , r are bounded, measurable (or
estimated) in real time and take their values in the domain
Θ, so that Θ is a convex polytope.
The LPV system (3) admits a (non-conservatism) poly-
topic model if it is possible to determine a set of matrices Mi,
i = 1, . . . ,N , constituting the vertices of a polytope defined
by
Co
{
β1, . . . ,βN
} =
{ N∑
i=1
βiM
(
Πi
)
, βi ≥ 0,
N∑
i=1
βi = 1
}
(5)
and such that it corresponds to the image byM of the domain
Θ:
{
M(θ), θ ∈ Θ} ≡ Co{M(Π1
)
, . . . ,M
(
ΠN
)}
. (6)
Then, βi, i = 1, . . . ,N define barycentric coordinates of Θ
and the following convex decomposition yields:
θ(t) = β1Π1 + · · · + βNΠN , βi ≥ 0,
N∑
i=1
βi = 1. (7)
Referring to the LPV system (3), the worst-case RMS gain
from u to y which is known as theH∞-norm for LPV systems
is defined by:
∥
∥M(θ)
∥
∥∞ = sup
∀θ∈Θ
‖u‖2 /=0
= ‖y‖2‖u‖2 . (8)
Following the definition of the index ‖•‖sens of a LTI transfer
given by (2), we will introduce the following evaluation func-
tion, that will be useful in the following to formulate fault
sensitivity requirements for LPV fault detection schemes:
∥
∥M(θ)
∥
∥
sens = inf∀θ∈Θ‖u‖e /=0
= ‖y‖e‖u‖e (9)
‖M(θ)‖sens is also a generalization of (2) to LPV case.
2. FDI FILTERS FOR LPV SYSTEMS
2.1. Problem setting
Consider the general FDI design problem for LPV systems
represented on Figure 1. G(θ) is a polytopic LPV model.
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G(θ)
y
F(θ)
ẑ
K
u
f
d
Figure 1: The general FDI filter design problem.
K is a known controller. d ∈ Rqd represents exogenous dis-
turbances and f ∈ Rqf represents the faults to be detected.
F(θ) is the FDI LPV filter to be designed. ẑ ∈ Rqr is an es-
timation of z = Myy + Muu, a subset of the measurements
y ∈ Rm and the controlled inputs u ∈ Rp. My ∈ Rqr×m and
Mu ∈ Rqr×p are the two residual structuring matrices to be
designed.
It is assumed that the problem depicted on Figure 1
is well posed and thus the lower fractional transformation
F1(G(θ),K) always exists.
The FDI design problem we are interested in can then be
formulated as follows.
Problem 1. Assume that the faults f are detectable (the inter-
ested reader can refer to [13] for a discussion on fault de-
tectability).
The goal is to find the state space matrices AF (θ) ∈
RnF×nF , BF(θ) ∈ RnF×(m+p), CF(θ) ∈ Rqr×nF and DF(θ) ∈
Rqr×(m+p) of the (stable) polytopic LPV filter F(θ) and the
residual structuring matrices My ∈ Rqr×m and Mu ∈ Rqr×p
defining the residual vector
r = z − ẑ =Myy +Muu− F(θ)
(
y
u
)
, r ∈ Rqr (10)
such that the residual vector meets the following require-
ments:
∥
∥Trd(θ)
∥
∥∞ < γ1 (11)
∥∥Tr f (θ)
∥∥
sens > γ2 (12)
where Trd and Tr f denote the looped transfers between d and
r and f and r, respectively. This problem can be represented
by the block diagram illustrated on Figure 2, where P(θ) is
derived from F1(G(θ),K) so that
( y
u
) = P(θ)( df
)
. In this
formulation, γ1 and γ2 are two positive constants referring
respectively to the robustness and sensitivity performances
levels.
Equation (11) represents the worst-case robustness of the
residual to disturbances d for all θ ∈ Θ, in the H∞-norm
sense. Under plant perturbation, the effect that the exoge-
nous disturbances have on the residuals, can greatly increase
and the fault detection performance may then be consider-
ably degraded. A robust fault sensitivity specification is then
needed to maintain a detection performance level of the FDI
unit. Here the sensitivity measure (9) for LPV fault detection
scheme is used to guarantee the worst-case sensitivity of the
residual to faults.
P(θ)
y
F(θ)
ẑ
u
f
d
My
Mu
+
+
−
+
r
Figure 2: General setup for FDI/LPV filter design problem.
Of course, the smaller γ1 and the bigger γ2 are the better
the fault detection performance will be.
Remark 1. In Problem 1 formulation, it is assumed that the
structuring matrices My and Mu do not depend on θ. If this
assumption vanishes, it can be verified that the following the-
oretical developments still yields. The only difference in such
a case is that, if we considerMy(θ) andMu(θ) in Problem 1, a
set of structuring matrices My(Πi) and Mu(Πi) for each ver-
tex of the polytopeΘwould be obtained rather than constant
matrices.
2.2. Design of the FDI filter
In this section, a solution is provided to compute simulta-
neously My , Mu and F(θ) so that the requirements (11) and
(12) are satisfied. It is straightforward to verify that the major
difficulty in this problem is related to the fault sensitivity re-
quirement (12) since (11) can be solved using the techniques
developed in the robust control community (see, e.g., [14]
or [15]). To overcome this problem, a sufficient condition
is established in terms of a fictitious H∞ problem. It is then
shown in the following that a solution to this fictitious prob-
lem is a solution of the original one.
2.2.1. Standard setup for the filter design problem
To proceed, let
P(θ) =
(
A(θ) Bd(θ) Bf (θ)
C(θ) Dd(θ) Df (θ)
)
. (13)
Using some algebra manipulations, the filter design prob-
lem illustrated on Figure 2, can be re-casted into the setup
depicted in Figure 3, where P(θ,My ,Mu) is deduced from
P(θ),My and Mu, according to:
P
(
θ,My ,Mu
) =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
A(θ) Bd(θ) Bf (θ) 0n×qr
(
My Mu
)
C(θ)
(
My Mu
)
Dd(θ)
(
My Mu
)
Df (θ) −Iqr
C(θ) Dd(θ) Df (θ) 0(m+p)×qr
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
(14)
where Iqr and 0i× j denote respectively the identity matrix of
dimension qr and the null matrix of dimension i× j. n is also
the order of P(θ,My ,Mu), that is, A(θ) ∈ Rn×n.
Following the method proposed in [10, 11], the require-
ments (11) and (12) are now expressed in terms of loop
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P(θ,My ,Mu)
r
F(θ)
ẑ
f
d
(
y
u
)
Figure 3: FDI/LPV filter design problem.
shapes, that is, of desired gain responses for the appropri-
ate closed-loop transfers. These shaping objectives are then
turned into uniform bounds by means of the shaping filters.
Let Wd and Wf denote the (dynamical) shaping filters asso-
ciated with (11) and (12) respectively, so that:
∥∥Wd
∥∥∞ ≤ γ1 (15)∥
∥Wf
∥
∥− ≥ γ2 (16)
‖Wd‖∞ and ‖Wf ‖− denote respectively the H∞ and H−
norm of the LTI transfer Wd and Wf (see preliminaries).
Assume that Wd is invertible (this can be done without
loss of generality because it is always possible to add zeros
in Wd to make it invertible). Wd and Wf are also defined in
order to tune the gain responses for, respectively, Trd(θ) and
Tr f (θ). Then it is straightforward to verify that the specifica-
tion (11) yields if the following constraint is satisfied:
∥
∥Trd̃ (θ)
∥
∥∞ < 1. (17)
In this formulation, d̃ ∈ Rqd̃ is a fictitious signal generating
d through Wd (see Figure 4(a) for easy reference) and Trd̃
denotes the looped transfer between r and d̃.
The following lemma allows the sensitivity constraint
(12) to be transformed into a fictitious H∞ one.
Lemma 1. Consider an invertible transfer matrixWF such that
‖Wf ‖− = (γ2/λ)‖WF‖− and ‖WF‖− > λ where λ = 1 + γ2.
Define the (fictitious) signal r̃ ∈ Rqr such that r̃ = r−WF f (see
Figure 4(a)). Then a sufficient condition for the specification
(12) to hold, is:
∥∥Tr̃ f (θ)
∥∥∞ < 1, (18)
where Tr̃ f denote the looped transfer between r̃ and f .
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the signal r̃ introduced in Figure
4, that is,
r̃ = r −WF f , (19)
where WF is define as in Lemma 1. Then it can be verified
that the following relation yields:
∥
∥Tr f (θ)
∥
∥
sens ≥
∥
∥WF
∥
∥− −
∥
∥Tr f (θ)−WF
∥
∥∞ (20)
that can be re-written due to the definition of r̃ given by (19):
∥
∥Tr f (θ)
∥
∥
sens ≥
∥
∥WF
∥
∥− −
∥
∥Tr̃ f (θ)
∥
∥∞. (21)
Now consider the weighting function WF defined in Lemma
1. Since, WF is supposed to be invertible, we get
1
∥∥WF
∥∥−
= ∥∥W+F
∥
∥∞,Ω, (22)
where ‖W+F ‖∞,Ω = supω∈Ωσ(W+F ( jω))·W+F denotes the
inverse of WF which always exists by assumption (see
Lemma 1). Then, factorizing the right term of (21) by
‖WF‖− gives
∥
∥Tr f (θ)
∥
∥
sens ≥
(
1−
∥
∥Tr̃ f (θ)
∥
∥∞∥∥WF
∥∥−
)
∥
∥WF
∥
∥− (23)
that can be done since, by definition, ‖WF‖− /=0. With (22),
it then follows that:
∥
∥Tr f (θ)
∥
∥
sens ≥
(
1− ∥∥Tr̃ f (θ
)∥∥∞
∥
∥W+F
∥
∥∞,Ω
)∥
∥WF
∥
∥−. (24)
Now, since by construction ‖WF‖− > λ, it is straightforward
to verify that the following relation yields:
∥
∥W+F
∥
∥∞,Ω <
1
λ
. (25)
Suppose now that inequality (18) yields, that is, ‖Tr̃ f (θ)‖∞ <
1. From (25), it follows that
∥
∥Tr̃ f (θ)
∥
∥∞
∥
∥W+F
∥
∥∞,Ω <
1
λ
(26)
and with (24), we get
∥
∥Tr f (θ)
∥
∥
sens >
λ− 1
λ
∥
∥WF
∥
∥−. (27)
Thus, if ‖Wf ‖− = (γ2/γ)‖WF‖− with λ = 1 + γ2, then (27)
implies that
∥
∥Tr f (θ)
∥
∥
sens >
∥
∥Wf
∥
∥− (28)
which terminates the proof.
Following (17) and (18), the design problem can be
re-casted in a fictitious LPV H∞-framework as depicted in
Figure 4(a), where d̃ and r̃ are two fictitious signals, so that
d̃ = Wdd and r̃ = r −WF f . Then, including γ1, λ, WF and
W−1d into the model P(θ, My , Mu) leads to the equivalent
block diagram of Figure 4(b), where P̃(θ,My ,Mu) is defined
according to:
(
r
r̃
)
= F1
(
P̃
(
θ,My ,Mu
)
,F(θ)
)
(
d̃
f
)
. (29)
The residual generation problem can now be formulated in a
framework which looks like a standard H∞ problem for LPV
systems, by combining both requirements (17) and (18) into
a singleH∞ constraint. Using Lemma 1, it can be verified that
a sufficient condition for (17) and (18) to hold, is
∥
∥F1
(
P̃
(
θ,My ,Mu
)
,F(θ)
)∥∥∞ < 1. (30)
As mentioned above, this equation seems to be similar to a
standard H∞ LPV problem. In fact, this is not the case since
the transfer P̃(θ,My ,Mu) depends on My and Mu that are
unknown. In the following section, a procedure is given to
overcome this problem.
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P(θ,My ,Mu)
r
r̃
F(θ)
WF
ẑ
dW−1d
f
d̃
(
y
u
)
+
−
(a)
P̃(θ,My ,Mu)
r
r̃
F(θ)
f
d̃
(b)
Figure 4: Fictitious quadratic H∞ formulation for the filter design
problem.
Remark 2. It is clear that a key feature in the proposed for-
mulation is the a priori choice of the shaping filters Wd and
Wf . From a practical point of view, it is required that the
residuals r are as “big” and as “fast” as possible, when a fault
occurs. Then, if the considered faults manifest themselves in
low frequencies, this leads to select Wf as a low pass filter
with the static gain and the cutting frequency, the highest
possible. With regards to the robustness objectives, it is re-
quired that the effects of the disturbances on the residuals
are as “small” as possible. This implies to choose the gain of
Wd as “small” as possible in the frequency range where the
energy content of the disturbances is located. In other words,
it is required a high attenuation level of the disturbances on
the residuals in the appropriate frequencies (see Section 3
where a practical case is presented). However, both sensitiv-
ity to faults and robustness against disturbances might be not
achieved in some cases. Faults having similar frequency char-
acteristics as those of disturbances might go undetected. In
such cases, the proposed formulation provides a framework
to find a good balance between fault sensitivity and robust-
ness via the construction of the shaping filters Wd and Wf .
Finally, note that the work reported in [16, 17] could be an
interesting method to select Wd and Wf .
2.2.2. Synthesis of the FDI filter
In the following, a solution is derived in terms of a SDP
(Semi Definite Programming) problem. To proceed, let
{Awd,Bwd,Cwd,Dwd} and {AwF ,BwF ,CwF ,DwF} be the state-
space representations of W−1d and WF respectively, and de-
note nwd and nwF the associated order, that is,Awd ∈ Rnwd×nwd
and AwF ∈ RnwF×nwF . Using some linear algebra manipula-
tions, it can be verified from (14) that the matrices Ã(θ),
B̃(θ), C̃(θ) and D̃(θ) of the state-space representation of
P̃(θ,My ,Mu) are defined according to:
Ã(θ) =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
A(θ) Bd(θ)Cwd 0
0 Awd 0
0 0 AwF
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ ,
Ã(θ) ∈ R(n+nwd+nwF )×(n+nwd+nwF ),
(31)
B̃(θ) = (B̃1(θ) | B̃2
) =
⎛
⎜
⎝
Bd(θ)Dwd B f (θ) 0
Bwd 0 0
0 BwF 0
⎞
⎟
⎠ ,
B̃(θ) ∈ R(n+nwd+nwF )×(qd̃+q f +qr ),
(32)
C̃(θ) =
(
C̃1(θ)
C̃2(θ)
)
=
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
(
My Mu
)
C(θ)
(
My Mu
)
Dd(θ)Cwd 0
(
My Mu
)
C(θ)
(
My Mu
)
Dd(θ)Cwd −CwF
C(θ) Dd(θ)Cwd 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ ,
C̃(θ) ∈ R(2qr+m+p)×(n+nwd+nwF ),
(33)
D̃(θ)
=
⎛
⎝
D̃11(θ) D̃12
D̃21(θ) D̃22
⎞
⎠
=
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
(
My Mu
)
Dd(θ)Dwd
(
My Mu
)
Df (θ) −Iqr(
My Mu
)
Dd(θ)Dwd
[(
My Mu
)
Df (θ)−DwF
] −Iqr
Dd(θ)Dwd Df (θ) 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠,
D̃(θ) ∈ R(2qr+m+p)×(qd̃+q f +qr ).
(34)
Having in mind the definition of Ã(θ), B̃(θ), C̃(θ), and D̃(θ),
it can be noted that the H∞ optimization problem formu-
lated by (30) is non convex since it involves simultaneously
the residual structuring matrices My and Mu and the filter
state-space matrices AF(θ), BF(θ), CF(θ), and DF(θ). A solu-
tion to this problem may consist in chosen heuristically My
and Mu. However, as it has been outlined in [10], there is no
guarantee to the optimal solution.
The following lemma which is an adaptation of Proposi-
tion 1 in [8] for our purpose, gives the solution to this prob-
lem. The proof is omitted here as it can be found in [8].
Lemma 2. Let Ã(Πi), B̃(Πi), C̃(Πi), D̃(Πi)∀i = 1, . . . ,N be
the evaluation of Ã(θ), B̃(θ), C̃(θ), D̃(θ) at each vertex Πi of
the polytope Θ. Assume that C̃2(θ) and D̃21(θ) do not depend
of θ (see Remark 3 for a discussion about this assumption) and
let Ns = (C̃2 D̃21)⊥. Then, there exists a solution of (31) if
and only if there exists γ < 1 andMy ∈ Rqr×m andMu ∈ Rqr×p
and two symmetric matrices R ∈ R(n+nwd+nwF )×(n+nwd+nwF ) > 0
and S ∈ R(n+nwd+nwF )×(n+nwd+nwF ) > 0 solving the following SDP
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problem involving 2N + 1 LMI constraints:
min γ
s.t.
(
Ã
(
Πi
)
R + RÃT
(
Πi
)
B̃1
(
Πi
)
B̃T1
(
Πi
) −γI
)
< 0, i = 1, . . . ,N
(35)
(
NS 0
0 I
)T
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
ÃT
(
Πi
)
S + SA
(
Πi
)
SB̃1
(
Πi
)
C̃T1
(
Πi
)
B̃T1
(
Πi
)
S −γI D̃T11
(
Πi
)
C̃1
(
Πi
)
D̃11
(
Πi
) −γI
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
(
NS 0
0 I
)
< 0, i = 1, . . . ,N
(36)
(
R I
I S
)
≥ 0. (37)
Moreover, F(θ) is a full order filter if nF = n + nwd + nwF . The
state space realization of the LPV filter F(θ) is then computed
using the barycentric coordinates of Θ given by (7), so that:
(
AF(θ) BF(θ)
CF(θ) DF(θ)
)
=
N∑
i=1
βi
(
AF
(
Πi
)
BF
(
Πi
)
CF
(
Πi
)
DF
(
Πi
)
)
(38)
AF(Πi), BF(Πi), CF(Πi), and DF(Πi)∀i = 1, . . . ,N are the
state space matrices of the N LTI filters F(Πi)∀i = 1, . . . ,N
that are deduced from the unique solution (R, S,My ,Mu, γ) fol-
lowing the procedure described in [14].
Remark 3. As it is outlined in Lemma 2, it is required that
C̃2 and D̃21 do not depend on θ. This assumption is also
done for NS to be computed. If, by construction, such an
assumption is not verified, the solution consists in post fil-
tering (yT uT)T by a LTI filter at a high cutting frequency.
This solution has already been proposed in [14].
3. APPLICATION: THE SECONDARY CIRCUIT OF A NPP
To illustrate the benefits of the proposed approach, experi-
mental results obtained from the secondary circuit of a Nu-
clear Power Plant (NPP) are provided in this section.
In a NPP, the secondary circuit erosion can occur in the
steam generators, releasing radio nuclides into the secondary
coolant. This problem is now well understood and has been
the subject of some studies initiated by EDF (Eléctricité De
France) for its pressurized water reactors (PWR) to overcome
and master the steam generator corrosion problems. The
main degradation process is to be controlled by careful opti-
mization of the secondary water chemistry. There is a need to
ensure that the optimum secondary chemistry regime is se-
lected and maintained. So, the process of erosion—corrosion
of steel piping and other components is of critical impor-
tance during operation of a NPP. Feed water pH is adjusted
by hydrazine, so that the pH is maintained within the limits
specified by the nuclear authority (norm ISO-14253-1).
The NPP under consideration is a 900 MW pressurized
water reactors (PWR), located in France. During the win-
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Figure 5: The time varying parameter Qext(t).
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Figure 6: Filter F(θ(t)) synthesized scheme.
ter 2002, and thanks to a mandatory period of maintenance
operations, it has been possible to measure and record a set
of experimental data on the secondary circuit. The aim was
to optimally control hydrazine and pH through an adaptive
LQG control scheme. The designed controller has been suc-
cessfully tested under real operational conditions [18].
The dynamics of hydrazine and ammoniac concentra-
tions behavior in the secondary circuit of the NPP can be
expressed as follows:
V
d
dt
[
N2H4
] = −Qext(t)·
[
N2H4
]
+ u(t − τ)
V
d
dt
[
NH3
] = 4
3
Qext(t)
([
N2H4
]− [O2
])− β·[NH3
]
(39)
V is the circuit’s water volume, Qext the water extraction
flow rate of the condenser and β is a parameter depending
of the NPP operating conditions. [N2H4], [NH3], and [O2]
represent hydrazine, ammoniac and oxygen concentrations
respectively. u is the flow rates of the pumps used to inject
hydrazine in the circuit. Moreover, the system present a time
delay (τ = 560 s) corresponding to the chemical reaction af-
ter the introduction of hydrazine in the circuit. It is assumed
that the pH is measured, that is,
pH = 14 + 1
2
log
(
Kb
[
NH3
]
+ KMo[Mo]
)
+ npH, (40)
where npH denotes the measurement noise, [Mo] also de-
notes the morpholine concentration, Kb and KMo are the ba-
sicity constants of the ammoniac and morpholine respec-
tively.
Taken into account the dynamical equations (39), it fol-
lows that
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ẋ(t) =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
− β
V
4Qext(t)
3V
0 −Qext(t)
V
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ x(t) +
⎛
⎝
0
1
V
⎞
⎠u(t − τ)
+
⎛
⎝−
4Qext(t)
3V
0
⎞
⎠
[
O2
]
(t)
y(t) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
x(t) +
(
nNH3 (t)
nN2H4 (t)
)
,
(41)
where x = ([NH3] [N2H4])T represents the state vector.
nN2H4 represents the measurement noise of the hydrazine sen-
sor. nNH3 is the image of the measurement noise of the pH
sensor via the relation (40). Then, since (40) is static we will
consider that an ammoniac concentration measure is avail-
able through the pH sensor. Characteristics of nNH3 are then
deduced from the following equation, which is the inverse of
(40):
[
NH3
]
+ nNH3 =
102[pH−14−npH] − KMo[Mo]
Kb
. (42)
Figure 5 presents the behavior of the time varying param-
eter Qext(t) during a period of 3 days. We assume here that
Qext(t) is not affected by the considered faults. As it can be
seen on Figure 5, Qext(t) varies between Qmin and Qmax with:
Qmin = 878 l/s
Qmax = 1097 l/s. (43)
The considered faults are hydrazine sensor faults and pH
sensor faults. Note that monitoring of pH sensors is a key
feature for well functioning the overall system.
The relation between the ammoniac measurement and
the pH measurement is only algebraic (see (41)), then the
pH sensor fault is directly transmitted to the ammoniac mea-
surement. Therefore, we can consider an ammoniac sensor
fault in place of a pH sensor fault. Consequently, the follow-
ing state space representation derived from (42) models the
failing behavior of the secondary circuit (the notations are
chosen to be consistent with those used in Section 2):
G(θ) :
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ẋ =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
− β
V
4θ(t)
3V
0
0 −θ(t)
V
2
τV
0 0 − 2
V
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
x +
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
0
− 1
V
2
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
u
+
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
−4θ(t)
3V
0
0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
[
O2
]
y =
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
)
x +
(
0
0
)
u +
⎛
⎝
nNH3 (t)
nN2H4 (t)
⎞
⎠d1
+
(
1 0
0 1
)(
nNH3 (t)
nN2H4 (t)
)
(44)
fNH3 represent ammoniac sensor faults and fN2H4 hydrazine
sensor faults. In this model, the time delay due to actuators
is approximated using a first order Pade approximation. The
model (44) corresponds to the model described in Figure 1,
where 878 ≤ θ(t) = Qext(t) ≤ 1097. It follows that the con-
sidered polytope Θ = {θ : 878 ≤ θ ≤ 1097} becomes a
simple segment since dim (θ) = 1.
For the FDI purpose, two filters F1(θ) and F2(θ) are com-
puted such that the two residuals r1(t) and r2(t) satisfy the
following requirements:
(i) r1(t) is sensitive to pH sensor faults through the (ficti-
tious) ammoniac sensor and robust to hydrazine sen-
sor faults.
(ii) r2(t) is sensitive to hydrazine sensor faults and robust
to ammoniac sensor faults.
This method allows to isolate sensor faults uniquely.
Therefore, we consider a different model for each filter to be
synthesized. For the design of F1(θ), the following model is
used
G1(θ) :
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ẋ =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
− β
V
4θ(t)
3V
0
0 −θ(t)
V
2
τV
0 0 − 2
V
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
x +
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
0
− 1
V
2
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
u
+
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
−4θ(t)
3V
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
d1 +
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
0
0
0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ fNH3
y =
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
)
x +
(
0
0
)
u +
(
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
)
d1 +
⎛
⎝
1
0
⎞
⎠ fNH3 ,
(45)
where the disturbances vector d1 includes the oxygen con-
centration, the measurement noises and the hydrazine sensor
fault, that is, d1 = [[O2] nNH3 nN2H4 fN2H4 ]T . For the design
of F2(θ), the following model is retained
G2(θ) :
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ẋ =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
− β
V
4θ(t)
3V
0
0 −θ(t)
V
2
τV
0 0 − 2
V
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
x +
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
0
− 1
V
2
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
u
+
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
4θ(t)
3V
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
d2 +
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
0
0
0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
fN2H4
y =
⎛
⎝
1 0 0
0 1 0
⎞
⎠ x +
⎛
⎜
⎝
0
0
⎞
⎟
⎠
u +
⎛
⎝
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
⎞
⎠d2 +
(
1
1
)
fN2H4 ,
(46)
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where the augmented disturbances vector takes into account
the ammoniac sensor faults; d2=
[[
O2
]
nNH3 nN2H4 fNH3
]T
.
According to the methodology developed in the Section
2, two polytopic models P1(θ) and P2(θ) are built as illus-
trated on Figure 2. To save place and for a better understand-
ing, the different steps are only detailed for F1(θ). Here, be-
cause the system is placed in an open-loop control law, it
follows from G1(θ) that (for clarity the index “1” is ignored
from now):
P(θ) :
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ẋ =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
− β
V
4θ(t)
3V
0
0 −θ(t)
V
2
τV
0 0 − 2
V
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
x
+
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
0 −4θ(t)
3V
0 0 0
− 1
V
0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
d +
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
0
0
0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ fNH3
(
y
u
)
=
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ x +
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠d
+
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
1
0
0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ fNH3 ,
(47)
where d = [u [O2] nNH3 nN2H4 fN2H4 ]T . Following
the developments in Section 2, the fault detector design
problem turns out to be the design of (F(θ),My ,Mu) satis-
fying the following objectives:
∥
∥Trd(θ)
∥
∥∞ < γ1∥
∥Tr f (θ)
∥
∥
sens > γ2
(48)
Figure 6 gives an illustration of this problem.
Finally, following the method describes in Section 2, the
problem is recasted into the setup depicted in Figure 3 where
the model P(θ,My ,Mu) is defined according to:
P
(
θ,My ,Mu
)
=
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
− β
V
4θ(t)
3V
0 0 −4θ(t)
3V
0 0 0 0 0
0 −θ(t)
V
2
τV
1
V
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −2
τ
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
My1 My2 0 Mu 0 My1 My2 My2 My1 −1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
(49)
My1 and My2 are the two components of the structuring ma-
trix My .
As it is outlined in Remark 2 an important step in the
proposed method is the choice of the shaping filters Wd and
Wf . Similarly to the developments presented in Section 2,
Wd is refereed to the robustness objectives against d and Wf
to the sensitivity requirements against fNH3 . Here, due to the
definition of d, it is natural to choose Wd such as:
Wd = diag
(
Wu,W[O2],WnNH3 ,WnN2H4 ,W[N2H4]
)
. (50)
The weighting functions Wu, W[O2], WnNH3 , WnN2H4 , W[N2H4]
and Wf allow to manage separately the robustness objectives
against u, [O2], nNH3 , nN2H4 , fN2H4 and fNH3 respectively. The
interested reader can refer to [10] or [19] if necessary. These
weighting functions are deduced from an off line spectral
analysis procedure of available measurements according to:
Wu = γu
(
1 + 1, 7 · 103 s)2
(
1 + 103 s
)2
W[O2] = γ[O2]
1 + 1, 5 · 104 s
1 + 102 s
WnNH3 = γnNH3
s + 2 · 10−2
s + 1 · 10−5
WnN2H4 = γnN2H4
s + 2 · 10−2
s + 1 · 10−5
W[N2H4] = γ[N2H4]
1 + 103 s
1 + 10−3 s
Wf = γ2
1
1 + 103 s
.
(51)
The parameters γu, γ[O2], γnNH3 , γnN2H4 , γ[N2H4] and γ2 allow
to manage the gain of the weighting functions separately.
They are optimized by performing an iterative refinement.
Remember that the goal is to minimize the effects of distur-
bances on the residual r(t) and maximize the effects of faults
on r(t). The numerical values of them have been fixed to
γu = 0.025, γ[O2] = 10−4, γnNH3 = γnN2H4 = 0.1,
γ[N2H4] = 2 · 10−5, γ2 = 2.
(52)
The method described in Section 2.2.2 is then used to synthe-
size the filter F(θ), and the structuring matrices My and Mu.
For the SDP optimization problem computation, the SDPT3
solver is used.
To analyze the computed solution, the principal gains
σ(Tkdr( jω)) and σ(TfNH3 r( jω)) of the closed loop transfers
Tkdr( jω) and TfNH3 r( jω) are plotted versus the objectives W
k
d
and Wf for some θ ∈ Θ (see Figure 7). The notation “k”
is introduced to outline that the analysis is performed with
respect to each component of d. As it can be seen on the fig-
ures, for each synthesis, σ(Tkdr( jω)) < σ(W
k
d ( jω))∀ω and
σ(TfNH3 r( jω)) > σ(Wf ( jω))∀ω ∈ Ω ≈ [0; 10−4[rd/s for
all considered values of θ(t). This indicates that the require-
ments (48) are satisfied for the considered values of θ and by
virtue of Lemma 2, we know that it still yields for all values
of θ.
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Figure 7: Behavior of the principal gains of the closed loop transfers Tkdr( jω) and TfNH3 r( jω) versus the shaping objective filters (in dB).
Simulation results
The FDI unit is implemented within the simulator of the
secondary circuit. For simulating faults, a variation of ten
percent of sensors measurements between t = 80 hours and
t = 85 hours for the pH sensor and between t = 120 hours
and t = 125 hours for the hydrazine sensor is made. Figures
8, 9 and 10 illustrate the behavior of the residual signals r1(t)
and r2(t) in both fault free and faulty situations for the afore-
mentioned period of 3 days. As expected, it can be seen from
figures that r1(t) is only sensitive to pH sensor faults and r2(t)
is only sensitive to hydrazine sensor faults.
10 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Time (hours)
−3
−2
−1
0
1
×10−5
r 1
(t
)
Fault free situation
(a)
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Time (hours)
−4
−2
0
2
4
×10−9
r 2
(t
)
(b)
Figure 8: Behavior of ri(t), i = 1, 2 and the decision test-fault-free
situation.
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Figure 9: Behavior of ri(t), i = 1, 2 and the decision test-pH sensor
fault (80 h–85 h).
Finally, a sequential Wald decision test is also imple-
mented within the simulator to make a final decision about
the faults. The probabilities of non-detection and false alarms
have been fixed to 0.1%. The results are presented in Figures
8, 9 and 10. As it can be seen, all faults are successfully de-
tected and isolated.
4. CONCLUSION
The problem which is addressed in this paper is that of de-
signing FDI filters for dynamic systems that can be described
by LPV polytopic models. The method can be seen as a gen-
eralization of the well known H∞/H− setting for LTI systems.
The H∞ norm for LPV systems is used to formulate the ro-
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Time (hours)
−3
−2
−1
0
1
×10−5
r 1
(t
)
Hydrazine sensor fault
(a)
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Time (hours)
0
1
2
3
×10−7
r 2
(t
)
(b)
Figure 10: Behavior of ri(t), i = 1, 2 and the decision test-hydrazine
sensor fault (120 h–125 h).
bustness specifications and a new index, that is, the Hsens
index, which is deduced from the H-norm for LTI systems,
is introduced for fault sensitivity specifications. As a result,
various design goals and trades-off can be formulated and
managed in a systematic way by means of some high level
design parameters formulated in terms of dynamic weight-
ing functions. A key feature of the proposed technique is
that the remaining control and measurement canals are op-
timally merged to build the fault indicating signals. The re-
sulting static matrices are also optimized via LMI together
with the dynamic FDI filter. The proposed technique is also
appropriate for fault diagnosis in nonlinear systems which
can be approximated efficiently by LPV models to cover a
wider range of operating, and to cope with rapid parameter
variations. The method has been successfully applied to ex-
perimental data set coming from the secondary circuit of a
nuclear power plant in France.
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centrale nucléaire de type REP,” Internal Report, LAPS-EDF,
Bordeaux, France, 2002.
[19] D. Henry and A. Zolghadri, “Norm-based design of robust
FDI schemes for uncertain systems under feedback control:
comparison of two approaches,” Control Engineering Practice,
vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 1081–1097, 2006.
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Journal of Control Science and Engineering
Volume 2008, Article ID 152030, 10 pages
doi:10.1155/2008/152030
Research Article
Design and Assessment of a Multiple Sensor Fault Tolerant
Robust Control System
S. S. Yang1 and J. Chen2
1 Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
2 School of Engineering and Design, Brunel University West London, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK
Correspondence should be addressed to J.Chen, jie.chen@brunel.ac.uk
Received 29 December 2006; Revised 21 September 2007; Accepted 12 December 2007
Recommended by Jakob Stoustrup
This paper presents an enhanced robust control design structure to realise fault tolerance towards sensor faults suitable for multi-
input-multioutput (MIMO) systems implementation. The proposed design permits fault detection and controller elements to be
designed with considerations of stability and robustness towards uncertainties, besides multiple faults environment on a common
mathematical platform. This framework can also cater to systems requiring fast responses. A design example is illustrated with a
fast, multivariable, and unstable system, that is, the double inverted pendulum system. Results indicate the potential of this design
framework to handle fast systems with multiple sensor faults.
Copyright © 2008 S. S. Yang and J. Chen. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Growing demands for plant or system availability, reliability,
and survivability have prompted active research in fault tol-
erant control systems (FTCSs) [1, 2]. FTCSs are designed to
accommodate component faults automatically by ensuring
overall system stability and acceptable performance. A typi-
cal FTCS design incorporating separate control and fault de-
tection elements can achieve fault tolerance objectives, but
without due considerations given to significant interactions
between the elements such as those described in [3, 4]. In
addition, addressing issues concerning uncertainties is cru-
cial as practical problems associated with variations in actual
plant operating range are undesirable.
Fault detectors are typically based upon the use of pro-
cess models [5–7]. Data from the monitored plant is input
to these algorithms and the outputs are compared with the
corresponding plant outputs. If there are discrepancies, then
it is an indication that at least one fault has occurred. The
model-based approach to designing sensor FTCS employs
mathematical manipulation of available signals, that is, an-
alytical redundancy, via suitably designed controllers to ac-
commodate for faults rather than using extra hardware (sen-
sors/actuators).
1.1. Integrating control and fault detection in FTCS
An integrated approach [8–11] where fault detection and
controller elements are designed with consideration to the
overall system stability or interaction is favourable as the re-
liability of operation can be determined in a mathematically
sound setting offering fast control responses in addition to
the availability of the established solution for incorporating
robustness towards uncertainties.
In this paper, a robust controller-based MIMO FTCS
which integrates the fault detection and controller elements
in a single design is presented. A fault indicating residual
is utilised as a function of control. The residual signals act
as weighting factors, which put corresponding emphasis on
nominal controller and fault accommodating controller. The
FTCS structure proposed allows the plant to be controlled
by a nominal controller that ensures the achievement of best
performance objectives, when sensor faults and uncertainties
are not present, while preserving the stability at a lower de-
gree of system performance in the presence of major sensor
faults [11, 12]. The proposed structure can handle systems
with fast responses, multiple sensor faults, and modelling un-
certainties.
Note that purely robust control-based FTCS such as de-
scribed in [13, 14] ensures robustness towards minor faults
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only; faults are modelled as very small perturbations on the
system. As demonstrated by [13, 14], it is not possible for
a purely robust control structure to maintain high perfor-
mance, when faults are not present as they are designed using
worst case criterion.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Assuming that the MIMO plants and controllers are de-
scribed mathematically in state-space form as follows:
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t), (1)
where x ∈ Rn is state vector, u ∈ Rl is the input vector, while
y ∈ Rm is the measured output vector.
A,B,C, and D are known matrices with appropriate di-
mensions related to the system dynamics. In addition, σ(M)
denotes the largest singular value of M. H∞ denotes the Ba-
nach space of bounded analytic functions with the ∞ norm
defined as ‖F‖∞ = supωσ(F( jω)) for any F ∈ H∞.
Definition 1. All MIMO transfer matrix representations have
appropriate dimensions and are proper real-rational matri-
ces, stabilisable, and detectable. A state space rational proper
transfer function is denoted by
G(s) =
[
A B
C D
]
= C(sI − A)−1B +D. (2)
Furthermore, let P be a block matrix,
P =
[
P11 P12
P21 P22
]
. (3)
Therefore, the linear fractional transformation of P over F is
defined as
Fl(P,F) = P11 + P12F(I − P22F)−1P21, (4)
where F is assumed to have appropriate dimensions and
(I − P22F)−1 is well defined.
2.1. Sensor faults defined
Sensor fault symptoms can be observed as measurements
that are unavailable, incorrect, or unusually noisy. These
faults may occur individually or concurrently or simulta-
neously, resulting in total system failure or degradation in
performance. Significant information about the influence of
faults on a process cannot be known without the inclusion
of its model in the design. Additive faults provide a suitable
framework for sensor faults and are modelled as additional
input signals to a system [5],
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t),
y′(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t) + fs(t),
(5)
where fs(t) ∈ Rm denote sensor faults. Hence
y(s) = Gp(s)u(s). (6)
The variable y(s) denotes all available sensor outputs. When
output sensor faults occur in the plant as shown in (5), the
measured outputs become
y′(s) = y(s) + fs(s). (7)
Due to the existence of fault represented by fs(s), a conven-
tional controller cannot usually satisfy required performance
and the closed-loop control system may even become un-
stable. A sensor fault-compensating controller can be intro-
duced to augment a nominal controller designed for best per-
formance. However, since the structure of the system as seen
in Figure 1 is virtually an internal model controller [15], con-
ditions for physical realizability need to be observed. To en-
sure that the fault-compensating controller, Q is well defined
and proper, the transfer matrix representation from fs(s) to
controller output u(s) must exist and is also proper. There-
fore,
fs(s) =Ws(s) f ′s (s). (8)
By appropriate use of input weight,Ws(s), the input f ′s (s) can
be normalised and transformed into the physical input, fs(s).
Consideration of such sensor fault models has been shown to
be suitable for use in formulating the FTCS objectives for the
rejection of sensor faults as an optimisation problem. Uncer-
tainties affecting the sensors can also be classified as a sub-
set of fs(s). Figure 1 shows the block diagram illustrating the
interconnections assumed for the formulation H∞ problem
associated with the proposed FTCS design.
2.2. Fault indicating residuals
The presence of sensor faults and uncertainty vectors defined
in Section 2.1 can be reflected by a fault indicating residual,
since a filtered estimation can be obtained via coprime fac-
torisation of the plant model, Gp(s) [11, 12]. Let
Gp(s) = M̃−1(s)Ñ(s). (9)
Hence, from (8) and (9), the fault indicating residual denoted
by fr(s) can be defined as
fr(s) = Ñ(s)u(s)− M̃(s)y′(s)
= Ñ(s)u(s)− M̃(s)[y(s) + fs(s)]
= −M̃(s)Ws(s) f ′(s).
(10)
2.3. Integrating the controller element
Now, since fr(s) reflects the presence of faults and uncer-
tainty, it can be utilised as an input to the fault compensating
controller. The perturbations caused can then be minimised
by control actions due to the nominal controller and fault
compensating controller. The control signal vector can be ex-
pressed as follows:
u(s) = uk(s) + uq(s), (11)
where
uk(s) = K(s)e(s) (12)
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and uk(s) denotes nominal controller (K(s)) output, and
uq(s) denotes sensor fault compensator (Q(s)) output. Error
from feedback is denoted by e(s) whereby r(s) denotes input
demand. Thus, from (10), fr(s) is utilised in the following
manner:
uq(s) = Q(s) fr(s) = −Q(s)M̃(s)Ws(s) f ′s (s). (13)
From (6), (7), and (8), e(s) can be expressed as
e(s) = r(s)− y′(s)
= r(s)− y(s)− fs(s)
= r(s)−Gp(s)u(s)−Ws(s) f ′s (s).
(14)
By substituting (12), (13), and (14) into (11), the following
is derived:
u(s) = (I + K(s)Gp(s))−1
×{K(s)r(s)− (K(s) + [Q(s)M̃(s)])Ws(s) f ′s(s)}.
(15)
Thus,
y′(s) = Gp(s)(I + K(s)Gp(s))−1
× {K(s)r(s)− (K(s) + [Q(s)M̃(s)])Ws(s) f ′s(s)}.
(16)
The plant output expression in (16) shows that in the absence
of sensor faults and uncertainties, the output closed-loop sys-
tem is only reliant on the nominal controller K(s), allowing
for high performance during healthy operation. Note that the
fault detection scheme generating the above-mentioned fault
indicating residual does not need to be made robust, since the
fault indicating residual is mainly used as an activating signal
forQ(s). It is thus not essential to identify nor to estimate the
source of the faults, hence even if the presence of fr(s) is due
to uncertainties and not faults in the sensors, Q(s) will still
provide the necessary control signals to compensate for such
perturbations thereby introducing robustness to the system.
2.4. Sensor fault compensator realisation
The sensor fault compensator Q(s) is integrated into the
framework by utilising fr(s) as a function of control. The
design Q(s) is achieved with the H∞ technique. A perfor-
mance weights Wftc(s) can be defined to establish post-
fault performance requirements, which emphasise on stabil-
ity rather than high performance. The corresponding solu-
tion for achieving Q(s) is by minimising the following opti-
misation criterion:
γ = min
Q(s)
‖Fl[Pf (s),Q(s)]‖∞. (17)
Therefore, the standard H∞ problem is specified in (17) for
which the corresponding transfer functions from f ′s (s) to
z(s) must satisfy. If the controller Q(s) in (17) is found, then
the closed-loop system is said to have robust performance
towards uncertainty and sensor faults; it is well known that a
system satisfies robust performance if and only if it is robustly
r(s)
K(s)
uk(s)
++
uq(s)
Q(s)
Ñ ′(s)
+−fr(s)
M̃′(s)
u(s)
Gp(s)
y(s)
+
+ fs(s)
Ws(s)
f ′s (s) z(s)
y′(s)
Wf tc(s)
Figure 1: Block diagram representation of H∞ problem formula-
tion for the proposed FTCS design.
f ′s (s)
uq(s)
Q(s)
P f (s)
z(s)
fr(s)
Figure 2: The LFT representation of the proposed FTCS.
stable with respect to norm-bounded matrix perturbation
[16]. The equivalent linear fractional transformation (LFT)
block diagram for the H∞ problem stated above is shown in
Figure 2.
Thus,
[
z(s)
fr(s)
]
=
[
P11(s) P12(s)
P21(s) P22(s)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ps(s)
[
f ′s (s)
uq(s)
]
. (18)
From (10), P21 and P12 can be derived as
P21(s) = −M̃(s)Ws(s),
P12(s) = 0.
(19)
Now, note that
uk(s) = K(s)
(
r(s)− y′(s))
= K(s)(r(s)−Gp(s)u(s)−Ws(s) f ′s (s))
= K(s)r(s)−K(s)Gp(s)
[
uk(s)+uq(s)
]−K(s)Ws(s) f ′s (s),
(20)
and thus,
uk(s) =
(
I + K(s)Gp(s)
)−1
K(s)r(s)
− (I + K(s)Gp(s))−1K(s)Ws(s) f ′s (s)
− (I + K(s)Gp(s))−1K(s)Gp(s)uk(s).
(21)
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Also
z(s) =Wftc(s)y′(s)
=Wftc(s)
[
Gp(s)u(s) +Ws(s) f ′s (s)
]
=Wftc(s)Gp(s)uk(s)
+Wftc(s)Gp(s)uq(s)
+Wftc(s)Ws(s) f ′s (s).
(22)
Substituting (21) into (22),
z(s) =Wftc(s)Gp(s)
(
I+K(s)Gp(s)
)−1
K(s)r(s)
−Wftc(s)Gp(s)(I+K(s)Gp(s))−1K(s)Gp(s)uq(s)
+Wftc(s)Gp(s)uq(s)−Wftc(s)Gp(s)(I + K(s)Gp(s))−1
× K(s)Ws(s) f ′s (s) +Wftc(s)Ws(s) f ′s (s).
(23)
Ignoring the reference input r(s), we have
P11(s) = −Wftc(s)Gp(s)
(
I + K(s)Gp(s)
)−1
× K(s)Ws(s) +Wftc(s)Ws(s)
=Wftc(s)
{
I −Gp(s)
(
I + K(s)Gp(s)
)−1
K(s)
}
Ws(s)
=Wftc(s)
(
1 +Gp(s)K(s)
)−1
Ws(s),
P12(s) = −Wftc(s)Gp(s)
(
I + K(s)Gp(s)
)−1
× K(s)Gp(s) +Wftc(s)Gp(s)
=Wftc(s)
{
I −Gp(s)
(
I + K(s)Gp(s)
)−1
K(s)
}
Gp(s)
=Wftc(s)
(
1 +Gp(s)K(s)
)−1
Gp(s).
(24)
Note that the following matrix operation (Zhou, Doyle &
Glover, 1996, page 23) has been used in the derivation of
(24):
A−111 +A
−1
11 A12(A22 − A21A−111 A12)−1A21A−111
= (A11 − A12A−122 A21)−1.
(25)
With the conditions laid out, the closed-loop system shown
above is guaranteed to be tolerant to sensor faults and mod-
elling uncertainty, stable for any nonlinear, time varying, and
stable K(s) and Q(s) due to the minimisation of the transfer
matrix between fault-generating signal f ′s (s) to the perfor-
mance evaluation signal z(s).
3. A NUMERICAL SIMULATION EXAMPLE
An experimental study of the FTCS implementation on a
double inverted pendulum system for tolerance towards sen-
sor faults is shown next to illustrate the feasibility of the pro-
posed design method. The implementation is tested for fault
tolerance towards sensors in nominal and under plant uncer-
tainty conditions.
3.1. The double inverted pendulum system
The double inverted pendulum system is an example of a
chaotic system. The system is a fast, multivariable, nonlin-
Servo motor
Track
Upper arm
Lower arm
Cart
θ1
θ1
θ2
xc
u
Figure 3: Schematic diagram of the pendulum system.
ear, and unstable process. The pendulum system is a stan-
dard classical control test rig for the verification of different
control methods, and is among the most difficult systems to
control in the field of control engineering. Similar to the sin-
gle inverted pendulum problem, the control task for the dou-
ble inverted pendulum is to stabilise the two pendulums. The
position of the carriage on the track is controlled quickly and
accurately, so that the pendulums are always erected in their
inverted position during such movements.
The double inverted pendulum system is made up of two
aluminium arms connected to each other with the lower arm
attached to a cart placed on a guiding rail, as illustrated in
Figure 3. Data used in this case study has been obtained from
[9]. The aluminium arms are constrained to rotate within a
single plane and the axis of rotation is perpendicular to the
direction of the force acting on the cart motion f . The cart
can move along a linear low-friction track and is moved by a
belt driven by a servo motor system. Sensors providing mea-
surements of cart position xc, the pendulums angles θ1 and
θ2, controller output, u, and motor current i are assumed
available for the purpose of control. The control law has to
regulate the lower-arm angle and upper-arm angle, θ1 and
θ2, respectively, from an initial condition, and the control of
the position of the cart xc from an initial position.
3.2. Nominal high-performance controller
An H∞ loop shaping controller, as high-performance nomi-
nal controller K for the MIMO system, is designed using the
MATLAB command ncfsyn.m. The specification functionWp
is augmented to K in the manner shown in Figure 4. Sensors
for detecting ex (cart positional error), θ1 and θ2, are fault
prone sensors. Motor voltage and current are denoted by u
and i, respectively. The controller output variable is the cor-
responding motor voltage demand u. The controller perfor-
mance was tested on the SIMULINK model of the double
inverted pendulum. Initial conditions are with θ1 = 0.05 rad
and θ2 = −0.04 rad. The cart movement command signal rc
is initiated at 0.5 m and at −0.5 m after 50 seconds, is shown
in Figure 5, while system responses are shown in Figure 6.
It is observed that the output responses are within limits
of specifications, and the cart position set points have been
achieved in a stable and smooth manner.
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ex
θ1
θ1 − θ2
u
i
Wp(s) K
u
Figure 4: The H∞ loop-shaping controller K with specification
function.
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
r c
(m
)
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Time (s)
Figure 5: Command signal requiring the cart to move from 0.5 m
to −0.5 m.
3.3. FTCS design and implementation
The nominal model of the double inverted pendulum model
is described by its left coprime factors to ensure well posed-
ness. The double inverted pendulum model without mod-
elling uncertainty is considered for the representation of
the nominal plant in the fault indicating residual generator
setup. Fault indicating residuals are denoted by fθ1, fθ2 and
fex for faults in the corresponding sensors.
The interconnection of the system is setup and the de-
sign of the controller sensor fault compensating controller,
Q is automated with the command hinfsyn.m provided in
MATLAB’s μ-analysis and synthesis toolbox [17], which itera-
tively solves the optimisation criterion set out in (17). When
γ value of below 1 is obtained, the solution of a satisfactory
Q is used. This condition is only met with relaxations to the
effects of additive faults, as it is obvious that total failure can-
not be handled. Note that the performance weights Wftc(s)
(shown in the appendix) to establish postfault performance
requirements reuse the elements in the original specification
function Wp, which are related to the fault prone sensors,
that is, sensors providing measurements of cart position xc,
the pendulums angles θ1 and θ2. The block diagram showing
the augmentation of Q to nominal controller K is illustrated
in Figure 7.
3.4. Tests and results
The following responses have been recorded from testing the
FTCS by simulating the occurrence of faults in the relevant
sensors. Sensor effectiveness indicating faults are simulated
as deterioration of performance; 0%: no fault, 100%: to-
tal failure. Results are shown for conditions with and with-
out modelling uncertainty. Responses of the inverted dou-
ble pendulum system performances with the proposed FTCS,
H∞, and μ controllers are recorded for comparison purposes.
−0.1
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0.2
−1
0
1
θ 2
(r
ad
)
θ 1
(r
ad
)
x c
(m
)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time (s)
Figure 6: System responses with K implementation (position of
cart xc is shown instead of cart position error ex).
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Sensor fault
compensator
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H∞ loop
shaping
controller
ex
θ1
θ2
u
i
fex
fθ1
fθ2
uk
uq
u
+
+
Figure 7: Block diagram of sensor fault compensator Q augmented
to nominal controller K in the FTCS structure.
Nominal response, without modelling uncertainties and
sensor faults
Nominal performances of all controllers for healthy system
are recorded in Figure 8. Apparently the proposed FTCS pro-
duces faster cart positioning response compared to all other
control system responses, initiating slightly higher over-
shoots in θ1 and θ2.
Multiple sensor faults without plant uncertainty
Multiple sensor faults are assumed to occur at 2, 4, and 6
seconds after the simulation has been initiated (ex at 90%
deterioration, θ1 at 20% deterioration, and θ2 at 10% deteri-
oration, resp.). The output responses are shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 8: Nominal double inverted pendulum system responses of
all controllers under healthy conditions. (a) —- FTCS, (b) . . . H∞
controller, and (c) - - - μ controller.
Observe that the proposed FTCS and the μ controller han-
dled the faults and managed to achieve satisfactory control
responses. However, stability could not be maintained by the
H∞ controller.
Multiple sensor faults with plant uncertainty
Tests for control systems to handle system uncertainty and
multiple sensor faults were also performed. Conditions were
made similar to the tests performed for the nominal system
with multiple sensor faults. The supremacy of the proposed
FTCS to accommodate for faults even under the influence of
system uncertainties is seen in Figure 10.
The H∞ controller could not handle this mode of fault
and oscillates beyond control as shown. Meanwhile, both the
proposed FTCS and the μ controller handled the fault satis-
factorily.
Further discussion
Overall, the proposed FTCS has managed to handle all pre-
and postfault conditions satisfactorily, while maintaining the
highest level of stability in all test scenarios. Although it
seems that the μ controller could handle faults and modelling
uncertainty as well as the proposed FTCS, it could not han-
dle certain cases of single faults such as the cases shown in
Figure 11 for the effect of θ2 sensor fault at 10% deteriora-
tion. Responses of μ control system is too oscillatory and un-
stable.
4. CONCLUSION
The proposed FTCS has been observed to have managed all
faults simulated in the nominal performance tests, while the
two other control systems could not consistently maintain
stability in a majority of fault scenario. Robust performance
assessments showing the performance of the control systems
when faced with system uncertainty in addition to sensor
faults were also simulated. Again, it is observed that fault tol-
erance capability of the proposed FTCS has been maintained.
The proposed improvement to the model-based FTCS struc-
ture provides a potential framework for the realisation of an
integrated MIMO FTCS. This design framework is suitable as
it inherently incorporates fault residuals as feedback and al-
lows the application of established robust MIMO control de-
sign concept. The test results show the capability of the pro-
posed FTCS to maintain availability and an acceptable level
of performance for multiple deteriorated sensor conditions.
APPENDIX
Transfer matrix of Q:
uq(s)
fex(s)
= α1
β1
,
uq(s)
fθ1−θ2(s)
= uq(s)
fθ3(s)
= α2
β2
,
uk(s)
fex(s)
= α3
β3
,
(A.1)
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Figure 9: System responses of all controllers under multiple sensor
fault condition, without modelling uncertainty. (a) —- FTCS, (b)
. . . H∞ controller, and (c) - - - μ controller.
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Figure 10: System responses of all controllers under multiple sensor
fault condition with modelling uncertainty. (a) —- FTCS, (b) . . . H∞
controller, and (c) - - - μ controller.
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Figure 11: System responses of all controllers under θ2 sensor fault
at 10% deterioration, without uncertainties. (a) —- FTCS, (b) . . .
H∞ controller, and (c) - - - μ controller.
where α1 = (0.0001s7 + 0.0025s6 + 0.0465s5 + 0.3162s4 +
1.5660s3 + 2.5422s2 + 1.0939s − 0.1242), β1 = 0.0004s7 +
0.0088s6 +0.1299s5 +0.6940s4 +2.8528s3 +3.3483s2 +2.4253s+
0.1423, α2 = 10−3( − 0.0001s7 − 0.0032s6 − 0.0603s5 −
0.3832s4 − 1.8085s3 − 2.176s2 − 0.9779s + 0.0841), β2 =
0.0004s7+0.0088s6+0.1299s5+0.6940s4+2.8528s3+3.3483s2+
2.4253s + 0.1423, α3 = (0.0001s7 + 0.0016s6 + 0.0223s5 +
0.1791s4 + 0.8204s3 + 1.9258s2 + 1.7793s + 0.2839), β3 =
0.0006s7+0.0137s6+0.1474s5+0.8104s4+2.8431s3+4.6326s2+
3.8566s + 1.5476.
Transfer matrix of K :
uk(s)
ex(s)
= α4
β4
,
uk(s)
θ1(s)
= α5
β5
,
uk(s)
θ3(s)
= α6
β6
,
uk(s)
u(s)
= α7
β7
,
uk(s)
i(s)
= α8
β8
,
(A.2)
where α4 = (0.0001s7 + 0.0016s6 + 0.0223s5 + 0.1791s4 +
0.8204s3 + 1.9258s2 + 1.7793s + 0.2839), β4 = 0.0006s7 +
0.0137s6 +0.1474s5 +0.8104s4 +2.8431s3 +4.6326s2 +3.8566s+
1.5476, α5 = (0.003s7 +0.061s6 +0.740s5 +4.942s4 +17.436s3 +
26.050s2+16.23s+4.898), β5 = 0.0006s7+0.0137s6+0.1474s5+
0.8104s4 + 2.8431s3 + 4.6326s2 + 3.8566s + 1.5476, α6 = ( −
0.005s7 − 0.115s6 − 1.333s5 − 8.249s4 − 25.938s3 − 35.97s2 −
21.914s − 6.633), β6 = 0.0006s7 + 0.0137s6 + 0.1474s5 +
0.8104s4 + 2.8431s3 + 4.6326s2 + 3.8566s + 1.5476, α7 =
(−0.00006s7−0.00149s6−0.01616s5−0.08897s4−0.30832s3−
0.49612s2 − 0.40571s− 0.16099), β7 = 0.0006s7 + 0.0137s6 +
0.1474s5 + 0.8104s4 + 2.8431s3 + 4.6326s2 + 3.8566s+ 1.5476,
α8 = ( − 0.00006s7 − 0.00159s6 − 0.01862s5 − 0.06867s4 −
0.10104s3−0.04271s2−0.01119s−0.01105), β8 = 0.0006s7 +
0.0137s6 +0.1474s5 +0.8104s4 +2.8431s3 +4.6326s2 +3.8566s+
1.5476.
Postfault performance weight matrix:
Wp =
⎡
⎢⎣We 0 00 Wθ1 0
0 0 Wθ2
⎤
⎥⎦ , (A.3)
where
(i) We = 25/(50s + 1) denotes the performance weight
related to ex;
(ii) Wθ1 = 50/(s+ 10) denotes the performance weight re-
lated to θ1;
(iii) Wθ2 = 45/(s+ 10) denotes the performance weight re-
lated to θ2.
The performance function of the signals provided is
weighted to characterise the following limits:
(i) limiting cart position tracking error ex at 0 m at high
frequency and relaxed for low frequency at a maxi-
mum error of 0.04 m;
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(ii) limiting the vertical to lower arm angle θ1 at 0 radians
at high frequency and relaxed for low frequency at a
maximum angle of 0.20 radians;
(iii) limiting the vertical to upper arm angle θ2 at 0 radians
at high frequency and relaxed for low frequency at a
maximum angle of 0.22 radians.
System interconnection and synthesis of Q(s)
The appropriate system interconnection structure of P(s)
which is the outer loop of the FTCS inclusive of the nomi-
nal controller, K(s),and fault indicating generation elements
needs to be formed using MATLAB μ-toolbox instruction
sysic.m [17]. Hence, Figure12 is equivalent to Figure13.
Following that, the sensor fault compensating controller,
Q(s), which is an H∞ controller closing the inner loop of
the FTCS (i.e., closing the loop for the system interconnec-
tion obtained from P(s) shown above), can be solved with
the MATLAB instruction, hinfsyn.m [17]. Since
[k] = hinfsyn(p, nmeas, ncon, gmin, gmax,
tol, ricmethd, epr, epp),
(A.4)
hence, in this case,
(i) k denotes the calculated H∞ controller, that is, Q(s);
(i) p denotes system interconnection P(s) as shown above;
(iii) nmeas denotes number of fault indicating signals;
(iv) ncont denotes the number of control inputs;
(v) gmin, gmax, tol, and so on are as denoted in [17].
Finally, the closed-loop interconnection with Q(s) is
shown as in Figure 14.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Increasing demands on reliability for safety critical systems
such as aircraft or spacecraft require robust control and
fault diagnosis capabilities as these systems are potentially
subjected to unexpected anomalies and faults in actuators,
input-output sensors, components, or subsystems. Conse-
quently, fault diagnosis capabilities and requirements for
aerospace applications have recently been receiving a great
deal of attention in the research community [1, 2]. A fault
diagnosis system needs to detect and isolate the presence and
location of the faults, on the basis also of the control sys-
tem architectures. Development of appropriate techniques
and solutions for these tasks are known as the fault detec-
tion and isolation (FDI) problem. There are, broadly speak-
ing, two main approaches for addressing the FDI problem,
namely, hardware-based and model-based techniques [3, 4].
A common and important approach in model-based tech-
niques is known as the residual-based method. A number of
researchers have developed residual-based methods for dy-
namic systems such as the parity space [5], state estimation
[6], unknown input observer (UIO), Kalman filters (KFs)
[3], and parameter identification [6].Intelligent techniques
[7] can be also exploited. Furthermore, the Massoumnia’s
geometric method [8] was successfully extended to nonlin-
ear systems [9, 10]. A crucial issue with any FDI scheme is
its robustness properties and a viable procedure for practical
application of FDI techniques is really necessary. Moreover,
robust FDI for the case of aircraft systems and applications is
still an open problem for further research.
The first part of this work deals with the residual gen-
erator design for the FDI of input-output sensors of a gen-
eral aviation aircraft subject to turbulence, wind gust distur-
bances, and measurement noises. The developed PM scheme
belongs to the parity space approach [5] and it is based on
an input-output polynomial description of the system under
diagnosis. In particular, the use of input-output forms allows
to easily obtain the analytical description for the disturbance-
decoupled residual generators. These dynamic filters, organ-
ised into bank structures, are able to achieve fault isolation
properties. An appropriate choice of their parameters allows
to maximise robustness with respect to both measurement
noise and modelling errors, while optimising fault sensitiv-
ity characteristics. The development of NLGA methodology
is based on the works by De Persis and Isidori [10]. It was
shown that the problem of the FDI for nonlinear systems is
solvable if and only if there is an unobservability distribu-
tion that leads to a quotient subsystem which is unaffected
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by all faults but one. If such a distribution exists, an appro-
priate coordinate transformations in the state space can be
exploited for designing a residual generator only for the ob-
servable subsystem. This technique was applied for the first
time to a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft with
reference to a reduced-order model [11]. The NLGA resid-
ual generators have been designed in order to be analytically
decoupled from the vertical and lateral components of the
wind (gusts and turbulence). Moreover, a new full analyt-
ical developed mixed H−/H∞ optimisation is proposed in
order to design the NLGA residual generators so that a good
tradeoff between the fault sensitivity and the robustness with
respect to measurements and model errors is achieved. The
designed residual generators have been tested on a PIPER PA-
30 aircraft flight simulator that was implemented in Matlab-
Simulink environments. With respect to the related works
by the same authors [12, 13], the main contribution of
this paper regards the enhancement in the designs of the
proposed FDI schemes. Moreover, the final performances
have been evaluated by adopting a typical aircraft reference
trajectory embedding several steady-state flight conditions,
such as straight flight phases and coordinated turns. Com-
parisons with different disturbance-decoupling methods for
FDI based on neural networks (NNs) and unknown input
Kalman filter (UIKF) have been also provided. Finally, exten-
sive experiments exploiting Monte Carlo analysis are used for
assessing the overall capabilities of the developed FDI meth-
ods, in the presence of uncertainty, measurement, and mod-
elling errors.
2. AIRCRAFT MODEL OVERVIEW
This section recalls briefly the description of the monitored
aircraft whose main parameters and variables are reported in
Table 1.
The considered aircraft simulation model consists of a
PIPER PA-30, based on the classical nonlinear 6 degrees
of freedom (DoF) rigid body formulation [14] whose mo-
tion occurs as a consequence of applied forces and moments
(aerodynamic, propulsive, and gravitational). A set of lo-
cal approximations for these forces has been computed and
scheduled depending on the values assumed by true airspeed
(TAS), curvature radius, flight path angle, altitude, and flap
deflection. In this way, it is possible to obtain a mathemati-
cal model for each flight condition. This model is suitable for
a state-space representation, as it can be made explicit. The
parameters in the analytic representation of the aerodynamic
actions have been obtained from wind tunnel experimen-
tal data, and the aerodynamic actions are expressed along
the axes of the wind reference system. It should be observed
that aerodynamic forces and moments are not implemented
by the classical linearised expressions (stability derivatives)
but by means of cubic splines approximating the nonlinear
experimental curves. The nonlinear 6 DoF model has been
completed by means of the PIPER PA-30 propulsion system
consisting of two 4-pistons aspirated engines, with the throt-
tle valve aperture δth as input and the overall thrust intensity
as output. The overall simulation model, used to perform
all the following tests, consists of the aircraft 6 DoF flight
Table 1: Nomenclature.
α Angle of attack
β Angle of sideslip
pω Roll rate
qω Pitch rate
rω Yaw rate
φ Bank angle
θ Elevation angle
ψ Heading angle
ne Engine shaft angular rate⎡
⎣
Ix 0 −Ixz
0 Iy 0
−Ixz 0 Iz
⎤
⎦ Inertia moment matrix
V True airspeed (TAS)
δe Elevator deflection angle
δa Aileron deflection angle
δr Rudder deflection angle
δth Throttle aperture percentage
H Altitude
γ Flight path angle
m Airplane mass
ωu, ωv , ωw Wind gust components
dynamics and the engine model completed with the model
of input-output sensors, the servo actuators, the atmosphere
turbulence Dryden description, the wind gust disturbances,
and a classical autopilot. Moreover, the sensor models embed
all the possible sources of disturbance (calibration and align-
ment errors, scale factor, white and coloured noises, limited
bandwidth, g-sensitivity, gyro drift, etc.).
The linear model used by the proposed PM FDI approach
described in Section 3 embeds the linearisation both of the 6
DoF model and of the propulsion system as follows:
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bc(t) + Ed(t) (1)
with
x(t) = [ΔV(t)Δα(t)Δβ(t)Δpω(t)Δqω(t)Δrω(t)
· · ·Δφ(t)Δθ(t)Δψ(t)Δne(t)]T ,
c(t) = [Δδe(t)Δδa(t)Δδr(t)Δδth(t)]T ,
d(t) = [wu(t)wv(t)ww(t)]T ,
(2)
where Δ denotes the variations of the considered variables
while c(t) and d(t) are the control inputs and the distur-
bances, respectively. The disturbance contribution of the
wind gusts as air velocity components, wu, wv, and ww, along
body axes was also considered. The output equation associ-
ated with the model (1) is of the type y(t) = Cx(t), where
the rows of C correspond to rows of the identity matrix, de-
pending on the measured variables.
On the other hand, regarding the NLGA FDI scheme
described in Section 4, it requires a nonlinear input affine
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system [10], but the adopted simulation model of the aircraft
does not fulfil this requirement. For this reason, the follow-
ing simplified aircraft model is used:
V̇ = −
(
CD0 + CDαα + CDα2α
2
)
m
V 2
+ g(sin α cos θ cosφ − cosα sin θ)
+
cos α
m
tp
V
(
t0 + t1ne
)
δth +wvsinα,
α̇ = −
(
CL0 + CLαα
)
m
V+
g
V
(cos α cos θ cosφ+sin α sin θ)
+ qω +
sin α
m
tp
V 2
(
t0 + t1ne
)
δth +
cos α
V
wv,
β̇ =
(
CD0 + CDαα + CDα2α
2
)
sin β + CYβ β cos β
m
V
+ g
cos θ sinφ
V
+ pω sin α− rω cos α
+
cos α sin β
m
tp
V 2
(
t0 + t1ne
)
δth +
1
V
w
 ,
ṗω =
(
Clβ β + Clp pω
)
Ix
V 2 +
(
Iy − Iz
)
Ix
qωrω +
Cδa
Ix
V 2δa,
q̇ω =
(
Cm0 + Cmαα + Cmqqω
)
Iy
V 2 +
(
Iz − Ix
)
Iy
pωrω
+
Cδe
Iy
V 2δe +
td
Iy
tp
V
(
t0 + t1ne
)
δth,
ṙω =
(
Cnββ + Cnrrω
)
Iz
V 2 +
(
Ix − Iy
)
Iz
pωqω +
Cδr
Iz
V 2δr ,
φ̇ = pω +
(
qω sin φ + rω cosφ
)
tan θ,
θ̇ = qω cosφ − rω sinφ,
ψ̇ =
(
qω sin φ + rω cosφ
)
cos θ
ṅe = tnn3e +
t f
ne
(
t0 + t1ne
)
δth,
(3)
where C(·) are the aerodynamic coefficients; t(·) are the en-
gine parameters; and wv, wl are the vertical and lateral wind
disturbance components. In particular, the model of (3) has
been obtained on the basis of some assumptions.In particu-
lar, the expressions of aerodynamic forces and moments have
been represented by means of series expansions in the neigh-
bourhood of the steady-state flight condition, then only the
main terms are considered. The engine model has been sim-
plified by linearising the power with respect to the angular
rate behaviour in the neighbourhood of the trim point. The
second-order coupling between the longitudinal and lateral-
directional dynamics have been neglected. The x-body axis
component of the wind has been neglected. In fact, the air-
craft behaviour is much more sensitive to the y-body and
z-body axis wind components. Finally, the rudder effect in
the equation describing the β dynamics has been neglected.
It is worth noting that Section 5 has shown that the designs
and the simulations of the NLGA residual generators are ro-
bust with respect to the last approximation. In fact, the model
of the β dynamics will never be used.
3. PM RESIDUAL GENERATORS
Let us consider the input-output representation of a
continuous-time, time-invariant linear dynamic system af-
fected by faults and disturbances in the form
P(s)y(t) = Qc(s)c(t) +Qd(s)d(t) +Qf (s) f (t), (4)
where y(t) ∈ Rm is the output vector, c(t) ∈ Rlc is the input
vector, d(t) ∈ Rld is the disturbance vector, and f (t) ∈ Rl f
is the fault vector; P(s), Qc(s), Qd(s), and Qf (s) are known
polynomial matrices of proper dimensions.
Models of type (4) can be frequently found in prac-
tice by applying well-known physical laws to describe the
input-output dynamical links of various systems. Algorithms
to transform multivariable state-space models to equivalent
multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) polynomial repre-
sentations and vice versa are available [15]. Suitable software
routines for multivariable system transformations have been
implemented by the authors in the Matlab environment. In
fact, the Matlab software for state-space and transfer func-
tion conversions is not able to manage directly MIMO mod-
els, since they are considered as concatenations of single-
input-single-output (SISO) systems.
An important aspect of the residual generator design
concerns the decoupling properties of the disturbance d(t).
The decoupling can be obtained premultiplying all the terms
of (4) by the matrix L(s) ∈ Nl(Qd(s)), that is, the left null-
space of the matrix Qd(s):
L(s)P(s)y(t)− L(s)Qc(s)c(t) = L(s)Qf (s) f (t). (5)
Hence, the residual generator for the system of (4) is repre-
sented by
R(s)r(t) = L(s)P(s)y(t)− L(s)Qc(s)c(t)
= L(s)Qf (s) f (t),
(6)
where it is assumed that r(t) ∈ R and L(s) is a polyno-
mial row vector. The polynomial R(s) can be arbitrarily se-
lected among the polynomials with degree greater than or
equal to n∗r , where n∗r is the maximum row-degree of the pair
{L(s)P(s),L(s)Qc(s)}. Moreover, if all the roots of R(s) lie in
the open left-half s-plane, it assures the stability of the filter
of (6). Without loss of generality, it is assumed that R(0) = 1.
Remark 1. If the matrix Qd(s) is of full-column rank (i.e.,
rank Qd(s) = ld), Nl(Qd(s)) has dimension m − ld. There-
fore, a polynomial matrix B(s), whose rows represents a min-
imal polynomial basis of Nl(Qd(s)), has m − ld rows and m
columns.
This work is focused on the problem of detecting and iso-
lating additive faults acting on the input and output sensors
of the monitored system. If the input-output measurements
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are modelled by the relations of (7):
c∗(t) = c(t) + fc(t),
y∗(t) = y(t) + fo(t),
(7)
the system of (4) becomes
P(s)
(
y∗(t)− fo(t)
) = Qc(s)
(
c∗(t)− fc(t)
)
+Qd(s)d(t),
(8)
under the assumptions that Qf (s) f (t) = [−Qc(s),P(s)] ·
[ f Tc (t), f
T
o (t)]
T . Thus, the residual generator of (6) is writ-
ten as
R(s)r(t) = L(s)P(s)y∗(t)− L(s)Qc(s)c∗(t)
= L(s)P(s) fo(t)− L(s)Qc(s) fc(t).
(9)
Remark 2. The residual generator described by (7) and (9)
can be seen as an errors-in-variables (EIV) model [16] with
respect the input and output variables, as the measurements
that feed the residual function are affected by additive faults.
This description highlights the importance of the residual
generator in the form of (9).
Remark 3. The diagnostic capabilities of the residual genera-
tor of (6) strongly depend on the choice of the terms L(s) and
R(s). This paper proposes a method for the design of these
polynomials, under the assumption that f (t) is a scalar and,
consequently, Qf (s) is a vector. The rationale of this assump-
tion is commented in Section 3.2 where the fault isolation
method is proposed.
In the following, the freedom design in the selection of
the rows of the polynomial matrix L(s) is investigated when
q = m − ld ≥ 2. These degrees of freedom are used to opti-
mise the sensitivity properties of r(t) with respect to the fault
f (t), for example, by maximising the steady-state gain of the
transfer function Gf (s) = L(s)Qf (s)/R(s).
If bi(s) (i = 1, . . . , q) are the row vectors of the basis B(s),
L(s) can be expressed as linear combination of these vectors:
L(s) =
q∑
i=1
kibi(s), (10)
where ki are real constants maximising:
lim
s→0
1
R(s)
[ q∑
i=1
kibi(s)
]
Qf (s) =
[ q∑
i=1
kibi(0)
]
Qf (0) (11)
with the constraint
q∑
i=1
k2i = 1. (12)
Under these assumptions, when the fault f (t) is a step-
function of magnitude F,the steady-state residual value is
lim
t→∞r(t) = lims→0s
L(s)Qf (s)
R(s)
F
s
=
[ q∑
i=1
kibi(0)
]
Qf (0)F. (13)
If the following real vectors are defined as
k =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
k1
k2
...
kq
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, a = B(0)Qf (0) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a1
a2
...
aq
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (14)
the problem of the maximisation of the residual fault sensi-
tivity can be recast as follows.
Proposition 1. Given the vector a, the vector k that maximises
the steady-state fault sensitivity, that is, the function W given
by the expression
W = aTk =
q∑
i=1
aiki, (15)
under the constraint of (12), can be found by solving
k̃ = arg maxW(k). (16)
The solution to the problem described by Proposition 1
can be derived as follows. The constraint of (12) describes
a hypersphere, whilst the expression of the function of (15)
is a hyperplane. The unknown coefficients k must belong
to both the hyperplane and the hypersphere. Therefore, the
points of tangency between the hypersphere and the hyper-
plane represents the solutions that maximise or minimiseW .
As shown below, the solution of the problem described by
Proposition 1 exists and is unique.
Proof. From (12), k1 is expressed as a function of k2,
k3, . . . , kq, and it is substituted into (15):
W = a1
√
1− k22 − k23 − · · · − k2q + a2k2 + · · · + aqkq.
(17)
By computing∇W = 0, that is,
∂W
∂k2
= 1
2
a1
−2k2√
1− k22 − k23 − · · · − k2q
+ a2 = 0,
∂W
∂k3
= 1
2
a1
−2k3√
1− k22 − k23 − · · · − k2q
+ a3 = 0,
...
∂W
∂kq
= 1
2
a1
−2kq√
1− k22 − k23 − · · · − k2q
+ aq = 0,
(18)
and squaring the expression, after algebraic manipulation:
a22 =
(
a22 + a
2
1
)
k22 + a
2
2k
2
3 + · · · + a22k2q ,
a23 = a23k22 +
(
a23 + a
2
1
)
k23 + · · · + a23k2q ,
...
a2q = a2qk22 + a2qk23 + · · · +
(
a2q + a
2
1
)
k2q ,
(19)
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an expression in the form of Ax = b is obtained, where
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
a22 + a
2
1
)
a22 · · · a22
a23
(
a23 + a
2
1
) · · · a23
...
...
. . .
...
a2q a
2
q · · ·
(
a2q + a
2
1
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
x =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
k22
k23
...
k2q
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, b =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a22
a23
...
a2q
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
(20)
The unknown vector x̃, under the constraint of (12), can be
expressed as follows:
x̃ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−
q−1∑
i=1
(
A−1b
)
i
A−1b
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (21)
where (A−1b)i is the ith element of the vector A−1b. The vec-
tor x̃ represents the squares of the solution of the problem of
Proposition 1.
Let us indicate Ω the set of the vectors k whose elements
are the square roots of the elements of x̃. As every element
can be taken both with signs “+” and “−”, such vectors are
2q. Therefore, the solution k̃ of Proposition 1 can be refor-
mulated as
k̃ = arg max
k∈Ω
W(k). (22)
Remark 4. The matrix A can be expressed as A = E + a21Iq−1,
where E is a matrix with equal columns. If a1 /= 0, this as-
sumption guarantees the existence of A−1, and consequently
the existence and the uniqueness of the solution A−1b. Ob-
viously, if a1 = 0 and aj /= 0, it is sufficient to express kj as
function of the remaining variables and to reapply the same
procedure.
Remark 5. The same solution can be found by maximising
the function |W|. Due to the symmetry properties, the max-
imisation of |W| admits two solutions corresponding to the
maximum and the minimum of the function W . Moreover,
the choice of the quadratic constraint of (12) guarantees the
unicity of the solution to the problem of Proposition 1.
Remark 6. The problem described by Proposition 1 could
have been solved also in a numerical way, that is, by searching
k that maximises W on the surface of the q-dimensional hy-
persphere. However, the computational cost of this numeri-
cal solution can be a drawback when q is big.
3.1. PM residual design
Section 3 has shown how to maximise the steady-state
gain of the continuous-time transfer function Gf (s) =
L(s)Qf (s)/R(s) trough a suitable choice of the real vector k
(i.e., k = k̃). The design of the filter of (6) has been com-
pleted here by introducing a method for assigning both the
zeros and the poles of the continuous-time transfer function
Gf (s). The zeros and poles location influences the transient
characteristics (maximum overshoot, delay time, rise time,
settling time, etc.) of the filter of (6). In many applications,
these characteristics must be kept within tolerable or pre-
scribed limits in order to guarantee good performances of
the filter in terms, for example, of fault detection times and
false-alarm probabilities.
Remark 7. When k = k̃, the polynomial L(s)Qf (s) =
kTB(s)Qf (s) is fixed and no freedom degree is left to arbitrar-
ily assign the zeros. In order to solve this problem, a polyno-
mial vector k(s) can be considered. Under this assumption,
L(s) still belongs to the subspace Nl(Qd(s)), where the terms
ki are polynomial coefficients.
The previous consideration leads to introduce the poly-
nomial E(s) = kT(s)B(s)Qf (s), where k(s) is a q-dimensional
polynomial vector whose ith element has the form
ki(s) =
nk∑
j=0
k
j
i s
j . (23)
The degree nk and the q × nk coefficients k ji are freedom de-
sign ( j /= 0) that are exploited for obtaining the desired roots
of the polynomial E(s). However, in order to maximise the
steady-state gain, as shown in Section 3, the following condi-
tion must hold:
k(0) = k̃ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
k̃1
k̃2
...
k̃q
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⇐⇒ k0i = k̃i, i = 1, . . . , q. (24)
Definition 1. H(s) is the reference polynomial whose roots
are the zeros to be assigned:
H(s) =
nh∑
j=0
hjs j . (25)
Since the constraint of (24) must hold, H(0) = k̃TB(0) ·
Qf (0). Obviously, this assumption does not provide any re-
striction on the roots assignable. Under the previous consid-
erations, the zero assignment and pole placement problem is
formulated as follows.
Proposition 2. The degree nk and the coefficients k
j
i have to
be determined under the constraint of (24) in order to obtain
E(s) = H(s).
Proof. In Section 3, the polynomial vector a(s) = B(s)Qf (s)
was defined. Its ith element is a known polynomial of a
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certain degree, nai . If na is defined as follows:
na = max
i=1,...,q
nai , (26)
the ith element of a(s) can be always written as a polynomial
of degree na:
ai(s) =
na∑
j=0
a
j
i s
j (27)
by imposing that a
j
i = 0 when j > nai .
As E(s) = kT(s)a(s), by multiplying (23) and (27), it re-
sults
E(s) =
q∑
i=1
nk+na∑
j=0
( ∑
α+β= j
kαi a
β
i
)
s j =
nk+na∑
j=0
e js j , (28)
where
e j =
q∑
i=1
∑
α+β= j
kαi a
β
i . (29)
Equations (28) and (29) assume that kαi = 0 when α > nk and
a
β
i = 0 when β > na. Note that the coefficients e1, . . . , enk+na
depend on the freedom design k1i , . . . , k
nk
i . On the other hand,
e0 is fixed as the coefficients k0i are assigned by (24).
Let us suppose that nh ≤ nk + na. By imposing E(s) =
H(s), from (29) and (25), the following expressions are com-
puted:
q∑
i=1
∑
α+β= j (α /= 0)
kαi a
β
i = hj −
q∑
i=1
k0i a
j
i , j = 1, . . . ,nk + na.
(30)
Equations (24) and (30) represent a linear system with nk+na
equations and q × nk unknowns, which can be expressed in
the classical form Ax = b, where
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a01 · · · a0q 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
... a01 · · · a0q
ana1 · · · anaq
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 ana1 · · · anaq
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
... 0 · · · 0
a01 · · · a0q
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 ana1 · · · anaq
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
x =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
k11
...
k1q
k21
...
k2q
...
...
knk1
...
knkq
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, b =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
h1 −
q∑
i=1
k0i a
1
i
...
hna −
q∑
i=1
k0i a
na
i
hna+1
...
hna+nk
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
(31)
The degree nk of the polynomials ki(s) has to be cho-
sen in order to obtain a solvable system (i.e., rank A =
rank [Ab]).
In order to understand the proposed solution, the follow-
ing points should be considered.
(i) The choice of nk must guarantee that the relations nh ≤
nk + na are satisfied.
(ii) When q ≥ 2, the difference between the number of
unknown terms and the number of equations, that is,
(q − 1) × nk − na, is greater than zero if nk is selected
sufficiently high.
(iii) Even if the system admits solutions, the inverse of the
matrix A may not exist; in such case there are infinite
solutions and the one associated to the pseudoinverse
of A, that is, A+b can be computed.
Remark 8. The use of a polynomial vector k(s) instead of a
real vector k has the drawback of increasing the complexity
of the residual generator. Many FDI applications require that
Gf (s)
Gf (0)
= F(0)
F(s)
, (32)
where F(s) is an arbitrary polynomial. These cases do not
require a k(s) such that E(s) = Gf (0), but it is enough con-
sidering k = k̃ and imposing
R(s) = E0(s)F(s)
Gf (0)F(0)
, (33)
where E0(s) = k̃B(s)Qf (s). However, there is a restriction on
the choice of F(s). In fact, due to the realisability condition,
deg{F(s)} > n∗r − deg{E0(s)}. Moreover, the method cannot
be applied if E0(s) admits one or more roots with positive real
part, as the residual generator would become unstable. These
cases require an approximate solution.
Remark 9. This section is focused on the design of residual
generators on the basis of a given reference function with
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disturbance-decoupling and fault sensitivity maximisation
properties. The pole location influences the transient dy-
namics of the designed residual filters, while the steady-state
properties depend on the PM residual design, as it maximises
the residual steady-state values with respect to step faults af-
fecting input and output sensors. The poles of the residual
functions could be optimised with respect to both fault and
disturbance terms, as shown, for example, in a work by the
same authors [17].
3.2. PM fault isolation
This section addresses the design problem of residual gener-
ator banks for the isolation of faults affecting the input and
the output sensors. This design is performed by using the
disturbance-decoupling method suggested in Section 3.
To univocally isolate a fault concerning one of the output
sensors, under the hypotheses that the input sensors and the
remaining output sensors are fault-free, a bank of residual
generator filters is used. The number of these generators is
equal to the number m of the system outputs, and the ith
device (i = 1, . . . ,m) is driven by all but the ith output and
all the inputs of the system. In this case, a fault on the ith
output sensor affects all but the ith residual generator.
In presence of a fault on the jth output sensor, the mea-
sured output y∗(t) can be expressed as follows:
y∗(t) = y(t) + foj (t), (34)
with
foj (t) =
[
0 · · · 0 hoj (t) 0 · · · 0
]T
, (35)
where hoj (t) represents the jth output fault function.
In these conditions, the system of (4) becomes
P(s)y∗(t)− pj(s)hoj (t) = Qc(s)c(t) +Qd(s)d(t), (36)
where pj(s) is the jth column of the matrix P(s).
Let us indicate Loi(s) a polynomial row vector belonging
to the basis of the left null space of the matrix [Qd(s) | pi(s)].
The expression of the ith filter when a fault is acting on the
jth output sensor is obtained by multiplying (36) by Loi(s):
Roi(s)roi(t) = Loi(s)Pi(s)y∗i(t)− Loi(s)Qc(s)c(t)
=
{
Loi(s)pj(s)hoj (t) for j /= i,
0 for j = i,
(37)
where Pi(s) is the matrix obtained by deleting from P(s) the
ith column, and y∗i(t) represents the (m − 1)-dimensional
vector obtained by deleting from y∗(t) its ith component.
From the comparison between (37) and (6) with f (t) ∈
R if q′ = m − ld − 1 ≥ 2, the methods shown in Sections
3 and 3.1 can be exploited for the design of the ith filter. In
particular, the parameters of this filter can be properly chosen
in order to optimise its performances when a fault is acting
on the jth output sensor.
In more detail, as shown in Section 3, Loi(s) is chosen to
maximise the steady-state gain in the presence of the fault
foj (t). Moreover, as shown in Section 3.1, Roi(s) is chosen to
obtain a fixed behaviour of the transfer function due to the
fault foj (t).
It is worth noting that the similar design technique can
be used for input sensor fault isolation.
The problem requirements determine the selection of the
specific fault with respect to which the design depends. Most
often in practice, it is important to obtain good performance
with respect to all possible faults rather than optimal be-
haviour with respect to one specific fault. In this situation,
a different design of the filter behaviour for each fault situa-
tion is needed.
4. NLGA RESIDUAL GENERATORS
The considered NLGA to the FDI problem is suggested in
[18] and formally developed in [10]. It consists in finding, by
means of a coordinate change in the state space and in the
output space, an observable subsystem which, if possible, is
affected by the fault and not affected by disturbance. In this
way, necessary and sufficient conditions for the FDI problem
to be solvable are given. Finally, a residual generator can be
designed on the basis of the model of the observable subsys-
tem.
More precisely, the approach considers a nonlinear sys-
tem model in the form
ẋ = n(x) + g(x)c + 
(x) f + p(x)d,
y = h(x)
(38)
in which the state vector x ∈ X (an open subset of R
n),
c(t) ∈ R
c is the control input vector, f (t) ∈ R is the fault,
d(t) ∈ R
d the disturbance vector (embedding also the faults
which have to be decoupled), and y ∈ R
m the output vector;
whilst n(x), 
(x), the columns of g(x) and p(x) are smooth
vector fields; and h(x) is a smooth map.
Therefore, if P represents the distribution spanned by the
column of p(x), the NLGA method can be devised as it fol-
lows: first, determine the largest observability codistribution
contained in P⊥, denoted with Ω∗ [10].
If 
(x) /∈Ω∗, the design procedure can continue, other-
wise, the fault is not detectable; whenever the previous con-
dition is satisfied, it can be found a surjection Ψ1 and a func-
tion Φ1 fulfilling Ω∗ ∩ span{dh} = span{d(Ψ1 ◦ h)} and
Ω∗ = span{d(Φ1)}, respectively. The functions Ψ(y) and
Φ(x) defined as
Ψ(y)=
(
y1
y2
)
=
(
Ψ1(y)
H2y
)
, Φ(x)=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
x1
x2
x3
⎞
⎟⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
Φ1(x)
H2h(x)
Φ3(x)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
(39)
are (local) diffeomorphisms, where H2 is a selection matrix
(i.e., a matrix in which any row has all 0 entries but one,
which is equal to 1), Φ1(x) represents the measured part of
the state which is affected by f and not affected by d, and
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Φ3(x) represents the not measured part of the state which is
affected by f and by d.
In the new (local) coordinate defined previously, the sys-
tem of (38) is described by the relations in the form
ẋ1 = n1
(
x1, x2
)
+ g1
(
x1, x2)c + 
1
(
x1, x2, x3) f ,
ẋ2 = n2
(
x1, x2, x3
)
+ g2
(
x1, x2, x3
)
c
+ 
2
(
x1, x2, x3
)
f + p2
(
x1, x2, x3
)
d,
ẋ3 = n3
(
x1, x2, x3
)
+ g3
(
x1, x2, x3
)
c
+ 
3
(
x1, x2, x3
)
f + p3
(
x1, x2, x3
)
d,
y1 = h
(
x1
)
,
y2 = x2
(40)
with 
1(x1, x2, x3) not identically zero. Denoting x2 with y2
and considering it as an independent input, it can be singled
out the x1-subsystem:
ẋ1 = n1(x1, y2) + g1(x1, y2)c + 
1(x1, y2, x3) f ,
y1 = h(x1),
(41)
which is affected by the single fault f and decoupled from the
disturbance vector. This subsystem has been exploited for the
design of the residual generator for the FDI of the fault f .
As already described in Section 2, the proposed NLGA
FDI scheme is designed on the basis of a model structure of
the input affine type as described in [10]. For this reason, the
aircraft simulation model has been simplified and the non-
linear model of (3) has been considered for the NLGA de-
sign.
Under these assumptions, by means of computations de-
tailed in [19], the residual generators for detecting the faults
affecting the aircraft input sensors are obtained. In particu-
lar, the residual generator for the elevator rδe(t), with kδe > 0,
is described by the relation
ξ̇1 = V
2
m
[− (CD0 + CDαα + CDα2α2
)
cos α
]
+
V 2
m
(
CL0 + CLαα
)
sinα− g sin θ
+Vqωsin α−
(
Cm0 + Cmαα + Cmqqω
)
mtd
V 2
−
(
Iz − Ix
)
mtd
pωrω − Cδe
mtd
V 2δe
+ kδe
[(
Vcos α− Iy
mtd
qω
)
− ξ1
]
,
rδe =
(
V cosα− Iy
mtd
qω
)
− ξ1.
(42)
The aileron residual generator rδa(t), with kδa > 0, has the
form
ξ̇2 =
(
Clββ + Clp pω
)
Ix
V 2 +
(
Iy − Iz
)
Ix
qωrω
+
Cδa
Ix
V 2δa + kδa
(
pω − ξ2
)
,
rδa = pω − ξ2.
(43)
The rudder residual generator rδr (t), with kδr > 0, is written
in the form
ξ̇3 =
(
Cnββ + Cnrrω
)
Iz
V 2 +
(
Ix − Iy
)
Iz
pωqω
+
Cδr
Iz
V 2δr + kδr
(
rω − ξ3
)
,
rδr = rω − ξ3.
(44)
The throttle residual generator rδth (t), with kδth > 0, has the
form
ξ̇4 = tnn3e +
t f
ne
(
t0 + t1ne
)
δth + kδth
(
ne − ξ4
)
,
rδth = ne − ξ4.
(45)
Remark 10. It is worth observing that each residual genera-
tor is affected by a single input sensor fault and is decoupled
from the wind components and the faults affecting the re-
maining input sensors. This feature can be obtained by defin-
ing a different p(x) for each residual generator design [19].
In this way, the tuning of the residual generator gains kδe , kδa ,
kδr , and kδth can be carried out independently. Finally, by a
straightforward analysis, the positive sign of each gain is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the asymptotic stabil-
ity of the dynamics (42)–(45).
A procedure optimising the tradeoff between the fault
sensitivity and the robustness to the modelling errors and
disturbances of the generic residual generator is proposed in
the next section.
4.1. NLGA robustness improvement
The proposed NLGA-based scheme consists of two design
steps:
(1) the structural decoupling of critical disturbances
(wind gust and turbulence) and critical modelling er-
rors can be obtained as described in Section 4;
(2) the nonlinear residual generators robustness is im-
proved by minimising the effects of both noncritical
disturbances and modelling errors, whilst maximising
the fault effects on the residual signals.
In order to apply the robustness improvement procedure
presented in this section, the considered framework is re-
stricted to suitable scalar components of the x1-subsystem
(41). In particular, the vectors x1 and y1 are decomposed as
follows:
x1 =
[
x11
x1c
]
, y1 =
[
y11
y1c
]
, (46)
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where x11 ∈ R, y11 ∈ R, and, correspondingly, it follows
that
n1(·) =
[
n11(·)
n1c(·)
]
, g1(·) =
[
g11(·)
g1c(·)
]
, 
1(·) =
[

11(·)

1c(·)
]
(47)
Let us consider the following conditions:
y11 = h11(x11) y1c = h1c(x1c) 
11(·) /= 0 , (48)
where h11(·) is a smooth map and h1c(·) is an invertible
smooth map. It is important to highlight that if the con-
straints (48) are satisfied, the decomposition (46)-(47) can
always be applied to obtain the following x11-subsystem:
ẋ11 = n11
(
x11, y1c, y2
)
+ g11
(
x11, y1c, y2
)
c
+ 
11
(
x11, y1c, y2, x3
)
f ,
y11 = h11
(
x11
)
.
(49)
As can be seen in [19], the conditions (48) are satisfied for
the considered aircraft application, hence, from now on, the
scalar x11-subsystem (49) is referred to in place of the x1-
subsystem (41).
It can be noted that the tuning of the residual generator
gains, in the framework of the x11-subsystem (49), cannot
be properly carried out. In fact, the critical disturbances are
structurally decoupled but the noncritical ones are not con-
sidered. For this reason, to achieve robustness of the residual
generators, the tuning of the gains is performed by embed-
ding the description of the noncritical disturbances in the
x11-subsystem as follows:
ẋ11 = n11
(
x11, y1c, y2
)
+ g11
(
x11, y1c, y2
)
c
+ 
11
(
x11, y1c, y2, x3
)
f + e
(
x11, y1c, y2, x3
)
ζ ,
y11 = x11 + ν,
(50)
where, to simplify the treatment without loss of generality
(accordingly to the considered aircraft application), the state
variable x11 is supposed to be directly measured. Moreover,
the variable ν ∈ R is the measurement noise on x11. Finally,
the variable ζ ∈ R and the related scalar field e(·) represent
the noncritical effects which have not been considered in the
simplified aircraft model (3) used for the NLGA scheme.
The following system, which is referred to as filter form,
represents a generic scalar residual generator (based on the
subsystem (50)) to which (42)–(45) belong as a particular
case
ξ̇ f = n11
(
y11, y1c, y2
)
+ g11
(
y11, y1c, y2
)
c + k f
(
y11 − ξ f
)
,
r f = y11 − ξ f ,
(51)
where the gain k f has to be tuned in order to minimise the
effects of the disturbances ζ and ν whilst maximise the effects
of the fault f on the residual r f . The quantification both of
the disturbances and of the fault effects on the residual can
be obtained by defining the estimation error
x̃ f = x11 − ξ f , (52)
which allows to write the following equivalent residual
model:
˙̃x f = n11
(
x11, y1c, y2
)− n11
(
y11, y1c, y2
)
+ g11
(
x11, y1c, y2
)
c − g11
(
y11, y1c, y2
)
c
+ 
11
(
x11, y1c, y2, x3
)
f + e
(
x11, y1c, y2, x3
)
ζ
− k f x̃ f − k f ν,
r f = x̃ f + ν.
(53)
In order to apply the effective mixed H−/H∞ approach
[3, 20] to tune k f , the system (53) has to be linearised in
the neighbourhood of a stationary flight condition, as sug-
gested in [2] with reference to the H∞ optimisation of non-
linear unknown input observers. It is worth observing that
the considered aircraft application is characterised by small
excursions of the state, input, and output variables with re-
spect to their trim values x10, x30, c0, y10, and y20, hence the
robustness of the nonlinear residual generator is achieved.
The linearisation of (53) is the following:
˙̃x f = −k f x̃ f − k f ν + mf + q̆ζ̆ ,
r f = x̃ f + ν,
(54)
where
a′= ∂n11(·)
∂x11
∣∣∣∣
(x10,y20)
, b = g11(·)|(x10,y20),
m = 
11(·)|(x10,y20,x30), q = e(·)|(x10,y20,x30),
q̆ζ̆ = qζ − a′ν.
(55)
Now, it is important to note that in place of the residual gen-
erators in the filter form (51), the following observer form of
the residual generators can be used:
ξ̇o = n11
(
ξo, y1c, y2
)
+ g11
(
ξo, y1c, y2
)
c + ko
(
y11 − ξo
)
,
ro = y11 − ξo.
(56)
For the same reasons previously described, the estimation er-
ror x̃o is introduced:
x̃o = x11 − ξo, (57)
hence
˙̃xo = n11
(
x11, y1c, y2
)− n11(ξo, y1c, y2
)
+ g11(x11, y1c, y2
)
c − g11(ξo, y1c, y2
)
c
+ 
11
(
x11, y1c, y2, x3
)
f + e
(
x11, y1c, y2, x3
)
ζ
− kox̃o − koν,
ro = x̃o + ν.
(58)
The linearisation of (58) is
˙̃xo =
(
a′ − ko
)
x̃o − koν + mf + qζ ,
ro = x̃o + ν.
(59)
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Both the linearised models (54) and (59) of the residual gen-
erators in the filter form and observer form, respectively, can
be represented by the following general form:
˙̃x = (a− k)x̃ + (E1 − kE2
)
ε + mf,
r = x̃ + E2ε
(60)
with E1 = [cce11 0] as well as the following positions:
general form x̃ ε r a k e11 E2
filter form x̃ f
⎡
⎣ζ̆
ν
⎤
⎦ r f 0 k f q̆
[
0 1
]
observer form x̃o
[
ζ
ν
]
ro a ko q
[
0 1
]
.
(61)
On the basis of (60) and (61), the mixed H−/H∞ [3, 20]
procedure is developed for the robustness improvement of
the residual generators both in the filter and observer form.
Since the considered NLGA residual generators are scalar, the
H−/H∞ procedure leads to a new analytical solution.
The following definition will be used throughout the sec-
tion.
Definition 2. The norms H∞ and H− of a stable transfer
function G are defined as
‖G‖∞ = sup
ω≥0
σ[G( jω)], ‖G‖− = σ[G( j0)], (62)
where σ represents the maximum singular value, whilst σ the
minimum singular value. The problem of the tradeoff be-
tween disturbances robustness and fault sensitivity is stated
as follows.
Problem 1 (Mixed H−/H∞ residual robustness improve-
ment). Given two scalars β > 0 and γ > 0, find the set K
defined as:
K = {k ∈ R : (a− k) < 0, ‖Grε‖∞ < γ, ‖Gr f ‖− > β},
(63)
where
Grε(s) = (s− a + k)−1
(
E1 − kE2
)
+ E2, (64)
Gr f (s) = (s− a + k)−1m. (65)
In order to obtain the analytical solution of Problem 1, the
following propositions are given.
Proposition 3. For all k ∈ R, (a− k) < 0, then
∥∥Grε
∥∥2∞ = max
{
1,
(
e211 + a
2
)
(k − a)2
}
, (66)
sup
{k∈R:(a−k)<0}
∥∥Grε
∥∥∞ = +∞. (67)
Proof. From the definition (64)
Grε(s) =
[
e11
s− a + k
s− a
s− a + k
]
, (68)
hence it is possible to write
{
σ
[
Grε( jω)
]}2 = e
2
11
(k − a)2 + ω2 +
a2 + ω2
(k − a)2 + ω2
=
(
e211 + a
2
)
+ ω2
(k − a)2 + ω2
(69)
so that it follows
∥∥Grε
∥∥2∞ = sup
ξ≥0
(
e211 + a
2
)
+ ξ
(
k − a)2 + ξ
. (70)
From the last expression, it is straightforward to obtain (66)
and (67).
Proposition 4. The set
Kγ =
{
k ∈ R : (a− k) < 0, ∥∥Grε
∥∥∞ < γ, γ > 1
}
(71)
is given by
k > k with k = a +
√
e211 + a2
γ
. (72)
Proof. By means of Proposition 3, it is possible to write
(
e211 + a
2
)
(k − a)2 < γ
2, (73)
which holds for
k > a +
√
e211 + a2
γ
. (74)
Proposition 5. If γ > 1, then {‖Gr f ‖− : ‖Grε‖∞ < γ} is given
by
0 < ‖Gr f ‖− < βmax(γ) where βmax(γ) =
mγ√
e211 + a2
.
(75)
Proof. From the definition (65), it results Gr f (s) = m/(s −
a+ k) and assuming, without loss of generality, that m > 0, it
follows ‖Gr f ‖− = m/(k − a). By imposing ‖Gr f ‖− > β with
β > 0, the constraint k < a + (m/β) has to hold. Then, by
recalling the result of Proposition 4, the maximum feasible
value of β fulfilling the constraint ‖Grε‖∞ < γ is given by
k = a + m
βmax(γ)
, (76)
hence
βmax(γ) = m
k − a =
mγ√
e211 + a2
. (77)
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Theorem 1. Given γ > 1 and β ∈]0,βmax(γ)[, the set K ful-
filling the constraints of Problem 1 is given by
K =
{
k ∈R : k ∈]k, k[, k = a + m
βmax(γ)
, k = a + m
β
}
.
(78)
Proof. The proof of the theorem is not reported, as it is
straightforward from Propositions 3, 4, and 5.
Remark 11. Let us consider the following performance index
to maximise
J = ‖Gr f ‖−‖Grε‖∞ . (79)
From (66), it follows
‖Grε‖∞ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, k >
(
a +
√
e211 + a2
)
√
e211 + a2
k − a , a < k ≤
(
a +
√
e211 + a2
) (80)
hence
J =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m
k − a , k >
(
a +
√
e211 + a2
)
,
m√
e211 + a2
, a < k ≤
(
a +
√
e211 + a2
)
.
(81)
From (81), it can be observed that
J = m
k − a <
m√
e211 + a2
, k >
(
a +
√
e211 + a2
)
. (82)
In this way, the maximum value of the performance index J
is
Jmax= m√
e211 +a2
∀k∈KJ=
{
k ∈ R :a<k≤
(
a+
√
e211 +a2
)}
.
(83)
The method proposed in this paper guarantees the maxi-
mum value of the performance index J as well as the con-
straints ‖Grε‖∞ < γ and ‖Gr f ‖− > β if β ≥ m/
√
e211 + a2.
In fact, from β ≥ m/
√
e211 + a2 it follows
‖Gr f ‖− =
m
k − a > β ≥
m√
e211 + a2
, (84)
hence k < (a +
√
e211 + a2).
Finally, from (75) it is always possible to find a β such that
m√
e211 + a2
≤ β ≤ βmax(γ) ∀γ > 1. (85)
On the basis of Theorem 1, k can be designed by means of
the following procedure.
Procedure 1. (1) Choose γ > 1 to obtain a desired level of
disturbance attenuation.
(2) Compute βmax(γ) and choose β ∈]0,βmax(γ)[ to ob-
tain a desired level of fault sensitivity.
(3) Choose k ∈]k, k[, with k = a + m/βmax(γ) and k =
a +m/β.
(4) Apply the chosen gain k to the k f of (51) or to the ko
of (56) if the NLGA residual generator is in the filter form or
in the observer form, respectively.
5. FDI PERFORMANCE ESTIMATION
To show the diagnostic characteristics brought by the appli-
cation of the proposed FDI schemes to general aviation air-
crafts, some numerical results obtained in the Matlab and
Simulink environments are reported. The final performances
that are achieved with the developed FDI schemes are finally
reported. These performances are evaluated by means of ex-
tensive simulations applied to the aircraft simulation model.
This section presents also some comparisons of the devel-
oped PM and NLGA FDI strategies with NN and UIKF FDI
schemes.
The designed PM residual generator filters are fed by the
4 component input vector c(t) and the 9 component out-
put vector y(t) acquired from the simulation aircraft model
previously described. In particular, a bank of 4 residual gen-
erator filters has been used to detect input sensor faults re-
garding the 4 input control variables. Moreover, in order to
obtain the fault isolation properties, each residual generator
function of the considered bank is fed by all but one of the
4 control input signals and by the 9 output variables. Obvi-
ously, the residual generator bank has been designed to be
decoupled from the 3 component wind disturbance vector
d(t) = [wu(t),wv(t),ww(t)]T . As to the NLGA residual gen-
erator filters, the aircraft synthesis model of (3), adopted for
the design, is simplified with respect to the simulation model.
Analogously to the PM, the approximations of the NLGA
synthesis nonlinear model are related to a particular steady-
state flight condition. For this reason, the switching for the
NLGA FDI scheme is also required when a generic reference
trajectory is followed. Hence, it is important to evaluate the
robustness characteristic of a single design of NLGA resid-
ual generators when a large set of flight conditions is dealt
with.
It is worth noting that the aircraft reference trajectories
are typically made up of a sequence of steady-state flight
conditions, each one described by the associated input state
output set point and the linearised model of (1). As a con-
sequence, all the FDI linear techniques are usually imple-
mented by switching among the residual generators related
to the different steady-state flight conditions. The target of
this work is to reduce the switching by adopting robust PM
residual generators. In particular, the robustness is achieved
by using the same residual generators for a large set of flight
conditions. The chosen single steady-state flight condition
for designing both of the PM and of the NLGA residual
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generators is a coordinated turn characterised as follows:
(i) the true airspeed is 50 m/s;
(ii) the curvature radius is 1000 m;
(iii) the flight-path angle is 0◦;
(iv) the altitude is 330 m;
(v) the flap deflection is 0◦.
This represents one of most general flight condition due to
the coupling of the longitudinal and lateral dynamics. More-
over, it is used in simulation to highlight the performances of
the proposed methods in the nominal flight condition.
Regarding the PM, the detection properties of the filters
in terms of fault sensitivity and disturbance rejection can
be achieved according to Section 3. The synthesis of the dy-
namic filters for FDI has been performed by choosing a suit-
able linear combination of residual generator functions. This
choice has to maximise the steady-state gain of the transfer
functions between input sensor fault signals. The roots of the
R(s) polynomial matrix have been optimised for maximis-
ing the fault detection promptness, as well as to minimise
the occurrence of false alarms. In order to assess the PM di-
agnosis technique, different fault sizes have been simulated
on each sensor. Single faults in the input sensors have been
generated by producing abrupt (step) and ramp (slowly de-
veloping) faults in the input signals c(t). The residual signals
indicate fault occurrence according to whether their values
are lower or higher than the thresholds fixed in fault-free
conditions. The residual processing methods can be based
on simple residual geometrical analysis or comparison with
fixed thresholds [3]. More complex residual evaluation can
rely on statistical properties of the residuals and hypothesis
testing [6], or based on adaptive thresholds, that is, the so-
called threshold selector [21].
In this paper, the threshold test for FDI is performed with
the logic described by (86):
r − νσr ≤ r(t) ≤ r + νσr for f (t) = 0,
r(t) < r − νσr or r(t) > r + νσr for f (t) /= 0,
(86)
that is, the comparison of r(t) with respect its statistical nor-
mal characteristics. r and σ2r are the normal values for the
mean and variance of the fault-free residual, respectively. In
order to separate normal from faulty behaviour, the tolerance
parameter ν (normally ν ≥ 3) is selected and properly tuned.
Hence, by a proper choice of the parameter ν, a good trade-
off can be achieved between the maximisation of fault detec-
tion probability and the minimisation of false-alarm proba-
bility. In practice, the threshold values depend on the residual
error amount due to measurement errors, linearised model
approximations, and disturbance signals that are not com-
pletely decoupled.
Thus, in this case, a suitable value of ν = 4 for the com-
putation of the positive and negative thresholds in (86) has
been considered. To summarise the performances of the PM
FDI scheme, the minimal detectable step faults on the vari-
ous input sensors are collected in Table 2.
On the other hand, the minimal detectable ramp faults
are reported in Table 3.
Table 2: PM FDI technique: minimal step faults with ν = 4.
ci(t) Variable Fault size Delay time
Elevator δe 2◦ 18 s
Aileron δa 3◦ 6 s
Rudder δr 4◦ 8 s
Throttle aperture % δth 2% 15 s
Table 3: PM FDI technique: minimal ramp faults with ν = 4.
ci(t) Variable Fault size Delay time
Elevator δe 0.11◦/s 26 s
Aileron δa 0.50◦/s 11 s
Rudder δr 0.49◦/s 12 s
Throttle aperture % δth 0.13◦/s 19 s
Table 4: NLGA FDI technique: minimal step faults with ν = 8.
ci(t) Variable Fault size Delay time
Elevator δe 2◦ 5 s
Aileron δa 2◦ 3 s
Rudder δr 2◦ 6 s
Throttle aperture % δth 6% 3 s
Table 5: NLGA FDI technique: minimal ramp faults with ν = 8.
ci(t) Variable Fault size Delay time
Elevator δe 0.21◦/s 11 s
Aileron δa 0.45◦/s 12 s
Rudder δr 0.32◦/s 10 s
Throttle aperture % δth 0.15◦/s 15 s
Concerning the NLGA, the synthesis of the residual gen-
erators has been performed by using filter gains that optimise
the fault sensitivity and reduce as much as possible the oc-
currence of false alarms due to model uncertainties and to
disturbances not completely decoupled. This robustness re-
quirement has been fulfilled by designing the residual gains
according to the Procedure 1. For example, with reference to
the fourth residual generator, Procedure 1 has led to Kδth = 1
which satisfies the norm bounds γ = 1.2 and β = 400.
This guarantees a good separation of the residual signal with
‖ f ‖L2 ≥ 0.05 and ‖d‖L2 ≤ 10, where L2-norm is consid-
ered.
In order to assess the NLGA diagnosis technique, single
step and ramp faults have been used. Moreover, also in this
case the threshold values have been chosen in simulation ac-
cording to (86). A suitable value of ν = 8 for the computation
of the positive and negative thresholds in (86) has been con-
sidered. For what concern NLGA FDI scheme, the minimal
detectable step faults on the various input sensors are sum-
marised in Table 4.
On the other hand, the minimal detectable input sensor
ramp faults are reported in Table 5.
The minimal detectable step fault values in Tables 2, 3,
4, and 5 are expressed in the unit of measure of the sensor
signals. The fault step sizes and ramp slopes are relative to the
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Figure 1: PM residuals for the 1st input sensor ramp fault fc1 (t) isolation with ν = 4.
case in which the occurrence of a fault is detected and isolated
as soon as possible. The detection delay times represent the
worst case results, as they are evaluated on the basis of the
time taken by the slowest residual function to cross the settled
threshold. These experiments represent a further validation
of the residual generator robustness with respect to the fault
type, as the the residual function sensitivity was optimised
only with respect to step faults.
As an example, Figure 1 shows the 4 PM residual func-
tions generated for the complete trajectory. On the basis of
the fault-free and faulty conditions, this bank provides the
correct isolation of the considered input sensor ramp fault.
The horizontal lines represent the levels of the fault-free
thresholds that are settled according to test (86) with ν =
4. The first residual function depicted in Figure 1, provides
also the isolation of the fault fc(t) regarding the 1st input
sensor.
The second example of Figure 2 shows the 4 residual
functions generated by the NLGA filter bank applied to the
complete aircraft trajectory. The horizontal lines represent
the thresholds with ν = 12. Note that, due to the NLGA de-
sign technique, only the 1st residual related to the δe signal
of the filter bank is sensitive to a ramp fault affecting the 1st
input sensor.
5.1. Reliability and robustness evaluation
In this section, the robustness characteristics of the proposed
PM and NLGA FDI schemes have been evaluated and com-
pared also with respect to the UIKF scheme [3] and the NN
technique [7]. In particular, a bank of UIKF has been ex-
ploited for diagnosing faults of the monitored process. This
technique seems to be robust with respect to the modelling
uncertainties, the system parameter variations, and the mea-
surement noise, which can obscure the performance of an
FDI system by acting as a source of false faults. The procedure
recalled here requires the design of a UIKF bank and the basic
scheme is the standard one: a set of measured variables of the
system is compared with the corresponding signals estimated
by filters to generate residual functions. The diagnosis has
been performed by detecting the changes of UIKF residuals
caused by a fault. The FDI input sensor scheme exploits a
14 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
4003002001000
Time (s)
−20
−5
10
25
40
δe NLGA residuals
(a)
4003002001000
Time (s)
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
δa NLGA residuals
(b)
4003002001000
Time (s)
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
δr NLGA residuals
(c)
4003002001000
Time (s)
−50
0
50
100
δth NLGA residuals
(d)
Figure 2: NLGA residuals for the 1st input sensor fault isolation with ν = 12.
number of KF equal to the number of input variables. Each
filter is designed to be insensitive to a different input sensor
of the process and its disturbances (the so-called unknown
inputs). Moreover, the considered UIKF bank was obtained
by following the design technique described in [3, Section
3.5, pages 99–105], whilst the noise covariance matrices were
estimated as described in [22, Section 3.3, pages 70–74 and
Section 4.6, pages 130-131]. Each of the 4 UIKF of the bank
was decoupled from both one input sensor fault and the wind
gust disturbance component, thus providing the optimal fil-
tering of the input-output measurement noise sequences. On
the other hand, a dynamic NN bank has been exploited in or-
der to find the dynamic connection from a particular fault re-
garding the input sensors to a particular residual. In this case,
the learning capability of NN is used for identifying the non-
linear dynamics of the monitored plant. The dynamic NN
provides the prediction of the process output with an arbi-
trary degree of accuracy, depending on the NN structure, its
parameters, and a sufficient number of neurons. Once the
NN has been properly trained, the residuals have been com-
puted as the difference between predicted and measured pro-
cess outputs. The FDI is therefore achieved by monitoring
residual changes. The NN learning is typically an offline pro-
cedure. Normal operation data are acquired from the mon-
itored plant and are exploited for the NN training. Regard-
ing the NN FDI method and according to a generalised ob-
server scheme (GOS) [3], a bank of 4 time-delayed three-
layers multilayer perceptron (MLP) NN with 15 neurons in
the input layer, 25 neurons in the hidden layer, and 1 neuron
in the output layer is implemented. Each NN was designed
to be insensitive to each input sensor fault, and the NN were
trained in order to provide the optimal output prediction on
the basis of the training pattern and target sequences [7].
In the following of this section, the performances of the
different FDI schemes have been evaluated by considering a
more complex aircraft trajectory. This has been obtained by
means of the guidance and control functions of a standard
autopilot which stabilises the aircraft motion towards the ref-
erence trajectory as depicted in Figure 3. The reference tra-
jectory is made up of 4 branches (2 straight flights and 2 turn
flights) so that a closed path is obtained. It is worth observing
that only 2 steady-state flight conditions are used to follow
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Figure 3: Aircraft complete trajectory example.
Table 6: Performances of the FDI schemes for a complete aircraft
trajectory.
Variable PM NLGA UIKF NN
ν 4 12 9 5
δe 4◦ 3◦ 4◦ 3◦
δa 5◦ 3◦ 5◦ 4◦
δr 5◦ 3◦ 4◦ 4◦
δth 7% 10% 11% 12%
Mean detection delay 26 s 25 s 31 s 27 s
alternatively the 4 branches of the reference trajectory:
(i) straight flight condition: true airspeed = 50 [m/s];
radius of curvature = ∞; flight-path angle = 0◦;
altitude = 330 [m]; flap deflection = 0◦;
(ii) turn flight condition: true airspeed = 50 [m/s]; radius
of curvature = 1000 [m]; flight-path angle = 0◦; alti-
tude = 330 [m]; flap deflection = 0◦.
The reference turn flight condition is used to design the
PM and the NLGA filters. The achieved results are reported
in Tables 2 and 4, respectively. The performed tests represent
a also a possible reliability evaluation of the considered FDI
techniques. In fact, in this case the diagnosis requires that
the residual generators are robust with respect to the flight
conditions that do not match the nominal trajectory used for
the design.
As an example, the fault-free and faulty residuals gener-
ated by the designed NN and UIKF banks are shown in Fig-
ures 4 and 5, respectively.
Table 6 summarises the results obtained by considering
the observers and filters (corresponding to the PM, NLGA,
UIKF,and NN) for the input sensor FDI whose parameters
have been designed and optimised for the steady-state coor-
dinated turn represented by the 2nd reference flight condi-
tion of the complete trajectory. Table 6 reports the perfor-
mances of the considered FDI techniques in terms of the
minimal detectable step faults on the various input sensors,
as well as the corresponding parameters ν for the residual
evaluation of (86). The mean detection delay is also reported
in Table 6 in order to compare the effectiveness of the differ-
ent FDI schemes.
The choice of ν has been performed with reference to the
particular flight conditions involved in the complete trajec-
tory following. In particular, the selected value of ν for each
FDI observer or filter represents a tradeoff between two ob-
jectives, that is, for increasing the residual fault sensitivity
and promptness, as well as for minimising the occurrence of
false alarms due to the switching among the reference flight
conditions needed to stabilise the aircraft motion towards the
reference trajectory. Table 6 shows how the proper design of
the parameter ν allows to obtain good performances with all
the considered FDI schemes, hence the robustness with re-
spect to the proposed complete trajectory is always achieved.
It is worth noting that the NLGA has a theoretical advan-
tage by taking into account the nonlinear dynamics of the air-
craft. However, the behaviour of the related nonlinear resid-
ual generators is quite sensitive to the model uncertainties
due to variation of the flight condition. In fact, the NLGA
FDI scheme requires high values of ν which have to be in-
creased (from 8 to 12 in this work) when the aircraft motion
regarding the complete trajectory is considered in place of
the nominal flight condition. In particular, even though the
analysis was restricted just to the aircraft turn phase of the
complete trajectory, a performance worsening would hap-
pen, since the steady-state condition (nominal flight condi-
tion) is quite far to be reached. However, the filter design
based on the NLGA lead to a satisfactory fault detection,
above all in terms of promptness. On the other hand, regard-
ing the PM, it is rather simple to note the good FDI perfor-
mances, even if optimisation stages can be required. The ν
values selected for the PM are lower, but the related residual
fault sensitivities are even smaller. Similar comments can be
made for the UIKF and NN techniques.
The simulation model applied to the complete trajec-
tory is an effective way to test the performances of the pro-
posed FDI methods with respect to modelling mismatch and
measurement errors. The obtained results demonstrate the
reliability of the PM-, NLGA-, UIKF-, and NN-based FDI
schemes as long as proper design procedures are adopted.
5.2. Monte Carlo analysis
In this section, further experiment results have been re-
ported. They regard the performance evaluation of the de-
veloped FDI scheme with respect to uncertainty acting on
the system. Hence, the simulation of different fault-free and
faulty data sequences was performed by exploiting the air-
craft Matlab-Simulink simulator and a Monte Carlo analysis
implemented in the Matlab environment. The Monte Carlo
tool is useful at this stage as the FDI performances depend on
the residual error magnitude due to the system uncertainty,
as well as the signal c(t) and y(t) measurement errors. It is
worth noting how the Monte Carlo simulations have been
achieved by perturbing the parameters of the PM filter resid-
uals by additive white Gaussian noises with standard devia-
tion values equal to a fixed percentage p of the element val-
ues. The same experiments have been performed by statis-
tically varying the main parameters of the NLGA filters. In
16 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
9080706050403020100
Time (s)
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
δe residuals
(a)
9080706050403020100
Time (s)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
δa residuals
(b)
9080706050403020100
Time (s)
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
δr residuals
(c)
9080706050403020100
Time (s)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
δth residuals
(d)
Figure 4: NN residuals with ramp fault.
these conditions, the Monte Carlo analysis represents a fur-
ther method for estimating the reliability and the robustness
of the developed FDI schemes, when applied to the consid-
ered aircraft.
For robustness and reliability experimental analysis of the
FDI schemes, some performance indices have been used. The
performances of the FDI method are then evaluated on a
number of Monte Carlo runs equal to 1000. This number
of simulations is carried out to determine the indices listed
below with a given degree of accuracy.
False-Alarm Probability (rfa): the number of wrongly de-
tected faults divided by total fault cases.
Missed-Fault Probability(rmf): for each fault, the total
number of undetected faults, divided by the total number of
times that the fault case occurs.
True Detection/Isolation Probability (rtd, rti): for a par-
ticular fault case, the number of times it is correctly de-
tected/isolated, divided by total number of times that the
fault case occurs.
Mean Detection/Isolation Delay (τmd, τmi): for a particular
fault case, the average detection/isolation delay time.
These indices are hence computed for the number
of Monte Carlo simulations and for each fault case.
Table 7summarises the results obtained by considering the
PM dynamic filters for the input sensor FDI for a complete
aircraft trajectory and with p = 10%.
The same analysis can be applied again to the resid-
ual generated by means of the NLGA, NN, and UIKF FDI
schemes. The results are summarised in Tables 8, 9, and
10.
Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 show how the proper design of the
dynamic filters with a proper choice of the FDI thresholds al-
low to achieve false-alarm and missed-fault probabilities less
than 0.6%, detection and isolation probabilities bigger than
99.4%, with minimal detection and isolation delay times.
The results demonstrate also that Monte Carlo simulation is
an effective tool for testing and comparing the design robust-
ness of the proposed FDI methods with respect to modelling
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Figure 5: UIKF residuals with ramp fault.
Table 7: PM Monte Carlo analysis with ν = 4 and p = 10%.
Faulty sensor rfa rmf rtd, rti τmd, τmi
δe 0.002 0.003 0.997 27 s
δa 0.001 0.001 0.999 18 s
δr 0.002 0.003 0.997 25 s
δth 0.003 0.002 0.998 35 s
Table 8: NLGA Monte Carlo analysis with ν = 12 and p = 10%.
Faulty sensor rfa rmf rtd, rti τmd, τmi
δe 0.003 0.004 0.996 30 s
δa 0.002 0.002 0.998 15 s
δr 0.001 0.001 0.999 23 s
δth 0.004 0.003 0.997 32 s
uncertainty (p = 10%) and fixed measurement errors. This
last simulation technique example hence facilitates an assess-
Table 9: NN Monte Carlo analysis with ν = 5.
Faulty sensor rfa rmf rtd, rti τmd, τmi
δe 0.004 0.005 0.995 33 s
δa 0.003 0.003 0.997 23 s
δr 0.004 0.004 0.996 29 s
δth 0.005 0.003 0.997 38 s
Table 10: UIKF Monte Carlo analysis with ν = 9.
Faulty sensor rfa rmf rtd, rti τmd, τmi
δe 0.003 0.004 0.996 26 s
δa 0.002 0.002 0.998 17 s
δr 0.001 0.002 0.998 26 s
δth 0.004 0.003 0.997 37 s
ment of the reliability of the developed, analysed, and applied
FDI methods.
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6. CONCLUSION
The paper provided the development and application of
two FDI techniques based on a PM scheme and on an
NLGA method, respectively. The PM procedure led to resid-
ual generators optimising the tradeoff between disturbance-
decoupling and fault sensitivity. Moreover, the application of
the PM FDI scheme resulted robust with respect to model
uncertainties. On the other hand, the NLGA relies on a novel
design scheme based on the structural decoupling of distur-
bances and modelling errors, Thus, the mixed H−/H∞ op-
timisation of the tradeoff between fault sensitivity, distur-
bances, and modelling errors has been proposed. The PM
and NLGA residual generators were tested by considering a
nonlinear aircraft simulator model that takes into account
also the wind gusts, the Dryden turbulence, the input-output
sensors measurement errors, as well as the engine and the
servo actuators. Moreover, in order to verify the robustness
characteristics and the achievable performances of the ap-
proaches, the simulation results considered a typical aircraft
reference trajectory consisting of several steady-state flight
conditions. The effectiveness of the developed PM and NLGA
FDI schemes was shown by simulations and a comparison
with widely used data-driven and model-based disturbance-
decoupling FDI schemes, such as NN and UIKF diagnosis
methods, was provided. The reliability and the robustness
properties of the proposed residual generators to model un-
certainty and disturbances and measurement noise for the
aircraft nonlinear model were investigated via Monte Carlo
simulations. Further works extensive comparative studies
for robustness of the FDI algorithms when applied to real
data.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Marcos, S. Ganguli, and G. J. Balas, “An application of H∞
fault detection and isolation to a transport aircraft,” Control
Engineering Practice, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 105–119, 2005.
[2] F. Amato, C. Cosentino, M. Mattei, and G. Paviglianiti, “A
direct/functional redundancy scheme for fault detection and
isolation on an aircraft,” Aerospace Science and Technology,
vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 338–345, 2006.
[3] J. Chen and R. J. Patton, Robust Model-Based Fault Diagnosis
for Dynamic Systems, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
The Netherlands, 1999.
[4] R. Isermann, Fault-Diagnosis Systems: An Introduction from
Fault Detection to Fault Tolerance, Springer, Berlin, Germany,
1st edition, 2005.
[5] J. Gertler, Fault Detection and Diagnosis in Engineering Systems,
Marcel Dekker, New York, NY, USA, 1998.
[6] M. Basseville and I. V. Nikiforov, Detection of Abrupt Changes:
Theory and Application, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ,
USA, 1993.
[7] J. Korbicz, J. M. Koscielny, Z. Kowalczuk, and W. Cholewa,
Eds., Fault Diagnosis: Models, Artificial Intelligence, Applica-
tions, Springer, Berlin, Germany, 1st edition, 2004.
[8] M. A. Massoumnia, A geometric appoach to failure detection
and identification in linear systems, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 1986.
[9] H. Hammouri, M. Kinnaert, and E. H. El Yaagoubi,
“Observer-based approach to fault detection and isolation for
nonlinear systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 44, no. 10, pp. 1879–1884, 1999.
[10] C. De Persis and A. Isidori, “A geometric approach to nonlin-
ear fault detection and isolation,” IEEE Transactions on Auto-
matic Control, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 853–865, 2001.
[11] C. De Persis, R. De Santis, and A. Isidori, “Nonlinear actuator
fault detection and isolation for a VTOL aircraft,” in Proceed-
ings of the American Control Conference (ACC ’01), vol. 6, pp.
4449–4454, Arlington, Va, USA, June 2001.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the mass advent of digital communication
networks and systems has boosted the integration of tele-
operation in feedback control systems. Applications like un-
manned vehicles [1] or internet-based real time control [2]
provide significant examples raising, in turn, new problems.
This paper deals with one of such problems, if the com-
munication channel through which feedback information
passes is not completely reliable, sensors’ measurements may
not be available to the controller during some intervals
of time. In such a situation, one has to couple the con-
troller with a block, hereafter called supervisor, which is
able to discriminate between intervals of signal availability
(availability time Tai) and unavailability (unavailability time
Tui+1 ), and to generate an estimate of the plant’s state dur-
ing this Tui+1 intervals. Methods for detection and estima-
tion for abruptly changing systems [3] can be applied in
the problem considered here. For that purpose an algorithm
based on Bayesian decision could be implemented, for exam-
ple.
Somehow related with the problem of temporary sensor
unavailability presented in this paper are the problem of data
packet dropout, and the problem of network-induced delay,
in networked control systems [4, 5].
Moreover, the approach suggested in this paper can be
compared with different techniques based, for example, on
the idea of the unknown input observer, as suggested in [6].
On the other hand, it is obvious to exploit Kalman filters and
fuzzy logic for sensor fusion, applied to autonomous under-
water vehicle systems, as described in [7]. It was, also, shown
in [8, 9] that the design of fault-tolerant observers can be
successfully applied to the control of rail traction drives. Fi-
nally, the stability analysis for a real application example in
the presence of intermittent faults is described in [10].
Biomedical applications provide, as well, examples in
that the sensor used for feedback is intermittently unavail-
able. In [11] the artifacts in the neuromuscular blockade level
measurement in patients subject to general anaesthesia are
modeled as sensor faults. The occurrence of these faults is
detected with a Bayesian algorithm and, during the periods
of unavailability of the signal, the feedback controller is fed
with an estimate generated by a model.
It is shown, throughout the paper, that with the above
described scheme, the controlled open-loop unstable plant
will be stable (in some sense, to be defined later) if the time
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Figure 1: Block diagram of a discrete feedback system with nonlinear actuator and interrupted observations supervisor.
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Figure 2: Operation time line with availability intervals alternating with unavailability intervals.
interval, during which at least one of the sensors measure
is unavailable, is somehow “small”, and that the Euclidean
norm of the state x(k), at the end of each Tui+1 interval, is
a monotonic descent sequence. Moreover, if the plant state
is perturbed by a class of vanishing perturbations δx(k, x),
similar stability results are derived.
The contributions of the paper consist in providing suf-
ficient conditions for stability of feedback controlled open-
loop unstable systems with intermittent sensors faults. Linear
as well as nonlinear systems are considered.
This paper is organized in four sections and two appen-
dices. After this introduction, Section 2 makes a detailed sys-
tem description referring the functionality of the supervisor
in terms of detection and estimation of the state, and the
way the feedback system with linear as well as with nonlin-
ear actuators behaves when intermittent sensors faults oc-
cur. Section 3 presents two theorems with sufficient condi-
tions, one for uniform stability of the system with linear and
nonlinear actuators, and respective corollaries, also with suf-
ficient conditions, and the other for uniform exponential
stability and descent monotonicity of the Euclidean norm
of the state x(k) at the end of each Tui+1 interval. More-
over, Section 3 presents two other theorems, again with suf-
ficient conditions, that prove that the system with linear and
nonlinear actuators, subject to a vanishing perturbation, is
asymptotically stable. In Section 4 conclusions are drawn.
Appendix A.1 gives a full proof of Theorem 1 and Corollar-
ies 1 and 2, and Appendix A.2 gives a full proof of Theorem 2
and Corollaries 3 and 4.
2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The system depicted in Figure 1 is composed of two sub-
systems: (i) the supervisor responsible for detection of sen-
sors’ measures interruptions, and for switching state feed-
back from plant to model and from model to plant; (ii) the
plant and the model rendered stable through state feedback.
An example of supervisor based on Bayesian inference is
provided in [12, 13]. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
detail this block.
The supervisor decides whether the state x(k) is being
correctly measured by the sensors or not and commands the
switch signal σ(k). During the time intervals in which the
sensors do not provide a reliable measure of the actual plant
state (it is admitted that the state coincides with the out-
put) one possibility is to replace it by an estimate x̂(k) ob-
tained from a plant model. This yields a loss of performance
with respect to the ideal situation in which the sensors are
always available, and may pose stability problems if the plant
is open-loop unstable.
In order to understand the system functioning, consider
the time line of operation, depicted in Figure 2, divided in
alternate intervals where all sensors operate correctly (Taj ,
with j = 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . , i), and where, at least, one of them
fails (Tuj , with j = 2, 4, 6, . . . , i − 1, i + 1) being replaced by
the model estimate. Note that the index j does not repre-
sent discrete instants of time, but is rather used to enumerate
both the availability, Taj , and the unavailability, Tuj , inter-
vals. These intervals are identified in script font in the up-
per part of the time line of Figure 2. The time instants cor-
responding to the beginning of each interval, wether it is
an availability or an unavailability interval, are represented
in the lower part of the time line of Figure 2. Let k0 de-
note the beginning of one such intervals. It is assumed that
the first interval always corresponds to an availability inter-
val, and that the intervals are open at their end. Further-
more, the time analysis always finishes in an unavailability
interval at time k. Therefore, in a complete time sequence
there are (i + 1) intervals, where (i + 1) is an even num-
ber.
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Figure 3: Block diagram of a discrete feedback system with linear actuator, and interrupted observations supervisor.
The model initial sate x̂ is made equal to the last available
observation of the state x when an interrupted observation
occurs (x̂(k0) = x(k0) = x(k0 − 1)), since the sate x is no
longer available.
3. STABILITY RESULTS
Three distinct situations regarding system’s stability are con-
sidered. In the first case, the nonlinear function ψ(u(k)) does
not exist (ψ(u(k)) = I ; see Figure 3). Moreover, the per-
turbation function δx(k, x) is also considered not to exist
(δx(k, x) = 0, see Figure 3). The second case is referred to the
feedback system with nonlinear actuator function ψ(u(k))
but, also, without the perturbation function δx(k, x); see
Figure 1. The third case considers the existence of the per-
turbation function δx(k, x) in both feedback systems, with
linear actuator, and with nonlinear actuator.
In all the situations the reference signal, r(k), is consid-
ered to be zero, for all k ≥ 0 (regulation problem).
Throughout the text, matrices norms are the ones in-
duced by the Euclidean norm of vectors, being given by their
largest singular value (‖A‖ = σmax [A] = σA ≥ 0).
3.1. System with linear input
Consider Figure 3 with δx(k, x) = 0, and r(k) = 0, for all
k ≥ 0. The plant and the model depicted are described in the
state-space form by (1) and (2), respectively
x(k + 1) = (A + δA)x(k) + (B + δB)u(k), (1)
x̂(k + 1) = Ax̂(k) + Bu(k) (2)
with x and x̂ ∈ Rn, accessible for direct measurement, u ∈
Rp, A, B, δA, and δB are of appropriate dimensions, and
(A,B) is controllable. Moreover, δA and δB represent mod-
eling uncertainties. It is assumed that the plant is time in-
variant, and open-loop unstable. The state feedback of signal
z(k), yielded by the sensor
u(k) = −Lz(k), (3)
is implemented by L, a matrix of feedback gains assumed to
stabilize the model. Furthermore, z(k) = x(k) during avail-
ability intervals, when all sensors are working properly, and
z(k) = x̂(k) during unavailability intervals, when measuring
interruptions take place.
During availability intervals the plant state equation is
x(k + 1) = [(A + δA)− (B + δB)L]x(k) (4)
and during unavailability intervals the plant state equation is
x(k + 1) = (A + δA)x(k)− (B + δB)Lx̂(k). (5)
Define the plant closed-loop dynamics matrix as
AδCL :=
(
A + δA
)− (B + δB)L = Aδ − BδL, (6)
the model closed-loop dynamics matrix as
ACL := A− BL, (7)
the plant open and closed-loop transition matrices
Φδ
(
k, k0
)
:= Ak−k0δ ,
ΦδCL
(
k, k0
)
:= Ak−k0δCL ,
(8)
and the model open and closed-loop transition matrices
Φ
(
k, k0
)
:= Ak−k0 ,
ΦCL
(
k, k0
)
:= Ak−k0CL .
(9)
Theorem 1. Consider the closed-loop system of Figure 3 with
the unstable model in open-loop (bounded by ‖Φ(k, k0)‖ ≤
αβk−k0 with α ≥ 1 and β > 1, finite constants) rendered sta-
ble in closed-loop (‖ΦCL(k, k0)‖ ≤ γλk−k0 with γ ≥ 1 a finite
constant and 0 ≤ λ < 1), through proper design of L. Consider,
also, that σB := ‖B‖, σL := ‖L‖, and that model uncertainties
are bounded ‖δA‖ ≤ σδA , and ‖δB‖ ≤ σδB . The system with
initial condition x(0) = x0 is globally uniformly stable provided
that the total unavailability time Tu, up to discrete time k inside
the unavailability interval Tui+1 , satisfies the bound
Tu <
logM1
log
(
β + α·σδA
) − (i + 1)
2
· log
[(
1 +
(
σB + σδB
)
σL·γ/
(
β + α·σδA − λ
))
αγ
]
log
(
β + α·σδA
)
− Ta
log
(
λ + γΣ
)
log
(
β + α·σδA
)
(10)
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with M1 ≥ 1, a finite constant, and Σ := σδA + σδB·σL is such
that verifies
0 ≤ Σ < 1− λ
γ
, (11)
Ta is the total availability time.
A result derived from the previous theorem is stated on
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, ‖x(Tj)‖,
for j = 0, 2, 4, . . . , i−1, (the state norm at the beginning of each
availability interval) is a monotonic descent sequence provided
that the unavailability interval Tui−1 satisfies
Tui−1 <
log
[(
1 +
(
σB + σδB
)
σL·γ/
(
β + α·σδA − λ
))
αγ
]
log
(
β + α·σδA
)
− Tai−2
log
(
λ + γΣ
)
log
(
β + α·σδA
) (12)
and Σ := σδA + σδB·σL is such that verifies
0 ≤ Σ < 1− λ
γ
, (13)
Tai−2 is the availability time previous to Tui−1 .
Concerning global uniform exponential stability, con-
sider the next corollary.
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the sys-
tem with initial condition x(0) = x0 is globally uniformly
exponentially stable provided that the total unavailability time
Tu, up to discrete time k inside the unavailability interval Tui+1 ,
satisfies
Tu <
logM2
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
) − (i + 1)
2
· log
[(
1 +
(
σB + σδB
)
σL·γ/
(
β + α·σδA − λ
))
αγ
]
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
)
− Ta
log
((
λ + γΣ
)
/N2
)
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
)
(14)
with M2 ≥ 1, a finite constant, and Σ := σδA + σδB·σL is such
that verifies
0 ≤ Σ < 1− λ
γ
(15)
and 0 ≤ N2 < 1 is a constant constrained to
N2 > λ + γΣ, (16)
Ta is the total availability time.
A proof of the theorem and of the corollaries is presented
in Appendix A.1.
Remark 1. The constraint Σ < (1 − λ)/γ is imposed to as-
sure that the plant closed-loop transition matrix is such that
‖ΦδCL (k, k0)‖ ≤ γ(λ + γΣ)k−k0 with 0 ≥ (λ + γΣ) < 1 (see the
proof in Appendix A.1).
Remark 2. Notice that since (β + α·σδA) > 1 and 0 ≤ (λ +
γΣ) < 1, then the bound on Tu has a monotonous crescent
linear relation with Ta in the result from Theorem 1, and
Tui−1 also has a monotonous crescent linear relation withTai−2
in the result from Corollary 1.
Remark 3. The constant N2 (in Corollary 2) represents an
upper bound on the rate of exponential decay of the overall
system. If N2 < λ + γΣ, then the result of Corollary 2 would
indicate a negative solution for Tu, which, clearly, is not pos-
sible, since Tu ∈ [0,∞[. Being N2 > λ + γΣ, then the bound
on Tu has also a monotonous crescent linear relation with Ta,
as mentioned in the previous remark.
Remark 4. Concerning Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, con-
stants M1 and M2 represent an offset term for the upper
bound function on the evolution of ‖x(k)‖. The bigger these
constants are, the more conservative is the referred upper
bound on uniform stability and uniform exponential stabil-
ity, respectively.
Remark 5. Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2 present only
conservative sufficient stability conditions for the system of
Figure 3.
3.2. System with nonlinear input
Consider Figure 1 with δx(k, x) = 0, and r(k) = 0, for all
k ≥ 0. The plant and the model depicted are described in the
state-space form by (17) and (18), respectively,
x(k + 1) = (A + δA)x(k) + (B + δB)unl(k), (17)
x̂(k + 1) = Ax̂(k) + Bunl(k), (18)
with x and x̂ ∈ Rn, accessible for direct measurement, u and
unl ∈ Rp,A, B, δA, and δB are of appropriate dimensions, and
(A,B) is controllable. Moreover, δA and δB represent model-
ing uncertainties. It is assumed that the plant is time invari-
ant, and open-loop unstable.
The vector unl represents the nonlinear input to both the
plant and the model, unl(k) = ψ(k,u). A memoryless nonlin-
earity, ψ : [0,∞[×Rp→Rp, is said to satisfy a sector condition
globally [14] if[
ψ(k,u)− Kminu(k)
]T[
ψ(k,u)− Kmax u(k)
] ≤ 0 (19)
for all t ≥ 0, for all u ∈ Rp, for some real matrices Kmin and
Kmax , whereK = Kmax−Kmin is a positive definite symmetric
matrix. The nonlinearity ψ(k,u) is said to belong to a sector
[Kmin ,Kmax ].
Proposition 1. Consider Kmin = −(γ2/2)I and Kmax =
(γ2/2)I with γ2 a finite positive constant. The nonlinear-
ity ψ(k,u) can be decomposed in a linear component and a
nonlinear component, [15]
ψs(k,u) = ψ(k,u)− Kminu(k), (20)
where ψs(k,u) represents the nonlinear component and verifies
the sector condition
ψTs (k,u)
[
ψs(k,u)− Ku(k)
] ≤ 0. (21)
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Proof. This result is straightforward using (20) in (19), and
considering matrix K definition.
Proposition 2. For the defined matrices Kmin and Kmax ,
the memoryless sector nonlinearity ψ(k,u) is bounded by
‖ψ(k,u)‖ ≤ (γ2/2)‖u(k)‖, for all t ≥ 0, for all u ∈ Rp.
Proof. Replacing Kmin and Kmax by their respective values in
(19), and since ψT(k,u)u(k) is a scalar, yields
∥∥ψ(k,u)∥∥2 − (γ2
2
)2∥∥u(k)∥∥2 ≤ 0. (22)
By definition ‖ψ(k,u)‖ ≥ 0, ‖u(k)‖ ≥ 0, and γ2/2 > 0, which
implies ∥∥ψ(k,u)∥∥ ≤ γ2
2
∥∥u(k)∥∥. (23)
In order to find a bound on ψs(k,u) starting from (20),
using (23), and Kmin definition, it follows that∥∥ψs(k,u)∥∥ ≤ γ2∥∥u(k)∥∥. (24)
The state feedback of signal z(k), yielded by the sensor
u(k) = −Lz(k), (25)
is implemented by L, a matrix of feedback gains assumed to
stabilize the model. Furthermore, z(k) = x(k) during avail-
ability intervals, when all sensors are working properly, and
z(k) = x̂(k) during unavailability intervals, when measuring
interruptions take place.
During availability intervals, the plant state equation is
x(k + 1) = [(A + δA)− (B + δB)KminL]x(k)
+
(
B + δB
)
ψs
(− Lx(k)) (26)
and during unavailability intervals, the plant state equation
is
x(k + 1) = (A + δA)x(k) + (B + δB)
.
(
ψs
(− Lx̂(k))− KminLx̂(k)). (27)
Define the plant closed-loop dynamics matrix as
AδCL :=
(
A + δA
)− (B + δB)KminL = Aδ − BδKminL, (28)
the model closed-loop dynamics matrix as
ACL := A− BKminL, (29)
the plant open and closed-loop transition matrices as
Φδ
(
k, k0
)
:= (A + δA)k−k0 = Ak−k0δ ,
ΦδCL
(
k, k0
)
:= Ak−k0δCL ,
(30)
the model open and closed-loop transition matrices as
Φ
(
k, k0
)
:= Ak−k0 ,
ΦCL
(
k, k0
)
:= Ak−k0CL ,
(31)
and matrix P = KminL, considered to stabilize the model in
closed loop.
Theorem 2. Consider the closed-loop system of Figure 1 where
the model is unstable in open-loop (bounded by ‖Φ(k, k0)‖ ≤
αβk−k0 , with α ≥ 1, and β > 1, finite constants), rendered sta-
ble in closed-loop (‖ΦCL(k, k0)‖ ≤ γλk−k0 , with γ ≥ 1 a fi-
nite constant, and 0 ≤ λ < 1), through proper design of P.
The nonlinearity ψs(k,u) satisfies ‖ψs(k,u)‖ ≤ γ2‖u(k)‖ for
all t ≥ 0, for all u ∈ Rp. Consider, also, that σB := ‖B‖,
σL := ‖L‖, σP := ‖P‖ and that model uncertainties are
bounded ‖δA‖ ≤ σδA and ‖δB‖ ≤ σδB . The system with initial
condition x(0) = x0 is globally uniformly stable provided that
the total unavailability time Tu, up to discrete time k inside the
unavailability interval Tui+1 , satisfies the bound
Tu <
logM1
log
(
β + α·σδA
) − (i + 1)
2
.
log
[(
1 +
(
σB + σδB
)(
σP + γ2·σL
)
γ(
β + α·σδA
)− (λ + γσδB·γ2·σL)
)
αγ
]
log
(
β + α·σδA
)
− Ta
log
[(
λ + γΣ
)
+ γ
(
σB + σδB
)
γ2·σL
]
log
(
β + α·σδA
)
(32)
with M1 ≥ 1, a finite constant, and Σ := σδA + σδB·σP is such
that verifies
0 ≤ Σ < 1− λ
γ
(33)
and γ2 is the less of the following two inequalities:
γ2 <
1− (λ + γΣ)
γ
(
σB + σδB
)
σL
,
γ2 <
β + α·σδA − λ
γ·σδB·σL
,
(34)
Ta is the total availability time.
As in the previous subsection the following two corollar-
ies are derived.
Corollary 3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, ‖x(Tj)‖,
for j = 0, 2, 4, . . . , i−1, (the state norm at the beginning of each
availability interval) is a monotonic descent sequence provided
that the unavailability interval Tui−1 satisfies
Tui−1 < −
log
[(
1 +
(
σB + σδB
)(
σP + γ2·σL
)
γ(
β + α·σδA
)− (λ + γσδB·γ2·σL)
)
αγ
]
log (β + α·σδA)
− Tai−2
log
[(
λ + γΣ
)
+ γ
(
σB + σδB
)
γ2·σL
]
log
(
β + α·σδA
)
(35)
and Σ := σδA + σδB·σL is such that verifies
0 ≤ Σ < 1− λ
γ
(36)
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and γ2 is the less of the following two inequalities:
γ2 <
1− (λ + γΣ)
γ
(
σB + σδB
)
σL
,
γ2 <
β + α·σδA − λ
γ·σδB·σL
,
(37)
Tai−2 is the availability time previous to Tui−1 .
Corollary 4. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the system
with initial condition x(0) = x0 is globally uniformly exponen-
tially stable provided that the total unavailability time Tu, up to
discrete time k inside the unavailability interval Tui+1 , satisfies
Tu <
logM2
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
) − (i + 1)
2
.
log
[(
1 +
(
σB + σδB
)(
σP + γ2·σL
)
γ(
β + α·σδA
)− (λ + γσδB·γ2·σL)
)
αγ
]
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
)
− Ta
log
(((
λ + γΣ
)
+ γ
(
σB + σδB
)
γ2·σL
)
/N2
)
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
)
(38)
with M1 ≥ 1, a finite constant, and Σ := σδA + σδB·σP is such
that verifies
0 ≤ Σ < 1− λ
γ
(39)
and γ2 is the less of the following two inequalities:
γ2 <
1− (λ + γΣ)
γ
(
σB + σδB
)
σL
,
γ2 <
β + α·σδA − λ
γ·σδB·σL
,
(40)
and 0 ≤ N2 < 1 is a constant constrained to
N2 >
(
λ + γΣ
)
+ γ
(
σB + σδB
)
γ2·σL, (41)
Ta is the total availability time.
A proof of the theorem and of the corollaries is presented
in Appendix A.2.
Remark 6. Notice that since (β + α·σδA) > 1 then it must
be (λ + γΣ) + γ(σB + σδB )γ2·σL < 1, which leads to (34),
(37), and (40), so that the bound on Tu has a monotonous
crescent linear relation with Ta in the result from Theorem 2,
and Tui−1 also has a monotonous crescent linear relation with
Tai−2 in the result from Corollary 3.
Remark 7. The constant N2 (in Corollary 4) represents an
upper bound on the rate of exponential decay of the over-
all system. If N2 < (λ + γΣ) + γ(σB + σδB )γ2·σL, then the
result of Corollary 4 would indicate a negative solution for
Tu, which, clearly, is not possible, since Tu ∈ [0,∞[. Being
N2 > (λ + γΣ) + γ(σB + σδB )γ2·σL, then the bound on Tu has
also a monotonous crescent linear relation with Ta, as men-
tioned in the previous remark.
Remark 8. Concerning Theorem 2 and Corollary 4, con-
stantsM1 andM2 represent, once again, an offset term for the
upper bound function on the evolution of ‖x(k)‖. The big-
ger these constants are, the more conservative is the referred
upper bound on uniform stability and uniform exponential
stability, respectively.
Remark 9. Theorem 2 and Corollaries 3 and 4 present only
conservative sufficient stability conditions for the system of
Figure 1.
3.3. Perturbed system with linear and nonlinear inputs
Consider that both systems depicted in Figures 1 and 3,
suffer the influence of perturbation δx(k, x), where δx :
[0,∞[×D→Rn is piecewise continuous in k and locally Lips-
chitz in x on [0,∞[×D, andD ⊂ Rn is a domain that contains
the origin x = 0. Also, ‖δx(k, x)‖ ≤ ε‖x(k)‖ for all k ≥ 0, for
all x ∈ D, and ε is a nonnegative constant, meaning that the
perturbation satisfies a linear growth bound, therefore, con-
sidering a vanishing perturbation, [14].
During availability intervals Taj , for j = 1, 3, 5, . . . , i,
both systems can be represented by the autonomous equa-
tion
x(k + 1) = F(k, x), (42)
where F(k, x), for the system depicted in Figure 3, is
F(k, x) = AδCLx(k), k ∈ Taj , (43)
and for the system depicted in Figure 1, F(k, x) is
F(k, x) = AδCLx(k) +
(
B + δB
)
.ψs
(− Lx(k)), k ∈ Taj .
(44)
Clearly, F(0) = 0 in both situations (from (19) and ma-
trices’ Kmin and Kmax definition in Proposition 1, the sec-
tor memoryless nonlinearity verifies ψs(0) = 0). Recalling
the state equations (5) and (27) during unavailability inter-
vals Tuj , for j = 2, 4, 6, . . . , i + 1, and the fact that the ini-
tial model state x̂ is made equal to the last available obser-
vation of the state x when an interrupted observation occurs,
(x̂(k0) = x(k0) = x(k0−1)), it is clearly understood that if the
state becomes zero during an availability interval, then it will
remain zero for all time instants belonging to any unavail-
ability interval that may occur. The function’s F(k, x) branch
related with the unavailability interval is not of obvious writ-
ing in terms only of x(k). It has an easier writing in terms of
x(k) and of x̂(k). Nevertheless, since these two states are re-
lated at the switching time between availability and unavail-
ability intervals (as recalled above), it can be understood that
during an unavailability interval, F(k, x) exists.
It is important to stress out that an unavailability interval
cannot occur without having previously existed an availabil-
ity interval. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to state that
F(0) = 0, for all k ≥ 0, (including availability and unavail-
ability intervals).
Also, linear and nonlinear systems were proved to be
globally uniformly exponentially stable, under the conditions
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of Corollaries 2 and 4, respectively, therefore, both F(k, x)
are Lipschitz not only near the origin, but in Rn, and verify
‖F(x1)− F(x2)‖ ≤ Lv‖x1 − x2‖.
Combining the results from Corollaries 2 and 4 with the
above comments, and with the result presented in [16], is
reproduced in the next theorem.
Theorem 3. Let F : Rn→Rn satisfy a Lipschitz condition in
a neighborhood of the origin, with F(0) = 0. If the origin is
an exponentially stable fixed point of x(k + 1) = F(x(k)), it
is an asymptotically stable fixed point of the perturbed system
x(k + 1) = F(x(k)) + δx(k, x).
This leads to the next two theorems.
Theorem 4. The nonperturbed system from Figure 3, x(k +
1) = F(k, x), verifying Corollary 2 and Theorem 3 sufficient
conditions, has a globally asymptotically stable fixed point of
the perturbed system x(k + 1) = F(x(k)) + δx(k, x) in the ori-
gin, and δx : [0,∞[×D→Rn is piecewise continuous in k and
locally Lipschitz in x on [0,∞[×D, and D ⊂ Rn is a domain
that contains the origin x = 0. Also, ‖δx(k, x)‖ ≤ ε‖x(k)‖ for
all k ≥ 0, for all x ∈ D with ε a nonnegative constant satisfies
a linear growth bound.
Theorem 5. It is the same redaction of Theorem 4, but consid-
ering the system from Figure 1.
Remark 10. These results are global since both F(k, x) are
Lipschitz continuous in Rn, and the original systems are uni-
formly exponentially stable, [16].
4. CONCLUSIONS
The paper presents and proves sufficient conditions that al-
low a discrete time analysis of sensor unavailability (inter-
rupted observations) intervals, bounding these intervals in
order to state that the unstable open-loop plant represented
in Figure 1, when controlled in closed-loop, is globally uni-
formly exponentially stable. These results are proved under
the existence of modeling uncertainties and if plant state van-
ishing perturbations occur, then global asymptotical stability
is achieved for the perturbed system. The results were proved
for either systems with linear actuators, or with memoryless
sector nonlinear actuators.
It is interesting to note that in a related work [4], a sim-
ilar conservative theoretical result regarding uniform expo-
nential stability is reported, showing that longer intervals of
unavailability can be reached in practice and that these the-
oretical results might be too conservative for practical pur-
poses.
APPENDIX
Throughout the appendix, the matrices norms are the ones
induced by the Euclidean norm of vectors, being given by
their largest singular values.
Consider the discrete time line represented in Figure 2.
The intervals where the sensors yield correct measures are
designated as Taj , with j = 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . , i, and the intervals
where the observations are interrupted are designated as Tuj ,
with j = 2, 4, 6, . . . , i−1, i+ 1. Let the discrete time instant k0
denote the beginning of a generic interval.
Since it will be often used in the following proofs, a
Gronwall-Bellman type of inequality for sequences is pre-
sented [17].
Lemma 1. Suppose the scalar sequences υ(k) and φ(k) are such
that υ(k) ≥ 0 for k ≥ k0, and
φ(k) ≤
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Ψ, k = k0,
Ψ + η
k−1∑
j=k0
υ( j)φ( j), k ≥ k0 + 1, (A.1)
where Ψ and η are constants with η ≥ 0. Then
φ(k) ≤ Ψ
k−1∏
j=k0
[
1 + ηυ( j)
]
. (A.2)
Consider, also, the sum of the (k−k0) terms of a geomet-
ric progression with ratio r,
k−1∑
j=k0
r j = r
k0 − rk
1− r . (A.3)
If |r| < 1, then, as k→∞, (A.3) becomes
k−1∑
j=k0
r j = r
k0
1− r . (A.4)
A.1. Stability proofs for system with linear input
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the system depicted in
Figure 3. During availability time intervals Taj , with
j = 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . , i, it is z(k) = x(k), and the plant state x(k)
evolves according to
x(k) = ΦδCL
(
k, k0
)
x
(
k0
)
, k ≥ k0 + 1. (A.5)
On the other hand, during unavailability time intervals Tuj ,
with j = 2, 4, 6, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, it is z(k) = x̂(k), the model
state x̂(k) evolves according to
x̂(k) = ΦCL
(
k, k0
)
x̂
(
k0
)
, k ≥ k0 + 1, (A.6)
and the plant state x(k) evolves according to
x(k) = Φδ
(
k, k0
)
x
(
k0
)
−
k−1∑
j=k0
Φδ
(
k, j + 1
)(
B + δB
)
Lx̂( j), k ≥ k0 + 1.
(A.7)
Replacing (A.6) in (A.7), and knowing that the model ini-
tial sate x̂ is made equal to the last available observation of
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the state x when an interrupted observation occurs (x̂(k0) =
x(k0) = x(k0 − 1)), the plant state x(k) evolution is
x(k) = Φδ
(
k, k0
)
x
(
k0
)
−
k−1∑
j=k0
Φδ(k, j + 1)
(
B + δB
)
LΦCL
(
j, k0
)
x
(
k0
)
,
k ≥ k0 + 1.
(A.8)
It is assumed that the model in closed-loop is stable and
bounded by ‖ΦCL(k, k0)‖ ≤ γλk−k0 , k ≥ k0, with 0 ≤ λ < 1
and γ ≥ 1, and that the model is unstable in open-loop, but
bounded by ‖Φ(k, k0)‖ ≤ αβk−k0 , k ≥ k0, with β > 1 and
α ≥ 1.
For bounded model uncertainties ‖δA‖ ≤ σδA , and con-
sidering the bound on ‖Φ(k, k0)‖, with β > 1 (this corre-
sponds to assume an unfavorable situation), it can be proved
through the use of Lemma 1, if δA is seen as a perturbation in
the system x(k + 1) = (A + δA)x(k), [17], that ‖Φδ(k, k0)‖ ≤
α(β + α·σδA)k−k0 , with (β + α·σδA) > 1. This means, as ex-
pected, that if the model dynamics are open-loop unstable,
then there will be a δA such that the plant dynamics will
be open-loop unstable (the use of a continuity argumenta-
tion could also explain such assertion). A similar proof can
be given for the stability of the plant in closed-loop since
the model is stable in closed-loop (‖ΦCL(k, k0)‖ ≤ γλk−k0 ,
with 0 ≤ λ < 1). Again, recurring to Lemma 1, and con-
sidering that (δA − δBL) is seen as a perturbation in the
system x(k + 1) = [(A + δA) − (B + δB)L]x(k), it can be
proved that ‖ΦδCL (k, k0)‖ ≤ γ(λ + γΣ)k−k0 , k ≥ k0, with
0 ≤ Σ < (1− λ)/γ, and Σ := σδA + σδB·σL.
Upper bounds for (A.5) during availability time inter-
vals, and for (A.8) during unavailability time intervals, are
obtained, respectively∥∥x(k)∥∥ = ∥∥ΦδCL(k, k0)x(k0)∥∥, (A.9)∥∥x(k)∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥∥Φδ(k, k0)x(k0)
−
k−1∑
j=k0
Φδ
(
k, j + 1
)(
B + δB
)
LΦCL
(
j, k0
)
x
(
k0
)∥∥∥∥∥.
(A.10)
Starting from (A.9), yields∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ γ(λ + γΣ)k−k0∥∥x(k0)∥∥ (A.11)
and for (A.10), recalling that ‖B‖ := σB, ‖δB‖ ≤ σδB , and
‖L‖ := σL,
∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ (α(β + α·σδA)k−k0
+
k−1∑
j=k0
α
(
β + α·σδA
)k− j−1(
σB + σδB
)
σLγλ
j−k0
)
·∥∥x(k0)∥∥.
(A.12)
Since 0 ≤ λ/(β + α·σδA) < 1, and considering (A.4), after
some calculations∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ [1 + (σB + σδB) σL·γβ + α·σδA − λ
]
. α
(
β + α·σδA
)k−k0·∥∥x(k0)∥∥. (A.13)
The complete state evolution from time instant k = 0, up to
the final time instant at k ∈ Tui+1 , is given by the alternate
product of (A.5) by (A.8), where x̂(k0) = x(k0) = x(k0 −
1) is considered. Applying results (A.11) and (A.13) to this
product originates
∥∥x(k)‖ ≤ [1 + (σB + σδB) σL·γβ + α·σδA − λ
]
α
(
β + α·σδA
)k−Ti
·γ(λ + γΣ)(Ti−1)−Ti−1
· · ·
[
1+
(
σB+σδB
) σL·γ
β + α·σδA − λ
]
α
(
β+α·σδA
)T2−T1
·γ(λ + γΣ)T1−1·∥∥x0∥∥
= c(i+1)/21 ·
(
β + α·σδA
)Tu·(λ + γΣ)Ta·∥∥x0∥∥,
(A.14)
where Tu and Ta represent the entire duration of all unavail-
ability and availability time intervals, respectively, and
c1 :=
[
1 +
(
σB + σδB
) σL·γ
β + α·σδA − λ
]
αγ. (A.15)
In order for the system to be uniformly stable, it must verify
‖x(k)‖ ≤ M1‖x(k0)‖, k ≥ k0, with M1 ≥ 1. Therefore, from
(A.14)
c(i+1)/21 ·
(
β + α·σδA
)Tu·(λ + γΣ)Ta ≤M1
=⇒ Tu ≤
logM1 −
(
(i + 1)/2
)
log c1 − Ta log
(
λ + γΣ
)
log
(
β + α·σδA
) .
(A.16)
Replacing (A.15) in (A.16) gives the desired result from
Theorem 1 subject to the constraint Σ < (1 − λ)/γ, and the
result holds globally since it is valid for any ‖x(k0)‖.
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider the Euclidean norm of x(k) at
discrete times k = Ti−1, and k = Ti−3, at the end of the un-
availability intervals Tui−1 , and Tui−3 , respectively. In order for
‖x(Tj)‖, for j = 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . , i−1, to be a monotonic descent
sequence, it should verify∥∥x(Ti−1)∥∥∥∥x(Ti−3)∥∥ < 1 (A.17)
equivalently, from the first two lines of (A.14), and consider-
ing (A.15)
c1
(
β + α·σδA
)Ti−1−Ti−2·(λ + γΣ)(Ti−2−1)−Ti−3 < 1 (A.18)
or, since Ti−1 − Ti−2 = Tui−1 , and (Ti−2 − 1)− Ti−3 = Tai−2
Tui−1 <
− log c1 − Tai−2 log
(
λ + γΣ
)
log
(
β + α·σδA
) . (A.19)
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Replacing (A.15) in (A.19) gives the desired result from
Corollary 1 subject to the constraint Σ < (1 − λ)/γ, and the
result holds globally since it is valid for any ‖x(k0)‖.
Proof of Corollary 2. In order for the system to be uni-
formly exponentially stable, it must verify ‖x(k)‖ ≤
M2N
k−k0
2 ‖x(k0)‖, k ≥ k0, with M2 ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ N2 < 1.
Therefore, from (A.14) and considering k0 = 0, and (k −
k0) = Tu + Ta,
c(i+1)/21 ·
(
β + α·σδA
)Tu·(λ + γΣ)Ta ≤M2NTu+Ta2
=⇒ Tu ≤
logM2−
(
(i+1)/2
)
log c1−Ta log
((
λ+γΣ
)
/N2
)
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
) .
(A.20)
Replacing (A.15) in (A.20) gives the desired result from
Corollary 2 subject to the constraint Σ < (1 − λ)/γ, and the
result holds globally since it is valid for any ‖x(k0)‖.
A.2. Stability proofs for system with nonlinear input
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the system depicted in
Figure 1. During availability time intervals Taj , with
j = 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . , i, it is z(k) = x(k), and the plant state x(k)
evolves according to
x(k) = ΦδCL
(
k, k0
)
x
(
k0
)
+
k−1∑
j=k0
ΦδCL
(
k, j + 1
)(
B + δB
)
. ψs
(− Lx( j)), k ≥ k0 + 1.
(A.21)
On the other hand, during unavailability time intervals Tuj ,
with j = 2, 4, 6, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, it is z(k) = x̂(k), the model
initial sate x̂ is made equal to the last available observation of
the state x when an interrupted observation occurs (x̂(k0) =
x(k0) = x(k0 − 1)), the model state x̂(k) evolves according to
x̂(k) = ΦCL
(
k, k0
)
x
(
k0
)
+
k−1∑
j=k0
ΦCL(k, j + 1)Bψs
(− Lx̂( j)), k ≥ k0 + 1
(A.22)
and the plant state x(k) evolves according to
x(k) = Φδ
(
k, k0
)
x
(
k0
)
+
k−1∑
j=k0
Φδ(k, j + 1)
(
B + δB
)
.
[
ψs
(− Lx̂( j))− Px̂( j)], k ≥ k0 + 1.
(A.23)
It is assumed that the model in closed-loop is stable and
bounded by ‖ΦCL(k, k0)‖ ≤ γλk−k0 , k ≥ k0, with 0 ≤ λ < 1
and γ ≥ 1, and that the model is unstable in open-loop, but
bounded by ‖Φ(k, k0)‖ ≤ αβk−k0 , k ≥ k0, with β > 1 and
α ≥ 1.
For bounded model uncertainties ‖δA‖ ≤ σδA , and con-
sidering the bound on ‖Φ(k, k0)‖ with β > 1 (this corre-
sponds to assume an unfavorable situation), it was proved
in Appendix A.1 that ‖Φδ(k, k0)‖ ≤ α(β + α·σδA)k−k0 with
(β + α·σδA) > 1. A similar proof can be given for the stability
of the plant in closed-loop since the model is stable in closed-
loop (‖ΦCL(k, k0)‖ ≤ γλk−k0 with 0 ≤ λ < 1). Recurring to
Lemma 1, and considering that (δA − δBP) is seen as a per-
turbation in the system x(k+1) = [(A+δA)−(B+δB)P]x(k),
it can be proved that ‖ΦδCL (k, k0)‖ ≤ γ(λ + γΣ)k−k0 , k ≥ k0
with 0 ≤ Σ < (1− λ)/γ, and Σ := σδA + σδB·σP , [17].
Upper bounds for (A.21) during availability time inter-
vals, and for (A.23) during unavailability time intervals, are
obtained, respectively
∥∥x(k)∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥∥ΦδCL(k, k0)x(k0)
+
k−1∑
j=k0
ΦδCL
(
k, j + 1
)(
B + δB
)
ψs
(− Lx( j))∥∥∥∥∥,
∥∥x(k)∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥∥Φδ(k, k0)x(k0) +
k−1∑
j=k0
Φδ(k, j + 1)
(
B + δB
)
.
[
ψs
(− Lx̂( j))− Px̂( j)]∥∥∥∥∥.
(A.24)
From (A.24), recalling that ‖B‖ := σB, ‖δB‖ ≤ σδB , ‖L‖ :=
σL and considering (24) yield, respectively
∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ γ(λ + γΣ)k−k0·∥∥x(k0)∥∥
+
k−1∑
j=k0
γ
(
λ + γΣ
)k− j−1·(σB + σδB)γ2·σL·∥∥x( j)∥∥,
(A.25)∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ α(β + α·σδA)k−k0·∥∥x(k0)∥∥
+
k−1∑
j=k0
α
(
β + α·σδA
)k− j−1
·(σB + σδB)(σP + γ2·σL)·∥∥x̂( j)∥∥.
(A.26)
Applying Lemma 1 to (A.25) gives
∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ γ[(λ + γΣ) + γ(σB + σδB)γ2·σL]k−k0·∥∥x(k0)∥∥.
(A.27)
An upper bound for (A.22) is obtained from
∥∥x̂(k)∥∥ ≤ γλk−k0·∥∥x(k0)∥∥ + k−1∑
j=k0
γλk− j−1σB·γ2·σL·
∥∥x̂( j)∥∥.
(A.28)
Applying Lemma 1 and recalling that x̂(k0) = x(k0) = x(k0−
1) yield
∥∥x̂(k)∥∥ ≤ γ(λ + γ·σB·γ2·σL)k−k0·∥∥x(k0)∥∥. (A.29)
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Using (A.29) in (A.26),
∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ [α(β + α·σδA)k−k0 + α(σB + σδB)(σP + γ2·σL)γ
.
(
β + α·σδA
)k−1·(λ + γ·σB·γ2·σL)−k0
·
k−1∑
j=k0
(
λ + γ·σB·γ2·σL
β + α·σδA
) j]
·∥∥x(k0)∥∥.
(A.30)
Making use of (A.3) in (A.30) gives
∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ [α(β + α·σδA)k−k0 + α(σB + σδB)(σP + γ2·σL)γ
.
(
β + α·σδA
)k−k0 − (λ + γ·σB·γ2·σL)k−k0(
β + α·σδA
)− (λ + γ·σB·γ2·σL)
]
·∥∥x(k0)∥∥.
(A.31)
Providing γ2 < (β + α·σδA − λ)/(γ·σB·σL), and considering
(A.4), after some calculations, (A.31) yields
∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ [1 + (σB + σδB)·(σP + γ2·σL)γ(
β + α·σδA
)− (λ + γ·σB·γ2·σL)
]
. α
(
β + α·σδA
)k−k0·∥∥x(k0)∥∥.
(A.32)
From this point on, the demonstration follows closely the
one of Theorem 1 (see Appendix A.1), and applying results
(A.27) and (A.32) originates
∥∥x(k)∥∥ ≤ c(i+1)/22 ·(β + α·σδA)Tu
·[(λ + γΣ) + γ(σB + σδB)γ2·σL]Ta·∥∥x0∥∥, (A.33)
where Tu and Ta represent the entire duration of all unavail-
ability and availability time intervals, respectively, and
c2 :=
[
1 +
(
σB + σδB
)·(σP + γ2·σL)γ(
β + α·σδA
)− (λ + γ·σB·γ2·σL)
]
αγ. (A.34)
In order for the system to be uniformly stable, it must verify
‖x(k)‖ ≤ M1‖x(k0)‖, k ≥ k0 with M1 ≥ 1. Therefore, from
(A.33)
c(i+1)/22 ·
(
β + α·σδA
)Tu·[(λ + γΣ) + γ(σB + σδB)γ2·σL]Ta
≤M1 =⇒ Tu ≤
logM1 −
(
(i + 1)/2
)
log c2
log
(
β + α·σδA
)
− Ta log
[(
λ + γΣ
)
+ γ
(
σB + σδB
)
γ2·σL
]
log
(
β + α·σδA
) .
(A.35)
Replacing (A.34) in (A.35) gives the desired result from
Theorem 2 subject to the constraints Σ < (1 − λ)/γ, and
γ2 < (β + α·σδA − λ)/(γ·σB·σL). The result holds globally
since it is valid for any ‖x(k0)‖.
Proof of Corollary 3. Consider the Euclidean norm of x(k) at
discrete times k = Ti−1, and k = Ti−3, at the end of the un-
availability intervals Tui−1 , and Tui−3 , respectively. In order for
‖x(Tj)‖, for j = 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . , i−1, to be a monotonic descent
sequence, it should verify∥∥x(Ti−1)∥∥∥∥x(Ti−3)∥∥ < 1. (A.36)
This proof is outlined in the very same way as Corollary 1
proof, therefore, the following equation yields naturally after
Theorem 2 proof calculations:
Tui−1 <
− log c2 − Tai−2 log
[(
λ + γΣ
)
+ γ
(
σB + σδB
)
γ2·σL
]
log
(
β + α·σδA
) .
(A.37)
Replacing (A.34) in (A.37) gives the desired result from
Corollary 3 subject to the constraints Σ < (1 − λ)/γ, and
γ2 < (β + α·σδA − λ)/(γ·σB·σL). The result holds globally
since it is valid for any ‖x(k0)‖.
Proof of Corollary 4. In order for the system to be uni-
formly exponentially stable, it must verify ‖x(k)‖ ≤
M2N
k−k0
2 ‖x(k0)‖, k ≥ k0, with M2 ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ N2 <
1. Therefore, from (A.33), and considering k0 = 0, and
(k − k0) = Tu + Ta,
c(i+1)/22 ·
(
β + α·σδA
)Tu·[(λ + γΣ) + γ(σB + σδB)γ2·σL]Ta
≤M2NTu+Ta2 =⇒ Tu ≤
logM2 −
(
(i + 1)/2
)
log c2
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
)
−
Ta log
([(
λ + γΣ
)
+γ
(
σB+σδB
)
γ2·σL
]
N2
)
log
((
β + α·σδA
)
/N2
) .
(A.38)
Replacing (A.34) in (A.38) gives the desired result from
Corollary 4 subject to the constraints Σ < (1 − λ)/γ and
γ2 < (β + α·σδA − λ)/(γ·σB·σL). The result holds globally
since it is valid for any ‖x(k0)‖.
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is robust to sensor distortion. It does not require sensor redundancy to compensate sensor distortion. The essential assumption
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provide useful information for fault diagnosis. The robustness of the presented diagnosis method is analyzed, as well as its ability
to detect actuator faults. A numerical example is provided to illustrate its efficiency.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the design of modern control systems, fault diagnosis is
often considered for component faults, sensor faults, and ac-
tuator faults. Various methods for fault diagnosis are gener-
ally based on the processing of sensor signals [1–3]. Many
methods for actuator fault diagnosis assume reliable fault-
free sensors, see, for instance, [4, 5]. For methods simultane-
ously dealing with actuator and sensor faults, it is typically
assumed that there is sufficient redundancy among the sen-
sors such that at any moment, the valid sensors can provide
the information required for faults diagnosis. For mass pro-
duction, it is important to use as less sensors as possible to
reduce production cost. In such situations, fault diagnosis
cannot uniquely rely on redundant sensors. Moreover, still
for the purpose of cost reduction, sensors used in mass pro-
duction may be highly nonlinear. If the sensor nonlinearity is
well known, it can often be electronically compensated. Un-
fortunately, sometimes sensor nonlinearity varies within the
production, and for each piece in use, the nonlinearity varies
during its normal life duration. For example, most oxygen
sensors used in cars equipped with catalytic converters are
highly nonlinear. They roughly indicate if the oxygen con-
centration is over or below a reference value. Nevertheless,
such sensors are sufficient for the purpose of engine control.
It is then important to develop fault diagnosis methods rely-
ing on the same sensors. In this paper, unknown nonlinear
behaviors of sensors are generally called sensor distortion.
The purpose of this paper is to present a method for ac-
tuator fault diagnosis which is robust to sensor distortion.
It is assumed that each sensor can be affected by an un-
known and arbitrary, but strictly monotonous, nonlinearity.
The monotonousness is a weak assumption since any non
monotonous distortion would make the sensor information
useless. Remark that saturation is not a strictly monotonous
nonlinearity, and thus is excluded in the proposed method.
Nevertheless, a correctly working sensor should not be satu-
rated when it is in its normal working range.
Robust methods for fault diagnosis has been studied in
different contexts by many authors. In [6], a method based
on adaptive wavelet analysis is proposed. The method stud-
ied in [7] uses generalized frequency response functions.
Kullback discrimination information is used as a fault de-
tection index in [8]. In [9], some faults of induction motors
are detected by Fourier analysis of frequency signatures. (See
the references cited in these publications for more informa-
tion.) Compared to these existing results, the novelty of the
method presented in this paper is its ability to deal with un-
known nonlinear sensor distortions without requiring sensor
redundancy.
The preliminary results presented in [10] are further de-
veloped in this paper, in particular, the analysis of the pro-
posed robust detection method is completed with the char-
acterization of the faults which can be detected.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem consid-
ered in this paper is formulated in Section 2. Fault detection
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and isolation are, respectively, studied in Sections 3 and 4. A
numerical example is presented in Section 5. Some conclud-
ing remarks are given in Section 6.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The considered linear state-space system with sensor distor-
tion is formulated as
ẋ(t) =Ax(t) + B diag(u(t))θ +w(t), (1a)
z(t) =Cx(t) + v(t), (1b)
y(t) =h(z(t)), (1c)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state, u(t) ∈ Rl the input, z(t) ∈ Rm
the output before sensor distortion, y(t) ∈ Rm the output af-
ter sensor distortion, andw(t) ∈ Rn and v(t) ∈ Rm represent
bounded modeling uncertainties. The notation diag(u(t))
denotes the diagonal matrix formed by the components of
the input vector u(t), and the vector θ ∈ Rl is a coefficient
vector introduced to describe the efficiency loss of actua-
tors (multiplicative actuator faults). For fault-free actuators,
θ takes the nominal value θ0.
For notation simplicity, the parenthesis (t) of the time-
dependent variables will not be written unless necessary.
Sensor distortion is modeled by the component-wisely
defined nonlinear function h: let zi and yi be, respectively,
the ith component of z and y, i = 1, . . . ,m, then
yi = hi
(
zi
)
. (2)
Assumption 1. Each sensor distortion hi : R→R is an un-
known, but a strictly monotonously increasing, function. In
other words, for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ R,
ξ1 < ξ2 =⇒ hi
(
ξ1
)
< hi
(
ξ2
)
. (3)
Assumption 2. The system dynamics matrix A is asymptot-
ically stable, that is, the eigenvalues of A have negative real
parts.
Remark 1. No additive uncertainty is assumed in the sen-
sor distortion equation (1c) since the arbitrary unknown
monotonous nonlinear function can take into account some
sensor distortion uncertainty. On the other hand, if it is as-
sumed that
y = h(z) + ε, (4)
where ε is some additive uncertainty, define
ṽ =h−1[h(Cx + v) + ε]− Cx,
z̃ =Cx + ṽ, (5)
then (4) can be replaced by
y = h(z̃) (6)
which is in the form of (1c). Of course, in order to limit ṽ,
some regularity of h should be assumed.
With the above formulation, the problem considered in
this paper is the detection and isolation of multiplicative ac-
tuator faults, modeled as changes in the coefficient vector θ,
despite the unknown sensor distortions.
3. FAULT DETECTION
The main difficulty of the problem formulated in the pre-
vious section is caused by the unknown sensor distortions.
The key question is how to use the information provided by
such sensors. Because of the unknown nature of hi, for each
measured value of yi = hi(zi), the corresponding value of zi
is completely unknown, and even the sign of zi is unknown.
The strict monotonousness of hi assumed in Assumption 1 is
not helpful in this aspect. However, it is important to make
the following observation. For any two time instants t and τ,
Assumption 1 implies that
sign
[
zi(t)− zi(τ)
] = sign[yi(t)− yi(τ)
]
. (7)
In other words, the relative sign of zi at different time in-
stants is known from the sensor output yi measured at these
time instants. Remark that t and τ are two arbitrary and in-
dependent time instants, and either one can be earlier than
the other one. Since the absolute value |zi(t)− zi(τ)| is com-
pletely unknown, the relative sign is thus the only informa-
tion about zi(t) − zi(τ) provided by the sensor output. This
information will be the basis for the design of fault detection
and isolation algorithms in this paper. Such information can
also be used for the identification of Wiener systems [11].
Let Z(s), U(s), W(s), and V(s) be, respectively, the
Laplace transforms of z(t), u(t), w(t), and v(t). It is then
derived from (1a), (1b), and (1c) (by assuming zero initial
state) that
Z(s)=C(sI−A)−1B diag(U(s))θ+C(sI−A)−1W(s)+V(s).
(8)
Define
Φ(t) =L−1
[
C(sI − A)−1B diag(U(s))
]
, (9)
ζ(t) =L−1
[
C(sI − A)−1W(s) +V(s)
]
, (10)
where L−1 is the inverse Laplace transform operator. Then
z(t) =Φ(t)θ + ζ(t), (11a)
y(t) =h(z(t)). (11b)
Notice that Φ(t) ∈ Rm×l depends on u(t) and can be
computed through (9), whereas ζ(t) ∈ Rm depends on mod-
eling uncertainties w(t), v(t) and is unknown.
Remark 2. Zero initial condition of the state x has been as-
sumed when (8) was derived. The asymptotic stability con-
dition (Assumption 2) is not explicitly used in the above
reasoning, but it ensures well-behaved computation of Φ
through (9). To some extent, this stability condition allows
also to tolerate nonzero initial states which are asymptoti-
cally forgotten. If the system was not asymptotically stable,
then, in principle, an observer should be used in the compu-
tation of Φ. However, it is difficult to design observers with
sensors distorted by unknown nonlinear functions.
Let φi be the ith row of Φ and ζi be the ith component of
ζ , then the ith row of (11a) writes
zi(t) = φi(t)θ + ζi(t). (12)
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For any two time instants t and τ, it is obvious that
sign
[
zi(t)− zi(τ)
][
zi(t)− zi(τ)
] ≥ 0. (13)
Substitute zi(t) and zi(τ) with the last equality, then, for con-
stant θ,
sign
[
zi(t)− zi(τ)
][(
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ + ζi(t)− ζi(τ)
] ≥ 0.
(14)
Remind the relative sign equality (7), then
sign
[
yi(t)− yi(τ)
][(
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ + ζi(t)− ζi(τ)
] ≥ 0,
(15)
or equivalently
−sign[yi(t)− yi(τ)
][
φi(t)− φi(τ)
]
θ
≤ sign[yi(t)− yi(τ)
][
ζi(t)− ζi(τ)
]
.
(16)
Let θ0 be the nominal value of θ (corresponding to fault-
free actuators), a residual ri(t, τ) for actuator fault detection
can be generated as
ri(t, τ) = −sign
[
yi(t)− yi(τ)
][
φi(t)− φi(τ)
]
θ0. (17)
It then follows from (16) that, in the fault-free case,
ri(t, τ) ≤ sign
[
yi(t)− yi(τ)
][
ζi(t)− ζi(τ)
]
. (18)
This result leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If |ζi(t)| ≤ λ for some constant λ and any t,
then the residual ri(t, τ) defined in (17) satisfies, in the fault-
free case, that is, θ = θ0, the inequality
ri(t, τ) ≤ 2λ. (19)
Proof. Let us first consider the case yi(t)=yi(τ), then it fol-
lows from the inequality (18) that
ri(t, τ) ≤
∣
∣ri(t, τ)
∣
∣
≤ ∣∣ζi(t)− ζi(τ)
∣
∣
≤ ∣∣ζi(t)
∣
∣ +
∣
∣ζi(τ)
∣
∣ ≤ 2λ.
(20)
Now for the case yi(t) = yi(τ), it follows trivially from the
inequality (18) that
ri(t, τ) ≤ 0 ≤ 2λ. (21)
Remind that ζi(t) is a component of the variable ζ(t)
depending on the bounded modeling uncertainties w(t)
and v(t), as defined in (10). The boundedness of w(t) and
v(t), together with Assumption 2, implies the boundedness
of ζ(t). For practical convenience, the residual threshold
should be directly derived from the assumed bounds of w(t)
and v(t). It would require nontrivial error bound propa-
gation through (10). Techniques of interval analysis or set-
membership computation [12] can be applied for this pur-
pose. This topic is not further discussed in this paper.
Proposition 1 guarantees the absence of false detection if
fault detection is made by comparing the residual ri(t, τ) with
the threshold 2λ. However, it does not tell what are the faults
which can be detected with such a decision rule. In general,
robust fault detection methods are based on conservative de-
cision rules, preventing the detection of some faults. In pub-
lications about robust fault detection, typically robustness
results are provided, but the analysis about the set of faults
which can be detected is usually absent, because it is often
difficult to characterize the detectable faults in a robust de-
tection framework. In contrast, for the method proposed in
this paper, the faults which can be detected are clearly char-
acterized as follows.
Proposition 2. Assume that the system matrix pair (A,B) is
controllable, θ=0, and θ0=0. For the faulty actuator parameter
vector θ = θ0, if there does not exist any positive real number
α such that θ = αθ0, then there exist an input signal u(t) and
time instants t and τ such that
ri(t, τ) > 2λ (22)
for each i = 1, . . . ,m, where λ is a positive constant such that
|ζi(t)| ≤ λ.
Proof. This proof applies to the residual ri(t, τ) for each i =
1, . . . ,m.
Define the vector
ν = β
(
‖θ‖−1θ − ∥∥θ0
∥
∥−1θ0
)
, (23)
where the norm ‖θ‖ =
√
θTθ and β is a positive number to
be specified later. Then
νTθ = β
(
‖θ‖ − ∥∥θ0
∥
∥−1θT0 θ
)
= β‖θ‖
(
1− ∥∥θ0
∥
∥−1‖θ‖−1θT0 θ
)
≥ 0,
(24)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that |θT0 θ| ≤
‖θ0‖‖θ‖.
Notice that the equality
∣∣
∣θT0 θ
∣∣
∣ = ∥∥θ0
∥
∥‖θ‖ (25)
would imply θ = αθ0 for some α > 0, that is, the case ex-
cluded in Proposition 2. Therefore,
νTθ = β
(
‖θ‖ − ∥∥θ0
∥
∥−1θT0 θ
)
> 0. (26)
Similarly, it is also shown that
νTθ0 = β
(
‖θ‖ − ∥∥θ0
∥
∥−1θT0 θ
)
< 0. (27)
It then follows that
sign
[
νTθ
]
νTθ0 < 0. (28)
For given values of θ and θ0, the value of β in (23) is chosen
large enough such that
∣∣
∣νTθ
∣∣
∣ > 2λ,
∣∣
∣νTθ0
∣∣
∣ > 2λ.
(29)
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Now, let us consider φi, the ith row of the matrix Φ
defined in (9). If there is an input signal u(t) such that
φi(t) − φi(τ) = νT for two time instants t and τ, then the
inequality (28) leads to
sign
[(
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ
](
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ0 < 0. (30)
Notice that the existence of such input signals is ensured
by the controllability of the matrix pair (A,B).
Because
∣∣(φi(t)−φi(τ))θ| = |νTθ| > 2λ ≥ |ζi(t)−ζi(τ)|,
the sign of (φi(t)− φi(τ))θ + (ζi(t)− ζi(τ)) is determined by
the sign of (φi(t)− φi(τ))θ, thus
sign
[(
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ +
(
ζi(t)− ζi(τ)
)]
= sign[(φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ
]
.
(31)
This last equality, together with the inequality (30), leads to
sign
[(
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ +
(
ζi(t)− ζi(τ)
)](
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ0<0,
(32)
or equivalently
sign
[
zi(t)− zi(τ)
](
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ0 < 0,
sign
[
yi(t)− yi(τ)
](
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
θ0 < 0.
(33)
Remind that |[φi(t)− φi(τ)]θ0| = |νTθ0| > 2λ, then
sign
[
yi(t)− yi(τ)
][
φi(t)− φi(τ)
]
θ0 < −2λ. (34)
Therefore, the residual as defined in (17) satisfies
ri(t, τ) > 2λ. (35)
If t is the current time instant, then ri(t, τ) can be com-
puted for different past time instant τ. In order to reduce the
effect of modeling uncertainties, ri(t, τ) can be averaged over
different values of τ in a sliding window. The computation of
the residul from sampled signals is summarized as follows.
Residual generation algorithm summary
Assume that Φ(t) and y(t) are sampled1 at discrete time
instants 1, 2, . . . ,N . Choose the sliding window length 0 <
L < N for residual averaging. For each sensor number i =
1, 2, . . . ,m, a residual is computed, for k ≥ L+ 1, through the
formulas
ri(k, s) = −sign
[
yi(k)− yi(s)
][
φi(k)− φi(s)
]
θ0,
ri(k) = 1
L
k−1∑
s=k−L
max
(
ri(k, s), 0
)
.
(36)
Notice that the max function is used to exclude negative val-
ues of ri(k, s) in the computation of the average value.
1 For notation simplicity, the sampling period is assumed to be 1 here.
4. FAULT ISOLATION
After the detection of an actuator fault, the purpose of fault
isolation is to figure out which actuators are faulty. In terms
of (11a) and (11b), it amounts to deciding which compo-
nents of θ have deviated from the nominal value θ0.
It should be first remarked that, because of the arbitrary
unknown function h, it is not possible to detect or isolate any
proportional changes in all the components of θ. In other
words, for any value α ∈ R, the parameter vector θ1 = αθ0
cannot be distinguished from θ0 based on the known signals
Φ(t) and y(t). For the same reason, if all the components of
θ, except one, have changed, it is not possible to determine
which one has not changed.
After having clarified the limitation related to unknown
sensor distortion, let us look for an algorithm for fault iso-
lation. The basic idea is to design residuals similar to (17),
but capable of rejecting some actuator faults. Each designed
residual should be insensitive to some of the possible actuator
faults, whereas sensitive to the others. The actually occurred
fault can then be isolated by comparing such residuals.
Let P be a permutation matrix, that is, a matrix obtained
by permuting the rows of the l × l identity matrix Il (remind
that l is the number of actuators). Divide P into two sub-
matrices Pf and Ps, respectively, composed of l f and ls = l−l f
rows of P. Then it can be easily verified that
PTf P f + P
T
s Ps = Il. (37)
The notations Pf θ and Psθ will be used to select, respec-
tively, the assumed faulty components and sound (or fault-
free) components of θ. It is derived from (11a) that
z(t) = Φ(t)PTf P f θ +Φ(t)PTs Psθ + ζ(t). (38)
If Ps is assumed to select the components of θ corresponding
to sound actuators, then, even after the occurrence of actua-
tor faults, the equality
Psθ = Psθ0 (39)
still holds. Define
θ f  Pf θ, (40)
then
z(t) = Φ(t)PTf θ f +Φ(t)PTs Psθ0 + ζ(t). (41)
For the purpose of fault isolation, different partitions of
P into (Pf ,Ps) should be considered. For each particular par-
tition, a residual will be designed to be insensitive to changes
in the corresponding subvector θ f = Pf θ. Such a residual is
said to be rejecting changes in θ f . The rejection method used
in the following is the estimation of θ f from measure signals.
For two time instants t, τ, Assumption 1 implies (by
rewriting inequality (15)) that
sign
[
yi(t)− yi(τ)
][(
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
PTf θ f +
(
φi(t)− φi(τ)
)
×PTs Psθ0 + ζi(t)− ζi(τ)
] ≥ 0.
(42)
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For a given set of signals Φ(t), y(t) sampled at discrete time
instants 1, 2, . . . ,N , the value of θ f can be estimated by min-
imizing the error term ζi(t) − ζi(τ) in the inequality (42)
where the time instants t, τ are replaced by all pairs among
the sampling instants 1, 2, . . . ,N .
Because yi(t) < yi(s) and yi(s) < yi(τ) imply yi(t) <
yi(τ), there would be too much redundancy if all the possible
pairs among 1, 2, . . . ,N were considered in (42). In order to
reduce redundancy, for each sensor yi, the data samples are
sorted according to the values of yi(t), and only the neigh-
boring pairs are considered. The algorithm is summarized as
follows.
Residual generation algorithm summary
For each chosen partition of P into (Pf ,Ps), the residuals re-
jecting changes in θ f = Pf θ are computed as follows. For
each sensor number i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, sort the data such that
yi
(
ki1
)
≤ yi
(
ki2
)
≤ · · · ≤ yi
(
kiN
)
. (43)
Solve the constrained optimization problem
min
θ f
max
1≤i≤m, 1≤ j≤N−1
ζ̃ i
(
j
)
, (44)
subject to the constraints, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j =
1, 2, . . . ,N − 1,
[
φi
(
kij
)
− φi
(
kij+1
)]
PTf θ f
+
[
φi
(
kij
)
− φi
(
kij+1
)]
PTs Psθ0 + ζ̃ i
(
j
) ≤ 0.
(45)
The corresponding sequences
ζ̃ i(1), ζ̃ i(2), . . . , ζ̃ i(N − 1), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (46)
are the residuals rejecting changes in θ f .
Remark that the inequality (45) corresponds to the in-
equality (42) where the omitted sign[yi(kij)− yi(kij+1)] is al-
ways negative due to the sorted sequence, and accordingly,
the inequality changes from “≥ ” to “≤ ”.
The constrained minimization (44)-(45) can be easily
reformulated in the form of a standard linear programing
problem. There are efficient numerical algorithms for its so-
lution [13].
Proposition 3. If the true parameter vector θ governing (11a)
satisfies Psθ = Psθ0, and if |ζi(t)| ≤ λ for some constant λ
and any t, then the residual ζ̃ i
(
j
)
, solution of the constrained
optimization problem (44)-(45), satisfies
ζ̃ i
(
j
) ≤ 2λ. (47)
Proof. The proof of this result is quite straightforward. Let us
first derive from (11a), (11b), and (37) that
[
φi
(
kij
)
− φi
(
kij+1
)]
PTf P f θ +
[
φi
(
kij
)
− φi
(
kij+1
)]
PTs Psθ
+ζi
(
kij
)
− ζi
(
kij+1
)
= zi
(
kij
)
− zi
(
kij+1
)
≤ 0,
(48)
where the indices kij , k
i
j+1 come from the sequence sorting
yi(k) as in (43).
It is assumed that Psθ = Psθ0. Then the above inequal-
ity shows that there exist a value of θ f (equal to Pf θ) and a
value of ζ̃ i
(
j
)
(equal to ζi(k
i
j) − ζi(kij+1)) such that the in-
equality (45) is satisfied. These values of θ f and ζ̃ i
(
j
)
do not
necessarily correspond to the solution of the constrained op-
timization problem (44)-(45), however, the optimal solution
certainly has a value of ζ̃ i
(
j
)
not larger than ζi(k
i
j)− ζi(kij+1).
Therefore,
ζ̃ i
(
j
) ≤ ζi
(
kij
)
− ζi
(
kij+1
)
≤ 2λ. (49)
Property (47) has been proved under the assumption
Psθ = Psθ0. It can be shown that (47) holds also if Psθ =
αPsθ0 for any α ∈ R because of the unknown sensor distor-
tion function.
For fault isolation, various matrices Ps are assumed and
the corresponding residuals are computed. Then property
(47) can be used to decide if each assumed Ps is correct or
not. Alternatively, for different matrices Ps of the same size,
the values of the residuals can also be compared for fault iso-
lation.
Keep in mind that fault isolation cannot distinguish the
cases such that Psθ = αPsθ0. For reliable fault isolation, the
following assumption is required.
Assumption 3. There exists a permutation matrix P such
that, for Ps composed of some rows of P,
Psθ = Psθ0, (50)
and there does not exist any P̃s = Ps (except for P̃s composed
of a subset of permutated rows of Ps) such that
P̃sθ = αP̃sθ0, (51)
for some scalar real value α.
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, the presented fault diagnosis method will be
illustrated with a simulated distillation column.
In [14, page 223], a distillation column is modeled with a
transfer function matrix with three control inputs: top draw
flow rate, side draw flow rate, and bottom temperature con-
trol, and three outputs: top draw composition, side draw
composition, and bottom reflux temperature. In order to il-
lustrate the possibility of fault diagnosis with only one out-
put sensor, let us consider the model relating the three inputs
and one of the outputs, the bottom reflux temperature. The
transfer function model is
Z(s) = 4.38e
−20s
33s + 1
U1(s) +
4.42e−22s
44s + 1
U2(s) +
7.20
19s + 1
U3(s).
(52)
Note that the known time delays at the inputs do not cause
any serious difficulty for fault diagnosis, though the on-line
computation has to be delayed accordingly.
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Figure 1: Fault detection residual. The same residual is plotted twice at different scales. The time unit is the minute.
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Figure 2: Fault isolation residuals. The time unit is the minute. Top:
residual rejecting the fault of actuator 1. Middle: residual rejecting
the fault of actuator 2. Bottom: residual rejecting the fault of actua-
tor 3.
Numerical simulation is first made in continuous time.
The three input variables are randomly drawn with uniform
distributions ranged within the intervals [20, 40] (mol/min),
[10, 30] (mol/min) and [10, 20] (◦C). The simulated noise-
free output is disturbed by an additive bandlimited noise
with noise power 0.01 and unitary sample time. Then the
sensor distortion function
h(z) = 100
1 + e−0.2(z−320)
+ 10 (53)
is applied. In this monotonously increasing function, the ad-
ditive constant 10 has been added to illustrate the robustness
of the proposed method to sensor bias (shifting error). Fi-
nally, the distorted sensor output y(t) sampled at the period
of one minute is corrupted by a random noise uniformly dis-
tributed within the interval [−0.05, 0.05] (◦C). The simu-
lated data is recorded during 2000 minutes after an initial
simulation of 1000 minutes to avoid the initial transient pe-
riod. At the beginning, all the actuators are fault free. At the
1000th minute (of the recorded duration), a factor of 0.8 is
applied to the first actuator, simulating an actuator fault.
The residual for fault detection, computed with the av-
eraging window length L = 100, is illustrated in Figure 1. In
Figure 1(a) showing the residual in full scale, there is a strong
transient behavior of the residual after occurrence of the ac-
tuator fault (at the 1000th minute). This transient behavior
is in favor of a fast detection of the actuator fault. In order
to view better the residual outside the transient period, it is
plotted in Figure 1(b) in a finer scale. The detected fault is
clearly confirmed by the residual after the transient period.
For fault isolation, three residuals are computed with the
signals from the 1801th minute to the 2000th minute. Each
of the three residuals is designed to reject a fault affecting one
of the three actuators. The residuals rejecting the faults of ac-
tuator 1, 2, and 3 are, respectively, plotted in the top, middle,
and bottom pictures of Figure 2. The first residual is clearly
smaller than the two others, indicating that the hypothesis of
a fault affecting the first actuator is the most likely one, which
corresponds to the actually simulated fault.
6. CONCLUSION
Despite unknown nonlinear distortions of sensors, the in-
formation provided by such sensors is still useful for fault
diagnosis, even when there is no redundant sensors, if the
distortions are strictly monotonous. The monotonousness is
a weak assumption since nonmonotonous distortion would
make the sensor information useless. The main idea of the
method presented in this paper is about how to use the infor-
mation provided by such sensors. Because of the unknown
nature of nonlinear distortion, neither the absolute value of
the measured physical variable nor its sign can be determined
from the sensor signal. The strict monotonousness of the
nonlinear distortion is not helpful in this aspect. However,
for any two different time instants, the relative sign of the
measured variable is preserved by the monotonous nonlinear
distortion. By using the information residing in the relative
sign of sensor signals, the method for actuator fault diagnosis
presented in this paper is conceptually robust to sensor dis-
tortions, as illustrated by the numerical example presented in
this paper.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fault-tolerant control (FTC) techniques against actuator
faults can be classified into two groups [1]: passive and ac-
tive approaches. In passive FTC systems, a single controller
with fixed structure/parameters is used to deal with all possi-
ble failure scenarios which are assumed to be known a priori.
Consequently, the passive controller is usually conservative.
Furthermore, if a failure out of those considered in the design
occurs, the stability and performance of the closed-loop sys-
tem might not be guaranteed. Such potential limitations of
passive approaches provide a strong motivation for the de-
velopment of methods and strategies for active FTC (AFTC)
systems.
In contrast to passive FTC systems, AFTC techniques rely
on a real-time fault detection and isolation (FDI) scheme and
a controller reconfiguration mechanism. Such techniques al-
low a flexibility to select different controllers according to dif-
ferent component failures, and therefore better performance
of the closed-loop system can be expected. However, this
holds true when the FDI process does not make an incorrect
or delayed decision [2]. Some preliminary results have been
obtained on AFTC which is immune to imperfect FDI process
[3, 4]. In [5], the latter issue is further discussed in a classical
setting (i.e., point-to-point control) by using the guaranteed
cost control approach and online controller switching in or-
der to ensure stability of the closed-loop system at all times.
The aim of this paper is to extend the results in [5] to uncer-
tain plants controlled over digital communication networks.
In such networks, the information transfer from sensors to
controllers and from controllers to actuators is not instan-
taneous but suffers communication delays. Such communi-
cation delays can be highly variable due to their strong de-
pendence on variable network conditions such as congestion
and channel quality. These network-induced delays may im-
pact adversely on the stability and performance of the control
system [6, 8]. Networked control systems (NCSs) are now
pervasive (see, e.g., the recent special issue of the proceed-
ings of the IEEE [7]), and such systems are long-running
real-time systems which should function in a correct man-
ner even in the presence of failures. This makes the issue of
fault tolerant control in NCS an important one and entails
designing strategies to cope with some of the fundamental
problems introduced by the network such as bandwidth lim-
itations, quantization and sampling effects, message schedul-
ing and communication delays. Motivated by the above con-
siderations, we address the problem of fault tolerant con-
trol in NCSs with time-varying delays. Specifically, we extend
the results of [5] for the stabilization of a plant, subject to
model uncertainties and actuator faults, which is controlled
over a communication network that induces time-varying
but bounded delays.
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Figure 1: Networked control system with actuator failures.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a
network-based control model for an uncertain plant subject
to actuator failures is proposed and the guaranteed cost con-
trol problem is formulated. In Section 3, the detailed proce-
dure for designing the NCSs-based fault-tolerant controller
is given. Section 4 presents a design example to illustrate the
benefit of the proposed FTC design procedure. Finally, con-
clusions are given in Section 5. The proof of the main theo-
rem of the paper is reported in the appendix.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Figure 1 shows the basic networked control architecture
which is considered in this paper and which consists of a
single uncertain plant, with few sensors and actuators, con-
trolled by a digital controller in a centralized structure.
The delays induced by the network in the closed-
loop control system are modeled as time-varying quantities
τ(k) = τsck arising from the communication delays between
sensors and controllers at time k. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that there are no transmission time-delays be-
tween the controllers and the actuators. The actuators might
be subject to faults during the system operation. Thus, taking
into account the potential failures of actuators, the intercon-
nection of the uncertain discrete-time plant and a discrete-
time controller through the digital communication link as
depicted in Figure 1 can be described by the following dy-
namical and state-delayed feedback equations:
x(k + 1) = (A + DΔ(k)E)x(k) + BLu(k), (1)
x(0) = x0, (2)
u(k) = Kx(k − τ(k)), (3)
where x(k) ∈ Rn is the state of the uncertain plant, u(k) ∈
Rm is the control input, A, B, D, E are all real constant
matrices, and matrix K is the controller gain matrix to be
designed. The time-varying matrix Δ(k) represents norm-
bounded parameter uncertainties and satisfies the bound
Δ(k)TΔ(k) ≤ I where I denotes the identity matrix with ap-
propriate dimension. The constant matrices D and E char-
acterize the structure of these parameter uncertainties. The
fault indicator matrix L is given by
L = diag{l1, . . . , lm} (4)
with l j ∈ {0, 1} for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, where l j = 1 means that
the jth actuator is in healthy state, whereas the jth actuator
is meant to experience a total failure when l j = 0. Having a
finite number of actuators, the set of possible related failure
modes is also finite and, by abuse of notation, we denote this
set by
L = {L1, L2, . . .LN} (5)
with N= 2m − 1. Each failure mode Li, (i = 1, 2 . . . ,N) is
therefore an element of the set L. We also view Li as a ma-
trix, that is, as a particular pattern of matrix L in (4) de-
pending on the values of l j ( j = 1, 2, . . .m). Throughout,
when L is invoked as a matrix, it will mean that matrix L
varies over the set of matrices in (5). Note that the faulty
mode Li in the NCS architecture of Figure 1 is estimated by
the FDI unit. In order to ensure that system (1) should re-
main controllable, we assume that the set L excludes the ele-
ment diag{0, 0, . . . , 0}, that is, at least one actuator should be
healthy.
We further assume that the time-varying delays τ(k) lie
between the following positive integer bounds τm and τM ,
that is,
τm ≤ τ(k) ≤ τM. (6)
Given positive definite symmetric matrices Q1 and Q2, we
consider the quadratic cost function
J =
∞∑
k=0
[xT(k)Q1x(k) + uT(k)Q2u(k)], (7)
and with respect to this cost function, we define the guaran-
teed cost controller in the event of actuator failures as follows.
Definition 1. If there exists a control law u(k) and a positive
scalar J∗ such that for all admissible uncertainties Δ(k) and
all failure modes Li ∈ L the closed-loop system (1)–(3) is
stable with cost function (7) satisfying J ≤ J∗, then J∗ is said
to be a guaranteed cost and u(k) a guaranteed cost controller
for the uncertain system (1).
In Section 3, we will proceed through two main steps to
design a cost guaranteed active fault tolerant control in the
NCS framework. These steps are
(i) construct a fault-tolerant controller (i.e., a robust con-
troller), with structure as given by (3), which achieves
the smallest possible value for J∗ under all admissible
plant uncertainties and all actuator failure modes;
(ii) redesign that part of the above controller associated to
only one fault-free actuator in order to improve the ro-
bust performance without loss of the stability property
of the design in step (i); step (ii) repeats for all m actu-
ators and results in a bank of m controllers.
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It follows from inequality m ≤ N = 2m − 1, that the cardi-
nality of the bank of controllers (which is equal to the num-
ber of actuators) is less than the cardinality of the set L of
faulty modes. For each faulty mode Li, the controller to be
switched on should be the best as ranked with respect to a
closed-loop performance index. In this paper, we will not
address the switching and reconfiguration mechanisms; we
focus on the design of the bank of m controllers.
3. AFTC DESIGN FOR NCS
3.1. Robust stability
In this subsection, we establish a sufficient condition for the
existence of a guaranteed cost network-based controller for
the uncertain plant (1). Note that the control law (3) applied
to plant (1) results in the following system:
x(k + 1) = A1x(k) + BLKx(k − τ(k)), (8)
where A1 = A + DΔ(k)E. The cost function associated to
system (8) is therefore
J =
∞∑
k=0
xTe (k)Qxe(k), (9)
where xTe (k)=[xT(k),xT(k−τ(k))] and Q=diag{Q1,KTQ2K}.
Under the assumptions made in Section 2, we can state the
following result.
Theorem 1. If there exist a gain matrix K , a scalar ε > 0, sym-
metric positive-definite matrices P1 ∈ Rn×n, R ∈ Rn×n, S ∈
Rn×n, and matrices P2 ∈ Rn×n, P3 ∈ Rn×n, W ∈ R2n×2n,
M ∈R2n×n such that the following matrix inequalities are sat-
isfied:
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Γ PT
[
0
BLK
]
−M
⎡
⎣
ET
0
⎤
⎦
∗ −R + KTQ2K 0
∗ ∗ −εI
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
< 0, (10)
[
W M
∗ S
]
≥ 0 (11)
with
Γ = PT
[
0 I
A− I −I
]
+
[
0 I
A− I −I
]T
P
+ εPT
[
0 0
0 DDT
]
P +
[
μR + Q1 0
0 P1 + τMS
]
+ τMW + [ M 0 ] + [ M 0 ]
T
,
μ = 1 + (τM − τm
)
, P =
[
P1 0
P2 P3
]
,
(12)
then system (8) is asymptotically stable and the cost function
(9) satisfies the inequality
J ≤ xT(0)P1x(0) +
−1∑
l=−τM
xT(l)Rx(l)
+
0∑
θ=−τM+1
−1∑
l=−1+θ
yT(l)Sy(l)
+
−τM+1∑
θ=−τM+2
−1∑
l=θ−1
xT(l)Rx(l),
(13)
where y(l) = x(l + 1)− x(l).
Proof. See the appendix.
Remark 2. The “∗” sign represents blocks that are readily in-
ferred by symmetry.
Remark 3. Note that the upper bound in (13) depends on the
initial condition of system (8). To remove the dependence on
the initial condition, we suppose that the initial state of sys-
tem (8) might be arbitrary but belongs to the set S = {x(l) ∈
Rn : x(l) = Uv, vTv ≤ 1, l = −τM ,−τM + 1, . . . ,−τm},
where U is a given matrix. Inequality (13) leads to
J ≤ λmax
(
UTP1U
)
+ ρ1λmax
(
UTRU
)
+ ρ2λmax
(
UTSU
)
,
(14)
where λmax(·) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of matrix
(·), ρ1 = μ(τM + τm)/2, and ρ2 = 2τM(τM + 1).
3.2. Step (i): Controller Design
Now, we derive the guaranteed cost controller in terms of the
feasible solutions to a set of linear matrix inequalities.
Using Sherman-Morrison matrix inversion formula, we
have
P−1 =
[
P−11 0
−P−13 P2P−11 P−13
]
. (15)
In the sequel, we will denote X = P−11 , Y = P−13 , and Z =
−P−13 P2P−11 . We further restrict M to the following case in
order to obtain a linear matrix inequality (LMI) (see, e.g.,
[9]):
M = δPT
[
0
BLK
]
, (16)
where δ is a scalar parameter. Pre- and postmultiply (10)
by diag{(P−1)T ,P−11 , I} and diag{P−1,P−11 , I}, respectively;
also pre- and postmultiply (11) by diag{(P−1)T ,P−11 } and
diag{P−1,P−11 } and denote
L = P−11 RP−11 , F = KP−11 , S = S−1,
(
P−1
)T
WP−1 =
[
W1 W2
∗ W3
]
.
(17)
Applying the Schur complement and expanding the block
matrices, we obtain the following result under the assump-
tions made in Section 2.
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Theorem 2. Suppose that for a prescribed scalar δ, there ex-
ist a scalar ε > 0, matrices X > 0, Y , Z, F, L > 0, S >
0, W1, W2, W3, such that the following matrix inequalities
are satisfied:
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Ψ1 Ψ2 0 Ψ41
∗ Ψ3 (1− δ)BLF Ψ42
∗ ∗ −L Ψ43
∗ ∗ ∗ Ψ5
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
< 0, (18)
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
W1 W2 0
∗ W3 δBLF
∗ ∗ XS−1X
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ ≥ 0, (19)
where
Ψ1 = Z + ZT + μL + τMW1,
Ψ2 = Y + X(A− I)T − ZT + τMW2 + δ(BLF)T ,
Ψ3 = −Y − YT + τMW3 + εDDT ,
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
Ψ41
Ψ42
Ψ43
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
XET τMZT 0 X ZT
0 τMYT 0 0 YT
0 0 FT 0 0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ ,
Ψ5 = diag{−εI ,−τMS,−Q−12 ,−Q−11 ,−X}.
(20)
Then, the control law
u(k) = FX−1x(k − τ(k)) (21)
is a guaranteed cost networked control law for system (1) and
the corresponding cost function satisfies
J ≤ λmax
(
UTX−1U
)
+ ρ1λmax
(
UTX−1LX−1U
)
+ ρ2λmax
(
UTS
−1
U
)
,
(22)
where ρ1 = μ(τM + τm)/2 and ρ2 = 2τM(τM + 1).
Remark 4. From (22), we establish the following inequalities:
[
−αI UT
∗ −X
]
< 0,
[
−βI UT
∗ −XL−1X
]
< 0,
[
−γI UT
∗ −S
]
< 0,
(23)
where α, β, and γ are scalars to be determined. It is worth
noting that condition (23) is not an LMI because of the term
−XL−1X . This is also the case for condition (19) which is not
an LMI because of the term XS
−1
X . Note that for any matrix
X > 0 we have
XS
−1
X ≥ 2X − S, XL−1X ≥ 2X − L. (24)
Given a prescribed scalar δ, the design problem of the op-
timal guaranteed cost controller can be formulated therefore
as the following optimization problem:
OP1: min
ε,X ,Y ,Z,F,L,S,W1,W2,W3
(
α + ρ1β + ρ2γ
)
s.t.
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(i) inequality (18),
(ii)
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
W1 W2 0
∗ W3 δBLF
∗ ∗ 2X − S
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
≥ 0,
(iii)
⎡
⎣
−αI UT
∗ −X
⎤
⎦ < 0,
⎡
⎣
−βI UT
∗ −2X + L
⎤
⎦ < 0,
⎡
⎣
−γI UT
∗ −S
⎤
⎦ < 0.
(25)
Clearly, the above optimization problem (25) is a convex op-
timization problem which can be effectively solved by exist-
ing LMI software [10]. Thus, the minimization of α+ρ1β+ρ2γ
implies the minimization of the cost in (9). By applying a
simple one-dimensional search over δ for a certain τM , a
global optimum cost can be found.
3.3. Robust Stability with at least a fault-free actuator
Based on the controller designed in Theorem 2, let us as-
sume that actuator i is fault-free, then we can redesign the
i th row of controller gain matrix K to improve the robust
performance for the system against actuator failures. We can
rewrite the overall control system as
x(k + 1) = A1x(k) +
(
BiLiKi + biki
)
x
(
k − τ(k)), (26)
where A1 = A + DΔ(k)E, matrix Ki is obtained by deleting
the ith row from K , Bi is obtained by deleting the ith col-
umn from B, and Li is obtained by deleting ith row and ith
column from L. The cost function associated to system (26)
reads as
J =
∞∑
k=0
xTe (k)Qxe(k) (27)
with xTe (k) = [xT(k), xT(k − τ(k))], Q = diag{Q1, kTi Q2iki +
KTi Q2iKi}, where Q2i is obtained by deleting the ith row and
ith column from Q2. With regard to system (26) where Ki is
assumed to be known, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. If there exist a gain matrix ki, a scalar ε > 0, sym-
metric positive-definite matrices P1 ∈ Rn×n, R ∈ Rn×n, S ∈
Rn×n, and matrices P2 ∈ Rn×n, P3 ∈ Rn×n, W ∈ R2n×2n,
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M ∈R2n×n such that the following matrix inequalities are sat-
isfied:
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Γ PT
[
0
BiLiKi + biki
]
−M
[
ET
0
]
∗ −R + kTi Q2iki + KTi Q2iKi 0
∗ ∗ −εI
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
< 0, (28)
[
W M
∗ S
]
≥ 0, (29)
then, system (26) is asymptotically stable and the cost function
(27) satisfies inequality (13).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
3.4. Step (ii): Controller Redesign
Proceeding as in step (i), we restrict M to the following case
in order to obtain an LMI:
M = δPT
[
0
biki
]
, (30)
where δ is a scalar parameter. Pre- and postmultiply (28)
with diag{(P−1)T ,P−11 , I} and diag{P−1,P−11 , I}, respectively;
also pre- and postmultiply (29) with diag{(P−1)T ,P−11 } and
diag{P−1,P−11 }, respectively, and denote
L = P−11 RP−11 , F∗ = kiP−11 , S = S−1,
(
P−1
)T
WP−1 =
⎡
⎣
W1 W2
∗ W3
⎤
⎦ .
(31)
The Schur complement trick leads to the following controller
redesign result.
Theorem 4. Suppose that for a prescribed scalar δ, there ex-
ist a scalar ε > 0, matrices X > 0, Y , Z, F∗, L > 0, S > 0,
W1, W2, W3, such that the following matrix inequalities are
satisfied:
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Ψ̃1 Ψ̃2 0 Ψ̃41
∗ Ψ̃3 BiLiKiX + (1− δ)biF∗ Ψ̃42
∗ ∗ −L Ψ̃43
∗ ∗ ∗ Ψ̃5
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
< 0, (32)
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
W1 W2 0
∗ W3 δbiF∗
∗ ∗ XS−1X
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ ≥ 0, (33)
where
Ψ̃1 = Z + ZT + μL + τMW1,
Ψ̃2 = Y + X(A− I)T − ZT + τMW2 + δ
(
biF∗
)T
,
Ψ̃3 = −Y − YT + τMW3 + εDDT ,
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Ψ̃41
Ψ̃42
Ψ̃43
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
=
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
XET τMZT 0 0 X ZT
0 τMYT 0 0 0 YT
0 0 (F∗)T XKTi 0 0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ ,
Ψ̃5 = diag
{− εI ,−τMS,−Q−12i ,−Q−12i ,−Q−11 ,−X
}
.
(34)
Then, the ith control law
ui(k) = F∗X−1x
(
k − τ(k)) (35)
is a guaranteed cost networked control law of system (26) and
the corresponding cost function satisfies
J ≤ λmax
(
UTX−1U
)
+ ρ1λmax
(
UTX−1LX−1U
)
+ ρ2λmax
(
UTS
−1
U
)
,
(36)
where ρ1 = μ(τM + τm)/2 and ρ2 = 2τM(τM + 1).
Given a prescribed scalar δ, the redesign problem of the
optimal guaranteed cost controller can be formulated as the
following convex optimization problem:
OP2: min
ε,X ,Y ,Z,F∗ ,L,S,W1,W2,W3
(α + ρ1β + ρ2γ)
s.t.
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(i) inequality (32),
(ii)
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
W1 W2 0
∗ W3 δbiF∗
∗ ∗ 2X − S
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ ≥ 0,
(iii)
⎡
⎣
−αI UT
∗ −X
⎤
⎦ < 0,
⎡
⎣
−βI UT
∗ −2X + L
⎤
⎦ < 0,
⎡
⎣
−γI UT
∗ −S
⎤
⎦ < 0.
(37)
4. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The dynamics are described by the following matrices:
A =
[
0.9 0
0.2 0.5
]
, B =
[
0.2 0.1
0 −0.1
]
,
D =
[
0 0.1
0.1 0
]
, E =
[
0.1 0
0.1 −0.1
]
,
(38)
and the design parameters are chosen as
Q1 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, Q2 =
[
0.1 0
0 0.1
]
, U =
[
1 0
0 1
]
.
(39)
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Figure 2: Disturbance, actuator failures, and state response.
When τm = 1, τM = 2, and δ = 1, by OP1 (25), the cost
is obtained as J1 = 61.6653 and the fault-tolerant controller
can be designed for step (i):
[
k1
k2
]
=
[−0.0812× 10−5 −0.1333× 10−5
−0.1865× 10−5 −0.3060× 10−5
]
. (40)
In step (ii), by OP2 (37), the cost and the feedback gains are
redesigned as
J2 = 39.0026, k∗1 =
[
−0.8776 −0.2857
]
,
J3 = 49.9616, k∗2 =
[
−0.6494 −0.4161
]
.
(41)
As a result, the two controllers are determined as follows:
#1 :
[
k∗1
k2
]
=
[ −0.8776 −0.2857
−0.1865× 10−5 −0.3060× 10−5
]
,
#2 :
[
k1
k∗2
]
=
[−0.0812× 10−5 −0.1333× 10−5
−0.6494 −0.4161
]
.
(42)
Figure 2 reports the simulation for two failures scenarios of
the actuators. For this simulation, the time-varying norm-
bounded uncertain matrix Δ(k) is taken as
Δ(k) =
(
sin(πk) 0
0 cos(πk)
)
, (43)
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which clearly satisfies the bound Δ(k)TΔ(k) ≤ I . The left col-
umn of Figure 2 is related to failures of actuator 1 and the
right column is related to failures of actuator 2. Note also
that for these two failures scenarios the system has been dis-
turbed by step disturbances entering additively in the state
equations. This is illustrated in the simulation where the step
disturbance 1 shown in Figure 2(a) disturbs the state vari-
ables at time instant 35 and disappears at time instant 40.
The step disturbance 2 shown in Figure 2(b) disturbs the sys-
tem at time instant 5 and disappears at time instant 10. In
Figure 2(c), the solid line represents the failure of actuator 1
which occurs at time instant 15 and disappears at time in-
stant 35, occurs again at time instant 55 and disappears at
time instant 65. In Figure 2(d), the solid line represents the
failure of actuator 2 which occurs at time instant 35 and dis-
appears at time instant 45, occurs again at time instant 65
and disappears at time instant 80. The delay of fault detec-
tion is assumed to be 3 time steps, which is represented by
dot-dashed lines as shown in Figures 2(c) and 2(d). Under
the above simulation setting, the state responses are shown
in Figures 2(e) and 2(f):
(i) the dotted line represents the state response for
controller-switching sequence N◦1 : #2 is the initial
controller, and #1 is switched-on at time instant 38,
then #2 at time instant 48, #1 at time instant 68;
(ii) the solid line represents the state response for
controller-switching sequence N◦2 : #1 is the initial
controller, and #2 is switched-on at time instant 38,
then #1 at time instant 48, #2 at time instant 68;
(iii) the dot-dashed line represents the state response un-
der the fault tolerant control (i.e., robust control) of
step (i).
The trace of matrices (x∗)(x∗)T/(simulation time) is used as
a performance measure for comparison, where x∗ represents
the state trajectory in the different schemes and the simula-
tion time is 80 seconds. After computation, we obtain for the
above three control schemes the traces Tr1 = 0.0279,Tr2 =
0.0338,Tr3 = 0.0499, which means that Tr1 < Tr2 < Tr3.
We conclude that the proposed method for sequence N◦1 is
the best control scheme. We also observe that for all possi-
ble switching sequences with controllers in the designed con-
trollers bank, the proposed active FTC is able to guarantee at
least the closed-loop stability of the overall system.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the stability guaranteed active fault tolerant
control against actuators failure in networked control system
with time-varying but bounded delays has been addressed.
Plants with norm-bounded parameter uncertainty have been
considered, where the uncertainty may appear in the state
matrix. Modelling network-induced delays as communica-
tion delays between sensors and actuators, linear memory-
less state feedback fault-tolerant controllers have been de-
veloped through LMI-based methods. A simulation example
has been presented to show the potentials of the proposed
method for fault-tolerant control in networked control sys-
tems.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The following matrix inequalities are essential for the proof
of Theorem 1.
Lemma 5 (see [11]). Assume that a(·) ∈ Rna , b(·) ∈
Rnb , and N(·) ∈ Rna×nb . Then, for any matrices X ∈
Rna×na , Y ∈Rna×nb , and Z ∈Rnb×nb , the following holds:
−2aTNb ≤
[
a
b
]T [
X Y −N
YT −NT Z
][
a
b
]
, (A.1)
where
[
X Y
YT Z
]
≥ 0.
Lemma 6 (see [12]). Let Y be a symmetric matrix and let
H , E be given matrices with appropriate dimensions, then
Y + HFE + ETFTHT < 0 (A.2)
holds for all F satisfying FTF ≤ I , if and only if there exists a
scalar ε > 0 such that
Y + εHHT + ε−1ETE < 0. (A.3)
Proof. Note that x(k − τ(k)) = x(k) −∑k−1l=k−τ(k)y(l), where
y(l) = x(l + 1)− x(l). Then from system (8) we have
0 = (A1 + BLK − I
)
x(k)− y(k)− BLK
k−1∑
l=k−τ(k)
y(l). (A.4)
Choose the Lyapunov-Krasovskii function candidates as fol-
lows:
V(k) = V1(k) + V2(k) + V3(k), (A.5)
where
V1(k) = xT(k)P1x(k),
V2(k) =
k−1∑
l=k−τ(k)
xT(l)Rx(l),
V3(k) =
−1∑
θ=−τM
k−1∑
l=k+θ
yT(l)Sy(l)
+
−τm+1∑
θ=−τM+2
k−1∑
l=k+θ−1
xT(l)Rx(l)
(A.6)
Taking the forward difference for the Lyapunov functional
V1(k), we have
ΔV1(k) = 2xT(k)P1y(k) + yT(k)P1y(k). (A.7)
From (A.4), we have
2xT(k)P1y(k) = 2ηT(k)PT
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
y(k)
N − BLK
k−1∑
l=k−τ(k)
y(l)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
(A.8)
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where N = (A1 +BLK−I)x(k)− y(k),ηT(k)= [xT(k) yT(k)].
Choose constant matrices W , M, and S satisfying (11); by
Lemma 5, we have
− 2
k−1∑
l=k−τ(k)
ηT(k)PT
[
0
BLK
]
y(l)
≤ τMηT(k)Wη(k) +
k−1∑
l=k−τM
yT(l)Sy(l)
+ 2ηT(k)
{
M − PT
[
0
BLK
]}
(
x(k)− x(k − τ(k)).
(A.9)
Similarly,
ΔV2(k) = xT(k)Rx(k)− xT
(
k − τ(k))Rx(k − τ(k))
+
k−1∑
l=k+1−τ(k+1)
xT(l)Rx(l)−
k−1∑
k−τ(k)+1
xT(l)Rx(l).
(A.10)
Note that
k−τm∑
l=k+1−τ(k+1)
xT(l)Rx(l)
=
k−1∑
l=k+1−τm
xT(l)Rx(l) +
k−τm∑
l=k+1−τ(k+1)
xT(l)Rx(l)
≤
k−1∑
l=k+1−τ(k)
xT(l)Rx(l) +
k−τm∑
l=k+1−τM
xT(l)Rx(l).
(A.11)
So, we have
ΔV2(k) ≤ xT(k)Rx(k)− xT
(
k − τ(k))Rx(k − τ(k))
+
k−τm∑
l=k+1−τm
xT(l)Rx(l).
(A.12)
Furthermore, we have
ΔV3(k) = τM yT(k)Sy(k)−
k−1∑
l=k+1−τm
yT(l)Sy(l)
+
(
τM − τm
)
xT(k)Rx(k)−
k−τm∑
l=k+1−τm
xT(l)Rx(l).
(A.13)
Combining (9) and (A.7)–(A.13), we have
ΔV(k) ≤ ξT(k)[Θ0
(
τm, τM
)
+ D̂Δ(k)Ê + ÊTΔT(k)D̂T
]
ξ(k)
− xTe (k)Qxe(k),
(A.14)
where
ξT(k) = [ ηT(k) xT(k − τ(k)) ],
D̂T =
[[
0DT
]
P 0
]
, Ê =
[
[E0]0
]
,
Θ0(τm, τM) =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
Γ0 PT
[
0
BLK
]
−M
∗ −R + KTQ2K
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦ ,
Γ0 = Γ− εPT
[
0 0
0 DDT
]
P.
(A.15)
By Lemma 6, we have
ΔV(k) ≤ ξT(k)[Θ0
(
τm, τM
)
+ εD̂D̂T + ε−1ÊT Ê
]
ξ(k)
− xTe (k)Qxe(k).
(A.16)
It is worth observing that matrix [Θ0(τm, τM) + εD̂D̂T +
ε−1ÊT Ê] is the Schur complement of −εI in the matrix of
the left-hand side of inequality (10). Therefore, the negative
definiteness of matrix [Θ0(τm, τM) +εD̂D̂T +ε−1ÊT Ê] result-
ing from inequality (10) implies that
ΔV(k) ≤ −xTe (k)Qxe(k). (A.17)
Summing both sides of the above inequality from 0 to ∞
leads to
∞∑
k=0
ΔV(k) = V(∞)−V(0)
≤ −
∞∑
k=0
xTe (k)Qxe(k) = −J
(A.18)
which, from system stability, yields
J ≤ V(0), (A.19)
that is, inequality (13).
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The reliability index is defined based on system dynamical responses and a safety region; the plant and controller are assumed to
have a multiple regime model structure, and a semi-Markov model is built for reliability evaluation based on the safety behavior
of each regime model estimated by using Monte Carlo simulation. Moreover, the history data of fault detection and isolation
decisions is used to update its transition characteristics and reliability model. This method provides an up-to-date reliability index
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1. INTRODUCTION
In order to meet high reliability requirement of safety-critical
processes, major progress has been made in fault toler-
ant control systems (FTCSs). FTCSs usually employ fault
detection and isolation (FDI) schemes and reconfigurable
controllers to accommodate fault effects, also known as ac-
tive FTCSs. Most work on reconfigurable controller design
is performed under the assumption of perfect FDI detec-
tions. However, imperfect FDI results are inevitable owing
to disturbances or modeling uncertainties and may corrupt
designated reliability requirement. Therefore, it is necessary
to validate the design of FTCSs from a reliability perspec-
tive.
The reliability of FTCSs has been investigated using var-
ious methods. The key problem is to set up appropriate
reliability models with control objectives and safety require-
ments incorporated. As fault occurrences and system failures
are rare events, dynamic models are usually not suitable
for reliability analysis. For example, Wu used serial-parallel
block diagrams and Markov models for evaluation purpose,
and defined a coverage concept to relate reliability and con-
trol actions [1]. Walker proposed Markov and semi-Markov
models to describe the transitions of fault and FDI modes,
but control actions are not considered [2]. In previous work,
we considered static model-based control objectives and
built a semi-Makov model from imperfect FDI and hard-
deadline concepts [3, 4]. However, in many practical sys-
tems, the safety and reliability of operation are often assessed
based on dynamic system responses. For instance, reliability
in structural control is defined as the probability of system
outputs outcrossing safety boundaries and evaluated by us-
ing Gaussian approximation [5]. Also, an online available re-
liability monitoring scheme using updated information may
aid maintenance scheduling, provide prealarming, and avoid
emergent overhauls. How to evaluate reliability when it is de-
fined based on system trajectory and how to implement an
online-monitoring scheme are the main motivations of this
paper.
The objectives of this paper are threefold. First of all,
a steady-state test (SST) is proposed to reduce false alarms
of FDI decisions. The stochastic modeling of such an FDI
scheme is studied based on which the transition character-
istics of FDI modes can be described. The second objective
is to develop a reliability evaluation scheme for FTCSs based
on system dynamic responses and safety boundary. At last,
online monitoring features are considered, such as estima-
tion of FDI transition parameters based on history data and
timely update of reliability index to reflect up-to-date system
behavior.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the
assumptions and system structure are given in Section 2; FDI
scheme, modeling, and parameter estimation are discussed
in Section 3; the determination of outcrossing failure rates
and hard-deadlines are discussed in Section 4; the reliabil-
ity model construction is discussed in Section 5 followed
by a demonstration example of an F-14 aircraft model in
Section 6.
2. ASSUMPTIONS AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE
Assumption 1. The considered plant is assumed to have fi-
nite fault modes, and dynamics under each fault mode can
be effectively represented by a linear system model.
Fault modes are represented by a set S with N integers;
{Mi : i ∈ S} represents the set of dynamical plant models
under various fault modes; {K j : j ∈ S} denotes a set of
reconfigurable controllers in a switching structure. K j is de-
signed for fault mode j based on M j , j ∈ S. However, true
fault modes are usually not directly known, so an FDI scheme
is used to generate estimates of fault modes, which may de-
viate from true fault modes with error probabilities.
Assumption 2. FDI scheme is assumed to generate a fault es-
timate based on a batch of measurements and calculations
for every fixed period Tc.
This assumption states a cyclic feature of FDI, such as sta-
tistical tests and interactive multiple model (IMM) Kalman
filters [6]. FDI modes are represented by a discrete-time
stochastic process ηn ∈ S, where n ∈ N, the set of nonnega-
tive integers. The time duration between consecutive discrete
indices is equal to FDI detection period Tc. K j is put in use
when ηn = j, j ∈ S. Corresponding to ηn, a discrete-time
stochastic process ζn denotes true fault mode. In reliability
engineering, constant failure rates are usually assumed for
the main part of component life cycle. In such a case, ζn can
be described as a Markov chain [7], and its transition proba-
bilities are denoted as Gij = Pr{ζn+1 = j | ζn = i}, i, j ∈ S.
Remark 1. The semi-Markov process can be used as a gen-
eral FDI model. It can describe any type of sojourn time
distribution; in contrast, the Markov process model accepts
exponential sojourn time distributions only. More discus-
sions can be found in [4].
Assumption 3. System performance is assumed to be repre-
sented by a vector signal z(t). Safety region, denoted as Ω,
is assumed to be a fixed region in the space of z(t) bounded
by its safety threshold. Failure is assumed to occur when z(t)
exceeds a safety region for the first time.
This assumption intends to define an appropriate relia-
bility index based on system dynamical response. It is com-
mon in control systems to use a signal z(t) to represent
performance, and z(t) is usually to be kept at small values
against influences from exogenous disturbances, modeling
uncertainties, and dynamical characteristic changes caused
M0, K0
M0, K1
M1, K0
M1, K1
ζn: 0 → 1
η
n
:0
→
1
Figure 1: Transitions among regime models.
by faults. Safety region Ω is assumed to be fixed and known
a priori. The scenario that z(t) exceeds Ω represents lost
of control and system failures. More discussions on this as-
sumption can be found in [8].
Definition 1. For a time interval from 0 to t, the reliability
function R(t) is defined as the following probability:
R(t) = Pr{∀0 ≤ τ ≤ t, z(τ) ∈ Ω}. (1)
Mean time to failure (MTTF) is defined as the expected time
of satisfactory operation:
MTTF =
∫∞
0
R(t)dt. (2)
Remark 2. Different from repairs relying on human inter-
vention when system operation is stopped, control actions
are executed automatically and can be deemed as an inter-
nal actions of FTCSs. Therefore, MTTF represents the mean
operational time without human intervention before failure.
Compared with ζn and ηn, z(t) is typically a fast chang-
ing function determined by both continuous and discrete
dynamics. As shown in Figure 1, ζn and ηn are two regime
modes and determine the transitions among regime models.
When ζn = i and ηn = j are fixed, z(t) evolves according to
plant model Mi and controller K j . As a result of this hybrid
dynamics, directly evaluating R(t) and MTTF is a difficult
problem. Therefore, a discrete-time semi-Markov chain Xn
is constructed for reliability evaluation purpose. The main
idea is that the hybrid system is decomposed into various
regime models; each regime model is then evaluated for re-
lated safety characteristics, and Xn is constructed to integrate
these characteristics with transition parameters of regime
modes and to solve its transition probabilities for reliability
evaluation. The structure and main components of reliability
monitoring scheme are illustrated in Figure 2.
Semi-Markov reliability model Xn is the kernel compo-
nent for calculating MTTF. It is constructed based on the fol-
lowing parameters: (1) the transition rates of ζn, called plant
failure rates, (2) the estimates of ζn from FDI and confirma-
tion test, called confirmed fault modes, (3) the parameters of
ηn estimated from history data, called FDI transition charac-
teristics, (4) the probability of z(t) crossing safety boundary
during an FDI cycle Tc when ζn = ηn, called failure outcross-
ing rates, (5) the average number of periods before crossing
safety boundary when ζn=ηn, called hard deadlines. Among
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Figure 2: System structure.
these parameters, the second and third ones can be updated
online.
3. FDI SCHEME AND ITS CHARACTERIZATION
3.1. Steady-state tests
It is well known that false alarm and missing detection rates
are two conflicting quality criteria of FDI. One is usually im-
proved at the cost of degrading the other. What is worse, the
general rules of adjusting FDI to improve these two crite-
ria simultaneously are often not known. For example, in a
scheme based on IMM Kalman filters, it is not clear how to
determine Markov interaction parameters. Considering that
most false alarms last for short time only, an SST strategy is
adopted for postprocessing FDI decisions.
SST requires that, when FDI decision changes, new
decision is accepted only when it stays the same for a min-
imum number of detection cycles. Let TSST j denote the re-
quired number of consistent cycles for FDI mode j, j ∈ S.
The effectiveness of this SST strategy relies on the distribu-
tion of false alarm durations. For example, if a nonnegative
discrete random variable λ0 denotes the false alarm duration
when system fault mode ζn = 0, TSST0 can be taken as (1−α)-
quantile of λ0, 0 < α < 1, meaning
Pr
{
λ0 > TSST0
} ≤ α, (3)
which implies that false alarm probability can be reduced by
ratio α when accepting FDI decisions after TSST0. The weak-
ness of this method is additional detection time delay of
TSST j when fault occurs. However, this happens only under
rare occurrences of faults. Compared with the improvement
on relatively more frequently transitions of FDI modes, this
weakness is acceptable.
Detection decisions from SST are represented by ηn and
used for controller reconfigurations. In Figure 2, the confir-
mation test is an SST with large test period to further reduce
false alarm probability to a negligible level. It generates con-
firmed fault modes, which are used with FDI trajectories for
updating transition parameters of ηn and reliability index.
nT2T1T0
ηn
η0
η5
η12
θ0
θ1
θ2TSST0 TSST1σ
0
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0
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τ001 τ
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Figure 3: A sample path of ηn.
3.2. Stochastic models
A sample path of ηn is given in Figure 3. Let θm ∈ S and Tm ∈
N denote the FDI mode and cycle index, respectively, after
the mth transition of ηn, m ∈ N. For example, in Figure 3,
θ1 = η5 and T2 = 5. θm and Tm together determine FDI
trajectory, and ηn = θSn , where Sn = sup{m ∈ N : Tm ≤ n}
is the discrete-time counting process of the number of jumps
in [1,n]. (θ,T)  {θm,Tm : m ∈ N} is called a discrete-time
Markov renewal process if
Pr
{
θm+1 = j,Tm+1 − Tm = l | θ0, . . . , θm;T0, . . . ,Tm
}
= Pr{θm+1 = j,Tm+1 − Tm = l | θm
} (4)
holds for fixed ζTm = ζTm+1 = · · · = ζTm+1 = k, k, j ∈ S,
l,m ∈ N. ηn = θm is then called the associated discrete-
time semi-Markov chain of (θ,T). It can be shown that θm
is a Markov chain, and its transition probability matrix is de-
noted by Pk.
Given ζTm = ζTm+1 = · · · = ζTm+1 = k, let τki j = Tm+1 −
Tm if θm = i and θm+1 = j, i, j, k ∈ S. τki j is the sojourn time
of ηn between its transition to state i at Tm and the consecu-
tive transition to j at Tm+1. If the transition destination state
is not specified, let τki denote the sojourn time at state i.
As shown in Figure 3, τki j is the sum of two variables: a
constant TSSTi for SST period and a random sojourn time σki j .
Let hki j(l) and g
k
i j(l) denote the discrete distribution functions
of τki j and σ
k
i j respectively, which have the following relations:
hki j(l) = Pr
{
τki j = l
} =
{
0, l ≤ TSSTi,
gki j
(
l − TSSTi
)
, l > TSSTi.
(5)
This semi-Markov description provides a general model on
FDI mode transitions, but it involves a large number of pa-
rameters. The transition characteristics of ηn are jointly de-
termined by Pk and hki j (or g
k
i j). If S contains N fault modes,
there are N transition probability matrices Pk and N3 distri-
bution functions hki j . If each h
k
i follows geometric distribu-
tion, the description of ηn may degenerate to a hypothetical
Markov model η′n.
All Markov chains can be considered as a special type of
semi-Markov chains. If ηn can be modeled as a Markov chain
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with transition probability matrix denoted by Hk for ζn = k,
the following relations hold:
Pki j =
Hki j
1−Hkii
, (6)
hki j(l) =
(
Hkii
)l−1
Hki j , (7)
hki (l) =
(
Hkii
)l−1(
1−Hkii
)
. (8)
It is obvious that hki is a geometric distribution. In fact, this
is an essential property of Markov chain, as shown in the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 1. A discrete-time semi-Markov chain degenerates to a
Markov chain if and only if the sojourn time at each state (when
subsequent state is not specified) follows geometric distribution.
The proof is given in the appendix. WhenTSST is nonzero,
the sojourn time of ηn does not follow geometric distribution
owing to this deterministic constant, and Lemma 1 cannot
be directly applied. However, as TSST is known, a hypotheti-
cal process η′n can be constructed by setting TSST to zeros; if
the sojourn time of η′n is geometrically distributed, it can be
described as a Markov chain; the original sojourn time of ηn
can be recovered by adding TSST to that of η′n. This method
may greatly reduce the number of parameters for character-
izing FDI results.
3.3. Transition parameter estimation
FDI transition parameters can be estimated as an offline test
on FDI when both fault mode and FDI detection results are
known. This estimation can also be carried out online using
FDI history data and confirmed fault modes.
When ηn is modeled as a semi-Markov chain, P
k and hki j
(or gki j) are parameters to be estimated. P
k can be estimated
from the transition history of ηn. For example, when ζn is
kept as a constant k, if there are Mij transitions from i to j
among all M transitions leaving i, the i jth element of Pk can
be estimated as P̂ki j =Mij/M.
The estimation of sojourn time distribution gki j can be
completed in two steps: the histogram of sojourn time is
firstly examined to select a standard distribution such that
nonparametric estimation is converted to a parametric one;
ĝki j is then obtained by estimating unknown parameters in
distribution functions.
If ĝki j follows geometric distribution for all i, j, k ∈ S, ηn
can be described as a hypothetical Markov chain η′n under the
hypothesis that TSSTi = 0. As a result, transition probability
Hki j from i to j and sojourn time τ
k
i at i have the following
relation:
Pr
{
τki = n
} = (Hkii
)n−1(
1−Hkii
)
. (9)
Therefore, E(τki ) = 1/(1−Hkii), and Hkii can be estimated by
Ĥkii =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1− 1∑M
l=1τ
k
i (l)/M
,
∑M
l=1τ
k
i (l)
M
=0,
1, otherwise,
(10)
where τki (l) denote M sojourn time samples at state i, l =
1, . . . ,M. Hki j can be estimated based on the transition fre-
quency from state i to j:
Ĥki j =
(
1− Ĥkii
)
wki j
M
, (11)
where 1−Ĥkii is a normalization coefficient andwki j represents
the number of FDI transitions from i to j.
4. OUTCROSSING FAILURE RATES
AND HARD-DEADLINES
Owing to FDI delays or incorrect decisions, controller Ki
may be used for its designated regime model Mi (namely,
matched cases) and other model M j , i= j (namely, mis-
matched cases). Matched cases usually account for major
operation time, while mismatched cases often appear as tem-
porary operation.
Definition 2. The outcrossing failure rate in matched cases is
defined as
vii  Pr
{∃τ, nTc < τ ≤ (n + 1)Tc,
z(τ) ∈ Ω | z(nTc
) ∈ Ω, ζn = ηn = i
}
, i ∈ S.
(12)
Monte Carlo simulation can be used for estimating vii:
sample simulations are performed by using generated sam-
ple uncertain plant model and sample disturbance input; the
simulation time when system fails is called a sample time-
to-failure. With a large number of time-to-failure samples
obtained, vii can be estimated as the ratio between Tc and
sample mean of time-to-failure.
Mismatched cases are usually temporary operation
caused by FDI false alarms or delays, and system may return
to matched cases if z(t) does not diverge to unsafe region.
So, it is important to find out the average tolerable time be-
fore system failure. This time limit is called hard-deadline,
denoted by Thdi j for ζn = i and ηn = j. It can also be esti-
mated by sample mean of time-to-failure using Monte Carlo
simulations.
5. RELIABILITY MODEL CONSTRUCTION
The states of semi-Markov chain Xn for reliability evaluation
are classified into two groups: one unique failure state, de-
noted by sF, and multiple functional states, defined as state
combinations of ζn = i and ηn = j, denoted as si j , i, j ∈ S.
For example, if two types of faults are considered in the plant,
ζn includes states of fault-free, fault type 1, fault type 2, and
both fault 1 and fault 2, represented by S = {0, 1, 2, 3}, and
Xn contains 17 states.
The semi-Markov kernel of Xn is denoted as Q(·, ·,m),
representing the one-time transition probability in m cycles.
It is determined by the following parameters: (1) transition
characteristics of fault and FDI modes, (2) outcrossing failure
rate in state sii denoted by vii, (3) hard-deadline in state si j
denoted by Thdi j , (4) FDI SST period denoted by TSST j for
FDI mode j.
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Let us begin with the case that FDI mode can be de-
scribed as a hypothetical Markov chain η′n with transition
probability denoted by Hki j . The calculation of Q is classified
into the following cases.
Case 1. The transitions from functional states to themselves
are not defined and the corresponding elements are assigned
as zeros:
Q
(
sii, sii,m
) = 0, Q(si j , si j ,m
) = 0, i, j ∈ S. (13)
Case 2. Failure state sF is absorbing:
Q
(
sF, sF,m
) =
{
1, m = 1,
0, m > 1.
(14)
Case 3. Initial states are matched states sii:
Q
(
sii, sF,m
)
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(
1− vii
)m−1
Gm−1ii vii, m ≤ TSSTi,
pii
[(
1− vii
)
GiiH
i
ii
](m−TSSTi−1)vii, m > TSSTi,
Q
(
sii, s ji,m
)
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(
1− vii
)m−1
Gm−1ii
(
1− vii
)
Gij , m≤TSSTi,
pii
[(
1−vii
)
GiiH
i
ii
](m−TSSTi−1)(1−vii
)
GijH
i
ii, m>TSSTi,
Q
(
sii, si j ,m
)
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
0, m≤TSSTi,
pii
[(
1−vii
)
GiiH
i
ii
](m−TSSTi−1)(1−vii
)
GiiH
i
i j , m>TSSTi,
Q
(
sii, sk j ,m
)
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
0, m≤TSSTi,
pii
[(
1−vii
)
GiiH
k
j j
](m−TSSTi−1)(
1−vii
)
GikH
i
i j , m>TSSTi,
(15)
where pii = Pr{X1 = X2 = · · · = XTSSTi = sii | X0 = sii} =
(1− vii)TSSTiGTSSTiii , i= j, k=i, i, j, k ∈ S.
The derivation of these equations are based on Markov
transition probabilities and the decomposition of each event.
For example,
Q
(
sii, sF,m
)
= Pr{X1 = X2 = · · · = Xm−1 = sii, Xm = sF | X0 = sii
}
= Pr{X1 = X2 = · · · = Xm−1 = sii | X0 = sii
}
× Pr{X1 = sF | X0 = sii
}
.
(16)
Considering the SST of FDI, if m ≤ TSSTi,
Pr
{
X1 = X2 = · · · = Xm−1 = sii | X0 = sii
}
= (1− vii
)m−1
Gm−1ii .
(17)
If m > TSSTi,
Pr{X1 = X2 = · · · = Xm−1 = sii | X0 = sii}
= Pr{X1 = X2 = · · · = XTSSTi = sii | X0 = sii}
× [(1− vii
)
GiiH
i
ii
](m−TSSTi−1).
(18)
Q(sii, sF,m) can be obtained by combining these two proba-
bilities with Pr{X1 = sF | X0 = sii} = vii.
Case 4. Mismatched states, si j , i= j. When m ≤ TSST j , the
transition probability of X(t) to any other state is zero be-
cause of SST period. When TSST j < m ≤ Thdi j , the proba-
bility of X(t) transiting to any other state is zero except to
sii. The above reasoning is based on the facts that FDI rarely
jumps to other false modes when current mode is incorrect,
and mean fault occurrence time is in a much higher order
compared with a short false FDI detection period. Therefore,
when TSST j < m ≤ Thdi j ,
Q
(
si j , sF,m
) = 0,
Q
(
si j , sii,m
) = (Hij j
)m−TSST j−1Hiji, j=l, j, l ∈ S.
(19)
When m > Thdi j + 1, Xn jumps to sF at the earliest time m =
Thdi j + 1 only:
Q
(
si j , sF,TSSTi + 1
) = 1−
Thdi j∑
k=TSSTi+1
Q
(
si j , sii,m
)
= 1−
1− (Hij j
)Tij−TSST j+1
1−Hij j
Hiji.
(20)
In the general cases, ηn is modeled as a semi-Markov
chain, and the competition probabilities methods discussed
in [4] can be utilized.
Definition 3. Given ζn = i and ηn = j, the combinational
mode is denoted as (i, j), i, j ∈ S. Suppose (ζn+1,ηn+1) =
· · · = (ζn+m−1,ηn+m−1) = (i, j) and the next combinational
mode after the consequent transition of ζn or/and ηn at n+m
is (ζn+m,ηn+m) = (k, l), where k=i or/and l= j, k, j ∈ S. The
probability of this event is called the competition probability,
denoted by ρ(i, j)(k,l)(m).
The calculation formulas of ρ(i, j)(k,l)(m) were derived in
[4, Section 3] and are omitted here for brevity. As the states
of Xn are mainly defined as the state combinations of ζn and
ηn, the calculation of the semi-Markov kernel of Xn is simpli-
fied when ρ(i, j)(k,l)(m) is available, as shown in the follow-
ing listed formulas:
Q
(
sii, skl,m
) = (1− vii
)m
ρ(i,i)(k,l)(m),
Q
(
sii, sF,m
) = (1− vii
)m−1
vii,
Q
(
sii, sii,m
) = 0,
Q
(
si j , skl,m
) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ρ(i, j)(k,l)(m), m ≤ Thdi j , k = l = i,
0, otherwise,
Q
(
si j , sF,m
) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, m ≤ Thdi j ,
1−
Thdi j∑
m=1
Q
(
si j , sii,m
)
, m > Thdi j ,
Q
(
sF, sF,m
) =
{
1, m = 1,
0, m > 1.
(21)
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Figure 4: Control design diagram for F-14 lateral axis (Courtesy of The MathWorks, Inc.).
Although these formulas appear to be simpler, both the pa-
rameter estimation and competition probability calculations
need much more calculation burden than the first case when
FDI decision is modeled as a hypothetical Markov chain.
Once Xn is constructed, calculation of reliability function
and MTTF are straightforward using available formulas [9].
6. DEMONSTRATION ON AN F-14 AIRCRAFT MODEL
6.1. Model description
A control problem of F-14 aircraft was presented in [10], and
also used as a demonstration example in MATLAB Robust
Control Toolbox.1 This problem considers the design of a
lateral-directional axis controller during powered approach
to a carrier landing with two command inputs from the pilot:
lateral stick and rudder pedal. At an angle-of-attack of 10.5
degrees and airspeed of 140 knots, the nominal linearized F-
14 model has four states: lateral velocity, yaw rate, roll rate,
and roll angle, denoted by v, r, p, and φ, respectively, two
control inputs: differential stabilizer deflection and rudder
deflection, denoted by δdstab and δrud, respectively, and four
outputs: roll rate, yaw rate, lateral acceleration, and side-slip
angle, denoted by p, r, yac, and β, respectively. The system
dynamics equations are ignored here, and can be loaded in
MATLAB 7.1 using command “load F14nominal.” An addi-
tional disturbance input is added to represent the wind gust
effects.
The control objective is to have desired handling qual-
ity (HQ) responses from lateral stick to roll rate p and from
rudder pedal to side-slip angle β. Under fault-free modes, the
1 MATLAB and Robust Control Toolbox are the trademarks of The Math-
Works, Inc.
HQ models are 5(2/(s+2)) and−2.5(1.252/(s+2.5s+1.252));
when fault occurs, HQ models degrade to 5(1/(s + 1)) and
−2.5(0.752/(s + 1.5s + 0.752)), respectively.
The system block diagram is shown in Figure 4, where F-
14nom represents the nominal linearized F-14 model, and AS
andAR the actuator models. ep and eβ represent the weighted
model matching errors. Actuator energy is described by eact,
and noise is added to the measured output after antialiasing
filters.
The considered fault occurs in two actuators. Under
fault-free mode, their transfer functions are
AS = AR = 25
s + 25
. (22)
Two types of actuator faults are considered here, each has
mean occurrence time 105 of FDI periods or its failure rate
is 10−5. Under fault type 1, the transfer function of AS be-
comes
A′S = 0.5
15
s + 15
. (23)
Under fault type 2, the transfer function of AR becomes
A′R = 0.5
10
s + 10
. (24)
These fault modes are described as the change of actuator
gains and time constants. The set of fault modes is denoted
by S = {0, 1, 2, 3}, representing fault-free, fault type 1, type
2, and simultaneous occurrence of both.
6.2. Performance characterization of
controller and FDI
Four H∞ controllers are designed for each fault mode to
achieve nominal HQ control objectives under fault-free
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Figure 5: Output trajectories.
mode and degraded HQ performance under fault modes.
Typical output trajectories under fault-free mode are shown
in Figure 5, where the curves labeled with “Real” represent
the measured outputs, “Ideal” the outputs under nominal
HQ performance, and “Degraded” the outputs under de-
graded HQ performance. The absolute minimal matching
errors between the real responses and the expected outputs
under ideal HQ performance are shown in Figure 6, which
are assumed to represent system safety behaviors. When
these matching errors go over the safety limits, 30% of ex-
pected output, aircraft is considered as failed.
An IMM FDI is constructed to detect fault occurrences.
To reduce false alarms, a steady-state test strategy is applied
on FDI decisions with TSST j = 6 for any FDI mode j. A typ-
ical FDI trajectory is shown in Figure 7. It is clear that the
steady FDI mode is free of false alarms in the shown time
period. But detection time delays are introduced when fault
occurs at 20 and 50 seconds, respectively.
To represent FDI detection characteristics, a batch of
fault and FDI history data is collected for statistical estima-
tion. First, histograms of FDI delays are generated to check
its distribution type. When there is no fault, the histogram
of FDI sojourn time at fault-free mode is shown in Figure 8.
It clearly resembles a geometric distribution. Equations (10)-
(11) are then used to estimate Markov transition probabili-
ties, and those under fault-free mode are obtained as
H0 =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
0.9990 0 0.0010 0.0000
1.0000 0 0 0
0.1330 0 0.8670 0
0.5000 0 0 0.5000
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
. (25)
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6050403020100
Time
1
2
3
4
Fa
u
lt
m
od
e
(a)
6050403020100
Time
1
2
3
4
FD
I
m
od
e
(b)
6050403020100
Time
1
2
3
4
St
ea
dy
FD
I
m
od
e
(c)
Figure 7: FDI trajectory.
Note that H0(2, 1) = 1 and H0(2, 2) = 0 represent the tran-
sition probabilities of FDI from a false alarm state. Estimated
based on the given history data, these values imply that the
FDI leaves false alarm state in one transition cycle. But there
may exist estimation error, and the true value ofH0(2, 2) may
be close to but not exact zero.
8 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
40003500300025002000150010005000
Sojourn time
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Figure 8: Histogram of FDI sojourn time.
10009008007006005004003002001000
Time
0.955
0.96
0.965
0.97
0.975
0.98
0.985
0.99
0.995
1
P
re
di
ct
ed
re
lia
bi
lit
y
fu
n
ct
io
n
Original
Optimized
Figure 9: Reliability functions comparison.
As a result of FDI false alarms, missing detections, and
detection delays, controllers may be engaged for various fault
modes for which they are not designed. So, it is necessary
to evaluate system behavior under all possible combinations
of FDI and fault modes. Here, Monte Carlo simulations are
adopted with the following settings: (1) command stick in-
puts are square waves with frequency as a random vari-
able ranging from 0.2 to 2 Hertz, (2) wind gust disturbances
and sensor measurement noises are assumed to be Gaus-
sian processes, (3) actuator saturation effects limit control
inputs to 20 and 30, respectively, (4) system failure is as-
sumed to occur when model matching errors go over 30%
of stick commands. For example, with fault mode 2 occurred
and K2 engaged, mean time to system failure is 57 403 sec-
onds when controller K2 is used, and 6 seconds when K1 is
used. Considering the sampling period to be 0.1 second for
IMM FDI, the outcrossing failure rate and hard-deadline are
v22 = 1/574030, Thd21 = 60.
6.3. Reliability evaluation
Reliability semi-Markov model can be constructed based on
fault transition rates, FDI transition parameters, outcrossing
failure rate, and hard-deadlines. Predicted reliability func-
tion and MTTF can be thereby calculated. By using MTTF
as an objective, an optimization is performed on TSST. It is
found that MTTF will be improved from 27 727 to 32 605
seconds if TSST j is reduced from 6 to 1. A comparison of reli-
ability functions before and after this optimization is shown
in Figure 9. It is clearly shown that reliability index is im-
proved.
Comparisons on the transition probabilities between
these two SST periods are shown in Figure 10, in which each
subfigure gives the transition probability curves from s00 to
other states. For example, the subfigure at the first row and
second column shows that the transition probabilities to s01
are increased from 0 to about 0.008. This is a natural result
of increased false alarms when reducing TSST j . In fact, when
TSST j = 1, new Markov transition parameters H′0 become
H′0 =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
0.9822 0.0017 0.0122 0.0038
0.2634 0.7366 0 0
0.1989 0 0.8011 0
0.3530 0 0 0.6470
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
. (26)
Compared with H0, the element on the first row and sec-
ond column is increased from 0 to 0.0017, a confirmation of
increased false alarms. On the other hand, detection delays
are reduced approximately from 6 to 1, and system stays less
time under mismatched fault and FDI cases. Overall, MTTF
is improved.
This evaluation procedure can be completed in an online
manner. Estimated FDI transition parameters H and current
mode of ζn provided by confirmed test on FDI can be used
to provide updated MTTF based on this most recent infor-
mation.
7. CONCLUSIONS
A reliability monitoring scheme for FTCSs is reported in this
paper. The scheme contains two postprocessing strategies on
FDI results to provide estimated fault mode for control re-
configuration and confirmed mode for updating reliability.
The stochastic transitions of FDI mode is represented by a
semi-Markov chain with parameters estimated from history
data. Under geometric sojourn time distributions, FDI mode
can be described by an equivalent hypothetical Markov chain
that simplifies its model and reliability analysis. Safety and
satisfactory operation of system is defined by system trajec-
tories and safety boundaries; the probability of violating this
safety criterion under fixed fault and FDI modes is estimated
using Monte Carlo simulations. Overall reliability evaluation
is obtained through a semi-Markov model constructed by
integrating FDI transition characteristics and failure prob-
abilities under each regime model. This scheme provides
timely monitoring on the reliability index of FTCSs, and was
demonstrated on an F-14 aircraft model.
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Figure 10: Comparison of transition probabilities.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. The “only if” part is trivial as shown in
(8). Let ηn denote a semi-Markov chain; the associated
Markov renewal processes are denoted as θm and Tm, and
the sojourn time distribution hki when subsequent state is not
specified is in geometric distribution:
Pr
{
ηn+1 = j | η1, . . . ,ηn
}
= Pr{ηn+1 = j | θ1, . . . , θSn ,T1, . . . ,TSn
}
.
(A.1)
If θSn = j,
Pr
{
ηn+1 = j | η1, . . . ,ηn
}
= Pr{TSn+1 > n + 1 | θ1, . . . , θSn ,T1, . . . ,TSn ,TSn+1 > n
}
= Pr{TSn+1 > n + 1 | θSn ,TSn ,TSn+1 > n
}
= Pr{TSn+1−TSn >n+1−TSn | θSn ,TSn+1−TSn >n−TSn
}
= Pr{TSn+1 − TSn > 1 | θSn
}
= Pr{ηn+1 = j | ηn
}
;
(A.2)
otherwise, θSn= j, and we have
Pr
{
ηn+1 = j | η1, . . . ,ηn
}
= Pr{θSn+1 = j,TSn+1 = n + 1 | θ1, . . . , θSn ,
T1, . . . ,TSn ,TSn+1 > n
}
= Pr{θSn+1 = j,TSn+1 = n + 1 | θSn ,TSn ,TSn+1 > n
}
= Pr{θSn+1 = j,TSn+1 − TSn = n + 1− TSn | θSn ,
TSn+1 − TSn > n− TSn
}
= Pr{θSn+1 = j,TSn+1 − TSn = 1 | θSn
}
= Pr{ηn+1 = j | ηn
}
.
(A.3)
In the above derivations, the memoryless property of geo-
metric distributions has been used:
Pr
{
TSn+1 − TSn > n + 1− TSn | TSn+1 − TSn > n− TSn
}
= Pr{TSn+1 − TSn > 1
}
,
Pr
{
TSn+1 − TSn = n + 1− TSn | TSn+1 − TSn > n− TSn
}
= Pr{TSn+1 − TSn = 1
}
.
(A.4)
The Markov property of ηn is proved, so ηn is a Markov chain.
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Optimal state information-based control policy for a distributed database system subject to server failures is considered. Fault-
tolerance is made possible by the partitioned architecture of the system and data redundancy therein. Control actions include
restoration of lost data sets in a single server using redundant data sets in the remaining servers, routing of queries to intact servers,
or overhaul of the entire system for renewal. Control policies are determined by solving Markov decision problems with cost criteria
that penalize system unavailability and slow query response. Steady-state system availability and expected query response time of
the controlled database are evaluated with the Markov model of the database. Robustness is addressed by introducing additional
states into the database model to account for control action delays and decision errors. A robust control policy is solved for the
Markov decision problem described by the augmented state model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A database, as described in [1], is a shared collection of re-
lated data and the description of this data, designed to meet
the information needs of a client. A recent study by Wu et al.
[2] on a distributed database system, as shown in Figure 1,
revealed the benefits of a conscientious design of redundant
architecture and the application of state information-based
control. Such benefits were quantified in terms of mean time
to system failure, steady-state availability, expected response
time, and service overhead. The database system was viewed
as a queuing network [3, 4] and mathematically modeled as
a Markov chain [5]. The control authorities considered in-
cluded the ability to restore the lost data sets in a single server
and the ability to route service requests. In order to obtain
an analytic model of manageable size for scrutinizing the ef-
fects of control, the queuing network was restricted to the
closed type with a query population of three. In addition,
all the event lifetime distributions were assumed to be expo-
nential. A simulation study conducted by Metzler [6] using
Arena [7, 8] with the above restrictions removed supported
the conclusions in [2].
The first objective of this paper is to provide justification
that the control policy applied in the aforementioned study
[2] is optimal in a well defined sense. To that end, a Markov
decision problem [9, 10] is formulated and the solution that
minimizes a total expected discounted cost is sought. For the
purpose of illustration, a simple problem that disregards the
query states is set up, for which the policy developed in [2] is
confirmed to be optimal.
In reality, however, it is not practical to monitor every
state variable in a network. As a result, knowledge on a cer-
tain set of states is inferred based on the observables. On the
other hand, a control action, in response to a state transi-
tion such as an occurrence of a server failure, must wait un-
til a process of diagnosing the failure state [11] is complete.
The time required for diagnosis is assumed to be a random
variable and the outcome of the diagnosis usually has some
degree of uncertainty as well. If servers must communicate
through wireless channels, the likelihood of an erroneous de-
cision and a delayed action is drastically increased. Recogniz-
ing that the assumption of instantaneous accessibility of the
state information in the database system could lead to overly
optimistic conclusions on system performance, Wu et al. [12]
took a further step to analyze the effects of control action de-
lays and decision errors for the same database system. Their
analysis concluded that delays and errors can significantly de-
grade the performance of the database system.
Therefore, the second objective of the paper is to seek a
robust control policy that mitigates the effects of such con-
trol action delays and decision errors. A robust solution ob-
viously has a strong dependence on how uncertainties are
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Figure 1: A queuing network representation of a partitioned
database system with three servers.
modeled. This paper establishes an uncertain database model
following the basic principles presented in [12]. The new
model also captures the effect of routing delays of queries
from a failed server to remote intact servers. A new Markov
decision problem is then formulated and solved. Due to the
increased dimension of the problem, approximate solutions
are sought via numerical means.
This paper presents a novel model of a replicated data
store wherein a set of information is partitioned and each
partition is stored on multiple servers. This work is moti-
vated by the recognition of the need for greatly enhanced
availability of information management systems in air op-
erations [13]. It addresses the desirability of hardware repli-
cation and state-information-controlled restoration, whereas
published works in the field of distributed database and repli-
cation have discussed specific protocols and software failures
[14].
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
baseline model of the controlled database system shown in
Figure 1; Section 3 formulates and solves a Markov decision
problem that justifies the control policy applied to the base-
line model; Section 4 presents an approach to modeling con-
trol action delays and decision errors; Section 5 formulates
and solves, using dynamic programming, a Markov decision
problem with an uncertain model containing delays and er-
rors, and analyzes the robustly controlled system in terms of
system availability and query response time in the presence
of control action delays and decision errors.
2. BASELINE MODEL AND NOTATION FOR
A CONTROLLED DATABASE SYSTEM
The description of a baseline model for a replicated data store
follows to a large extent that of Wu et al. [2]. In particular,
a system of three servers is studied, each storing two parti-
tions out of a total of three. Each partition has one “primary”
server and one “secondary” server.
The distributed database system in Figure 1 contains
three servers in parallel to answer three classes, A,B, and C,
of queries for which relevant information can be found in
the partitioned data sets, A,B, and C, of the database, respec-
tively. Server SMN would contain the data set corresponding
to class M as the primary set and a reproduction of data set
N as the secondary set. Alternate secondary data sets are re-
produced in order to automate restoration of failed servers
within the database. The failure of a server implies the loss of
two sets of data within the server. A system level failure is de-
clared when two servers fail, in which case one set of data is
completely lost. The queues preceding servers SAB, SBC , and
SCA are named QAC, QBC , and QCA, respectively. All queues
are of sufficient capacity in the baseline model. Service is pro-
vided on a first-come-first-served (FCFS) basis at each server.
The three delay elements of average delay 1/λ imply that
there are always three queries present in the system at any
given time. A new query is generated at a delay element with
rate λ upon the completion of the service to a query at one of
the servers. The delay elements are also intended to be reflec-
tive of the response time to the querying customers by other
service nodes in the system that are not explicitly modeled.
Any new query is assumed to have a likelihood of ρIJ to visit
server SIJ , where IJ can be AB, BC, or CA.
The use of a queuing network model for the database is
based on its suitability to involve control actions and to cap-
ture their effects on the system performance. The model is
built in this study with the premise that event life distribu-
tions have been established for the process of query genera-
tion (exp(λ) ≡ 1 − e−γt), the process of service completion
(exp(μ)), the process of server failure (exp(ν)), the process
of data restoration (exp(γ)), and the process of system over-
haul (exp(ω)) when the failed database system is repaired. All
such processes are independent. Standard statistical meth-
ods that involve data collection, parameter estimation, and
goodness of fit tests exist [15] for identifying event life distri-
butions. Alternative distributions and goodness of these as-
sumptions were investigated in [6]. Since all event lives are
assumed to be exponentially distributed, the database sys-
tem can be conveniently modeled as a Markov chain specified
by a state space X, an initial state probability mass function
(pmf) πx(0), and a set of state transition rates Λ.
2.1. Model specification
State space X
A state name is coded with a 6-digit number indicative
of all queue lengths and server states in the system. With
some abuse of notations, a valid state representation is given
by QABQBCQCASABSBCSCA, where queue length QAB, QBC ,
QCA ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} with total length L≡ QAB +QBC +QCA ≤ 3
limited by the three entities available in the closed-queue sys-
tem. The server states SAB, SBC , SCA ∈ {0, 1, 2} are further
defined as “2” ≡ data are lost in both the primary and the
secondary sets in a server, “1” ≡ the data in the primary set
have been restored and data in the secondary set have not
been restored, and “0” ≡ data in both primary set and sec-
ondary set in a server are intact. A server is said to be in the
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down state if it is either at states “1” or “2.” For example, state
110020 indicates that server SAB is up with one customer in
its queue, server SBC is down with both sets of data lost and
one customer in its queue, and server SCA is up and idle. Note
that the queue length includes the customer being served.
There are 540 valid states in the baseline system. The total
number of states is reduced to 147 when all the states repre-
senting system level failures are aggregated into seven states
memorizing the possible queue length distributions and ex-
ploiting the symmetry of the three servers. A set of alterna-
tive state names are assigned from X = {1, 2, . . . , 147} with
000000 mapped to x = 1 and the aggregated system failure
state mapped to x = 141, . . . , 147. Although the symmetry of
the system allows further reduction on the number of states
to 56, the 147-state model is retained for clarity of presenta-
tion.
Initial state pmf {πx(0), x = 1, 2, . . . , 147}
It is assumed that the database system starts operation from
state x = 1(000000), that is, the initial state probability is
given by vector π(0) = [1 0 . . . 0].
Set of state transition functions pi, j(t)
Events that trigger the transitions and the corresponding
transition rates are given as follows. A newly generated query
enters one of the servers with rate (3−L)×λ/3. A query is an-
swered at a server with rate μ. A complete data loss occurs at a
server with rate ν. Data in the primary data set of a server are
restored with rate γ or repaired with overhaul rate ω. Data in
the secondary data set of the server are restored with rate γ,
following the restoration of the primary data set. The failed
database system is always renewed with overhaul rate ω.
Let X ∈ X denote the random state variable at time t.
The set of state transition functions is given by
pi, j(t) ≡ P
[
X(t) = j | X(0) = i], i, j = 1, 2, . . . , 147.
(1)
The continuous-time Markov chain can be solved from
the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov equation [5, 10]
Ṗ(t) = P(t)Q(u(x)), P(0) = I , P(t) = [pi, j(t)
]
(2)
and Q(u(x)) is called an infinitesimal generator or a rate
transition matrix whose (i, j)th entry is given by the rate as-
sociated with the transition from current state i to next state
j. (See [2] for the complete rate transition.) Control variable
u(x) will be defined shortly. State probability mass function
at time t,
π(t) = [π1(t) π2(t) . . . π147(t)], t ≥ 0, (3)
is computed by
π(t) = π(0)P(t). (4)
At this point, a baseline Markov model for the database
system of Figure 1 has been established. Since transition rate
matrix Q is dependent on control actions, the state transition
functions pi, j(t) are being controlled, as are the state proba-
bilities.
2.2. Control Policy
Our intention is to eliminate all single point failures. Our ap-
proach is to base the control actions on the state informa-
tion, which effectively alter the transition rates when loss of
data occurs in a single server. The possible set of control ac-
tions includes restoration, overhaul, and no decision needed.
There is one admissible set of control actions at each state. A
state of no decision needed has an empty admissible set.
Taking into consideration the symmetry of the model,
the control policy considered for this study is summarized
as follows:
u(x) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, upon entering the state of one server
failure, system overhauls;
1, upon entering the state of one server
failure, system restores.
(5)
The presence of control in the transition rate matrix is seen
via u(x) and u(x) = 1 − u(x). The values of u(x) repre-
sent specific control actions associated with data restoration
(u(x) = 1) or system overhaul (u(x) = 1), respectively. Pre-
viously in [2], system overhaul is considered only at state
x = 141 through x = 147.
2.3. Performance measures
Two of the four performance measures defined in [2] are
reintroduced: steady-state availability Asys and expected re-
sponse time E[R]. These will be used later to validate the con-
trol policies that are derived under cost criteria intended to
improve both Asys and E[R].
Steady-state availability
Suppose as soon as the database system reaches a system level
failure, an overhaul process starts. Suppose, with a rate ω, the
system is repaired, and at the completion of the repair, the
system immediately starts to operate again. In this case, the
Markov chain becomes irreducible, and a unique steady-state
distribution exists [5, 10]. The steady-state availability, which
can be roughly thought of as the fraction of time the database
system is upto, is computed in [2] by
Asys = 1− πF(∞), (6)
where πF(∞) is the sum of the system level failure state prob-
abilities determined by solving
π(∞)Q = 0,
147∑
x=1
πx(∞) = 1. (7)
Expected query response time
Query response time is the amount of time elapsing from
the instant a query enters a queue until it completes service
[10]. With server failures, the average response time E[R] is
calculated as the expectation of the ratio of total amount of
time that all queries spend waiting for service in queue, plus
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Figure 2: Markov chain model of the database reflecting only the server states.
their service times to the number of queries that are serviced.
Consider, again, the irreducible chain modeling of the system
in Figure 1. Let Ii, j be the indicator function associated with
transition from state i to state j that indicates a query arrival.
Let Ni be the total number of queries in queue at state i. Then
the total expected number of queries in queue at the steady
state is given by
E[X] =
147∑
i=1
πi(∞)Ni, (8)
and the arrival rate at steady-state is
λs =
147∑
i=1
πi(∞)
147∑
i=1
Ii jqi j . (9)
The calculation of the response time at steady-state then fol-
lows Little’s Law [4, 10] E[X] = λsE[R].
3. RESTORATION AS SOLUTION TO MARKOV
DECISION PROBLEM
Intuition suggests that by restoring the lost data sets in a
single failed server, overhaul can be avoided, and therefore,
the stationary control policy u(x) given in (5) ought to ren-
der service more available. However, the restoration process
occupies one of the remaining servers, and therefore, may
prolong the average response time of the system to queries.
This section formulates and solves a Markv decision problem
(MDP) for the database system to justify the optimality of the
restoration policy used in [2].
The Markov decision problem considered in this paper
assumes that a cost C(i,u) is incurred at every state tran-
sition, where i is the state entered and u is a control ac-
tion selected from a set of admissible actions [9, 10]. The
solution amounts to determining a stationary policy π =
{u0(x0),u1(x1), . . . } that minimizes the following expected
total discounted cost:
Vπ(x0) = Eπ
∞∑
k=0
αkC(Xk,uk), (10)
where 0 < α < 1 is a discount factor.
To simplify the presentation, state information on repre-
senting service demand is ignored for the moment. In this
case, the inherent symmetry of the database system leads to
a very simple 4-state Markov model as shown in Figure 2.
As a result, the finite population assumption can be relaxed,
that is, the closed queuing network of Figure 1 can either re-
main closed or can be revised to an open queuing network.
In addition, query handling in the event of a server failure
becomes completely unrestricted. Two different methods of
query handling are to be examined in this section.
(1) Each arrival query has equal likelihood to seek infor-
mation in data sets A, B, or C, but only the primary
data set is available for query service in each server, and
the secondary server is there to restore data in a failed
server.
(2) Upon a server failure, queries are rerouted to the two
remaining servers where the secondary data sets also
participate in query service though only one of the two
intact servers can provide service to only two of the
three classes of queries during restoration.
The distinction in these two cases is captured in transi-
tion probabilities and in transition costC(i,u). Fault-tolerant
control policies are now developed for the two cases.
3.1. Secondary data set reserved for
lost data restoration
This subsection derives the optimal control policy with the
first method for handling queries; each arrival query has
equal likelihood to seek information in data sets A, B, or C,
but only the primary data set is available for query service in
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Table 1: One step cost C(xk ,uk).
State u = 1 u = 0
3 0 0
2 1/γ 1/ω
1 1/ω 1/ω
0 1/γ 1/ω
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α
Optimal control regions
u = 1 optimal
u = 0 optimal
Figure 3: Optimal policy on the (α, γ/ω) graph.
each server, and the secondary server is there to restore data
in a failed server.
Figure 2 shows a discrete time Markov chain model for
this case. This model is obtained by the application of a uni-
formization procedure [10] with a uniform rate ρ = 3ν+ω+γ
that is greater than any total outgoing transition rates at any
state of the original continuous time Markov process. All pa-
rameters in Figure 2 have been defined earlier.
A fault-tolerant control policy essentially determines
whether to occupy one of the two working servers to restore
the data in the failed server or to overhaul the entire system
at the state of one server failure. It is determined by how the
designer penalizes a control action at any given state. Table 1
specifies the one step cost at each state.
Let Xk ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the random state variable at
t = k/ρ in the discrete time Markov chain. Control action
u(xk) = 1(or 0, orϕ) indicates the system’s decision to (or not
to overhaul, or not to act) restore a failed server. C(xk,uk) in
Table 1 is the cost incurred when control action uk is taken
based on xk. It has been shown that under the condition
0 ≤ C( j,u) < ∞ for all j and all u that belongs to some
finite admissible sets Uj , the minimal cost V∗(i) satisfies the
following optimality equation [9, 10]:
V(i) = min
u∈Ui
{
C(i,u) + α
∑
j
pi, jV( j)
}
, (11)
where pi, j have been marked in Figure 2. In addition, pol-
icy π∗ is optimal if and only if it yields V∗(i) for all i. The
four optimality equations can be expressed explicitly based
on (11):
V(0) = min
u
{
1
ω
+ α
3ν + γ
ρ
V(0) + α
ω
ρ
V(3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u=0
,
1
γ
+ α
ν + ω
ρ
V(0) + α
2ν
ρ
V(1) + α
γ
ρ
V(3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u=1
}
;
V(1) = min
u
{
1
ω
+ α
3ν + γ
ρ
V(1) + α
ω
ρ
V(3),
1
ω
+ α
3ν + γ
ρ
V(1) + α
ω
ρ
V(3)
}
;
V(2) = min
u
{
1
ω
+ α
2ν + γ
ρ
V(2) + α
ω
ρ
V(3),
1
γ
+ α
γ
ρ
V(0) + α
2ν
ρ
V(1) + α
ν + ω
ρ
V(2)
}
;
V(3) = min
u
{
α
3ν
ρ
V(2) + α
ω + γ
ρ
V(3),
α
3ν
ρ
V(2) + α
ω + γ
ρ
V(3)
}
.
(12)
The above equations are solved for V∗(i), for i =
0, 1, 2, 3, using Mathematica [16]. Figure 3 is created with
ω = 10ν and α ∈ [0, 1). It can be seen that, when the ra-
tio of γ to ω is above the blue curve, u = 1 (restoration)
is optimal at all states, whereas u = 0 (overhaul) is optimal
when γ/ω is below the red curve. Between the two curves,
{u(2) = ϕ, u(0) = ϕ} is optimal, for transition from state
“2” to state “0” implies restoration of primary data set, which
cannot occur with control action u(2) = 0. Therefore, the
mid-region optimal policy does not take place in the opera-
tion of the database system.
Note that γ/ω = 5 in [2], which lies above the blue curve
in Figure 3 for any α ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, the always-restore
policy implemented in [2] is optimal under the cost structure
defined in Table 1.
3.2. Secondary data set available for both query
service and data restoration
This subsection considers the second method of query han-
dling upon a server failure: overhaul can only occur at
state “1,” which implies that queries of the failed server are
rerouted to the two remaining servers where the secondary
data sets also participate in query service though only one of
the two intact servers can provide service to only two of the
three classes of queries during restoration.
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Figure 4: Markov chain model of the database where overhaul does not occur until a second server failure.
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Figure 5: Minimum cost-to-go versus restoration rate for the 4-state model with cost criteria of Table 1.
The uniformized Markov chain model is shown in
Figure 4. In this case,
u(x) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, upon entering the state of one server
failure, system awaits,
1, upon entering the state of one server
failure, system restores,
(13)
overhaul is held until a second server fails, and all classes of
queries rely on the service of the two operating servers in the
meantime.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) compare the optimal cost-to-go’s of
the two methods of query handling as functions of restora-
tion rate γ at fixed ω = 10ν and ν = 0.001. Different line
types specify different control actions. In Figure 5(b), for ex-
ample, no control action is taken at state “0” unless γ ≥ 1.8ω
where restoration takes place; the system is always overhauled
at state “1;” no control action is taken at state “2” unless
γ ≥ 2.6ω where restoration takes place; and no control ac-
tion is ever taken at state “3.” It is seen that control pol-
icy change occurs at a higher ratio of γ/ω with the second
method (policy change at γ = .026 in Figure 5(b)) than
that with the first method (policy change at γ = .014 in
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Figure 6: Decision error modeling with an intermittent error state.
Figure 5(a)). Despite the slight favor toward overhaul, the
optimality of the “always-restore” policy applied in [2] still
holds with the second method at the nominal parameter val-
ues μ = 12, γ = 0.05, and ω = 0.01, where γ/ω = 5 > 2.6.
4. AUGMENTED MODEL INCLUDING CONTROL
DELAYS AND DECISION ERRORS
This section establishes a full-state model to include the ef-
fects of decision errors and control action delays upon enter-
ing a state of a single server failure. The first two subsections
follow [12] that treated these separately as the effect of de-
cision errors when a control action is taken incorrectly but
immediately upon entering a state, and the effect of delayed
control actions when a correct control action is taken but
after some time delay. There are deterministically diagnos-
able systems for which the only cost of diagnosis is time [11].
The third subsection presents a new model to be used in ro-
bust control policy design that combines the two augmented
models and introduces also delays due to rerouting queries
from failed sever to intact servers.
4.1. Modeling the effect of erroneous decisions
The control action considered in this study is state informa-
tion based. Upon entering a state, for instance, A, any infor-
mation deficiency can result in uncertainty in decision mak-
ing as to whether to take a control action or what control
actions to take. In this case, every decision carries a risk [17].
A decision error in the database system could include
the possibility that upon a server failure, the wrong server
is identified as being failed. More specifically, SAB, for in-
stance, has failed. However, SCA is mistakenly observed as the
failed server. Based on the false information, the control ac-
tion would be for SBC to restore data setC in SCA, whereas SAB
would be expected to continue to work. As a consequence,
none of the servers can process queries for a period of time,
and the database system is said to have entered an intermit-
tent error state. It is assumed that from this state, only tran-
sitions representing service completion can occur. Figure 6
depicts a generic representation of such a case.
Without loss of generality, let A be a state that is entered
upon the loss of both data sets in a server. Let C be the state
entered upon the completion of primary data set restora-
tion associated with the data loss. Let B1 through Bn be the
states representing completion of services at other n servers.
Let G1, . . . ,Gl be the state entered upon the arrival of a new
query in one of the queues. (Gi are not shown explicitly in
Figure 6.) Let F1 through Fm be the states entered upon data
loss at other m servers. An intermittent state I is introduced,
as shown in Figure 6, to allow the representation of imper-
fect decision making upon entering A. Therefore, there is an
intermittent error state for each state that involves outgoing
transitions with weakened control authorities due to some
decision errors. In the database system of Figure 1, 60 states
are added to the original 147 states of baseline model. It is as-
sumed that once the primary data set restoration takes place
for a particular server, the secondary data set restoration pro-
ceeds without a decision error.
Let λA,C denote the transition rate from state A to state
C in the absence of decision error in the restoration of the
primary database associated with the most recent data loss.
Let c be the probability of successful restoration, given that
the event of restoration occurs. (1 − c) then is referred to
as the thinning [5] of the Poisson arrival process associated
with the restoration. The split of rate λA,C into rate cλA,C and
rate (1 − c)λA,C is sometimes also called a decomposition of
a Poisson arrival process into type 1 with probability w and
type 2 with probability (1− c).
An imperfect decision corresponds to the value of c be-
ing less than unity. As a consequence, the authority of con-
trol that is supposed to reinforce the restoration process is
weakened. The smaller the value of c, the weaker the control
authority is.
The rate of recovery from decision error is denoted by rC .
To state the fact that recovery from an intermittent error state
to restoration cannot be faster than the error-free (c = 1)
restoration process, rC ≤ λA,C is enforced. On the other hand,
the outgoing transition rates from the intermittent error state
to the states of data loss in other servers, that is, from I to
Fi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, are bounded below by the corresponding
rates going from A to Fi. These transitions further reduce the
likelihood of reaching state C.
It is now shown that decision errors always degrade the
performance in terms of the state transition probability PAC
which is the probability that restoration to state C occurs
given current stateA. It turns out that this probability is read-
ily obtained for a Markov chain
PAC = cλAC
Λ(A)
, (14)
where
Λ(A) = λAB1 + · · · + λABn + · · · + λAF1 + · · · + λAFm + λAC
(15)
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Figure 7: Control action delay modeling with a single-stage delay
state.
without decision error, in which case w = 1 in (14), and
Λ(A)
= λAB1 +· · · +λABn +λAF1 +· · · +λAFm + cλAC + (1− c)λAC
(16)
with decision error, in which case c < 1. Note that (15) and
(16) are the same, and both enter (14). Therefore, (14) is pro-
portional to c, and is largest at c = 1 when there is no decision
error.
4.2. Modeling the effect of delayed control actions
Time required for diagnosis [11] can be regarded as the uni-
versal cause of a control action delay. An example of the con-
trol action delay in the database system shown in Figure 1
would be that a total loss of data in a server is not immedi-
ately observed. As a result, the action of data restoration is
delayed.
As in the previous subsection, let A be a state that is en-
tered upon a total loss of data in a server. Let C be the state
entered upon the completion of primary database restoration
associated with the data loss. States B1 through Bn and states
F1 through Fm also follow the earlier definitions. Figure 7
depicts a proposed model capable of describing a delayed
restoration action by an exponentially distributed random
amount with average δ−1 units of time upon entering state
A. With a single-stage delay for each state entered upon a to-
tal loss of data in a server, another 60 states are added to the
baseline model.
In a more general case, there can be an N-phased de-
lay implemented in the augmented model by inserting N
states D1 through DN in series between states A and C. Each
state Di retains outgoing transitions to all B1 through Bn, and
F1 through Fm, in addition to transition to Di+1. The total
amount of delay before restoration action is bounded below
by random variable D = D1 + · · · + DN , with a generalized
Erlang distribution [5];
L−1
{
N
Π
i=1
δi
s + δi
}
. (17)
One may use an N-stage Erlang to approach a constant
delay, an N-state hyperexponential to approach a highly un-
certain delay, or a mixture of the two to acquire more general
properties [10] in its distribution.
Note that there are two significant differences between
the decision error model of Figure 6 and the control delay
model of Figure 7. First, the link to restoration of primary
database is present in Figure 7 with a smaller likelihood of
transition, whereas the link to restoration without delay is ab-
sent in Figure 7. In addition, all links to service completion
are absent in Figure 6, but are present in Figure 7. Therefore,
each case has its distinct nature.
4.3. Full-state model of the controlled
database system
Referring again to the closed queuing network view of the
distributed database system in Figure 1, this section presents
its augmented model that incorporates all three sources of
uncertainties: decision errors (Section 4.1), control action
delays (Section 4.2), and routing delays. Routing delays are
incurred when queries at a failed server are rerouted to the
remaining intact servers.
Rerouting of queries becomes desirable when the queries
observe a server failure after they have entered the queue
preceding the server. An exponentially distributed random
routing time is introduced with rate τ/sec for this purpose.
A routing delay is assumed independent of a control ac-
tion delay. The former captures the random time of diag-
nosis, whereas the latter captures random time of transmis-
sion of queries among servers. Model augmentation amounts
to adding new transitions among existing states without the
need for new states.
In order to establish a full state model with all uncer-
tainty types, the representation of the composite state vari-
able is modified to x = QABQBCQCASABSBCSCAU , where
QIJ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and SIJ ∈ {0, 1, 2} as in the baseline model
described in Section 2; newly introduced uncertainty vari-
able U ∈ {0, 1, 2} with “1” = control delayed and “2” =
wrong decision made. This results in a 267 state-model. By
exploiting symmetry, the 256 (147 + 60 + 60) state model can
be reduced to a 96-state model. The binary control variables
are defined as follows: u1 = 1 to restore, u2 = 1 to overhaul,
and u3 = 1 to reroute queries.
The states, the transitions, and the transition rates of
the uncertain model are summarized in Figure 8, based on
which transition matrix Q of a Markov chain can be built
and used in the next section for robust control policy design.
τ in Figure 8 is the newly introduced query transmission rate
when the action for rerouting is called for. Error probability
c relates to c in Figure 6 through c = 1 − c. Subscript “p”
denotes “primary” and “s” denotes “secondary.” Use of sym-
metry is reflected in server state S f and arrival rates λ1, λ2,
and λ3.
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3 1 1 0 0 0 7 6 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 38 37 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 0 0 8 7 6 0 0 0 2 0 0 35 33 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 39 39 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 44 43 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 45 41 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 48 46 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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16 0 1 1 1 0 19 22 20 53 55 54 0 10 11 0 51 51 0 0 3 0 0 3 0
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21 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 55 55 0 0 7 0 0 7 26
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24 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 54 54 0 0 6 0 0 6 22
25 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 55 55 0 0 7 0 0 7 19
26 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 56 56 0 0 8 0 0 8 0
27 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 56 56 0 0 8 0 0 8 0
28 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 56 0 0 8 0 0 8 23
29 0 0 0 2 0 32 31 30 50 50 50 0 0 0 0 49 49 57 0 0 0 0 1 0
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42 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 34 0 55 55 70 0 0 0 0 7 0
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62 0 2 0 2 1 72 75 70 54 56 55 0 59 0 0 52 52 0 14 0 82 0 4 0
63 2 0 0 2 1 76 73 71 56 55 54 0 0 0 0 52 52 0 15 0 83 0 4 65
64 0 1 1 2 1 67 70 68 53 55 54 0 58 59 0 51 51 0 16 0 84 0 3 0
65 1 0 1 2 1 71 67 69 54 53 55 0 0 60 0 51 51 0 17 0 85 0 3 61
66 1 1 0 2 1 73 72 67 55 54 53 0 60 0 0 51 51 0 18 0 86 0 3 64
67 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 66 0 53 53 0 19 0 87 0 5 68
68 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 64 0 54 54 0 20 0 88 0 6 0
69 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 0 55 55 0 21 0 89 0 7 74
70 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 62 0 55 55 0 22 0 90 0 7 0
71 2 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 0 54 54 0 23 0 91 0 6 69
72 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 54 54 0 24 0 92 0 6 70
73 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 0 0 55 55 0 25 0 93 0 7 67
74 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 0 56 56 0 26 0 94 0 8 0
75 0 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 0 0 56 56 0 27 0 95 0 8 0
76 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 56 0 28 0 96 0 8 71
77 0 0 0 2 2 80 79 78 50 50 50 0 0 0 0 49 49 0 9 0 57 0 1 0
78 0 0 1 2 2 85 84 81 51 51 52 0 0 77 0 50 50 0 10 0 58 0 2 0
79 0 1 0 2 2 86 82 84 51 52 51 0 77 0 0 50 50 0 11 0 59 0 2 0
80 1 0 0 2 2 83 86 85 52 51 51 0 0 0 0 50 50 0 12 0 60 0 2 78
81 0 0 2 2 2 89 88 94 55 54 56 0 0 78 0 52 52 0 13 0 61 0 4 0
82 0 2 0 2 2 92 95 90 54 56 55 0 79 0 0 52 52 0 14 0 62 0 4 0
83 2 0 0 2 2 96 93 91 56 55 54 0 0 0 0 52 52 0 15 0 63 0 4 85
84 0 1 1 2 2 87 90 88 53 55 54 0 78 79 0 51 51 0 16 0 64 0 3 0
85 1 0 1 2 2 91 87 89 54 53 55 0 0 80 0 51 51 0 17 0 65 0 3 81
86 1 1 0 2 2 93 92 87 55 54 53 0 80 0 0 51 51 0 18 0 66 0 3 84
87 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 86 0 53 53 0 19 0 67 0 5 88
88 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 84 0 54 54 0 20 0 68 0 6 0
89 1 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 0 55 55 0 21 0 69 0 7 94
90 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 82 0 55 55 0 22 0 70 0 7 0
91 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 0 54 54 0 23 0 71 0 6 89
92 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86 0 0 54 54 0 24 0 72 0 6 90
93 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 0 0 55 55 0 25 0 73 0 7 87
94 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 0 56 56 0 26 0 74 0 8 0
95 0 3 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0 0 56 56 0 27 0 75 0 8 0
96 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 56 0 28 0 76 0 8 91
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Figure 8: Transitions and transition rates of the uncertain database state model.
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5. ROBUST CONTROL POLICY DESIGN
This section seeks robust control policies as solutions to the
Markov decision problem:
Vπ∗(x0) = min
π
Eπ
∞∑
k=0
αkC
(
Xk, uk
)
,
x0 ∈X = {1, 2, . . . , 95, 96},
(18)
where 0 < α < 1, π = {u0, u1, . . . } is the control policy
sought, u = (u1,u2,u3), and ui ∈ {0, 1}. u1 = 1 to restore,
u2 = 1 to overhaul, and u3 = 1 to reroute queries, as defined
in Section 4.3. Note that the full-state model enables the de-
signer to consider service demand and to weigh availability
against response time. Thus two cost criteria are established.
The first criterion,
C
(
xk, uk
) = Q1
(
xk
)
+ Q2
(
xk
)
+ Q3
(
xk
)
μ
, (19)
penalizes long queues that cannot effectively reduce in time
due to server failure, and thus favors response time. The sec-
ond criterion, shown in the following table, penalizes pro-
longed service time, again, due to server failure, and thus fa-
vors availability.
The size of the state space suggests numerical means for
solutions. Mathematical programs will be applied to obtain
the solutions. The steady-state availability and the expected
query response time of the controlled database system with
the optimal policy will then be examined under various con-
ditions.
5.1. Optimal policy design via mathematical
programming
The rate transition matrix Q(u(x)) of the 96-state model can
be obtained based on Figure 8 established in Section 4.3. This
Q(u(x)) depends on u(x) = (u1(x),u2(x),u3(x)),ui ∈ {0, 1}.
State probability equation
π̇(t) = π(t)Q(u(x)) (20)
originated from the forward Chapman-Kolmogorov (2) can
now be uniformized to yield a discrete time Markov chain
π(k + 1) = π(k)
[
I +
1
ρ
Q
(
u(x)
)]
, (21)
where uniform rate ρ can be chosen to be
ρ = 3λ + 3ν + τ + δ + γ + μ + ω. (22)
Recall optimality (11)
V(i) = min
u∈Ui
{
C(i, u) + α
∑
j
pi, jV( j)
}
, i ∈X, (23)
as an alternative characterization of the solution to Markov
decision problem (18), which produces a system of 96 equa-
tions.
Dynamic programming is the most natural numeri-
cal approach to policy design (18) because (11) is derived
through taking limit of a finite horizon dynamic program
[9, 10]
Vk+1( j) = min
u∈Uj
{
C( j, u) + α
∑
r∈X
pj,rVk(r)
}
,
k = 1, 2, . . . ,N − 1,
(24)
where α < 1, and terminal cost V0( j) = 0, forall j ∈ X. In
this case the optimal cost is given by VN (x0), x0 ∈ X. More
specifically, with u taking values in a finite set, the minimal
cost-to-go from x0 of the 96-state Markov decision process
satisfies
lim
N→∞
VN (x0) = V∗
(
x0
)
, x0 ∈X = {1, 2, . . . , 95, 96},
(25)
whereVN (x0) is the minimal cost-to-go from x0 of an N-step
finite horizon process.
The solution to a dynamic program results from an it-
erative calculation backwards along the horizon from V0( j)
to the first step VN ( j). For the dynamic programming calcu-
lation to converge to the true cost-to-go, N must be signifi-
cantly large, and must be less than 1.
Linear programming [18] can be considered as an alter-
native numerical approach to the solution of the Markov de-
cision problem. In this case, the set of optimality equations is
turned into a set of affine constraints on the set of optimiza-
tion variables {V(i)}, and the problem can be formally stated
as follows:
Maximize V(1) + V(2) + · · · + V(95) + V(96) (26)
subject to V(i) ≥ 0, i ∈X = {1, . . . , 96}, (27)
V(i) ≤
[
C(i, u) + α
∑
i
pi, jV( j)
]∣∣
∣
∣∣
u
∀u ∈ Ui, i ∈X.
(28)
The equivalence of the linear program formulation (26)–
(28) and the optimality equation formulation can be easily
established. First, (27) is trivially satisfied for all i in both
formulations because one-step cost C(i, u) is always nonneg-
ative.
Suppose (V(1), . . . ,V(96)) is the linear program solu-
tion. Then there must be one active (equality achieved) con-
straint for each of the affine inequality constraints of the
form V(i) ≤ · · · for each i. Suppose for some j, the con-
straint(s) V( j) is not active. Then V( j) can be increased until
one of the inequality constraints becomes active without vi-
olating the rest of the inequality constraints because αpi, j < 1
as coefficient of V( j) on the right side of the inequality con-
straints (28). This, however, contradicts the assumption that∑
iV(i) is maximum. Therefore, (V(1), . . . ,V(96)) is also the
solution to the optimality equations (28).
Assume now that (V(1), . . . ,V(96)) satisfies the optimal-
ity equations. It then automatically satisfies the inequality
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Figure 9: (a) Switching curves of the optimal policy under dis-
counted queue size. (b) Partial database model containing both con-
trol action delay and decision error.
constraints (28), of which 96 are active, one for each V(i)
appearing on the left side. Suppose
∑
iV(i) is not maximum.
There is at least a V( j) for some j that is smaller than the
corresponding cost in max
∑
iV(i), which implies that the
corresponding constraint(s) for V( j) < · · · is (are) slack or
inactive. This contradicts that V( j) satisfies the optimality
equation. Therefore, (V(1), . . . ,V(96)) must also be the so-
lution of the linear program formulation (28). The equiva-
lence is thus established.
The function linprog in MATLAB’s Optimization Tool-
box [19] solves the maximization problem above. The active
constraints are checked with a MATLAB script to determine
the optimal control policy.
The computational complexity of the dynamic program
and that of the linear program are now compared. Finding
the solution to a linear program generally requires a compu-
tation time proportional to n2m [18] when m ≥ n, where n is
the number of optimization variables, and m is the number
of constraints. The computational complexity of an iterative
dynamic programming solution can be approximated by as-
suming that each iteration is a series of linear programs. The
linear programming solution to the set of optimality equa-
tions is of course a single linear program.
The number of control variables, u, the number of states,
s, and the horizon length, N , are critical to the computation
time of these methods. First, consider the iterative method as
a series of linear programs. Each individual iteration along
the N-step horizon consists of s individual linear programs.
Each individual linear program has u variables and 2u con-
straints. Therefore, the computation time is proportional to
Ns(u22u) = Ns(2u3). Now, consider the method of solv-
ing the optimality equations through linear programming.
The single linear program has s variables and 2us constraints.
Hence, its computation time is proportional to s22us = s32u.
Although the computation time grows faster for the lin-
ear program as the number of states increases, the horizon
N is typically much larger than s2 for small discount factorin
β in α = ρ/(β + ρ). Therefore, the linear program is more
efficient for moderate numbers of states and small discount
factors.
5.2. Availability and response time under
robust control policy
A selected set of results on the robust control policies solved
via mathematical programming are presented in this subsec-
tion, and the system availability and query response time un-
der some of the optimal policies are examined.
5.2.1. Restoration-overhaul switching
Under the cost criterion (19) (minimum total discounted
queue size), the optimal policy depends on the number of
queries in the queue behind the failed server. No action is
taken to overhaul the system until the two active queues are
empty and the buildup of queries behind the failed server
is significant. Figure 9(a) depicts a switching curve of of
the control policy between overhaul and restoration before
(solid) and after (dotted) state D in Figure 9(b) is reached.
Policy switching is determined by the amount of control ac-
tion delay, the decision error probability, and the number
of queries in the failed server. It can be seen that, while the
two active queues are occupied or after the primary data is
successfully restored, restoration is performed on the failed
server as long as the server performing the restoration does
not have any customers waiting in its queue.
Under the cost criterion stated in Table 2 (minimally re-
duced service time), the optimal policy always attempts to
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Figure 10: Response time (upper panel) and availability (lower panel) resulting from robust control policy (solid black) and nominal control
policy (dotted red) versus (a) decision error (1− c) and (b) control delay (1/δ).
Table 2: Discounted service rate with service demand considera-
tion.
Current state xk One-step cost C(xk , uk)
The database is fully functional 0
One unavailable server has a queue 1/μ
Two unavailable servers have a queue 2/μ
All servers are unavailable and have a queue 3/μ
restore the failed server as long as the server performing the
restoration does not have any queries waiting in its queue.
The only exception is when three queries are piled into any
single queue. In this case, overhaul occurs when the uncer-
tainties are significant.
5.2.2. Performance under nominal and robust policies, and
effect of routing delay
This subsection examines the system steady-state availabil-
ity and the expected query response under the robust policy,
where random control delay and decision error are explic-
itly modeled, and under nominal policy where uncertainties
are ignored. The results are similar for policies derived with
either the queue size criterion (19) or the service time crite-
rion (Table 2). The robust policy shows two distinct features
in Figures 10(a) and 10(b); it switches control action when
uncertainties (delay and error) becomes significant, and it
balances between availability and response time in this sit-
uation.
The routing only policy does not attempt to restore the
single failed server. Instead, queries are routed to an empty
queue whenever the subsequent server contains the data for
the query. The system is overhauled upon a second server
failure. It offers some advantage in response time over the
always-restore policy when there is no routing delay, as
shown in Figure 11(a). It is also seen that the robust opti-
mal policy experience improved performance with rerouting
authority. However, a routing delay of about one second is
significant enough to discourage the use of the routing-only
policy, as shown in Figure 11(b).
6. CONCLUSIONS
Uncertainties due to control delays, transmission delays, and
decision errors in the distributed database system degrade
the performance of the database system performance in
terms of availability and response time. Restoration remains
to be the optimal policy over a significant range of uncertain-
ties. Beyond boundaries of the range, however, the optimal
control policy switches to overhaul. By formulating and solv-
ing a Markov decision problem, the robustness of the control
policies is investigated. Boundaries for which optimal actions
alter are shown to exist and are quantified. The robust poli-
cies are shown to provide the best compromise among com-
peting interests.
The authors have also investigated the optimal control
policy for the database under the open queuing network
setting in the face of delays and errors. Simulations with
SimEvents [20] show that response time further depends on
the arrival rate of queries. Simulation results will be reported
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Figure 11: Response time (upper panel) and availability (lower panel) resulting from robust control policy (solid black) and routing only
policy (dotted red) versus (a) control delay (1/δ) and (b) routing delay (1/τ).
separately. Simulation study of larger networks has also been
planned.
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